Sunday, March 11, 2007

The General's Trial: Dallaire Brought Around -- 6 December 2006

The General's Trial: Dallaire Brought Around -- 6 December 2006

[This is a very important piece of transcript from The General's Trial--but no light reading, no CounterPunch essay, or info-lite stroking of popular ignorance and critical onanism. If you are already aware of the Ruzibiza book, and the Booh-Booh book and the Ngbanda book--let's not forget the recently released Bruguièrè report (translation fron the French in progress on this blog), then you should be able to appreciate just how great is this juridical moment, this cross-examination in the Milosevic tradition, as a significant righting of the historical record.

Me Ronnie MacDonald is not clowning around here when he turns General Dallaire out like the wet-brain punk he's been from the jump. Again and again, he gets the Canadian General to drop the responsibility for all the massacres sited in previous ICTR trials (and even in Dallaire's own book, Swapping Spit with the Devil) squarely into the 'rebels'' laps--always, of course, resulting from thoroughly excuseable lapses in otherwise ironclad guerrilla discipline.

But the evidence against the RPF and Kagame is becoming as constricting as the rope that took off Saddam's half-brother's head. And as it is, the HR-STFG lobby, who've forever justified the destruction of the Rwandan revolution by demonizing its president, governments, gendarmerie, and civil defense system, is groping for new strategies for holding the moral high ground it lied and cheated its way onto and protecting their by-now obscenely lucrative spinoff of the ShoahBusiness.

The Tutsis have been called the 'Jews of Africa', and they banked that attitude of uniqueness early and often. So now Kagame admits he ('may have') killed the Hutu presidents Habyarimana and Ntaryamira, but cops self- defense in a state of war (see the Stephen Sackur/BBC interview with Kagame elsewhere on this blog). And Canada's own Global Research has posted a 2001 statement by Jean-Pierre Mugabe in which he admits Kagame's and the RPF's responsibility for the double assassination, but continues to blame the '100-day genocide' that followed from April to July 1994 on the Rwandan and French governments--another pathetic attempt (like the million Chinese Communist machete-myth) by this putative Left web site to justify the UN-backed militarization of Central Africa.

So overwhelmed is Gen Dallaire by MacDonald's charges of craven collaboration with the true Rwandan genocidaires that by the time Me Black gets hold of the Genny he's all but ready to beatify our General Ndindiliyimana--who, Dallaire acknowledges, was, at the time of the US-backed decapitation of the Rwandan state on 6 April 1994, in the South saving lives, many of them Tutsi lives--and that most of General Ndindiliyimana's gendarme guard corps were themselves Tutsis.

But read on and you may stave off some of the more gruesome mutations of this speciation of ignorance that is currently devouring contemporary consciousness. --mc]






Before the Judges:
Joseph Asoka de Silva, Presiding
Taghrid Hikmet
Seon Ki Park

For the Registry:
Mr. Roger Noël Kouambo (Canada)
Mr. Issa Toure
Mr. Abraham Koshopa

For the Prosecution:
Mr. Ciré Aly Bâ
Mr. Segun Jegede
Mr. Moussa Sefon
Mr. Abubacarr Tambadou (Canada)
Ms. Felistas Mushi

For the Accused Augustin Ndindiliyimana:
Mr. Christopher Black

For the Accused François-Xavier Nzuwonemeye:
Mr. Charles Taku
Mr. Hamuli Rety

For the Accused Innocent Sagahutu:
Mr. Fabien Segatwa
Mr. Seydou Doumbia

For the Accused Augustin Bizimungu:
Mr. Ronnie MacDonald

Court Reporters:
Ms. Kirstin McLean
Ms. Leslie Todd
Ms. Sherri Knox


For the Prosecution:


Cross-examination by Mr. MacDonald 1
Cross-examination by Mr. Black 41


Exhibit No. D. 161 (Bizimungu) 3
Exhibit No. D. 162 (Bizimungu) 18
Exhibit No. D. 163 (Bizimungu) 19
Exhibit No. D. 164 (Bizimungu) 23
Exhibit No. D. 165 (Bizimungu) 36
Exhibit No. D. 166 (Bizimungu) 36
Exhibit No. D. 167 (Bizimungu) 39
Exhibit No. D. 168 (Ndindiliyimana) 45
Exhibit No. D. 169 (Ndindiliyimana) 67


Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. Court is in session. Appearances as before.

Yes, Mr. MacDonald, you may start. You can continue till 4, thereafter we'll take a break -- we will continue to 4, thereafter we will take a break of 45 minutes, and Mr. Black can take over thereafter.



Q. Good morning, General.

A. Good morning.

Q. General Dallaire, I would like, with your leave, to revisit a few items which we touched on, rather disjointedly, yesterday.

The first thing would relate to the meeting between yourself and the Interahamwe. You have reiterated your position that, according to your recollection, the first meeting was on the 1st of May 1994. However, others who have testified, particularly Witness LG in Government I, have testified that they -- or that he found out that you had attended a meeting which would have been held on the 10th or the 11th of April 1994 with MRND officials and the Interahamwe at the Hôtel des Diplomates. Would you deny that fact, General?

A. I have no recollection of that meeting. The meeting at the Diplomat that I remember was on the 9th, I believe, and that was with the president and, if I'm not mistaken, the chief of staff of the gendarmerie. And I've had subsequent meetings there, but they were principally with Colonel Bagosora. And whether or not members of the crisis committee still going, I can't remember because I think most of those were done at the army headquarters.

Q. Just to clarify matters, General, yesterday on Colonel Cussac's revelations, that is, of the French Embassy, I brought to your attention some information that he had provided to Colonel Marchal and then to yourself, in which he revealed information that was available to him to the effect that the RPF had, in their possession, either at the CND or elsewhere nearby, that they had surface-to-air missiles. And I was wondering whether you mentioned that information in your book? I have cross-checked, I have gone through your book, and I haven't found that information.

However, those -- that information from Cussac, it would seem, was contained in the initial draft of your book. My question, therefore, is whether you can tell the Court why it is that you decided to maintain that information in your draft, and yet not have it published in such an important book as the one that you finally published?

A. The editor of my book compiled the work that I'd done on the book over the three years and estimated I had written just under 4,000 pages, of which 500 or so end up in the book. There was a lot of repetition, of course, and editing that was done. And in so doing, material never made it to the book because we would necessarily have a much longer book than that, and the to-ing and fro-ing of what's in and what's out was the subject of numerous meetings.

And, in all candour, it should have stayed in, and it's not in, and the final decisions on what ultimately the publisher will accept is the publisher's. So there was absolutely no malice of thought in regards to that information, and I'm wondering whether or not in that book, at that same meeting, if I had said -- if it was left in the book, the fact that I had met with Cussac and with the head of the Belgian advisers who were throughout the RGF headquarters, and of course the elite units, having had a specific meeting with those two officers to ask them to assist me in getting information on what was happening in regards to the evolving situation and tensions. And the response I received at that meeting was, "We do not serve two masters at the same time." And I'm sure that must have stayed in the book -- I hope it stayed in the book.

And it was only in the parting moments that I remember Cussac dropping this piece of information on the table. He never told me where he got the source, he never told me what confirmation he had, and if he provided a lot more information to Luc, them I'm surprised that that never made it to my headquarters.

Q. General Dallaire, I have with me a document, A25. This document is in -- is from you, and it's to Kofi Annan -- addressed to Kofi Annan.

A. Yep, got it.

Q. Okay. The document is a SITREP which focuses on the current assessment of the situation in Rwanda, dated 24 April '94. First of all, General, do you recognise that document? Are you, indeed, the author of that document?

A. I mean, I signed it, that's my signature, and I remember producing -- these are -- this is not a SITREP. This is in fact an assessment of the situation that I would, on a -- not regular basis, but when I felt that there were pertinent information to bring back things together that I felt I had to send to my higher headquarters.

Q. It's not entitled SITREP.

Says counsel.

I'm going to ask, Your Honour, at this point in time -- because it's a five-page document. I might or I might not have time to question General Dallaire on it. So -- but I wish to introduce this document at this point in time, since it's been recognised.

What is the number?

A25. It's an L number, L0024518.

Yeah, it's marked as D. 161.

(Exhibit No. D. 161 (Bizimungu) admitted)

Thank you. One question for the general on this document.


Q. I do understand that you certainly did -- have not read this document for a while, but you would agree with me that this is basically the document that reflects the positions of the parties on the field as at 24 April 1994; is that correct?

A. This document, as it so states, is an assessment of meetings and observations collected over the last 36 hours in which a whole bunch of meetings were held, remembering that on the 22nd of April the UN finally gave me a mandate with the reduced force. And so a resultant of that, with the different belligerents, is written in this document. Yep.

Q. Let me draw your attention to paragraph 14, which reads as follows -- or at least part of it:

"In conclusion, the next 48-72 hours should see a climax of the battle for Kigali, and mopping up in the north and east of the country. The RGF has lost the initiative and is focused on local tactical battles and is neglecting the greater operational level of this campaign. They are pushing reinforcements into Kigali where the RPF have seized the major terrain features and developed extensive defensive positions. RGF attempts to dislodge the RPF will result in heavy casualties and break the back of their army."

Is that what you wrote in this document, General Dallaire?

A. Yes, that's right.

Q. General Dallaire, I would like to refer to some facts that were catalogued by Amnesty International, and in some cases by Human Rights Watch as well, relating basically to killings allegedly carried out by the RPF in Rwanda from April 1994. In that catalogue of killings, I would like to ask you whether these killings were brought to your attention or not. First of all, if I were to put it to you that the RPF exterminated entire families in Kigali town from the 6th to the 7th of April in the night, and particularly in the day of the 7th -- Colonel Kayonga, commander of RPF forces, executed several persons in Kigali town; in Remera neighbourhood, they systematically massacred, in an organised manner and following a list, more than 160 persons; and I have a list of -- of the names of some of those persons, but let me just mention a few: The former minister of justice, Théoneste Mujyanama, M-U-J-Y-E-M-U-M-A (sic), and his entire family; the prefect of Ruhengeri, Sylvestre Baliyanga, and his entire family; Major Alan (phonetic) Bigirimana (phonetic) and his three children. Was that information --



Q. We had lost you there for a while, General. Did you understand my entire question, or could you tell us which aspects of the question you didn't quite hear because of the interruption?

A. I was with you as you were describing RPF people going around town with lists and conducting exactations. And after that you started a list of names, I gather.

Q. Okay. Did you get -- I mentioned three names from a list which is available to me. Did you get those three names, General?

A. Well, I mean, I've heard them, but I -- I have no particular links. The minister of justice, I think you were mentioning, was one of the names.

Q. Indeed, it was the former minister of justice, Mr. Mujyanama; the préfet of Ruhengeri, who was in Kigali at the time; Mr. Baliyanga and his entire family; and I also mentioned the name of Alan Bigirimana and his three children.

Now, about those killings, General, which again were carried out by the RPF on the 7th of April, were you informed of those facts? And, if yes, when and by whom?

A. I have no specific recollection of those names, as I have no recollection of hundreds of other names of people who were killed in those -- in those days. I mean, I didn't keep a list of them specifically. And I'm not sure if in the log of the duty officers, whether they were able to maintain such a list. We did start hearing that the RPF were conducting exactations in areas they were controlling, but that became much later on -- at least a couple of weeks down the road.

And ultimately, when I was able to see General Kagame -- and I believe it's around the 22nd of April or in that time frame -- and raised it with him, he then explained that a number of his soldiers had finally gotten to where their families, relatives, were living, only to find them slaughtered, and in so doing were reacting in an undisciplined manner and he was putting them under control. He reported that there was one case of rape in which they executed the soldier who did that. But there was no reports of looting or ill actions -- certainly not in the first weeks or so of the RPF operations inside of Kigali.

We did start to get information -- even the minister of defence provided me with some information about things going on in the Byumba area, as he was originally from that area. And again that was raised with General Kagame. And much later on there were other operations that, in my opinion, were absolutely against the rule of law.

Q. General Dallaire, I intend to cover the entire country, and I begin with Kigali. You seem to be saying that that information was not passed on to you two weeks before -- two weeks prior to the onset of the massacres. And yet Remera was in your backyard. Amahoro was even in the proximity of Remera or in Remera. And it seems, you said, there were some vehicles that were burnt at some point in time. So I find it difficult to understand if the Amnesty International information is correct, if at least 160 persons were massacred in your backyard, so to speak, I find it difficult to understand that this information was not passed on to you until two weeks later.

A. Well, the first thing is I'm not sure anymore what time frame you're speaking of. Did you -- are you speaking of exactations conducted by the RPF two weeks before the start of the genocide --

Q. No.

A. -- or are we speaking about since the start of the genocide?

General, the question is whether the RPF did any killings in Kigali starting from the 7th.


Q. 7th of April, that's right.

A. Right.

Q. The killings in Kigali were perpetrated specifically on the 7th of April.

A. I have received, as I indicated to you, hundreds of phone calls in those days. My staffs were absolutely swamped -- until the phone system crashed, of course, which didn't take that long -- of requests and of information and of fear, people who were being attacked or -- or thought that they were going to be attacked, and people who were actually dying at the end of the phone. I have not, in any way, shape, or form, compiled a list of a number of these people.

And in regards to people being slaughtered, you know, next door, within a week of the start of it, the smell was getting so bad at the headquarters that we had to go and -- and pick up all the bodies that were just across the street from my headquarters in which, just in the huts there, we counted 89 bodies and ultimately had to burn them. So we were in a slaughterhouse, and they were killing all over the place. And so the fact that I don't have information on some specifics is -- I would consider to be a horrible situation of the time.

Q. And among those bodies that you burned that day, UNAMIR burnt, did you carry out any reflection, or did you think about those who might have committed those acts?

A. In that time frame, we were -- we were originally under the RGF area of operations, and then subsequently when the RPF took over the area, under the RPF control. Those are the ones near us. And so the exactations that were being taken -- or had happened there were under the RPF control at the time. We also had to reinforce the protection of the Amahoro stadium because the Bangladesh contingent that was protecting it was not stopping RPF soldiers who were coming in to the stadium and picking out people and -- what I was informed of, taking them off into the woods and shooting them, using the criteria that if people identified a person that had conducted exactations, and if they had something like five witnesses to agree to it, they'd simply take them out and shoot them.

Q. So, they set up some kind of court that decided on the lives of people.

Now, in that case, General, you'll admit -- or, you recognise the fact that a lot of people were taken from the Amahoro stadium and the King Faisal hospital in Kigali, in the presence of the UNAMIR, to be executed by the RPF. And if yes, can you give us an estimate of the number involved in each location?

A. The answer to that is no. There were some cases at the Amahoro stadium which were rapidly brought to the attention of my headquarters, to which I gave very strict orders to the Bangladeshi, and also passed on directly to the RPF at the CND, that those actions were to stop, and they stopped. I had no reports of the RPF entering the Faisal hospital, nor the compound behind it, except for the altercation we had with RPF medical people who wanted to come in and take away all the medical supplies there. And in the end, with the help of the International Red Cross, we came to an agreement on a humanitarian basis in regards to medical supplies for combatants and non-combatants.

Q. Now, regarding those two locations, that is, the King Faisal hospital and Amahoro stadium, those abductions have once again been confirmed by the Amnesty International in a report of the 24th October 1994, index 1 -- (No interpretation)

Counsel gives an index which we couldn't take down.


Q. Now, Kacyiru.

The number that you gave was not caught by the interpreter.

Okay, it's not very important. 47/16/94.


Q. Now, General, on to Kacyiru. K-C-Y-U-R-U (sic).

Counsel, do you have a copy of the report that you can pass on to me? I do not have it.

Counsel Bâ, it's a summary of the report. But I can give you a copy later on.

Yes, if I can have a copy.

It is a summary. I made a summary for my own use. But you can check -- you can check it, Counsel Bâ.


Q. Now, General, on to Kacyiru. There's information to the effect that RPF killed a lot of people, including Mr. Jean Gaketimana (phonetic) (No interpretation) --

Counsel gives the spelling.


Q. -- chairman of the Court of first instance of Kigali and his entire family. Did you received any information, at any time whatsoever, about the killings committed by the RPF in Kacyiru?

A. I do not recall specific names or specific incidents. That information would have made its way through the Kigali headquarters, and whether it made its way up to my headquarters, I can't confirm at this time. But we knew that exactations were being done. The extent to which, I have no specific information that I can recall at this time.

Q. Now, regarding the excesses committed in Kigali, particularly in Kacyiru, were those excesses reported to New York?

A. Well, my reports that went up to New York, with what I can remember, was in the first instance that overall the RPF and its military force had demonstrated an enormous amount of restraint and control and discipline as they entered the city and took more and more control of the city. It wasn't a rebel or -- how does one say, a totally undisciplined mob of bandits. They had been observed of not looting, not raping, and the exactations were the ones I just described to you. And as -- as a disciplined military force.

And I believe -- in fact, I even sent that back up, and that was also observed by the information I was getting from, particularly, the media that seemed to be spreading itself all over town. No NGO at that point, that I remember, brought that to my attention. If subsequent investigations after the war, with witnesses, bring this information out, well, then, that is information you have, but I did not receive at the time.

Q. According to information available to me -- and we are still in the Kacyiru area, it appears -- and I'm not holding you to this information that I have, because I don't have any references -- but it appears you testified before the ICTR and stated that in Kacyiru the RPF had more than 500 -- took more than 500 prisoners, and that all those prisoners disappeared, together with a considerable number of the civilian population. Do you recall giving that testimony?

