The General's Trial: Dallaire Cross-examination, 23 Nov 2006

The General's Trial: Dallaire Cross-examination, 23 Nov 2006

[Here is the cross examination of Gen Dallaire by Me MacDonald, Gen Bizimungu's counsel, on Thursday, 23 November 2006. One of the disadvantages of posting these transcripts out of chronological order (in the order which I recieve them from Me Black) is that unless you already have a pretty good idea of what happened in Rwanda between 1990 and 1994, and the role this witness had in it, then this testimony might be a little difficult to follow. To this is added the ping-pong of English and French versions of the transcripts--MacDonald often mentions he is changing from one language to the other--and as is true with all translation, it is impossible to go back and forth from language to language and hope to maintain a distinct, logical through-line to your examination. Coherence in questioning and responding through out this process is loose at best. But this witness, Roméo Dallaire, is such an important player in the creation and maintenance of the False History of the destruction of the Rwandan Revolution, that his testimony--and not just here in Military II--is absolutely essential. You also might want to refer to other articles posted @ CM/P to gain background. For example: the two essays on Hotel Rwanda (or Hot'L Rwanda), and Me Black's pieces on the Fabrication of the Dallaire fax and the murder of Agate and the Belgian commandos, among several others. But now it's off to redacting other transcripts from other days in other languages. Plenty more to come.--mc]


THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA

CASE NO.: ICTR-00-56-T THE PROSECUTOR
CHAMBER II OF THE TRIBUNAL
v.
AUGUSTIN NDINDILIYIMANA
FRANÇOIS-XAVIER NZUWONEMEYE
INNOCENT SAGAHUTU
AUGUSTIN BIZIMUNGU

THURSDAY, 23 NOVEMBER 2006

(1310H)

CONTINUED TRIAL

Before the Judges:
Joseph Asoka de Silva, Presiding
Taghrid Hikmet
Seon Ki Park

For the Registry:
Mr. Roger Noël Kouambo (Canada)
Mr. Issa Toure
Mr. Abraham Koshopa

For the Prosecution:
Mr. Ciré Aly Bâ
Mr. Segun Jegede
Mr. Moussa Sefon
Mr. Abubacarr Tambadou (Canada)
Ms. Felicitas Mushi

For the Accused Augustin Ndindiliyimana:
Mr. Christopher Black

For the Accused François-Xavier Nzuwonemeye:
Mr. Charles Taku
Mr. Hamuli Rety

For the Accused Innocent Sagahutu:
Mr. Fabien Segatwa
Mr. Seydou Doumbia

For the Accused Augustin Bizimungu:
Mr. Ronald MacDonald

Court Reporters:
Ms. Eleanor Bastian
Ms. Kirstin McLean
Ms. Leslie Todd
Ms. Sithembiso Moyo


WITNESS

For the Prosecution:
ROMÉO DALLAIRE
Cross-Examination by Mr. Taku (continued) 6
Cross-Examination by Mr. Segatwa (continued) 11
Cross-Examination by Mr. MacDonald 26


EXHIBITS


Exhibit No. D. 149 [Nzuwonemeye] 9
Exhibit No. D. 150 [Nzuwonemeye] 10
Exhibit No. D. 151 [Nzuwonemeye] 10
Exhibit No. D. 152 [Nzuwonemeye] 11
Exhibit No. D. 153 [Nzuwonemeye] 60






P R O C E E D I N G S


MR. PRESIDENT:
Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen.

The Court is in session.

Where is Mr. Black? I don't see him.


MR. MACDONALD:
I have not seen him today, Your Honour. I know he was very sick yesterday. According to the information I got, he went to the doctor's office, yesterday. And I think Mr. Segatwa saw him this morning. So -- but I am not sure, I haven't heard -- I haven't had any news from him so I am not sure what the situation is with Mr. Black.


MR. BÂ:
Well, I saw him about 45 minutes ago. We even shared a meal, here -- here, at the court; sorry, at the Tribunal premises.


MR. PRESIDENT:
Registrar, could you send somebody to look for Mr. Black?

Yes, Court is adjourned for 10 minutes -- we will be back in 10 minutes. Either Mr. Black or Mister -- his co-counsel should be here. We will be back in 10 minutes.

(Court recessed from 1310H to 1315H)


MR. BLACK:
Mr. President, I am sorry to --


MR. PRESIDENT:
Well, Counsel, we have wasted 25 minutes because of you. You must be here on time. Your co-counsel is not here, you are not here, the Accused is not here.


MR. BLACK:
I have a medical certificate that I can give to you. I was told by a doctor not to be here at all. I'm not sure what the problem is, it may be malaria, but the tests haven't come back yet -- but they recommended I do not come here today at all. However, I realise I have no one to protect my client's interest if I'm not here. So, what I am willing to do is to try and stay here as long as I can, so I don't shut things down because I have no co-counsel.