A. Absolutely not. The only time that I ever mentioned of RPF with prisoners was when we handed over the near battalion-size force that gave itself up to me at the airport when the bulk of the RGF forces withdrew, and I believe that's around the 20th or so of May. And those people ended up giving themselves up to me, with their families, which we held at the airport --

Q. I'm not talking about -- I'm not talking about --

A. -- and worked out a process with the International Red Cross to ultimately hand them over --

Q. I'm not talking about --

A. -- to the RPF.

Q. I'm not referring to that, General. The question is very simple. Please try to cooperate. I have two hours to -- I have a thousand questions for you, I have two hours to put them to you. Obviously I was thinking of perhaps putting 10 or 15 to you, because the way you're answering now, sir -- I would appreciate if you could focus on the question and answer the -- the specific question. Not what you may have done with -- in other circumstances.

The information I have, 500 military soldiers from the RGF were made prisoners and disappears -- disappeared with members of the population. Over 4,000 people. Now, the information I have is you testified before the Tribunal on that particular point, and you say you did not. That's fine with me. And I told you I wasn't going to hold you to that because I don't have the specific area where you would have said that. So that's fine with me.

A. Mmm.

Mr. President?


Mr. President, if you will indulge me a moment: In my response that I've been trying to give to Counsellor MacDonald, I tried to give him all the information I have on that subject. And so if he pursues to ask me on the subject, he'll get no more information, for that is all I believe I can remember on that specific subject. And that's why I wanted to give a more complete response.

Thank you.


Q. On that -- on that issue, General, still in Kacyiru, some testimony referred to 4,000 Hutu victims, and these Hutu victims were buried in Nyanza by the RPF. And that to cover up these killings, the RPF invented and disseminated information to the effect -- or, information on the massacre of the Nyanza -- of Hutus and on Mount Nyanza. And on this Mount Nyanza, to support what they were saying -- Nyanza does not appear among the massacre sites inventorised (sic) by the ministry of higher education and culture. General, this massacre site, Nyanza, was never referred to before the indictment brought against Rutaganda by the Prosecutor of the ICTR in 1996.

So this is a zone under RPF control. It fell to RPF in the night of the 11th of April. This -- did this information get to you, that the RPF killed 2,000 persons who were at Nyanza on the 11th of April, and that subsequently they tried to put that on the account of the RGF; is that within your knowledge?

Counsel MacDonald, may we have the names of the witnesses that you are referring to and the dates on which they testified?

Counsel Bâ, these are not witnesses. This, I believe, is still information from the -- the Amnesty International. It appears from Amnesty International.

Counsel Bâ, I can give you a reference. It is a book entitled From Genocide to Defeat, Rebero Press, and the author is Ntaribi Kamanzi.

And counsel spells "Kamanzi" very fast; unfortunately we couldn't get it.

Kamanzi is K -- (No interpretation)

Counsel, you can't expect the witness to answer. It's not a question. You have been speaking for five minutes.

Well, you can't expect me, Your Honour, to go through a 43-page outline in two hours. You can't expect that either. And -- because if I break these questions up, he's going to give me five-ten minutes answers, and I'm going to end up putting three questions to General Dallaire in the two hours that you're giving me.

Out of the two hours you will be speaking for one-and-a-half hours.

Well how -- I will seek your guidance on how I should do this. Should I break up the questions and wait for General Dallaire to give me five-minute answers?

No, just put the question as if you are -- if this question, if you put it, but in the end, some people were killed on a particular date, and whether you have that information.

Well, I have -- I have the passage from this book, and I'm putting it in detail to General Dallaire. I mean, if you would like me to try to resume these questions, I will try to do it, Your Honour.


Q. General Dallaire, was the -- were these facts brought to your knowledge, that is, the 2,000 -- approximately 2,000 persons who were allegedly killed in Nyanza on the 11th of April, killings which were put -- which were blamed to the Rwandan government forces? Did you know that?

A. I do not recall specifically that massacre site, as I don't recall hundreds of other massacre sites. The only one I do recall was the one involving the people in Don Bosco, and that's because of other events that surrounded that one.

Q. Yeah, Don Bosco, that is where there were UNAMIR forces who left on the 11th of April (No interpretation).

Well, we didn't hear much of what counsel said. Wasn't too sure if it was a soliloquy.


Q. But, indeed, General, rumour has it 2,000 persons were there and were killed by the Rwandan government forces. And what I'm putting to you is that those persons were not killed by the Rwandan armed forces, but by the RPF. Now, to be more specific, people who were at ETO, those people were not killed. Later on in 1995-1996, attempts were made to introduce the fact that those who were at the ETO were killed by the Rwandan armed forces. Did you know this?

A. What I know is that the Belgian forces that were there moved out of that location under the auspices of the Belgian military organisation that came to pull out the expatriates, without orders, and left about 4,000 Rwandans there of which, ultimately, on the top of the mountain there in their garbage dump, 2,400 were slaughtered. That's the extent of the knowledge of that operation.

Q. And where did you get that information from, General Dallaire?

A. The original numbers I -- we had left us with the impression that all 4,000 had been killed. And I got that through the Belgian contingent, and I believe that it must have been through Colonel Marchal's headquarters. But that came nearly near the end of the operation as I found out about it. And I don't know how many years or something later, more precise information had become available of what actually happened there, as film footage became available. And on the 10th anniversary I visited the site.

Q. Considering the shelling of RPF, briefly mid-April -- mid-April 1994, you agree that the RPF shelled the city of Kigali? There were a lot of deaths in the civilian population, particularly the Kigali hospital, the Kanombe hospital, and the Red Cross hospital at Kiyovu. Was this brought to your knowledge?

A. I actually was there minutes after the bombardment at the Kigali hospital, and the estimates in doing crater analysis did indicate that those rounds would have come from what was, at the time, RPF-held territory.

The International Red Cross hospital was in fact right in the middle of the crossfire from both sides, and so took hits from both sides in its location, to the extent where we did considerable negotiations, Monsieur Philippe Gaillard and myself, in trying to stop both operations to shoot in that area.

And the Kanombe hospital, I'm not familiar with actually that military establishment being hit. But if it was that close inside -- if it was inside the camp or within the lines or close to the lines of the airfield, there were bombardments on the airfield by both sides at different times throughout that operation.

Q. Is it not correct that the Red Cross hospital was not between the two, but rather located at Kiyovu, and therefore could not have been caught in what you referred to as a crossfire?

A. No, it was within the crossfire of both operations as they continued to do the one -- on one side the advance, on the other side, redeploying and withdrawing. So, yes, rounds did fall short -- or, did fall in that area. But at no time do I remember Philippe Gaillard specifically saying that his hospital was actually being targeted. He was -- he had many arguments with the Interahamwe of killing the people who were trying to get to the hospital, but I don't recall him specifically --

Mr. President, there is no interpretation. I think there is a technical problem.

Counsel, you mentioned three hospitals. Don't you think that is going to create a confusion? Don't you think we should take it one at a time, because in the long run we don't know what he's talking about.

But I think the general was clear on the three locations.

Well, we are taking the interpretation, and since sometimes he speaks very fast, we do not have the totality of the interpretation.

Yeah. (Microphones overlapping)... your answer with regard to Kigali hospital and Kanombe; I couldn't get the third one. The third one, what is --

The Red Cross?

The International Red Cross. Could you repeat that part of your answer, please, slowly.

Yes; I'm sorry I'm speaking so fast.

The International Red Cross hospital was in a small valley area where troops and snipers and so on were on the different hills, and it was in an area that was contested regularly. So the lines did move, and as such rounds did fall within and around that hospital. However, at no time in my discussions with Philippe Gaillard, who is the leader of the International Red Cross there, did he specifically mention that one side was targeting his hospital. He was simply trying to get both sides to stop operations in that area because of the impacts in his hospital compound.


Q. Let us go to Kibungo, Byumba. That was one of the sites again, and the report was on the 20th of April '94, entitled: The RPF Responsible For Homicide and Abductions. It would appear that in Byumba préfecture, the scope of the massacres was such that some 470,000 persons were killed out of a population of about 800,000; 470,000 people allegedly killed by the RPF. Was that information available to you? Was it made available to you in any manner whatsoever?

A. The only information of the Byumba area was the following: One, that there were 800 students in the north-east of town in the hometown of the minister of defence who were at risk and who had asked me to see if I could get vehicles up there to get them out, to which the Ghanaians were not capable of achieving that mission.

Secondly, I was told by observers that they were hearing that the RPF were conducting executions or abductions of military officers and their families in the Byumba area. That is the information I have.

And lastly, Byumba, when it started to come under siege, which was nearly -- sometime during the night of the 7th to 8th, I believe -- certainly the 8th -- my observers reported massive numbers of people evacuating down the main road south. And so that's the only information that I have on that region.

Q. So we agree that, as it advanced with a view to capturing and controlling the country, the RPF did commit some of these offences. Don't you think that this is paradoxical that the RPF would require in its ceasefire requirements that a halt be put to the massacres, whereas they themselves were involved in those killings?

Did you, at any time, tell Kagame to stop? That:

"If the RPF is killing, you should also stop the massacres and stop blaming it on the Rwandan government forces."

Did you at any time make such a representation to Kagame or to anyone else?

A. I remember in discussions with Kagame and also whatever leadership that I met of the RPF, raising the point that we were getting information on exactations being done by soldiers. His response was -- is that the soldiers who had been, you know, in the bush with his forces were finally coming in to their home areas, only to find their own families having been massacred and were, on occasion, totally overreacting and going on killing sprees which he was putting under control with a more stringent discipline. He also indicated that some of the forces that were following on behind his main force, which were people that had joined the RPF as the war started, did not have the same level of discipline as his original force, and that he was putting a control on that.

In regards to the international community, we welcomed the rapidly -- the arrival of the human rights adjudicator in order to provide him with all possible information, and my orders both in writing and verbally to my forces were to provide every tidbit of information they had in regards to any crimes against humanity or abuses of human rights. Which they did.

Q. When did you have that discussion with Kagame, if you do recall?

A. I had a number of discussions with him as of, I believe, the 22nd -- the 21st-22nd of April. And this subject was raised here and there as information that I might have received during the time frame was brought to his attention. I would contend that the most significant problem that I never got resolved with him was the fact that when we were in the south-west zone taking over from the French, that his forces were filtering people who were returning, and that I couldn't get to those places where they were filtering them for, as they said, security reasons. So I don't know what was happening in those locations.

Q. General Dallaire, I also presume that you have information to the effect that the RPF committed large-scale killings, particularly in Butare, Gitarama, and Kigali-rural préfectures during the war, that is, from April to July 1994. But also after it -- its military victory, it is alleged by some, including the former prime minister, Twagiramungu, the former minister of interior (unintelligible), as well as Mr. (unintelligible), former intelligence director in the RPF government, as well as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International --

Mr. President, counsel is going too fast with his references.


Q. (No interpretation)

Counsel, slowly, slowly. They can't follow.

I'm sorry, sorry.


Q. So, several offences and acts of violence were committed by the RPF between April and July '92 (?), and also several killings after the RPF had come to power. Was that information brought to your knowledge?

A. My information was never one of the RPF conducting massacres. It was of events, or specific events, that were brought to our attention, and the ones I've described to you earlier on.

Now, I did not receive information, as best as I can recall, during that time frame, of specific acts of massive killings in the way you have described it. And it is only in subsequent years with people doing investigations and writing about it do people report, as you are using in your references, that such actions were taken at the time.

Q. Okay. Very well. During your stay in Rwanda, General, that is from April to October '94, was it brought to your attention that in Kigali-rural préfecture, more than 3,000 people had been killed at Muhundo (phonetic) school centre by the RPF in Rushashi commune? Was this specific information brought to your attention, General?

A. The time frame, just to make it clear, was April till August of '94, or at least the war's time --

Q. Mmm-mmm (No interpretation)

A. -- and immediately post-war. And as I indicated to you before, there were reports that were coming in and we were sending SITREPs back to New York. And I do not specifically remember a number of these places nor events that you are -- you are raising, as I don't remember so many of the other massive killing sites that were going on under the auspices of the Interahamwe and the extremist government behind their lines. So you can keep bringing these things up, but I just can't give you any specific data on any of those specific points as I do not recall them, I'm afraid.

Q. All right. Very well. In that case, maybe I'll try to focus on specific groups. For example, was it brought to your attention that the RPF decapitated a Catholic clergy from April 1994? On the 21st of April, the RPF attacked the priests at Byumba diocese? And I have a list of names -- and I don't think it is useful to put that list to you. Now, this is a very specific piece of information about the clergy of the Catholic church, priests and bishops. Are those acts of violence -- were those acts of violence of the 21st of April 1994 brought to your attention?

A. I -- I recall that report that we'd received, that at a school -- in fact, not very far between the Amahoro and the actual stadium -- correction, the Amahoro stadium and the road to the airport, that 12 priests had been killed, and I believe a couple of them were of European background. I remember very clearly, and the enormous reaction to the killings at Kabgayi where a bishop and I believe 13 priests -- maybe two bishops, I think -- were summarily executed in Kabgayi while they were under the protection or the control of the RPF. Those points were specifically brought to the attention of the international community, the media, and also, if I'm not mistaken, in SITREPs to New York.

If I may add to that, Counsellor: In confronting General Kagame with -- particularly the Kabgayi catastrophe, and with his sort of war council, the reaction as to the best of my memory was one that the Rwandan Catholic church had been complicit in the killings that had been going on, and that had been an overreaction by forces that were there on site. And that's the best I got out of him at that time.

Q. What Kagame tells you, whenever you confront him with killings of hundreds and thousands of people killed in cold blood by RPF soldiers, he simply provides a very simplistic answer, namely that it is an overreaction and that it was some specific elements of his forces that may have been reacting to situations relating to the killings of their family members. It is always that kind of answer, but never a matter of a systematic attack by the RPF. His answer has always focused on some isolated incident and an overreaction of his elements.

Did you buy that kind of explanation from General Kagame?

A. Well, in the first place, if I may just clarify, I never said nor agreed to your statements that whenever hundreds or thousands of people were slaughtered he reacted -- he gave me those answers. In every one of the events that I brought to his attention, they were very specific punctual events, and apart from essentially the numbers in Byumba, they all had that same tenure of local individuals taking local decisions of which he was conducting disciplinary actions.

Now, the information I was getting from the media who were, you know, all over the place, was that, generally speaking, the RPF soldiers were disciplined in the front lines, but that they were less so in the rear lines. And that that wasn't the same level or calibre of soldier. But I did not receive specific information, either from the media who were all over the place, or my observers, that exactations or slaughter sites of thousands upon thousands of people were being conducted by the RPF.

Q. Was it because of Kagame's explanations to you that you did not warn the international community -- or inform the international community, through New York, of those massacres? Was it because you were attentive to Kagame's explanations and you understood his explanations that you didn't do that?

A. Well, I don't know from what angle you're coming from. In the first place, I've answered at least five times that I did report that there were actions being taken, incidents where indiscipline was being reflected, and to the extent of what I knew from the ground with the limited forces that I had around the country, because of the fact that they were at risk and many of the countries pulled out their forces -- if you remember I even got the mandate to pull out my forces to observe.

Secondly, the media, which I specifically supported in going all over the place, flying them in and feeding them and sending them off to do their tasks, and they were able to move through the lines and were reporting from both sides. I don't recall them bringing to either my headquarters' attention nor to me that type of information, unless a very specific one, and I must say my memory banks here are at a loss. So if you're alluding to, which is certainly the nuance that I put in your question, that I'm trying to prevent information on the RPF actions on the ground going to the international community, I would say absolutely not.

Q. Let me revisit your testimony when you were being led in chief, in which you appear to state, categorically, that the Rwandan armed forces, at the time they were retreating, did commit some acts of violence systematically. What is the source of that information? And could you be as specific as possible, mentioning the regions, as would clarify this question, which is an important point. So, please, take it region by region and answer in any manner you choose to, but be as specific as possible. Where did you get this information that enabled you to make that assertion?

A. Well, you're asking me to give you three months of information here, and I will go in the following fashion: When the whole operation started with the forces that I had deployed and the information we were getting through them, killings were being conducted by the militias, by some soldiers and gendarmes, starting up in the northern region, Ruhengeri, Gisenyi, where observers were specifically posted and witnessing.

Then this information started to come in from the eastern flank of the country, moving southernly (sic) down through the major urban areas, along that main access road, along the whole eastern part of the country, which ultimately resulted in the amount of about 500,000 Rwandans fleeing into Tanzania, across the border bridge there with Tanzania. And behind them information out of the media, the information that observers that were there had, indicated sites where people had been slaughtered in their houses, slaughtered in groups as the forces were withdrawing.

Then as the battle moved from the east towards the west, mostly south of -- of Kigali, operations in the Byumba area were also conducted, and then the massive exodus of that towards Kigali and then towards the west.

Again, in the Kigali area, different reports coming in from my observers, from the media who were around where there were sites where people were being buried, massive graves in the town where the prisoners in pink uniforms with dump trucks from the government -- and these are regions under the control of the government forces still -- were picking up piles and piles and piles of bodies and dumping them into large pits dug by bulldozers in Kigali. Then as we moved -- the operations squeezed more and more in Kigali, there were less and less in the city. In fact, the city was nearly deserted. And it was no more a city by which most of the people who were running for their lives would go through because we had nearly emptied, what I can gather, the east and the north.

Then the operations moved westerly, and again by the two events. One was in the latter part of April where reports had come in from my observers in Butare that the prime minister of the interim government had gone down to Butare and had incited the population to killing, and I had to rapidly evacuate my observers from there as the killings and slaughtering were being conducted with elements of the Presidential Guard and other force members. And then as we moved towards the west, Gitarama, the same scenarios were being brought on the back of the Rwandan forces withdrawing, pushing the people with them and conducting exactations as they were going, or letting exactations being -- happen at all these different checkpoints and so on.

I have personally gone through certain areas that were under RGF control, neutral, and then RPF control where the village people were dead, huts -- people were slaughtered, and even rape sites. And so it is that sort of exercise that went on. Information was also coming in from Cyangugu that massive exactations were going on. And that information was coming in both by NGOs, media, and a few observers who were courageous enough to stay on and observe. And it is sort of a continuous exercise of that nature, until the French arrived. And then the Rwandan forces withdraw through the French lines and also withdrew northerly -- northwesterly through the Ruhengeri area to Goma and ultimately into Zaire.

And so it is in that sort of nature -- and if you're asking me more, very precise information, I'm afraid that my memory banks don't have too much more hard data, except that generic concept of operations that were going on.

Q. Was that a written report, General, or do you -- did you have any written report, either from your observers or your elements, to the effect that the Rwandan government forces were committing acts of violence -- rather, that the RPF was committing acts of violence?

A. On the RPF side, we were getting information, as I described to you, in the --

(No interpretation)

What's going on?

(No interpretation)

I will repeat the question.

(No interpretation)


Q. General Dallaire, from your testimony-in-chief, you said that there was information to the effect that the Rwandan armed forces, as they withdrew, were committing acts of violence. That has been formally contradicted and we will demonstrate that as our defence. But you insist that you have information to the contrary, namely, that the Rwandan armed forces committed acts of violence. My question, therefore, is: Did you have any written report from your observers to that effect?

A. The information that was coming in was logged in the operations centre, and on a daily basis with the SITREPs, a number of that information was sent up to New York. I don't -- yeah, I don't have all the, you know, the SITREPs or the contents of that.

Also, I'd like to make it quite clear that the exactations, or a lot of the killings, were being done by people on the barriers, and militiamen who identified themselves as the militia Interahamwes to people, to observers, to media, and that the army was condoning it. I am not saying that the army was complicit throughout this exercise because when I raised that with General Bizimungu -- and I believe General Ndindiliyimana as well as Bagosora -- I was told often that they were rogue soldiers, that these were deserters, in many cases, or simply people who had picked up the uniforms and were wearing half-uniforms. Which in that case was absolutely true, there were a lot of them who were running around with the top of a uniform or the bottom of a uniform or the boots from the uniform.

Q. I would like to refer -- let me refer you to document B12, which should be placed before you, General. It is an outgoing cable of 15th April '94 from your office to Kofi Annan.

A. Right.

Q. Okay. I'm showing you this document because I have difficulty understanding how it is that you could have systematically received reports from observers and obtained the information that you allege in paragraph 11.

"UNAMIR has lost its eyes and ears outside of Kigali with the concentration or withdrawal of its UNMOs, the withdrawal from the DMZ, and its inability, due to security tasks in Kigali, to conduct patrolling outside of the Kigali area."

Isn't that document, of the 15th of April 1994, saying effectively that several military observers were returning to Kigali? Is that what we're to understand from that cable?

A. What the cable indicates is that a number of observers, when the hostilities started, actually withdrew to the surrounding countries. So I lost a number of those. Others were forced to withdraw by the RGF forces that were there. And a number of them were able to re-concentrate back into Kigali as we tried to regain control of the forces that were all over the countryside. And so, yes, the bulk of my forces were in Kigali. The information I was receiving was from some who were still mobile, and I created a particularly -- a particular group called -- sort of like (French spoken) who were mobile in attempting to get as much of the information as we could.

I opened up my headquarters completely to the NGO community, as well as the media community, in order to gather whatever information I could from them and exchange whatever I had and provide whatever coordination and cooperation I could. And so a lot of information was coming from them, as well as people who were being saved, for my forces during that time frame went out and still were able to evacuate something like 700 people who had been left behind.

Q. (No interpretation)

A. And so, if I may, as a commander, my eyes and ears, this expression that I'm doing, is I really don't have -- and you're quite right in raising it -- I don't have a complete nor a particularly fully effective intelligence-gathering capability, and that's why, in the same paragraph, I'm asking for satellite pictures and electronic warfare capabilities to be able to build that picture.

Q. Okay.

I would like to introduce this document, Your Honour.

It is D. 162.

K number 0035456.



Situation report dated 15th April 1994.

(Exhibit No. D. 162 (Bizimungu) admitted)

15th April 1994.


Q. Generally speaking, did you receive any reports -- or, were you informed at any time of the fact that the RPF was using UN vehicles, and that General Bizimungu had drawn your attention to it? Do you have any such recollection, namely, that the -- okay.

Were you also aware, or informed of the fact that some bodies of RPF soldiers -- for identity -- were using identification documents of the UNAMIR -- were you aware of that?

A. There was one incident where it was reported that UNAMIR identity cards had been found, and that was in the area of the UNAMIR headquarters in Byumba. When we got those ID cards and checked them out, they had been cards that had not been distributed, that the officers were still alive, and that those cards had been left behind.

I don't recall -- you know, I don't recall so specifically whether RPF were found with UNAMIR ID cards. I can't really recall the specific incident that that actually happened. They did take some of our vehicles. Some of them were easy to take because my forces had left them behind and had not immobilised them, and in so doing the RPF, as they were doing with the government resources that they were leaving behind when they were withdrawing, simply muddied them up and used them for their own purposes. So if there was stuff left inside them, that's quite possible.

Q. You're right, indeed, because that is contained in document C23. I don't intend to produce -- I did not intend to produce that document, document C23 of 25th April '94. C23. It is a letter from your office to the prime minister on the 25th of April 1994. And you refer to nine UNAMIR ID cards and photocopies that were purportedly found on some bodies. You say in the message that you hope that this does not reflect UNAMIR's involvement in the conflict. In the third paragraph, you provide an explanation, namely that these were cards, ID cards that were stolen or taken away after the battalion -- the Ghanaian battalion had left the demilitarised zone.

(Microphones overlapping)

Yes, that document will be D. 163. This is a letter to the prime minister by Mr. Dallaire.

(Exhibit No. D. 163 (Bizimungu) admitted)

Thank you.


Q. Let us move on to something else, General. It has been alleged by some that you had, between April and July 1994, a relationship of complicity with -- or, with Kagame. Let me refer to the incident of the 2nd of April, and I believe you talked about it when you were being led in chief. On the 2nd of April 1994 you met Kagame in Mulindi. Kagame, at that time, told you in very broad strokes -- that would be on page 26 -- 278-289, that Kagame informed you that we were at the brink of a cataclysm, and that once begun, it will run totally out of control.

General, I believe that you remember that meeting with Kagame, don't you?

A. Yes, do I, yes.

Q. Very well. I understand that you did not take any notes of that discussion, but that you recollect, from memory; isn't it so?

A. I -- I don't think I had my military executive assistant with me on that -- on that occasion.

Q. Now -- now that you know the tragic outcome of the events a few days later, General, and are aware of that, and using some of your vocabulary, the announcement was made, as you say in your book, by Kagame with a very serious look on his face, could one not have expected this kind of discussion only to take place between people who trust each other, or who were confiding in each other?

The question, in other words, is that in your book, General, you describe those revelations by Kagame to the effect that "We are at the brink of a cataclysm", and then four days later we know what happened. Why would Kagame have told you that if he was not your confidant, your friend? And I use those words with some measure of neutrality, but how do you explain the fact that Kagame could make such statements to you? You, who were a neutral arbiter in charge of implementing the Arusha Accords?

A. Well, in the first place, in telling me what was clearly upper most in his mind in regards to the very tenuous, very under pressure situation that was happening on the political side, and the fact that on a number of other occasions he had raised with me the difficulties he was having in feeding and supplying his forces because of the fact that the BBTG was supposed to start on the 1st of January and provide it since then. And what I saw in there was a -- a commander of a force with whom we had had a number of meetings, joint meetings -- because if you remember I told you my joint military committee continued to work, and face-to-face, that he was a commander speaking to another senior officer who had been a commander in his own right, that in his estimation the situation was absolutely dire, if not on the brink of catastrophe. And so that transparency, on his part, gave me a sense of just how much more critical the situation was, and how I, in fact, reflected that back in -- in Kigali and in New York. And so it was an exchange that I considered to be exceptionally professional, versus one of someone trying to be coy or someone who's trying to fiddle with the information.

I must say that on the government side, and now I'm searching my brain to remember the specific events or moments, either with the minister of -- with the minister of defence or the generals, the same grave concern that they had that this political impasse was going to explode, and the situation would become untenable, in Kigali in particular, for them, and for the population.



Q. That is exactly where I am headed, General. In view of the gravity of the statement by Kagame when he was talking to you, one would have expected that you transmit that information to your hierarchy in New York. So I'm putting it to you, General Dallaire, that it was only on the 17th of April in a cable -- that a cable which I intend to produce, at page 3 -- it is only in that cable that you mention that discussion and Kagame's statement in the cable, and, in hindsight, on the 17th of April, you now indicate that Kagame's statements in confidence were of a serious nature. One would have expected that you forward that information and Kagame's statements about a cataclysm to your hierarchy in New York and that you should have done that before the 17th of April. Do you have any reaction to that? Do you have any comments to make on that?

A. My response is the following: We had submitted to New York the report, and I believe it is dated 30th of March, the final one. There was a draft sent before that, in which we explained quite clearly, under Mr. Booh-Booh's signature, the incredible gravity of the situation, the impasse and the fact that this thing was on the brink of completely going catastrophic or breaking down and that the whole peace process of Arusha was actually in complete jeopardy. And that report, although some portions of it I had indicated more stringently than others -- that is what I wanted, but, anyways, it still went in -- was also the subject of a number of phone calls between New York and us in the field. Because on the 5th of April, the Security Council agreed to the content of our report and put an extremely stringent limitation on the mission, saying that the mission -- if we did not have a solution, a political solution, within six weeks, the mission would be totally folded and pulled out, as it was an indication of the impatience of the international community with both sides in wanting to actually solve this problem.

Now, that information was there and it was already being acted upon.

Information was also sent up that both sides had been preparing their historic defensive positions. As an example, the Presidential Guard had been completely rebuilding its defensive positions inside of Kigali and around its camp. And so was the same with the paracommandos at Kanombe and also with the troops sitting in Camp Kigali. So we also reported at the time the number of incursions and launching positions that I saw would be used by a force that was trying to move either through the DMZ, or in that specific area, to potentially encircle Byumba. And, again, those points were raised higher up and actions were taken with the different authorities on why they were taking these actions, it was against the peace agreement, and that they should cease and desist. So we were -- no one was in a state of surprise in being flabbergasted by what happened. What we were feeling is enormous disappointment that what we were fearing actually did happen.

Q. General Dallaire, I have not understood your answer, with all due respect, at least as far as the question goes.

What I am putting to you is that Kagame makes some monstrous disclosures or revelations to you; he talks about a cataclysm, and you take it seriously enough to refer to it in your document, in your book on page 278 -- 277, 278. But what I'm putting to you is that, aware of that information, you kept it to yourself until the 17th of April; that, in hindsight, you provide that information to New York, relating to the fact that the matter that Kagame had brought to your attention in confidence was of a serious nature. Let me invite you, General, to look at document D. 38.

Before that, Mr. MacDonald, do you want to mark the other document?

Yes, please, Your Honour. Actually, it is already in. P. 118.

All right.

I'm afraid, Your Honour, this is one of the late -- late arrivals, so they don't have it over there. So, it is just a paragraph I will read to General Dallaire.

The document of the 3rd of April.

(Microphone not activated)


Q. Page 4 -- it is a fax from Booh-Booh to Kofi Annan on the 3rd of April, that is, the day following your meeting. And all what Booh-Booh says to Annan is in paragraph 4 as follows:

"The force commander went to Mulindi where he met RPF Major General Kagame. Various issues were discussed."

That comes across as a very laconic report, and, again, I know it is not from you.

Am I, therefore, to understand that you did not discuss those issues that Kagame had mentioned to you in confidence with Booh-Booh on the 2nd of April?

A. I don't remember a discussion with Mr. Booh-Booh on the 3rd nor on my return on the 2nd; I honestly don't remember. I do remember that in early March, Kagame had previously indicated that his forces were becoming extremely impatient and that the situation was becoming explosive, and that that had been reported. And so in all this state of affairs, what Kagame was telling us -- and now in hindsight, you can say, "Yeah, well, look at; that's what happened" -- in that time frame, those comments were coming from a variety of sources, which included political sources and simply civilian observations. And so I do not specifically remember exchanging that day or the day after with Mr. Booh-Booh that specific point.

I seek to introduce this document, Your Honour, document 38. It is L number L0006059.

It is D. 164.

(Exhibit No. D. 164 (Bizimungu) admitted)

Thank you.


Q. When Kagame talked about this cataclysm, General, is it not true to say that you knew that President Kagame's [sic] days were numbered? And by way of example, and that precisely is the reason why on the 4th of April, by extraordinary chance, you appointed Bagosora to step in for the president, and two days later, Kagame's --

Sorry, Your Honour. We didn't follow counsel.

The question was not complete.

Which part?

Kagame and --


Q. General Dallaire, are you still there?

Can you hear us, General?

Mr. Black tells me there was a problem with the question. I'll --

Yes -- no, there was no problem. It's just a problem with the translation, sir.

All right.

I can't hear him, unless --


Q. I'm going to ask the question once again, General. Is it not correct that in relation to the confidential information that Kagame gave you, on account of Kagame's state of mind on the 2nd of April when he was talking to you about that cataclysm, is it not correct to say that you knew from then on that President Habyarimana's days were numbered? And by way of example, I am submitting to you what you said in your evidence-in-chief, that is, on the 4th of April, by extraordinary chance, you asked Bagosora the identity of the next -- the person who was going to step in for Habyarimana?

A. First of all, the information that Kagame provided me was a continuum of his exasperation with the political --

Q. I'm sorry, General, I'm not receiving --

A. -- situation and the impact it was having on his troops, and, as such, it was not a completely new --

I'm sorry. I just couldn't hear the beginning of your answer, General Dallaire.

Can you start again, Witness?

As I indicated, the information that Kagame was giving me that evening was consistent with information of the continued frustration and pressure that was being caused by the non-solutioning of the political situation, and that it now was going into another phase of that stress because of the decisions in regards to the CDR party and the changing nature of the negotiations. Secondly, the analysis that I took out of Kagame's comments was that something was going to blow up. But in no way, shape or form did I specifically consider that it was either them or specifically the RGF side that would actually create the explosion. Both sides were preparing for war, both sides were in a state of enormous tension and pressure, both politically and militarily, so either side could have conducted an operation to make this peace agreement fall flat on its face.

In regards to the comment to Bagosora regarding the (French spoken), in my querying, and I will say in complete innocence, in any of the political structures I know of, leaders, particularly those who have a sort of dictatorial background generally had somebody in the wings that they are preparing, that they are sort of nurturing or mentoring, and I had not heard of that sort of situation in Rwanda, and I was purely querying the chef de cabinet of the minister of defence whether or not that was actually something that was going on in Rwanda. And so if you want to put one and one and make three, that's fine with me. But that is a complete fabrication of the interactions of those events.


Q. You already requested to know the identity of the successor of Habyarimana before the 4th of April 1994. Had you discussed that with anyone else, and, if yes, with whom?

A. No, it wasn't -- it was nothing that came up. We had not met socially or indirectly. The closest I could talk about was with the president's chef de cabinet, Enoch, when we were discussing the distribution of ministries in the post BBTG, that is to say, the BBTG and so on, and the concerns in regards to the fact that there had been no amnesty in the peace agreement and whether or not that put President Habyarimana in a possible state of being thrown into jail the day after the BBTG was put in, because of the fact that the RPF got the chief job of the gendarmerie, got the minister of interior, and there was another job that they had, which would sort of give them a possible control on the judicial system and, as such, would put President Habyarimana and his colleagues in jeopardy for alleged crimes of the past. That's the closest I've ever come to it.

Q. What you are saying is that Bagosora, to use your expression, reacted very violently to that question, and I put it to you that the reason for which we can only speculate on the interpretation that Bagosora gave to that question, but you will agree with me that the -- the nature of the reaction was such that we can say that he was interpreting that to mean that you were suggesting to him that President Habyarimana was going to die, be assassinated or in some other way; don't you believe that?

A. I think I would -- I would believe that if this guy had something to hide or if he felt a certain element of guilt or if I got too close to the target or to potential ulterior motives, but if I was asking a simple question of a president -- of a pseudo-democracy of whether he was preparing his successor in a time of tension and what was going on, I would have considered the response to say no or yes and it's such and such. And he is following the situation very closely. So if the guy had ulterior motives behind that and reacted so violently, which is a bit -- so what one can deduce then there is something there which I, of course, wasn't aware of. And I would end that comment, if I may, in the following fashion: Is that if someone who is ultimately so close to the actual catastrophic situation that happened in Rwanda is reacting with such a violent commentary, one would question whether or not, in fact, there had been some ideas of maybe that option. And, in fact, there was comments going around that Habyarimana was being considered to be a little too soft on the peace process and that some people were not particularly happy with that, and that was coming through the information on the political side. And, lastly, if I was really trying to find out what the hell was going on with the succession, do you think I would report it to you or anybody else in my book?

Q. I believe that anyone who can read your book cannot arrive at any conclusion other than to say that you were biased in favour of the RPF. And knowing the manner in which the things unfolded, and then I gave you an example of the letter of Gatabazi, 3rd December, 12 April, things that have been listed today and for which there is some evidence -- some evidence pointing to the fact that some of the points in your book are false, and I think that a neutral reader of your book can only -- cannot but come to the conclusion that you were biased in favour of the RPF. At least that is my general impression.

A. Well, the first question or how I answer that is I'm not too sure you are a neutral reader of the book, to start with.

Q. You might have a point there.

Counsel, I think you must continue on and put your questions.

Okay. I will see how my --


Q. General, on the 4th of April 1994, did you know Kagame's strategy sites fully or partially -- partly?

A. Could you just confirm to me -- the translation wasn't right. His strategic sites or his objectives? Sorry.

Q. As of the 4th of April 1994, did you know Kagame's plans and strategies, all of it or part of it? Well, of course I mean his strategy on the field.

A. My knowledge -- and this is from me as a commander looking at a situation that's going from bad to worse -- is the following: It would have been highly irresponsible for both sides, the commanders, chiefs of staff if you want to call them, to have not conducted worst-case contingency planning. I would have considered that to be highly irresponsible to their -- both political authorities. And so I certainly suspected that he had conducted a number of contingency plans, as I suspected the government forces by the way they had moved some heavy equipment and the fact that they were reinforcing their defenses around Kigali, that they had also looked at the possibilities of the conflict starting again. I mean, it's happened twice before; it's certainly possible to do it a third time. In that context, the RPF historically had always been an offensive force; that is to say, they never waited necessarily for the situation to go -- somebody to attack them; they have always been able to initiate or counter a possible attack. So I looked at the RPF and said, "What would I do if I was commanding the RPF?" Just like I then looked at the government forces and doodled, as I did with the RPF, on what sort of concepts of defence, with potential counterattacks -- if you are in the defence; you always look at that, what I would do if I was the chief of staff of the RGF. And so it is purely in my own sort of looking at the situation -- I think we might have talked about it within the headquarters amongst some of the senior officers of what happens if this thing goes catastrophic, but certainly no farther than that.

Q. I think Counsel Segatwa quoted a passage of your book to you, page 413. I might be wrong, but I think he drew your attention to the following sentence, where you allegedly told Kagame, and I'm quoting from your book, page 413: "I asked Kagame why he does not immediately, directly jump or attack his enemies in Kigali." I have no -- I have more difficulty understanding or seeing any neutrality on your part in the light of this sentence. Indeed, did you put this question to Kagame, that why does he not jump directly at the throat of his enemy --

Are you --


Q. -- of his enemy in Kigali?

Are you still on the 4th of April? You need to specify that you are referring to a period subsequent to 4th of April.


Q. Now, did you have this kind of discussion with Kagame; did you make this suggestion to him or did you ask him this question?

A. As the conflict advanced over the weeks and weeks, I had with both Kagame, and even with General Bizimungu, moments where we looked at what was going on in order for me to get a grasp of what situations I could expect into the future, particularly what was happening in regards to the conduct of the conflict and its impact on refugees, internally displaced, how I can move and assist the NGO community and bringing in humanitarian aid and the like. And that was very much my duties to know so that I wasn't putting, one, my people at risk, two, the NGO community at risk, three, that material was going to the wrong place for the wrong people at the wrong time. And so I conducted discussions with both sides, and I remember clearly with both sides taking my map of Rwanda, throwing it on the floor and saying, "Okay, where are you going with this, and what's going to happen?" And one of the questions that you bring back to my memory was, "Why is Kagame taking so long to secure Kigali?" In my estimation, and in one of the documents you actually brought out this morning, indicated by the 24th or something of April, it seemed to me that we were in the throes of probably the last phase of the RPF gaining control of Kigali, and it only happened on the 4th of July. So I couldn't understand why he was delaying those operations and causing us enormous problems, because all of the road network went through Kigali, and unless we had the fighting stop there, we couldn't use that road network for the humanitarian aid.

On the other side, with General Bizimungu, I remember quite clearly a discussion with him on him and how his defensive situation was going and the people, particularly behind his lines where there was the bulk of the refugees and internally displaced, and at one point I even said to him, I said, "Listen, why don't you give me the job of being your deputy and we can make a decent fight out of this?"

Q. Did he accept that?

A. No, he didn't accept it. And, of course, recognising, in jest. However, if I may give you an indication that General Bizimungu had proven to be an effective, if not even ruthless, battalion commander in the Ruhengeri area and district commander. However, when he took command of the army and then was responsible for the operational level of war that a commander of the army is needed, this gentleman just didn't have the skills nor the background to do it. And so it was in that sort of military respectful fashion that that exchange and others were done.

Q. I'm glad he is not here.

General, I will have to proceed in a more haphazard manner. This morning you made reference to the killing of the bishops in Kabgayi. In your book on page 506, you said that on the 2nd June 1994, you said you received a message from Kofi Annan, requesting UNAMIR to afford additional cover for Kabgayi and that request was made upon the intervention of Pope John Paul himself. And you know that in that region, there were more than 30,000 persons, including a number of clergy persons; is that correct?

A. I don't remember that specific memo. I mean, if you showed it to me, you might click something, and that the Pope -- I've got some vague something about the Pope. But the most I remember about the Catholic Church is that it ran and didn't even stay. So (inaudible) was the first one out of the countries and he was the dean of the diplomatic corps. So, I don't particularly remember that memo, but if it is there, it would help to clarify me in my duties.

I also, however, remember very well that Kabgayi was a centre of extensive people internally displaced because Philippe Gaillard from the International Red Cross had moved a whole capability there, and it was very much under his protection -- if I can use "protection" -- the Red Cross of that site, and he was moving food and assets there as much as he could because of that isolated location. And that ultimately -- in fact, in the discussions of the concept of operations that I had for UNAMIR 2 to stop the killing, it was one of those examples that I used in regards to establishing safe sites versus safe areas that the rest of the international community or the Americans were trying to push on the concept. So Kabgayi was one of those examples where you could ultimately, if you had the protection, protect and save a whole bunch of people without trying to do a whole region.

Q. Okay. And I refer to your book on page 506. You said:

"On the 2nd June I received a message from Kofi Annan requesting me to give additional protection to a place called Kabgayi," --

-- and you went on to say that there were 30,000 persons, including clergymen, priests and so on and so forth, and you also said that the area was surrounded by the RPF, --

"and Annan told me that the Pope himself requested for additional protection for those people."

That's what you said on page 506, French version.

A. Okay. Yes.

Q. General Dallaire, I put it to you that the effective conquest by the RPF of Kabgayi was on the 2nd June, that is, the very day that you received the request from Kofi Annan. The bishops were executed on the 5th of June; that is three days later. And I put it to you, General, that at that time you had all the necessary time to react to counter that threat, and I would like you to explain to the Court what were the actions that UNAMIR attempted carrying out between the 2nd and 5th June to protect those people.

A. On the 17th of May, the UN gave me the mandate to go and assist in the distribution of humanitarian aid and also in protecting people in vulnerable positions. In giving me that mandate, they gave me authority to increase my force from about 450, who were already protecting five sites, plus those who were conducting the patrols, plus those who were out there trying to protect people, save them, bring them in and the like. I needed those extra troops to do exactly what Kabgayi was, that is, to go and stop the killing and protecting. The first reinforcements arrived in the last week of July, and they were Ethiopians who had absolutely no skills in the particular operational concept that I had written. And so I totally agree with you, that that demand, amongst probably 5- to 600 other demands, from some very senior people, including heads of states, including ministers of foreign affairs, including very influential people who've got a lot of money and who've got a lot of influence, including people who sing for their life and are known internationally, asking me to risk my soldiers continuously to save them. And we saved over 700 of them, and in that case I did not have the resources to get out to Kabgayi. And if they had deployed those forces within the ten days that I had asked for them, the people in Kabgayi and those people would probably be still alive. And so I do not remember specifically giving any orders of moving assets there, I could have, and that would have been, at best, 4 to 6 military observers, unarmed.

General, you are to speak a little slowly because these stenographers are --

Oh, sure.

-- finding it difficult to keep pace with you, so please go a little bit slowly.

I'm very sorry.


Q. Therefore, General, Kofi Annan makes a request to you, a specific request; Kofi Annan tells you that, "I have a request from the Pope himself," talking about the bishops of Kabgayi, and the Pope wants UNAMIR to intervene, and Kofi Annan requests you to intervene, and I understand the explanation that you have given. But my question is as follows: Did you send back a cable message to Annan saying that, "There is nothing I can do; I do not have a capability, and I'm sorry, I'm not able to accede to fulfill your requests"? Did you tell Annan that on account of the number of troops at your disposal, on account of your capability, you are not able to honour his request? And if you did so, when?

A. I do not specifically remember responding to that request as so many others that were put. However, if you were able to find in your file search the code cable coming back from Annan to me in about that time frame or a little earlier, saying that they were very sorry, that they were under enormous pressure in DPKO by senior peoples from around the world of insisting on us in the field trying to save people, knowing full well that we did not have the capabilities to do so, that we were putting people enormously at risk in trying to do it, and that it was up to my judgment of whether or not I could conduct them or not, and it was entirely into my decisions. And so we did a whole bunch of them, and I don't know whether I was able to send a patrol out to Kabgayi. We would have to look at the logs. But, again, in Kabgayi, as I say, the best they could have gotten at that time would have been four to six UN observers, unarmed, and hopefully that would have been enough mal suasion to prevent the killing that happened.

Q. And, once again, Kagame, before this fait accompli, told you that it is some isolated elements of his troops who acted in a brutal manner in reaction to some events that they lived. That is the simplistic explanation that Kagame gave you. And my question to you is, today, do you agree that the true reason for the massacre and the killings of the Kabgayi bishops was the fact that it was an order which may have been given directly from the higher echelons of the RPF setup and that the bishops were not killed by accident? Would you agree with this assumption?

A. You are quite right in saying that Kagame's response was, if not glib, was certainly simply a method or technique, and that was insufficient and a protest was so recorded. But with me, no troops on the ground, I couldn't go and beat him over the head to go do something when I had absolutely no capabilities except mal suasion and witnessing. In regards to who and how and what orders were given or whether or not it was really the local commander who took it upon himself to do that, I have absolutely no information.

Q. In fact, General Dallaire, what is known today is that those who perpetrated those killings, or the one who perpetrated that killing is known -- he is called Jack Nzizi, N-Z-I-Z-A; alias Jackson Mkurinziza (phonetic). That is his real name. And he had a rank of major at the time, a major within the RPF army. He is currently a colonel and working in the intelligence setup of Kagame's government, to answer your question.

Perhaps to get a clearer idea of your position, do you admit that the RPF systematically perpetrated extensive killings in the areas that they occupied and which they occupied as they moved on, as they gained more grounds?

A. No, I have no specific proof of that.

Q. Okay.

A. And I'm sure that my answers to your question of massive killings, I never negated that exactations were being done, but I do not recall any reports saying that there were, you know, large-scale massacres of the scale we were seeing in the south being conducted by his troops behind his lines.

Q. This is what Booh-Booh says on the same issue -- he was not of your opinion. He said this on page 168, last but one paragraph. He said:

"Reinforced by troops that came from the DMZ, the RPF troops very quickly established the authority over a large portion of the capital. They attacked the civilian population, and this needs to be recorded as serious violations of international law."

Have you read this passage of Booh-Booh's book?

A. No. I'm not sure what page it is.

Q. 168.

A. And I find it rather unusual that he would write that, because for the first nearly two weeks of the war, he essentially was closeted in the Meridien hotel, and went out only once, I believe, on the 15th when we had a joint meeting, and that wasn't even outside the hotel. That was outside his room, down into the main lobby, where we had a multiparty ceasefire negotiations. Apart from that, he was continuously in his room, alone on his top floor of the Meridien, under the protection of UN security forces.

Q. Is it possible that you may have informed Booh-Booh of those violent acts -- you or someone else -- violent acts perpetrated by the RPF?

A. Of what I know, he was not getting any particular visitors at the time; he was quite isolated up there, by his own request. Dr. Caviar met with him, I know that, some of his staff did, and whether they were feeding him that information, that is, yes, quite possible.

Q. General Dallaire, let me read a passage of your book for you, page 175 -- 475 of the French version. The last but one paragraph, it begins with, "Our observers -- that is the fourth line --

"Our military observers started -- began to meet new troops behind the RPF lines. They observed that these -- some of these troops spoke only Swahili, a certain dialect of Kiswahili, which meant that they came from the Diaspora in Uganda. We received reports talking about the death of some former Hutu agents and their families. These killings took place particularly in the Byumba and Ngarama regions. According to Deme, D-E-M-E, a large number of orphans who survived the Hutus lived in Byumba, and Bernard Kouchner of Médecins sans frontières went to check if he could do any good deeds there."

It is to that passage specifically that I want to draw your attention.

"The RPF had imposed restrictions on areas that observers could go to. The last line of Deme's report said the following, quote: “We have the evidence that they have imposed restrictions on us, so that they, the RPF, can proceed with their activities, in particular, the killings."

General Dallaire, do you recall having written this? And my question is -- I'm sorry. Go ahead.

A. No, I mean, I don't recall specifically writing it. But what is in there is absolutely consistent with what I've been saying up to now: That the RPF made it difficult for us to be able to oversee areas where people were being moved to and made it impossible in certain areas for us to even enter. I have to, however, indicate to you that the same restrictions were imposed upon us on the other side, but they were more caused by the self-defence structures and those who were manning the barriers and the different local defence capabilities. But the RPF were less than transparent, and I don't negate that at all, with how they were handling casualties. The orphans, I remember them quite clearly. In fact, the minister of defence had asked me to see what we could do in regards to those orphans up there.

Q. A few words, General, on the attacks in November. We are quickly running out of time here. Now, I want to talk about the Kurambo attacks of the 18th of November 1994. General, I'm sure you will agree with me that the UNAMIR was criticised in respect of its inertia regarding those massacres. The question I'm putting to you, General, is the following: In view of the identity of the perpetrators of that attack, your position in November or December was that you were not able to identify the perpetrators of that attack, and again your position was that it could be MRND perpetrators or RPF perpetrators or other people. Yet, General Dallaire, in Kurambo sub-préfecture 55 people were killed and more than 30 persons who were assassinated were MRND members who had just won the election, the communal elections, which had been organised in the DMZ under the auspices of the UNAMIR. The RPF had taken part in those elections but did not win any seat. My question, General, is as follows: In terms of very simple logic, couldn't you have deduced that the MRND could not have killed its own elected members, particularly in a commune where it had won over other political parties, including the RPF?

Mr. MacDonald, I can see that you have the wrong date, 18th of November 1994. What is the correct date?

You are absolutely right, Your Honour. 1993.



Right. We are talking two separate events. And I must say I can't remember the date of the elections. Maybe you could refresh my memory.


Q. Unfortunately, I'm not able to do so, but I know that there were elections that had taken place and some were still scheduled, but all I know is that there had been elections in that area.

A. Yes -- no, you are quite right. I was just trying to get (inaudible). In the second event, the killings there, when we took on the role of monitoring the elections, one of the first things that we discovered was that people were in disagreement of where actually the demilitarised zone lay. And so a number of these towns were in contention as to whether or not they should be going through the election or not through the election, and so that created an enormous amount of tensions at that time. And I'm sorry to say I don't remember the results of that specific election, and I gather the information that you are saying we picked up was that all these people were MRND. I never saw their membership cards of the party or anything like that, so I leave that to your comment.

In regards to the killings on the night of the 17th to the 18th, we conducted three separate boards of enquiry. One started with the observers and if you maybe remember, I actually went personally to the site that same day and walked up the hill and didn't make it to where the children were, but took a personal look at the situation. Secondly, we ran a board of enquiry inside of UNAMIR and that proved to be inclusive and not transparent enough for the media or the people. And so we ran a third one which was run by members of the political side of our house, plus representatives of both the government and the RPF, and that board of enquiry was still inclusive in its results, and mostly because we had no solid investigative tools to prove who actually did it. Now, in regards to my deductions, my deductions come from the fact that these killings were done on five different places, that the mayor, I believe, of one of the towns or something was able to report it early that morning, that these five things had happened, yet he was in no way in a position to physically check them out. And we still don't know how he found out so fast about what had happened that night. The killings happened on the night that the president had come to open up my headquarters and was demonstrating an enormous amount of goodwill in his speech, and so it was an incredible set of circumstances that that -- that these killings happened at that point. And then there was some circumstantial information of how they were killed and the like, only to leave the impressions that we were facing a force that was professional and not some sort of amateur, just local, thugs. And so the deductions, although, would spew toward the commandos in the area because of the rope marks and so on, I never concluded who actually did it.

Q. Unfortunately, General Dallaire, I cannot follow you in that line of thinking. Now, about General Bizimungu, wouldn't you agree with me, General, that General Bizimungu has never been criticised, at least as far as you know, in the media regarding his possible objection to the Arusha Accords? And to go a little further, a second component of that question, my suggestion and mindful of time constraints, let me put it to you that, in fact, it is the contrary, that General Bizimungu was designated by Agathe's government as one of the five Rwandan officials to be part of the high command council of the army, which, in fact, was to govern the army during the transitional period. Were you aware of that?

A. In fact, no, I wasn't aware that he was being considered in one of those positions. We had not gone in our demobilisation and reintegration work with the joint military committee; we had not gone down to actually putting names to positions at that time yet, so, no, I wasn't aware of that. General Bizimungu, when I visited him in Ruhengeri in his headquarters and so on, was a very effervescent and dynamic commander who never negated, in fact, articulated clearly the effectiveness of his command in previous operations against the RPF and reflected in that a disdain, if not outright hatred, of RPF forces, and the fact that he was one of the few commanders in that army who had been successful in holding them back, if not defeating them, in his region, and so he was and came to us as an individual who was a very strong and determined commander who considered the RPF to be a very clear enemy.

Now, when he took command of all of the Rwandan forces at that time, it was evident that he was -- how do I say? -- on-the-job training for a while as he tried to grasp the complete nature of the operations and his roles and duties in so doing. And so when we met, there were times where he did not have all of the information on what, you know, what is going on. He was still on occasion, in fact, in a couple of meetings, quite antagonistic against the government and the politicians to whom he was reporting to who were not giving him the support he needed to conduct his operations and his work and were restricting him in being able to take decisions like the whole affair of the airport being neutral or not, and things of that nature. And so, I mean, he was in command and was in a command that was for which he was not necessarily well prepared to accomplish.

Q. Okay. Still on the very same question, General Dallaire, when General Augustin Bizimungu took command on the 19th of April '94, would you agree with the suggestion that he did not effect any changes to the general command that was in place during Gitsenzi's transition, and the only person who, as fate would have it, was replaced was Gitsenzi, but whether that be G1, G2, G3 or G4, General Bizimungu did not alter anything. Would you agree with that assertion?

A. In my assessment, I don't have the details of those who were holding those positions down at the time. I only know that Gitsenzi, as well as Rusatira were relegated to absolutely (French spoken) -- I don't know how you say it in English -- they were pushed aside and given absolutely no authority whatsoever, nor command responsibilities in the conduct of the war. Gitsenzi ended up by being the negotiator for the peace agreement, well, hopefully, the ceasefire and ultimately the peace agreement, and Rusatira sort of disappeared into the woodwork.

Later on in the war both of them from in the south, I believe, Gitarama, had established communications with me to try and establish a direct link with Kagame, which I established, in which they were hoping to stop the onslaught of the war, and General Kagame refused them -- to support them unless they were prepared to become far more public and ultimately gain forces to do so. The only other thing is that the forces that were at play were ultimately split in two, that is to say, those who were in a more northerly background, officered by the north and so on, were getting ammunition and getting weapons to fight, while those who were still remaining in the south essentially were not being resupplied, and the comment I remember them trying to -- I think it was from Bagasora saying that had --

Q. Could you please try, General Dallaire, to answer the question.

A. -- suffered yet enough in this war.

I shouldn't have to intervene; it seems so evident.


Q. All right. General Dallaire, I put it to you that you did not ask Gatsinzi why he did not go back to the south. In fact, it is that he wanted to remain in that position and be assigned to the negotiations; that he is the one who asked General Bizimungu -- he is the one who asked General Bizimungu to be left in that position because he was not shoved aside, as you claim. Maybe if Bizimungu had the courage, he would have been able to explain that. Rwabalinda, that was one of the persons you considered as being a moderate; isn't that correct?

A. Say again the name.

Q. Rwabalinda, Ephrem.

A. Yes, Ephrem Rwabalinda, on a number of occasions where we --

Q. Just say "yes" or "no," sir.

A. He indicated that he was of the moderate orientation within the Rwandan forces, yes.

Q. Rwabalinda was the liaison officer between the Rwandan armed forces and UNAMIR before the arrival of Bizimungu; isn't that correct? And I want to put it to you that he was maintained in that position by Bizimungu when he took office; is that correct?

A. Yes, and he was killed in doing it.

Q. He was not only maintained in that position, but Bizimungu appointed him the advisor to the chief of the general command; is that correct?

A. He never mentioned that to me.

Q. I'm sorry to be a little disjointed, but this is again because of time constraints which paralyse me.

Let me refer to the letter of 12th of April, and, General, I believe you know what I am talking about. It is a letter, the authors of which you have referred to as being moderate at the time. Now, wouldn't it be correct, General, that all those people you referred to as moderates, those who signed the letter of 12th April, isn't it true that all those people remained in office after Bizimungu took office?

A. I -- I can't deny it because I really can't remember except for Gitsenzi, who was the most qualified of the senior officers to actually command the army, ultimately never got the job.

Q. I'm sorry. Could you -- well, that's fine.

General Dallaire, please turn with me to document D. 10. It would seem you don't have it and that is my mistake. It is another document which I put together towards the end of our cross-examination. But let me simply draw your attention, General, to a letter of 17th May 1994 in which you say the following in paragraph 1, for Counsel Bâ's attention --

What number is it?

Bunch number 2, document number 10.


Q. This is a letter to the ministry of defence from your office, 17th May 1994, in which you say the following:

"I have the honour to forward this letter to you, by which I wish to indicate how surprised I was at the meetings which I held with ministry officials which you neither seem to encourage or support."

Do you remember that letter to the ministry of defence, General?

A. I'm afraid not. I'm not sure exactly what you are saying. I mean, I could accept -- would you mind just reading it out loud in French without it being translated? It might come out, if I may, without any insult to the translators, just getting the real tone.

Q. I will have to read two paragraphs to you, the first and the second.

"I have the honour to forward this letter to you to indicate how surprised I was that at the meetings I held with military officials of the government forces, you neither seemed to support nor encourage these meetings."

And the last paragraph:

"Mr. Minister, your director of cabinet represented you at that meeting. He may continue to play that role because there is an urgent need for some files that have not reached a point of decision to be moved forward and therefore consist of a serious handicap to the common actions that may be taken together in the future."

Unfortunately, General, I do not have the letter which the minister of defence had sent to you, but I believe it must have been a letter in which the minister of defence was blaming you -- that is, Mr. Bizimana was blaming you for having contacts, particularly in this case, with Bagosora and Bizimungu.

Do you remember the context of that letter, General?

A. No, I'm afraid not. I do, however, remember the frictions that were going on between the military commanders and the political leaders by the fact that the political leaders were insisting on operating out of Gitarama and they were not providing the commanders with timely information.

Okay. I seek to introduce this document, Your Honour.

Yes, this is D. 165.

(Exhibit D. 165 (Bizimungu) admitted)

Yes, Counsel, now it is time to --

This is L0026157. I understand your -- I understand your time limitations, Your Honour.


At this point in time, I will reiterate my demands to you that General Dallaire be brought back in January. I don't see any reason why we shouldn't -- we can't proceed in January. This trial has been moving on tracks. I think it is an example for this whole Tribunal the way that we've been operating in this trial. Again, General Dallaire is a very important witness. I understand your comments from yesterday, Mr. President; I understand -- I have difficulty with the fact that you are saying that in other instances they have had less time than we had with General Dallaire, and, with all due respect, I have to disagree with you on that. You have to consider that in other cases General Dallaire was -- first of all, he was present, we didn't have these technical difficulties, and, in other cases -- in one case, he testified in Defence, and in the Bagosora trial he testified basically against one accused. It's a bit different here; the substance is different, the context is different. And, again, for the record, anyways, I have to reiterate that demand, because I have a 43-page outline that's been polished and polished and polished. I brought it down to 43 pages. And if your decision ultimately was that General Dallaire would not be coming back, I would ask that my outline be introduced under seal so it could be ultimately assessed, the important questions that have not, because of time limitations, been put to General Dallaire.

I will do that if you so wish.

Very well. I will ask that the --

At this stage, counsel says that the questionnaire that he has prepared shall be accepted by the Court, and the Court has no objection to that and directs the registrar to bring that to us. And for the purpose of identification, we will give the marking to that too, and that will be marked as D. 166.

(Exhibit No. D. 166 (Bizimungu) admitted)

Could we have it under seal, Your Honour?

Could we have a copy of it?

And a copy to be handed over to the Prosecutor.

No, I don't want -- no. No. No. I don't want the Prosecutor to have a copy of my outline. What is this? I thought he wasn't serious.

Well, we could just move out then and leave you with the Judges then, Counsel.

These are special circumstances. It is my outline which we would consider as work product, Mr. Bâ.

The only difficulty will be that there will be no answers, only the questions. We will have to find the answers for that.

Well, I'm not expecting you, Your Honour -- that's why I'm saying we should perhaps introduce it under seal. I'm not producing this for you to read. It's just for ultimately if we did have to go on appeal -- I mean, it's our questions; we have raised this issue on many occasions and especially with General Dallaire, it is unfair, and we haven't --

The difficulty is that there should be a reason for producing this document. Are you producing it so that later on you can say that you were not able to ask the questions? Otherwise, then this will not be proper Court proceedings any longer.

Mr. Bâ, in the United States it is called offer of proof and it is directly for the purposes of appeal, that a defence counsel who has not been allowed to cross-examine a witness properly gives to the Court an indication of what he would have cross-examined on if given the time, that is, for the purposes of an appeal if an appeal comes.

Given then at the appeals level, we will be part of the trial, so we should be in a position to be able to respond. That having been said, you can put it in under seal.

That it has been given to the Defence will be reflected in the record, so whether this document is going to help them, I doubt very much. But, anyway, if it is going to be helpful to them, let it be there.

The Court will be adjourned for 45 minutes.

At this point, Your Honour --

Yes, one second. General Dallaire, you may come after 45 minutes.


Just one thing, Your Honour. Since Maître Bâ has no problems with the Bruguière report, so he says, we would like to introduce that report at this point in time. And as indicated, I think it was, yesterday --

Yes, Counsel Bâ?

Although the procedure doesn't seem to be appropriate, as far as I'm concerned -- well, if you feel that some connection has been made with the witness through the Bruguière report, there is no problem. You can produce it. Now, whether you do it now or at some other point, it would be through other Defence witnesses, so you might as well do it now. The difficulty is that we need a translated version of this document. That is why it must go into the registry. No objection from the Prosecutor.

Yes. I can't remember that this Court -- I think in the other military case that it has been accepted, but -

It has been introduced.

I saw something. But, anyway, I don't know whether that will be helpful to this case. But anyway, if you so wish, I will put this on the record.

Thank you, Your Honour.

And at this stage, Counsel MacDonald intends on introducing -- what is the name -- I am unable to remember now.

Well, I've referred to it as the Bruguière report, which is perhaps not the proper designation. Perhaps we should call it -- we've referred to it as the Bruguière report, and unless Mr. Bâ has any difficulties with it, but that is --

No. The Bruguière report.

And the first thing would have to be that this report would have to be translated --


-- under your auspices.

Yes. I think yesterday I gave a direction that it should be translated in due course. This document is marked as D. 167.

(Exhibit No. D. 167 (Bizimungu) admitted, under seal)

Counsel, with regard to this report, I see various witnesses come (inaudible) -- and they are now saying that the judge has misquoted them and various things, so what is the value that we can -- what is the value that we can -- is there any way that --

Mr. Bâ raised that yesterday, and, as you know, it was the exact wording as what General Dallaire had said in Military I, so I think we have to give credit to that report.

Mr. Jegede, what about the other matter that I raised with you yesterday? Will it be ready tomorrow?

It is ready. We have done it today, Your Honour.

We can do it today?

No. We have had contact with Defence counsel and we will settle the matter. I don't know. It is up to them to present it when they are ready.

Okay. So we will -- so it is only a question of accepting those documents and giving them numbers.

That is right, Your Honour.

So during the break tomorrow, we can do it. If you both get together and do it, then we can move faster and finish it.

That's right.

Just one thing, Your Honour. My legal intern has met with Mr. Jegede. Apparently Mr. Jegede opposes 28 of the 71 documents. In other words, Mr. St-Laurent's position was to the effect that these documents should be introduced under D as opposed to ID, and I think Mr. Jegede --

So, let us take a decision on that.

Well, I can't -- I wouldn't be in a comfortable position to plead that. So what I would suggest is, if we do it that way, that the documents that are deposited under ID would be, in French, (French spoken), that Mr. St-Laurent could come back to you on this matter and perhaps introduce the arguments that he wishes pertinent.

Yes, that would be fine. He can -- if he can bring something to show the relevancy and admissibility, we can change the ID number.

The Court will sit at five.

(Court recessed at 1615H)

(Court resumed at 1700H)

The last document that was given by Mr. MacDonald should be kept under seal, the questionnaire that he has prepared.

Yes, Mr. Black, you may start.


Q. General, are you there?

A. Yes.

Q. I'd like to say hello again. We met briefly in Arusha a couple of years ago, and I'd just like to tell you Augustin is still okay, and sometimes war is tough on people, but we'll -- I have to ask you some questions which might sound repetitive, but please bear with me.

In the Military I trial January 26, 2004, General, you were asked a question about -- this question, and you gave an answer. I'm just going to ask you -- repeat the question and the answer and just ask if you said that.

I'm sorry to the interpreters, I don't have a French copy. This is in English. I'll try and read very slowly.


Q. It's page 12 of that transcript, January 26, 2004.

Question: "General, thank you. Now I understand. I was nursing some worry about that. Let me go on to another question. You talked a lot of moderate officers and other officers, I would not quite say extremists, within the Rwandan army, and I believe you classified somebody like Ndindiliyimana and somebody like Rusatira among those you consider as moderates."

The answer, which you gave was, "Yes, and this was as a result of meetings with them and the time I spent with each of them about the war. And whether you're referring to Ndindiliyimana or Rusatira or Gatsinzi, it was when the war started and particularly within that period and the reputation that I got from dealing with them and his conduct" -- I think Ndindiliyimana -- "his conduct when it came to talking about the co-chairmanship of the crisis committee.

You were asked that question and you gave that answer, sir, as best as you can remember?

A. That makes sense, yes.

Q. All right. Thank you, sir. On page 10 of the transcript of 21st January 2004 in the same trial, you were asked this question:

"What is your view on” -- they were talking about Colonel Marchal's book and some of his views and the last question was: "What is your view on that opinion of Colonel Marchal?"

The answer you gave was, "It is for me a most surprising statement, nonreflective of, certainly, the work that we did together. However, I say that with a caveat inasmuch as Colonel Marchal worked intimately with the gendarmerie in particular and elements of the government forces, and he thought highly of General Ndindiliyimana and in his cooperative efforts in regards to making whatever he could available."

So you were asked that question and you gave that answer, as best you can remember, about General Ndindiliyimana?

Oh, we lost him.

Wait for two minutes.

Yes, Mr. Black.


Q. Sorry, General, we lost you, if you're there. Did you -- did you hear that --

A. Yes, we're back on line.

Q. Okay, General. Did you hear that last question about general -- Colonel Marchal's opinion of Augustin, or do you want me to read it again?

A. If it's the part you read in -- in which --

Q. I'll read it to you.

A. It's the second question you asked me, and that's right, yeah.

Q. Okay. Now, I take it you -- you share -- you shared that opinion of General Ndindiliyimana at that time, and you still do, do you not, at least when you wrote the book?

A. As I indicate in the book, I -- I find the gentleman to be an enigma, and in so doing, let the information fall where it is.

Q. Okay. Well, let me -- let me help you with -- with that. You testified before the -- Judge Vandermeersch during their Belgian enquiry into the death of the Belgian soldiers, and you gave quite a -- a very lengthy statement to them which the Prosecution has given to us. Do you remember that?

A. I believe that's in 1995 or so, yes.

Q. Yes, that's correct, sir. On page 36 --

Yes, document number 1. I'm sorry, Mr. Bâ, and for the translators; it's document number 1. It's headed "Information Notes" and the top number in the right-hand corner is 23331. I'm referring to page 36.

Give the K number also.

I'm sorry, sir. It's page 35. The K number on the page I'm -- of the document is K0191482. And then we're going to go to page 35 of that document, paragraph 77, which is K0191521.

I got it.


Q. Yes, sir. And they asked you what contact you had with Augustin Ndindiliyimana and so on, and you state in paragraph 77 -- and I have to put this on the record, so please bear with me. You say,

"The force commander" -- that is you -- "held regular contacts with Mr. Ndindiliyimana, the chief of staff of the gendarmerie, a moderate, who had relations with both moderate and hard-line political leaders. Mr. Ndindiliyimana appeared to the force commander to be sincere, when on 7th April 1994” --

Just a moment. Where are you reading from? Page 35, paragraph 77 -- 67. Can you go all over again, because I think there is a problem with the French interpretation.

Okay. I'll try and read it more slowly. Maybe it's me.


Q. Sorry, General. Okay, you said,

"The force commander held regular contacts with Mr. Ndindiliyimana, the chief of staff of the gendarmerie, a moderate who had relations with both moderate and hard-line political leaders. Mr. Ndindiliyimana appeared to the force commander to be sincere, when on 7th April 1994 he told him that they were doing all they could to save the Belgian soldiers in Camp Kigali."

You wrote that? That was your answer at the time; that's correct?

A. That's correct.

Q. Okay. Now, paragraph 78 you state further,

"The chief of staff was known to the force commander as an intelligent and cooperative officer who seemed genuinely loyal to the peace process. The force commander received information which possibly linked the chief of staff with a weapons cache; however, his involvement with the affair was never confirmed. After receipt of that information, the force commander treated the chief of the staff with a certain element of suspicion. During the war, he saved a number of the Rwandans and was always as responsible as possible to the force commander. The chief of staff fled in late June as extremists were eliminating -- eliminating suspected moderates, and he was being targeted."

That was also your answer, sir?

A. That's correct.

Q. Next paragraph, 79, you state -- you stated,

"The position taken by the chief of staff of the gendarmerie during a meeting at the RGF headquarters at approximately 2230 hours on 6 April was that the gendarmerie should be deployed throughout the city in order to maintain security. When he met the force commander the following morning, he stated that Camp Kigali was in the hands of rogue elements, that RGF officers were trying to control the situation and had been fired upon, that the soldiers were out of control, and that the force commander was not permitted to go to the camp, given the risks involved."

That was also your answer, sir?

A. That's right.

Q. Okay. And the last one in this document. Paragraph 80,

"Mr. Ndindiliyimana was informed of the killing of the ten Belgian peacekeepers on 7th April 1994 (2100 hours) at the -- at the army headquarters in the presence of the force commander. They both left for the Kigali hospital morgue where they discovered the scene of the dead Belgian soldiers piled outside the building. The chief of staff appeared to be shocked and was apologetic for the state of the corpses. Upon the assistance of the force commander, he ordered that the bodies be cleaned up and laid out in dignity, and stated that those who had committed this terrible act would be found."

You also gave that answer, sir?

A. That is correct.

Q. I'll just ask you about that episode in the hospital. I'm -- my information is that -- that General Ndindiliyimana also offered his own money to the morgue staff to do that. Is that -- is that correct? Do you remember that or not?

A. I would suspect if he did that, he did it after I left. We were still -- when -- when I was there, we were at the scene, and he told me that it would be -- so did Gatsinzi -- that they would sort this thing out, so I -- I honestly don't know how that happened or, you know, what method they used.

Q. Okay.

Perhaps this document could be marked as the next -- the next Defence exhibit, sir, if I could. This was -- this -- any objection? I think the title should be "Interview with Dallaire by --

One second.

I'm sorry, sir.

The document bearing number K0191482 is marked as D. 168, in brackets Ndindiliyimana.

Yes, please.

And maybe the title could be --

Information note.

Well, it's answers to questions submitted to Major General Dallaire by the judge (unintelligible) general of the military court. There's no date on this.

(Exhibit No. D. 168 (Ndindiliyimana) admitted)


Q. And just one last transcript I'd like to read to you from the Military I trial, again about the hospital episode. Can you confirm this: You were asked about your return to UNAMIR headquarters that evening, and the question put to you by Mr. White, the Prosecutor, is -- Drew White,

"And the point that I wish to clarify is when did you leave to go back, how long did it take, and whether anything happened along the way?"

This is page 55 on 20th January.

And you said, "We left the hospital, went back to the headquarters. We spoke in the compound there a few minutes. I was -- I would say the timing is about 10:30ish, quarter to 11 at the latest. General Ndindiliyimana insisted that I take his escort of gendarmes, for he said that the situation was dangerous and that he wanted to provide me all the protection that he could, and so we took a route -- a southern route from west to east to my headquarters because there was a lot of shooting going on around the CND, Mille Collines hotel and the Presidential Guard camp."

You gave that answer, sir?

A. Yes, yeah.

Q. And you can confirm also that the -- you say you were involved in what appeared to be an ambush going around one roundabout, and you were fired upon. Isn't it true also in your book you mentioned that the gendarmes fired back, maybe not so effectively, but they did try to fire back at whoever -- in the dark whoever was shooting at you?

A. (Inaudible) and looked back as tracer bullets were coming towards us. I was left with the impression that the gendarmes in the vehicle behind us were, in fact, firing back. They were not all laying on the floor.

Q. All right. Thank you, sir. And can you also confirm that -- the second part of your answer you say -- when you arrived at the headquarters you say,

"No one was injured, nor any of the gendarmes. In fact, the gendarmes arrived at the headquarters and then said they are not going back because the risks are too high for them to return" -- and it's "pack up" but maybe it means "back up Ndindiliyimana."

So you confirm that they stayed at your headquarters that night, those gendarmes?

A. That is correct.

Q. Thank you, sir. If Ms. Leblanc has my documents somewhere before her, I'm going to refer to document number 13, which is a single letter from Luc -- Colonel Marchal to then Colonel Ndindiliyimana, dated, it looks like, 31st December 1993, if you can find that. There's a big number 13 in the left-hand corner.

A. Right, got it.

Q. Now, I have to read this into the record, General, so please bear with me. My French accent is not that good, but it reads this way.

It's addressed to "Mon colonel" and if reads, "The execution -- the implementation of the clean corridor operation (that is, the installation of an RPF battalion and its political authorities) was a success, and I believe we should -- we should be gratified by it. We have just accomplished one important -- we have just taken one important step in the process towards peace. It would not have been possible without the perfect collaboration which existed between the gendarmerie nationale and the UNAMIR. As the person in charge of this implementation, I was able to appreciate the good work done by the national gendarmerie and their exemplary conduct all along. The excellence of the -- their contribution goes to the credit of the entire gendarmerie. And I wish, by this, to express my very sincere gratitude to you for the commitment and competence that your gendarmes showed. And I will wish you to forward this to all the persons concerned. Yours sincerely, Colonel Luc Marchal."

Did you -- did you receive a copy of that letter, General Dallaire, from Colonel Marchal at the time?

A. I'm not sure I received a copy of that letter; however, I also have in my mind that correspondence was also written by me, and I'm not sure if Mr. Booh-Booh signed, also indicating the work that the gendarmerie and -- I'm trying to think of the other elements that were involved, you know, the political (inaudible) this to happen, but I don't have copies of that. I'm just going by -- trying to refresh your memory.

Q. Right. But you will agree that -- perhaps the Court's not aware of the operation. That -- that operation I'll suggest to you was the mission -- or the operation by which the RPF battalion and politicians were escorted from Mulindi into Kigali, and they had a MINUAR -- a UNAMIR and gendarme escort to prevent any -- any attacks or a ambushes, is that correct, generally speaking?

A. That was the most -- that was the highest risk operation that we could have taken with the limited resources, and if we hadn't had the gendarmerie to help us, we would never have been able to pull it off, and so we would have been held accountable on the security side for delaying the implementation of the broad-based transitional government that was due on the 1st of January.

Q. Right. And as a result of that cooperation by the gendarmerie, did you become aware in the media -- local media that certain media and politicians criticised the gendarmes for assisting in placing the RPF -- helping place the RPF battalion in the CND, that they were regarded as somewhat --

A. I had no -- yeah. I had no media monitoring capabilities. The SRSG had one person who was a media rep, and I never got information -- certainly I don't remember any information coming to me on the negative side. I always thought that that was a plus, because we were able to help the political process move ahead.

Q. All right. But you have a memory that you may have sent a letter with similar contents to then Colonel Ndindiliyimana, the same --

A. It was either to him or to the minister of defence in -- in response, as part of our willingness to encourage the good cooperation between UNAMIR forces and the forces on the ground in our process of assisting the peace -- the peace agreement, yeah. And anyways, I'm afraid I have no specific reference to that.

Q. Okay, thank you.

I don't -- I suppose he hasn't really identified this, but maybe you consider it identified, Mr. President.

(Microphone not activated)

Or we can wait for Colonel Marchal, but --

We have already given it a D number.

Oh, you have already? That's great.

D. 70.

Oh, it's already there? Thank you very much.


Q. Now, I'm going to bore you a bit by going through your book and reading some extracts about your comments on General Ndindiliyimana and also, for the record, sir, I'm going to ask if you wrote certain words. And I'm sorry to bore you with it, but it's necessary for my case. At --

A. I'm not sure, sir, that you'll be boring me by reading my book.

Q. The vanity of all authors. I also appreciate that.

A. Exactly.

Q. All right. So in that case, you'll be happy.

Going to page 7 in the English -- page 70 in the English version, which is the one I'm using -- I think you have that before you.

A. Page 70? Yeah.

And for the French interpreters, this seems to be the second page in the extract from Dallaire's book. I don't know how it became second page, but anyway. And it's document number 5 for Ms. Leblanc -- oh, and for them, number 5 written in the right-hand corner, with General Dallaire's picture on it, of course.


Q. Okay, if you found page 70, it's just a -- it's the second paragraph, last sentence, you say this:

"Of all the officials with whom we had to work during the mission, Ndindiliyimana was by far the most helpful, candid and open."

You wrote those words?

A. And this reflected both sides of the force, be they RPF or RGF.

Q. Oh, so you regarded him as the most cooperative on either side?

A. Absolutely.

Q. Okay, thank you. And then if you can go to page 165, you are talking there about --

This is not in that selection, I'm sorry, I don't believe. I apologise for the interpreters, but you can do a loose translation. It's okay with me. I'll try and read slowly.


Q. You're talking about control of movements of men and materiel, and you -- and you say on page 165, about the fifth line down, that sentence beginning

"The minister of defence," you say, "The minister of defence then intervened with a request to deploy the military police battalion of over 400 troops inside the KWSA in static guard duties to relieve -- relieve the gendarmerie of those tasks. The minister argued that the gendarmerie was burning out and needed" -- I'm sorry -- "and needed reinforcement." And you continue, "I categorically refused both requests as the gendarmerie, although stretched" --

Respectfully, Your Honour, the French booth did not get the beginning of counsel's reading.

All right, I'll --

(Microphones overlapping)...start again.


Q. Okay. You said,

"The minister of defence then intervened with a request to deploy the military police battalion of over 400 troops inside the KWSA in static guard duties to relieve -- relieve the gendarmerie of those tasks. The minister argued that the gendarmerie was burning out and needed reinforcement."

And then you go on to say you deny both requests, for certain reasons. But you wrote those words, and that was the situation, that the gendarmerie was in a deplorable state at that time?

A. No, it wasn't in a deplorable state. It was in the state of being stretched yes.

Q. Okay.

A. But introducing the 400 military police as military troops into the equation of deployments within the city would have changed the nature of the KWSA structure, and I felt that the gendarmerie was still in the position to hold its duties. And, secondly, you don't use military police in a situation of peace to protect civilian general population type of targets, unless you got a curfew or something of that nature.

Q. Okay. Let me turn to page 173 of your book. There's a brief passage there.

And this is in -- yeah, this is the first page in the handout for the translators.


Q. This is again about crowd control, and you say at the top of that page,

"Ndindiliyimana appealed to me once again to ask the UN for nonlethal riot gear so that his gendarmes could control the violent demonstrations without having to resort to lethal force."

And then at the very bottom of that page you go back to that subject and you say, last paragraph,

"I took it upon myself to lobby the French, German and Belgian ambassadors for riot gear for the gendarmerie, but neither country would commit those resources," which puzzled you.

So when I say a deplorable state, what I mean -- I suppose what I -- I maybe didn't use the correct words, but that the gendarmerie didn't have all the -- the means at its disposal that a normal national police force would have, say, in Canada, to -- to control violent demonstrations; is that correct?

A. They did not have nonlethal weapons or instruments like bottles or tear gas or . . . nor did they have protective shields or helmets in order for them to -- to move into crowds and conduct riot control. So, they had, in the past, used their presence, plus the weapons, but that was an escalation of use of force for which they were accused, in the past, of being a bit trigger-happy or overresponsive.

Q. You -- I take it you contributed to Jacques Castonguay's book, Les Casques bleus au Rwanda; that's correct? Because he cites you in his book as one of the contributors, and Major Beardsley and others.

A. Yes, he interviewed me, yes.

Q. All right. And on page -- I don't know if you -- you probably don't have a copy?

And I'm sorry for everybody. I only came across this very late, these passages.


Q. Page 64 of that book, sir, Professor Castonguay says, with respect to the gendarmerie -- do you have a copy? General, do you have a copy of that book or you don't?

A. No, sorry.

Q. Oh, I'm sorry. So I'll read it -- I'll read it in my bad French and bear with me. Jacques Castonguay says, "Further, it must be said that the gendarmerie, whose responsibility it was to carry out arrests, was not, in itself, without fault. Including having Tutsis in its ranks, it had been infiltrated by extremists and lacked staff, equipment, and financial resources. Its chief of staff, which the chief of the UN -- whom the UN commander thought he had -- he could deal with, was not indifferent, nor did he have any illusions about his organisation.

"Faced with -- faced with the banditry and the increase in -- the increase in demonstrations, the gendarmerie, on more than one occasion, found itself overwhelmed by events. Since they did not have the necessary equipment to control the crowd and also not having communication equipment -- the necessary communication equipment, nor appropriate vehicles, nor even the necessary fuel to move the vehicles, they, therefore, did not have the capability of an impressive gendarmerie."

Would you agree with that assessment? In fact, did that come from you?

A. I don't know if -- if he's quoting me or reporting what I said, but essentially, the gendarmerie was -- was better trained than the army, had a higher proportion of Tutsis in it, including in their officer and NCO corps, than the army ever had. And in the opinion of the French colonel of the gendarmerie, who was the principal adviser, was a force that had a reasonable capability of conducting its duties.

And by the end of March, because there was no broad-based transitional government, the current government that was operating under Madam Agathe was running out of resources so teachers were not being paid, troops were not necessarily being fed, and fuel was hard to come by, as well as spare parts for the vehicles and replacement radios and the like. And so the gendarmerie was finding it difficult to be able to accomplish its full spectrum of responsibilities.

Q. And do you know what he means by -- when he says "infiltrated by extremists." What does that mean?

A. Informal conversations with different elements of the population, leaders, and I'm trying to grasp whether or not I got that from a dinner, supper party with the French gendarme colonel, and I can't put my hand in the fire on that. It was made clear to us that the gendarmerie, which was better trained and more, sort of, reflective of the reconciliation of the country, had elements in there that were of much more hard-line extremists perspectives and that they were spread throughout the units.

Later on in the war that was confirmed by General Ndindiliyimana, and one of the reasons why he felt that the gendarmerie could not necessarily coalesce into a counterforce to the extremists units that were involved with the killing behind the lines and so on.

Q. I've heard it said from a couple of informants, witnesses, that he had -- he had said, around the 8th and the 9th, to certain people, perhaps you yourself, that he, in fact, felt he had no real command. Did he ever say that to you?

A. Yes, I recall him explaining to me -- and we had a couple meetings during that time frame, so I don't remember exactly which one -- that because the country was now reverting to a war footing again, that the command of the gendarmerie was reverting to the command of the army, and that although there were elements that would still be deployed behind the lines in a sort of general security, and I never really got a figure on how many of those they were involved -- how many thousand involved, that the gendarmerie was to be responsive under command of the -- the chief of staff of the army. That's how he explained the less-than-available presence of the gendarmes to a specific point to stop all these damn barriers and stuff that were going up left, right, and centre.

Q. All right. So, you said at one point in your movements around Kigali those first few days that certain barricades -- you said there were regular tactically necessary barricades raised by the -- both the RPF and the RGF. You also said you saw some -- at a certain barricade you said you saw some gendarmes with militia. I take it that those were not gendarmes, in your opinion, under the command of General Ndindiliyimana; they would have been what you call rogue elements or deserters or civilians in gendarme uniform?

A. Well, that's what I was being told by Ndindiliyimana, and I had, truly, no way of discerning that; although, quite often they were drugged up or drunked up and quite wild, and some of them were only in half uniforms, as I indicated before. Yeah, that's it.

Q. So which would indicate that they were either deserters or soldiers out of control, not in anybody's command. Wouldn't that be your -- your -- your opinion -- professional opinion, if they're drugged up and drunked up?

A. Yeah, you're -- I -- I cannot confirm whether or not they were under an authority, be it an Interahamwe authority or simply they were rogue elements running around. There were some checkpoints established by the gendarmerie in a formal way, just like the army, just like the Presidential Guard. And there were a whole bunch of informal ones set up by the Interahamwe, the local population in which we did find some gendarmes and some soldiers. And so -- I mean, it's 50/50. Were they part of a plan? Well, both Ndindiliyimana and Bizimungu and Bagosora, the third one, all told me that this was absolutely essential. So did they then deploy troops to reinforce those (inaudible)? I mean, that would be a toss-up, I'm afraid, at that point.

Q. Right. In any event, neither in your book nor in any situation report that I can find did you ever reproach General Ndindiliyimana for seeing certain gendarmes or people appearing to be gendarmes at certain barricades, you never reproached him for that. And I take it because you never really thought that he was responsible for that; is that correct?

A. Well, it had been made clear early on that, in fact, those troops were -- were no more really under his command, except some elements in general security around the country, and so my complaint on that was far more directed towards the army, the chief of staff -- correction, the chief of staff, yes, of the army, Bizimungu, and the minister of defence.

Q. Okay. Going back to the book again at page 190, sir, you talk about a meeting with -- at the last paragraph on that page --

I'm not sure if it's in this -- no it's not in this extract. I'm sorry. My apologies again to the interpreters.


Q. You talk about a meeting with Colonel Marchal, Bizimana, and Ndindiliyimana, and Faustin Munyazesa. And you said this, you say,

"I told Ndindiliyimana" -- this is about riot control. "I told Ndindiliyimana that his gendarmes were not doing enough to help my troops get a grip on the riots. In defence, he confessed that he didn't really know what to do. His men -- his men were burnt out. Their vehicles were breaking down, and they were almost out of fuel. Besides, he had -- he added with a significant glance at the minister of the interior, he wasn't getting any political direction on the use of lethal force. His men had no other way to disperse the crowds, no riot gear, no tear gas or water canons. He also needed reinforcements to weather the crisis."

And did you -- when he -- when he said that to you, was there further discussion about how he could be assisted or whether there could be more assistance to the gendarmerie to accomplish that mission?

A. I remember attempting to work out a deal by trying to get him fuel and so on, but ultimately, I wasn't successful because the UN staff would not permit that to happen. Yet, there were still all kinds of cars and so on running around, so fuel was still available. It was a question of whether or not he or the gendarmerie was having access to versus, let's say, the army at that time.

Q. Well, in fact, on the next page you suggest that you proposed mixed patrols, gendarmes and UNAMIR, and he objects, saying he didn't have any -- enough vehicles, and you suggested that his men could ride with your troops. Is that correct -- a correct account of the conversation?

A. Yeah, we were -- we were actually -- sorry. We were actually going to break new ground in having all three elements there, the RPF, the RGF and -- and the UNAMIR, doing joint patrols to demonstrate the transparency and the willingness of all to keep the peace and to implement it. And the aim at that time was to try to stop the rioting and the exactations that were going on at night against certain people, and also the -- ultimately the implementation of the curfew that the minister of defence imposed.

Q. Okay. If you can now turn to page 202.

I don't think it's in this extract either. I'm afraid not. It's just a very short passage.


Q. Page 202 at -- just above -- midway down the page. It says, "Then Ndindiliyimana." And you're talking about a meeting with Bizimana and Ndindiliyimana is there and problems with the -- that the RPF was reinforcing the CND compound. And you say -- you say this:

"Then Ndindiliyimana again tried to insist that since his gendarmerie was overtaxed, I should allow him to beef up his forces with RGF troops. That would breach the KWSA agreement, and I said no."

So I take it that Ndindiliyimana was so cooperative that he -- he would never -- he didn't do things on his own. He would always come to you and ask for permission to move his troops around or to redeploy -- redeploy -- redeploy people on missions and so on?

A. No decisions, as far as I know -- and Luc Marchal was closer to the day-to-day operations of that area, but I know of no events where he moved forces without informing the KWSA authorities, and certainly in any major operation like this would be because of the state of affairs. He raised them only at those meetings, and so he was quite transparent, as far as I could determine, and I found that most supportive of him wanting troops.

However, at the same time, the suggestions that were coming forward were always suggestions to move more troops, either into the KWSA, deploy more troops in a -- in a tactical fashion around KWSA, and it started to look a little bit like we were trying to manoeuvre forces in the KWSA at a time when we had such political impasse.
I wouldn't go so far as to say -- I absolutely have no proof -- that Ndindiliyimana was part of a cabal with the minister of defence to actually try to get the forces redeployed in Kigali. I can't go that far to say something of that nature, I'm afraid. I'm not afraid; I mean, it's just fact.

Q. In fact, you've not -- you've got no evidence that there were any secret movements of troops in order to reinforce the gendarmerie, and he did, in fact, ask you several times -- go to you to seek permission to do so, correct? You're not aware of secret --

A. From the gendarmerie -- yeah, in the case of the gendarmerie, I have absolutely no reports of any manoeuvring outside of the KWSA rules.

Q. Okay. Now, something curious. Several times in your book it struck me, and many others, I'm sure -- refer to page 223 -- you talk as if you expected him to lead a coup of some sort. Could you explain why you felt -- felt that at the time, or that was your appreciation of the situation at the time? I can give you several references but --

A. (Microphones overlapping)

Q. Okay. Page 223 is the first reference.

We lost him.


Q. And you --

Mr. Black.

I'm sorry. Oh, we lost him.

Mr. President, what time -- what time are we going to take the break?

In 45 minutes.

In 45 minutes?


And then till eight?

No -- yeah, then we will take a 15-minute break and go on till eight.


I think it's okay now.


Q. We got cut off again. Did you find that reference --

A. Right.

Q. Now I've lost it. 223. Now, you say --

A. Right. Could we go maybe back to the question, if you don't mind.

Q. Sure. Sure, no problem. You're talking about a meeting with Bagosora and Ndindiliyimana there, and you say,

"Bagosora's presence undermined my frail hope that perhaps this coup, if it was a coup, had been launched by the moderate members of the military and the gendarmerie."

Why did you -- why did you have that expectation or sense or -- that there might be a coup by certain officers in the army or gendarmerie, and for what purpose?

A. The (inaudible) of the frictions that were going on amongst the different components in Rwanda at that time, be it the RPF on our side, be it the known identified people as moderate politicals on the government side, others who were perceived as hard-line in regards to their Hutu allegiances, on also the government side, and then those who were perceived outright extremists identified as such by a whole series of different groups of people from NGOs, to media, to observers, and I speak of, in that case, of the CDR type, and those frictions had established an atmosphere that was not conducive to actually bringing about the peace agreement.

And as we've gone through previously, we were in a state where we were expecting a spark or something to blow the lid off this thing if a political solution was not found.

And so here we have a situation, and my -- my instinctive reaction is that, are these guys for real or am I facing possibly an action being taken by either rogue officers or officers who were ultimately taking -- taking over control?

The way this phrase is written is -- is not particularly clear, and I would like to go over it one more time.

Q. Sure.



Q. Sure.

A. "Bagosora undermined my frail hope that perhaps this coup -- if it was a coup -- had been launched by the moderate members of the military and the gendarmerie." And what I was trying to communicate there is that maybe the moderate officers with whom I had been talking previously, candidly, were actually going to displace the very hard line, if not extremist, officers of the military, and bring about a more conciliatory situation in regards to solving the political impasse.

Q. Okay. And then you saw Ndindiliyimana as one of the potential leaders of that group?

A. Absolutely.

Q. Is that why you refer to him once in your book as an enigma, because you expected him -- him and others to mount or stage a coup or something like that, but he didn't move when you expected him to; is that why you were puzzled by him?

A. It -- well, the first indication was that sort of MRND headquarters and weapons that allegedly was his, and I never saw a document, but it was sort of confirmed by a couple of sources. But from there, it was mostly the actions on the 7th and subsequently, where there was -- and the evening of the 8th, where there was a sort of a quiet, tacit acquiescence to what Bagosora was doing. And Bagosora had been throughout, from the first day we ever met, had been an interlocutor who was exceptionally reticent to the peace agreement and its evolution.

Q. Two things. Going back to the MRND and the weapons cache at his house. You know -- he told you, I'm sure, to explain that situation to you, that he had rented that house at a commercial rate to the MRND and had no knowledge of the contents. Is that correct? That it was rented at a commercial rate, on a commercial basis.

A. Yeah. I'm not sure if he -- yeah, if he actually told me or I got it from Luc Marchal, but you're absolutely right, it was a commercial venture on his part. He had a couple of houses that he was renting.

Q. Okay. Now, go to page 224, and we're talking about -- you're talking about the authority of Madam Agathe. And at the bottom of page 224 -- and I don't think this is in this extract either -- you say this:

"I turned to Ndindiliyimana, who said he wanted to place gendarmerie guards at Radio Rwanda, the telephone exchange, and the utilities and fuel complexes. These were sensible sites to secure, though I insisted that everything be coordinated with Kigali sector under the rules of the KWSA agreement. Ndindiliyimana agreed."

And that's when you state he's an enigma.

And then on the next page over, you state that you directed Luc, Colonel Marchal, to link up with Ndindiliyimana to work out the details of these patrols, which they did. That's correct, that that conversation took place like that?

A. That's right.

Q. And on page 228, the second -- the first full paragraph on that page, second sentence, you say: "Luc" -- it was about 2 o'clock in the morning. You say:

"Luc had worked out a comprehensive plan for joint patrols with Ndindiliyimana. The trouble was that the plan called for a lot of Belgian troops to be moving around town at night, which I thought would be a provocation. I asked him to cut back, since that was the last thing we needed. And I told him to send an escort to Agathe's house." Is that also correct, that that's how things developed, that Ndindiliyimana did cooperate with Colonel Marchal?

A. Yes, that's --

Q. Sorry.

A. That's to the best of my memory.

Q. And why -- let me ask you this: Why did you feel, at that time at 2 o'clock in the morning on the 7th, that having Belgian troops move around at that time would be a provocation? Because at that point, I don't think the radio stations had -- maybe I'm wrong. My impression is they hadn't broadcast news that the Belgians were suspected of having taken part in the shoot down of the plane. So why did you feel that would be a provocation?

A. The reason why -- the reason why is that, upon my return and having gone through the city, the troops moving around at night, with not particularly well-lit streets or identifiable markings, could potentially be mistaken and taken as targets. We did not conduct massive patrols at night. In fact, they were more static than that. And because there were already rogue troops out in -- in the area, what I didn't want to do is have an altercation between the Belgians -- or, my troops and those rogue elements, or the elements that were already deployed. And so I wanted to wait till first light.

However, the escort to Madam Agathe, to me, was considered absolutely essential, and that's why I let that happen, as well as moving a force at the airport to try to get to the crash site and secure that.

Q. All right. But there was no doubt in your mind that General Ndindiliyimana, at that point, was quite willing to put his men at risk and on the streets to try and keep the city calm and maintain some sort of stability?

A. Yeah, I won't negate that the -- he was cooperative in doing that within the limited resources. And he could still do it with his resources. It's just that I felt it was putting the Belgians too much at risk at -- in those night-type of operations with an uncertain set of circumstances, with forces already deployed. And seeing the -- the Presidential Guard, in particular, who had not been the most amiable of forces in regards to applying the KWSA, I didn't want some altercation to happen between them.

Q. Okay. Well something on page 258 puzzles me about that answer; maybe you can clarify that for me. On page 258, which is also not in this selection -- just one sentence. You say, at the last big paragraph -- second sentence, you said:

"We all had to help Rusatira and Ndindiliyimana gain control of the Presidential Guard and stabilise the city."

I don't understand how that was to happen. What was the idea there?

A. Whereabouts is that on the page, sorry?

Q. Sorry, sir. If you go down to the paragraph beginning with the word "Luc" at the bottom of the page. It's the last full paragraph beginning with "Luc". And then in the second sentence it says: "We all had to help Rusatira", page 258. If you can read that.

Page number, please?

Oui, it's 258, in English.

Yeah, okay, got it.


Q. In another version it says at the same page, "Gatsinzi and Ndindiliyimana". Maître MacDonald has a book in English where it says "Gatsinzi", so which is correct?

A. That's the famous second edition.

Q. Oh, okay. So we should read "Gatsinzi"?

A. Absolutely.

Q. Okay. Now, why -- why would you include -- since Gatsinzi was chief of the staff of the army at that point, and he would be in control, I guess, of the Presidential Guard, why would you include Ndindiliyimana in the attempt to gain control of that unit?

A. Because Ndindiliyimana was the head of the crisis committee, still, at that point. So he had a lot of overarching responsibility, and it was the matter of having the two of them get whatever capabilities we could give them for them to get on with running the -- well, running the show.

Q. Okay, so it wasn't in any way a sense of a military operation by the gendarmes against the Presidential Guard? It doesn't have that sense about it?

A. No, the -- I mean -- no, I'm taking that for granted, that the gendarmes were reverting by then, or would be reverting if we went to war, to the army. But what we had here was an army unit, which is the most elite unit of the whole country, running amok in town. The gendarmes certainly didn't have the capabilities of getting control of those guys, so it had to be the army.

Q. Okay. Now, going to page 292, we've had this from Alison Des Forges, the same thing, I just want to confirm it with you as well. On the second paragraph you'll see the date April 13th, midway down the page. And you talk about this famous communiqué by Rusatira, Gatsinzi, and various other officers. You say -- submitting that there should be an unconditional surrender as of April 13th. And you say this:

"I wondered why Ndindiliyimana's signature was not on the communiqué, but I found out from him the next day that he'd been stuck in Butare helping some Tutsis escape from the country and hadn't been able to get back in time to sign."

Is that how the conversation went?

A. Yes, generally speaking, yes.

Q. And did he give any details about these Tutsis and who they were and how he was saving them, that you can remember?

A. I don't -- I don't think it's family. I -- there was a reason why he was down there, there was particular people. The killing really hadn't started much down there by then, and so I'm not -- to be quite honest, I don't remember whether it was family members, or extended family, or people he knew, or something of that nature. I cannot remember; I'm sorry.

Q. All right. By the way, are you also aware that, as a Prosecution witness confirmed here -- one of his escort members confirmed, and Alison Des Forges also confirmed, that he had taken into his house in Kigali, his residence there, 37 Tutsi orphans and a couple of Tutsi priests, at some risk to himself, and then later had them taken down to Gitarama -- down south for protection? Did he tell you that? Were you aware of that, that he was engaged in that activity?

A. Oh, you're pushing the limits here. I -- there was something about his house, I do remember. But I -- I can't tell you. I'm sorry.

Q. No, that's all right, we've got it from another two Prosecution witnesses. I just wondered if you knew anything about that.

A. There was something about the family and so on and the house, but I -- it's -- it's too jumbled, I'm sorry.

Q. Okay. Were you aware that some time in -- I'm not sure if it's April or May -- I think April, that Radio Muhabura put out a communiqué saying that General Ndindiliyimana was dead, or had been killed by northern officers?

A. Ah --

Q. Did you -- were you aware of that?

A. I'm afraid I don't remember that --

Q. Okay.

A. -- no, I don't remember that.

Q. If you can go to page 305. And just going back to a point you made before, confirming a point. On that page, in the second paragraph on that page, you say:

"There were more requests for assistance as the rogue elements of the RGF and gendarmerie overtly allied with the Interahamwe and other militias."

So again, your impression at the time, or when you wrote the book, was that it was rogue elements, deserters, or people not under the chain of command who were causing a lot of the trouble, mixing with the Interahamwe; is that correct?

A. In -- in the areas out of the operational area, like in parts of Kigali or other places, I would agree entirely that we saw elements. It didn't look structured in any way, and so I'm -- I'm sort of left with the impression that they could be rogue elements, or deserters, or people just using the uniforms at the time. And so I can't give you, you know, a true account of all the roadblocks, where some were totally just manned by military and gendarmerie and a mixture. But what I'm trying to say here is there were so many of these roadblocks all over the place, and on a number of them you would find one or two or three gendarme soldiers or whatever. Were they enough to influence that gang to do their job or not? Well, that's possible. But I have no formal way of saying that those soldiers were directly following orders from a central command. I don't have that proof.

Q. Right. And from your observations and knowledge of Ndindiliyimana at that time, it wasn't consistent with his actions, anyway, was it? That he would have given orders like that anyway. I mean, just from what you knew --

A. Well, by then anyway -- yeah, he essentially didn't have a command left, as the way I saw it at the time, and the way he had explained it to me, and certainly the minister of defence never negated that, is the fact that he was sort of like a floater. He did the crisis committee and then he bounced around and was present and things like that, and he was a very senior paramilitary officer.

And one of the problems with that is that, you know, why didn't they just give it to him? Why bring in Bizimungu or somebody else? He was there and he seemed to have the respect of a number of the other officers, so why didn't they give him the command to sort things out?

Q. Mmm. Right, well, history's passed us by, so what can we do now?

If you go to page 334 -- I'm almost finished with your book, I think. Page 334, second paragraph. This is again about him saving people. You said this, you said:

"I had a report from Gatsinzi" -- oh, let me go back to that communiqué of April 12th.

So anyway, Ndindiliyimana did confirm that he supported that communiqué, correct? That he would have signed if he'd been around? That the communiqué (Microphones overlapping)

A. That's right.

Q. I'm sorry.

A. That's what he said, anyways.

Q. Okay. I have a letter from Gatsinzi saying the same thing.

Anyway, on page 334 you say:

"I had a report from Gatsinzi that Ndindiliyimana was in the south actually helping people escape."

And this date would be April 25th or so.

"And that there existed a number of RGF officers who were disgusted with the way things were going."

So did Gatsinzi report that Ndindiliyimana was helping people escape? Did he give any details about that?

A. Um -- jeez.

Q. If you can remember or not; it's okay.

A. I can't remember specifically.

Q. And then if you -- sorry.

A. He -- he had a car or -- I know he had transport and stuff, so that was quite a resource at that time. So I suspect he was using that.

Q. Right. Alison Des Forges reports that RTLM attacked General Ndindiliyimana and stated he was -- accused him of transporting around RPF troops. Did you hear about that? And gave the license plate number that put him at some risk.

A. No.

Q. That's what she says.

A. No, I hadn't heard that.

Q. Okay. Now, on page 381, I have a note here -- page 381-382 --

Which may be -- yes, it's in my -- finally -- the interpreters, it's in my selection here. It's a long passage.


Q. You say -- I call this the confession passage. I don't know -- and we all know why -- you'll know why. You say this:

"Before the attack, I had met at the Hôtel des Diplomates with Ndindiliyimana, who had finally reappeared earlier in the month at a political session in Gitarama. He had approached me to arrange to meet with him alone in Kigali. And so Ndindiliyimana and I sat together, ostensibly to resolve some gendarmerie operational concerns with the transfers between the lines. He seemed terribly ill at ease, but determined to speak his mind. He warned me that the préfet of Kigali was not to be trusted, and confided that Bizimana, the minister of defence, was despondent due to the failures in the field, the loss of his properties in Byumba, and the deaths of his relatives there. He told me that the moderate faction in the RGF, including Gatsinzi and Rusatira, was growing in strength, yet he could give me no specifics -- specifics, except that most of its members had left Kigali and were now in the south."

And we will skip the quote there, or the bracketed section.

Next page, 382 -- and by the way, this is around the date of May 21st. You continue:

"The meeting continued for about an hour, with Ndindiliyimana doing nearly all the talking. He confided that he had become the protector of a large number of persons in danger in and around Butare. He said that many people had been hiding in the ceilings, the walls, and even the latrines of their houses, and were now dying of starvation, thirst, and worse, because we could not get to them. He stressed that it was essential to create a force or a movement that was neither ethnic nor military based to govern the country. He gave me the name -- he gave me names of prominent Tutsis in the Mille Collines that had to be saved from certain death."

And then skip down to the next paragraph. You say:

"Ndindiliyimana had one last piece of advice for me. He said that the roadblocks would disappear if I used the threat of force. The local bullies would abandon the barriers when they realised that the risks of being attacked by a reinforced and bolder UNAMIR 2 were high. He believed that if UNAMIR 2 came on strong, the hardliners would melt away, and he did not think they could readily organise a reappearance. I had sat through most of our session taking in what he said with a healthy scepticism, but he was now essentially confirming the rationale behind my argument for UNAMIR 2. If he was being candid with me, I was saddened that he had never once offered to take on the mantle of leader of the moderate movement. With support from Kagame, or even just from us, we might have helped the moderates create another front, confounding the extremists' belief that they were acting in the name of all Hutus."

And you say: "The moderates' ineptness, lack of courage and commitment would cost them dearly after the RPF victory. As we said our goodbyes, Ndindiliyimana looked like a man who had been to confession but had not received absolution."

Is that the gist of the conversation you had with him?

A. I remember that one.

Q. Yeah. I mean, many people read that and it -- he looks like a man who's coming to you to really ask you to help save the country. And when you say he looked like a man who'd been to confession but had received no absolution, is it because he came to you and told you a lot of things which could help, but he walked away without any commitment to do what he was suggesting? Is that why you said --

A. You got it dead on.

Q. Okay. And why -- why was it not possible for UNAMIR 2 to act in that way, as he suggested? Military reasons, tactical resources, or political reasons?

A. The whole -- the whole concept of operations of UNAMIR 2 was -- was exactly what he was talking about. The only problem is UNAMIR 2 never appeared. The forces never hit the ground until the latter part of July, and the genocide was already over by nearly a month, and the war was over on the 18th of July. So it is nothing more than a -- than another scandalous demonstration of the international community missing a golden opportunity of saving hundreds of thousands of lives.

Q. And can I suggest to you, sir, that it also confirms that he, as commander of the gendarmerie, didn't have enough force at his hand -- at his disposal to break those barriers himself, with the gendarmerie -- or even the RGF?

A. The -- the argument that he and the other moderates ultimately stood on was the fact that they couldn't act because it was, one, going to put their families at complete risk, a point that Kagame sort of sloughed off, and I reminded him his family was not at risk when he was conducting this war.

And secondly, the units in the south, who were already identified by the hardliner commanders of the bulk of the army who came from the north, considered those units to be more moderate, were, however, infiltrated, as they said, with enough hardliners, or even extremists, that they would be totally undermined in attempting to move those units.

That -- that, however, excuse was -- was less than what I would have appreciated from them. I think they could have attempted the risk -- they were already in the south, all three of them, they had a reasonable chance of getting out, or their families, and so if the -- the absolutely -- and I speak here -- I mean, my family wasn't in the middle of it either. But if they wanted to attempt it on the one side they could have. However, Kagame was not making it easy for them, and the international community was absolutely making it impossible.

Q. All right. I've seen several references in coded cables and American Embassy documents, their assessments of the situation at that time. We discussed with Alison -- Dr. Des Forges, where they talk about "a new army". Do you know what they -- what was meant by that? Was this again something about the potential division within the RGF, or -- when they use the phrase "a new army has been established"?

A. No, I have -- no, I've got no knowledge of a new army. And in fact that term was never raised with me. There was the reconciled army of the Arusha agreement, that was one thing, or what will happen at the end of the war, that's another thing. But in regards to building a moderate force to counterattack the extremists from the south, it was never qualified as an army, but it was -- the units in the south were ideally situated to catch the extremist army between the RPF and them.

Q. Okay.

A. And they could have stopped this thing -- anyway. Sorry. Going into my military stuff here.

Q. That's okay. Just -- one question. There's a document which Mr. (unintelligible) number 2 in the left-hand corner. I want to ask you a question about this document. It's a letter from the (French spoken) in Brussels, dated July 10th, 1996. It's by the assistant counsel to the commission, written to you, asking if you could answer some questions about General Ndindiliyimana in his refugee application. And it cites "very good things I've heard about him and also some attacks on him". Did you -- did you provide an answer to that -- to that letter? In fact, did you --

A. I must say I'm at a loss --

Q. Do you remember receiving it?

A. -- I don't even remember it, I'm sorry to say.

Q. Did you ever get this letter? Do you remember receiving it?

A. Yeah, I -- I don't -- I don't remember it. However, I did -- due to my responsibility as deputy commander of the Canadian Army, and I was not in a position to support any of these requests in any way, shape, or form. And so I probably responded in the negative, if I received it. But I'm sorry I haven't -- I don't remember. And that could have been stopped even at the staff level even before I saw it.

Q. Oh, okay. So there wouldn't have been a response at all?

A. Not sure. Either no response or a response that I'm -- I'm not in a position of authority to be able to respond.

Q. Okay. I have here before me -- there's two versions -- yeah, two. There's one document labelled 17 in the left-hand corner, which is an outgoing coded cable from you to General Baril in New York dated March 30th, 1994. And the subject heading is "gendarmerie capabilities". Hopefully you can find that document.

A. Yeah, I got it.

Q. I just want to refer -- we're not going to go through the whole document, but I just want to draw your attention to --

And, for the Prosecution, this is L0025215.


Q. And it's a complete analysis of the gendarmerie, I guess as of that date, March 30th, 1994. Can you tell me why -- first of all, why this was drawn up? Who requested this? Was it General Baril?

A. This -- the reference, as para 1 indicates, is a telephone conference between my executive assistant, Major Beardsley, and a Major Miguel Martin, who was the Rwandan desk officer on the military side of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, dated the 3rd -- 23rd of March. And it required -- it requested an assessment of the national gendarmerie of Rwanda. I don't know why they wanted it at that time, although I had been asking for that equipment, but I honestly don't know why --

Now, there was discussions at that time, at the military -- joint military committee about how to demobilise the gendarmerie and rebuild the gendarmerie, and whether that should be the first element of the demobilisation or not. And my opinion was, is that they seem the most trained and have been the most responsive, that if we restructured them very rapidly, early, we would have the sort of police, judicial paramilitary body throughout the country stable, before we actually did the army, which was at a much higher risk.

Q. Do you know if an analysis of the army was done in a similar fashion as this one, with the gendarmerie?

A. No, I don't think so. I don't know if the army analysis -- no, I don't remember doing it particularly for the army. And I -- I'm trying to see what could have initiated that request, and the only thing is, is the whole exercise of the demobilisation process and where we thought risks might exist in doing that.

Q. Mmm-hmm. Okay. Okay, can I draw your attention to the second page, paragraph 9B, discussing -- the VIP security company.

For the Prosecution, L0025216. It's the second page of this document.


Q. And at the paragraph 9B at the bottom of the page --

A. Yep, got it.

Q. -- you said: "The VIP security company is responsible for the security of VIP or bodyguard duties. This company is based in Camp Kacyiru, has one jeep and two small trucks."

That's correct, that's all they had at that time, as of March 30th?

A. Well, to be quite honest, I don't think they needed much more, because they were travelling with the VIPs, so they didn't need much transport.

Q. Okay. And it's also true, is it not, that -- we can get into this later, but in passing it's true that many VIPs, for instance head of the constitutional court, (unintelligible) and other people, Lando, had UNAMIR protection, the gendarmeries were taken away and replaced at their request by UNAMIR soldiers, for protection?

A. Gendarmes were not replaced -- gendarmes were still there, VIP protection gendarmes. And we augmented the gendarmes, because my mandate was not one of protecting, it was assisting in establishing an atmosphere of security. And under that I -- I -- I sort of stretched the mandate to permit us to do VIP guards also.

Q. Okay, I'll get back to discussing details of that maybe tomorrow with you.

Okay, on the next page, paragraph 11, you say -- despite what you told me before, that you thought they had some capacity, you say: "The gendarmerie is assessed to minimum -- minimally, if not ineffective." And you then start -- you give the reasons why.

A. Mmm-hmm.

Q. Their lack of training, lack of motivation. In paragraph B, that a number of them have been arrested for crimes, that the gendarmerie is politicised at some levels, desperately short of transport, is largely immobile, in paragraph D. And you even say:

"Unable to respond to routine calls for assistance like traffic accidents, neighbourhood complaints, or even more serious violations of law and order. This is compounded by severe budget and fuel restrictions."

Sorry, I will just read the rest of it and ask you to comment.

In paragraph E: "The gendarmerie is desperately short of communications and other specialist equipment due to budgetary constraints, and they lack communication and basic equipment at the platoon and company level."

They lack, paragraph G, gas masks and tear gas. And so on.

That was -- that was -- that was -- was that done -- your assessment, or was that done by Major Beardsley -- but I guess you passed on to Baril, so you must have agreed with that at the time.

A. Yeah, yeah, this is a staff analysis of -- of using a NATO standard to analyse a gendarmerie in a country that's been at war and is suffering already from months of lack of resources on top of the initial deployment. But, you know, as I'm reading this it's bringing to mind the operations that we were starting. If you remember, the first operation on the 1st of April of doing the arms cache raids, and I was to use the gendarmerie, principally, with me at arm's length with the Belgians, and have observers from the UN CIVPOL. And what's coming back to mind is my concern about the gendarmerie's ability to do that. So I -- I can't put my hand in the fire, but I know that it was part of the arguments that I was having of why I felt I had to use my forces more than the gendarmerie.

Q. Okay, thank you.

Mr. President, if that can be marked as the next Defence exhibit, I would appreciate that.

It's already marked as 1D2.

Thank you very much. And then if we can go --

Mr. President, sir?

Maybe we can take a break.

Yes, General?

Mr. Black, you read my mind, sir.

About 15, 20 minutes. Seven -- 7, we will come back at 7.

(Court recessed at 1843H)


Yes, Mr. Black.


Q. General, are you there now?

Now, we just discussed that document, gendarmerie capabilities -- which has been made an exhibit. It was also provided to you. Ms. Le Blanc may have it as number 44. There was a covering page 43, dated 1st April, and then a number 44 dated 5th April, which is generally a critique of that report from Major Delport, who was the liaison office -- section of the civilian police in the UNAMIR, to Colonel Marchal and to you. And I just want to put certain ammendations (sic) -- corrections or additions he has made to that other report. Do you have that before you?

A. Yes, got it.

Q. Okay. If you look at page -- the 5th April document, which is subject: "Review and comments on gendarmerie capabilities" which is on the left-hand side number 44, at the bottom --

A. Got it.

Q. Okay. At the bottom of the page, it says "item", and then "comment". At the bottom of that comment, the last sentence, it says:

"It, the gendarmerie, is requested by the administrative authority, préfet, and carries out instructions under that authority's responsibility."

Now, Dr. Des Forges also stated that when a préfet or bourgmestre requisitions gendarmes they come under that authority. Is that -- that is correct, what Major Delport wrote there?

A. That is in non times of conflict, yes.

Q. Okay. And go to the fourth page in that document, where it says:

"Never" -- and in paragraph 2 says this: "On public security matters, the gendarmerie can only act upon the request of the ministry of interior, and especially on the administrative authorities, préfets, bourgmestres. Those are politicians who are sometimes in the demonstrations themselves; this means that not every demonstration is monitored by those politicians so it becomes more difficult for the gendarmerie to do a good job."

Is that also your appreciation of the situation at that time?

A. I must say, we are into a technical dimension that I'm more a neophyte, but I've got a lot of time for Delport, so I will acknowledge his knowledge of that.

Q. Okay. And then on the last page, the last repeat that they come under the orders of the administrative authority, the last sentence is:

"A deliberated initiative from the gendarmerie itself will be illegal."

That is, it can't act on its own, it has to have instructions from the minister of the interior, the préfet, bourgmestre, or the prosecutor. You just can't go out and arrest people or do things on its own. Do you think Delport is correct on that as well?

A. Inasmuch as it is applying the rules, the judicial process and the rule of law in the country, you are absolutely right. Now, there are nuances to that when they use the rapid reaction capabilities, which can be called out at a much higher level. But certainly the ministry of interior is always in the loop of that, and so the Jarri (phonetic) companies as an example, the ministry of interior was informed when they were deployed to stop some crowds or even protect Madam Agathe at one point.

Q. Okay.

Perhaps also on -- number 33 and 34, it should be one document, it should be stapled together. Can that be made the next exhibit, Mr. President? I'm not sure --


Maybe not to confuse things, just -- the document dated April 5th, just make that an exhibit. I don't know why I have this other one.

That is all you want?

No, labeled 44 dated April 5th from Delport to Dallaire. That is --

The document dated 5th April 1994, reference 255/94, there is an L number which is not very clear. Anyway, this is a letter written by Major Delport to Major General Dallaire.


That is marked at D. 170.

There is another reference REF 225/94.

Yes, I read that one.

Just one other minor thing.

Is it 169 -- D. 169, within brackets, (Ndindiliyimana).

(Exhibit No. D. 169 (Ndindiliyimana) admitted)

Yes, Counsel.


Q. I believe -- I believe Mr. MacDonald raised with you the report of your reconnaissance mission. I think it was made an exhibit --

Is that right, Mr. -- okay.


Q. I forget the exhibit number, but I want to refer you to page L0022666. It's about -- the numbering on these pages is very awkward. It is about 20 pages inside the document, under the --

A. Got it.

Q. If you go to paragraph 97, I may be trying to gild the lily here, but let me try --

Which number is that in your bundle of documents?

It is now Defence Exhibit 153, and it's -- in my bundle of documents it's No. 19. It's a very big, a thick report. The report of the UN reconnaissance mission to Rwanda. And I'm on page L00 --

It's not in the bundle that you gave us this afternoon.

I'm sorry. Anyway, Mr. MacDonald had it --

(No interpretation)

I'm going to refer to one line only.

Mr. Black, for your information, documents from 19 to 22 are missing, I think.

19 to 22. Probably because I chose not to use them. I took them out.


Q. Okay, paragraph 97, sir: "Inability of the security forces to cope with the situation" is the title. And as I say, I may be trying to gild the lily, but -- because you said -- based on what you've already said. But at that time when you made reconnaissance, you say this:

"Meetings held with the high command of the gendarmerie and inspection of several of their barracks and Kigali prison confirmed the opinion that, even with the best will in the world, the gendarmerie are totally inadequate to effectively combat crime in Rwanda and preserve law and order."

And Mr. MacDonald raised some of these points with you before, and you said that, in fact, the situation had degraded as of April 1994. So -- and you told us that General Ndindiliyimana basically had no command. So would that still be your opinion, in April 1994, that you expressed in '93?

A. Well, the -- Delport, if I'm not mistaken, did that assessment with Colonel Tikoka in the recce and the assessment is taken as a comparison with a naval-based capability or European-based gendarmerie. And so that is the assessment, which is a rigorous assessment of what they are. Now, we were informed on the recce that there was banditry and there was a lot of weapons floating around left, right and centre. And so the situation in the country was not one of a serene environment. And at the same time we were informed that the gendarmerie tended to be, well, a bit bully in its use of force, and so those were the assessments -- essentially all the assessments surrounding the gendarmerie at the time.

Q. I also have a statement here from -- did you ever meet Major Nzanzimfura who was, I believe, the -- he was the G3 chief of operations in the gendarmerie? Did you ever meet that gentleman during that period?

A. I attended a couple of briefings at their headquarters and also I remember a couple of meetings, and a number of gendarmerie officers were there, and I would have been very surprised if the G3 had not attended at least a couple.

Q. He now works in the Prosecution's office here in Arusha at the Tribunal. And he made a statement; I just want to see if you would agree with what he -- I think you would because of what you said before, but -- because it confirms what Gatsinzi says. I have a statement, Mr. -- it's the statement he made to Judge Vandermeersch, on November 30th, 1998. And I'm referring to page 99, K0191171. It has another number 9942 in the top-right-hand corner.

What is the number given in the bundle?

I'm sorry. I just found this lately so I didn't put it in the bundle, sir.


Q. In that statement -- it is in French, so please bear with me. He says this --

You were giving the K-number. Can you continue with that?

Yes, it's -- well, the document's K-number is K0191164. And there is another -- there is -- the handwritten number at the top is 9949.


Q. And he says -- Major Nzanzimfura, who was the chief of operations during the events, says:

"On several occasions, Ndindiliyimana requested for aid and assistance and I, myself, as well as other officers to go and rescue people who were threatened in the neighbourhood. I went on a number of occasions to assist Ndindiliyimana, and I recall that I went to fetch the wife of Dr. Kalimba and the other persons. I took them to Mille Collines. I also recall giving out the minibus of my department to them so that the general can evacuate people from Kicukiro to Butare -- can evacuate orphans from Kicukiro to Butare. One could say that Ndindiliyimana rescued -- conducted rescue operations sporadically, just as most of my colleagues."

Further on down, he says: "I must also say that within the gendarmerie, I got to know three officers, and a corporal had been found guilty of murder. They were arrested and imprisoned, but since those were -- there was war raging in Kigali, they were taken to the Gitarama prison. Since the Kambanda government was at Gitarama, these murderers were freed."

Would that be consistent with your appreciation of -- your association of knowledge and observation of General Ndindiliyimana, General? That he would have done these things?

A. I -- I'm going by what he has told me and the information that I had at the time. I really don't have any sort of corollary information. What you are providing me there is that in regards to prisoners, yes, I had heard that prisoners had been moved out of prison and released, and that is a fact.

Q. Okay. All right. And just one situation report -- again I don't think it is in the bundle, I'm sorry. It's a situation report dated April 15th, sir, from you to Kofi Annan. And it is a political military assessment of the situation as of 16th April 1994. And what interests me is paragraph 3 in which you say – again, maybe I'm gilding the lily, but you say:

"As far as the RGF side, they yesterday changed the chairmanship of their representation group of officers, and nominated the chief of staff of the gendarmerie, a senior officer who has had our general respect throughout, even though one of his houses was rented by the MRND, due to his sincerity. Although he had not signed the unconditional ceasefire request, as he was out of town, they all said he immediately supported the proposal."

So you don't have that before you, but is that something you remember sending or would have sent? It's K0086859, an outgoing code cable.

A. That is consistent.

Q. All right.

At this point, Mr. President, I had -- depending on how General Dallaire and I got along, I had many, many more hours of cross-examination on many, many subjects. But I might be able to let him go as of tomorrow -- the beginning of tomorrow. But I need instructions from my client. If we could break now, I don't know, I can't promise you that there may not be a need for further cross-examination.

I can see from the way you are going, covering a lot of ground, and so --

So I don't --

Yeah, I leave it to you.

I don't want to burden the general any more if I don't have to. And I need instructions. I have certain instructions to go into certain other areas, but I have an opinion about that now, so I would like to see.

Yes, we can take a break and then come back tomorrow.

Thank you very much.

General, you can take a rest now and come back tomorrow at 1:00.

Thank you, sir.

Has Counsel Black concluded?

No, he will continue tomorrow.

I may conclude. I just need instructions from my client. It may be that I conclude tomorrow at the beginning of the session.

We will --

Maybe we could have a status conference at that time.

Yes, Court is adjourned until 1:00 tomorrow.

(Court adjourned at 1925H)


We, Kirstin McLean, Leslie Todd, and Sherri Knox, Official Court Reporters for the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, do hereby certify that the foregoing proceedings in the above-entitled cause were taken at the time and place as stated; that it was taken in shorthand (stenotype) and thereafter transcribed by computer; that the foregoing pages contain a true and correct transcription of said proceedings to the best of our ability and understanding.

We further certify that we are not of counsel nor related to any of the parties to this cause and that we are in nowise interested in the result of said cause.

___________________________ Kirstin McLean

___________________________ Leslie Todd

___________________________ Sherri Knox


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