MR. PRESIDENT:
Well, . . . you do have a co-counsel.


MR. BLACK:
Not at present, I don't; not in Arusha.


MR. PRESIDENT:
Co-counsel -- I don't know, co-counsel is appointed to be here.


MR. BLACK:
Well, he's not here. And that is a fact, and I'm sick. And that's the reality. And I apologise for being late. But I had to -- I saw a doctor last night but the technicians were not available, so I saw another one this morning. I had to wait for that, so that's why I'm late and I apologise for being late and delaying the proceedings. I really am not well. You can read the note. The doctor -- a nurse told me I should not be here at all. However, I don't want to stop the proceedings. So, what I will try to do is stay as long as I can. Maybe I can last a day. So as not to delay things but --


MR. PRESIDENT:
Court is in session now, appearances as before.

Yes, Mr. Segatwa, you can continue.


MR. SEGATWA:
Thank you.


MR. BÂ:
Is Counsel Black in a position to validly represent his client? If that's not the case, then, that might be a problem. You might tell me, that I am interfering with a matter that is none of my business, but in view of the proceedings and in order to observe the rights of the Defence we need to know whether he is in a position to participate validly in these proceedings and properly represent his client.


MR. BLACK:
I don't know, I am not exactly in my best form, Mr. Bâ. So, I don't feel well. I will try and do the best I can right now. I will try and do what I can, but I am not at my best.


MR. PRESIDENT:
Yes, Mr. Segatwa.


MR. SEGATWA:
Your Honours, before my colleague, Mr. Taku, addresses the Court, I would like, following the incident that took occurred yesterday, and advise counsel that you preferred to provide the following clarifications.

Mr. President, that's Kouambo, from Ottawa, Canada.


MR. PRESIDENT:
Yes.


MR. KOUAMBO:
We have a slight technical problem. We are not getting the pictures or the images from Arusha. We can hear you, but the images are not there.


MR. PRESIDENT:
Registrar, look into that. They cannot receive pictures.


MR. SEGATWA:
Can I proceed, Mr. President, because what I am about to say is of no concern to the witness anyway?

Mr. President, I was saying that in my humble opinion in joint trials each Accused is entitled to be represented as if it was a separate or individual trial, and that is consistent with Rule 82 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. And if that is not possible, Your Honour, it will lie with the Trial Chamber, again, in conformity with Rule 82(ii) (sic) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, to order a severance to avoid any conflict of interest that may cause serious prejudice to an Accused or to protect the interest of justice.

Mr. President, you will recall that my client had sought severance right from the beginning of this trial. That stated, I formally object that counsel for an accused be directing my cross-examination which was prepared in advance and discussed beforehand with my client. And my only purpose of being here is to defend him. That stated Your Honour, let me reiterate the fact that at no point in time have I intended to prejudice the interests of other co-accused. And if for reasons beyond my own control that has been the case, I seek the understanding or crave the indulgence of the counsel and his client.

And, now, after following your wise counsel -- namely, that silence is golden and words are made of silver, and after consulting with my team and client -- I have decided to be as brief as possible, and my cross-examination would be concluded in less than an hour.

Let me thank you very much, Your Honour, for your kind attention.


MR. PRESIDENT:
Yes, Counsel, you must not take direction from other counsel. You must take directions only from the Court. Don't allow others to dictate terms to you. Yes, thank you for taking advice from the Bench. You can continue now.

If the camera can --


MR. TAKU:
May it please, Your Honours, I was advised by the registry that the technical problems that we had yesterday are resolved, and that it is advisable that we put the -- the cassette the very first thing this afternoon, because if we fail to do that, other technical problems may arise. So, we did discuss with my learned colleague, Mr. Segatwa, that will be making -- that that cassette will be on. And we crave your indulgence, Your Honour, if it does not inconvenience you in any way, then we will likely view that cassette.


MR. PRESIDENT:
Yes. I was thinking of allowing you to have it after Mr. Segatwa's conclusion.


MR. TAKU:
Yes, we can do it now.


MR. PRESIDENT:
But anyway -- anyway, if you think that it is advisable to do it now; we will finish with you and then allow Mr. Segatwa to continue.

Yes, Mr. Roger, you are following the proceedings, here. Can you get our picture?


MR. KOUAMBO:
Yes, we got it now.


MR. PRESIDENT:
Yes, there is an application now, by Mr. Taku, to get back to his CD cassette and to proceed with that and conclude his cross-examination. So we will -- I have granted that. Are you in a position to -- to play that first?

Yes, Mr. Black, what do you want to say?


MR. BLACK:
Yes, I just want to explain the co-counsel situation because you might think I am deliberately trying to arrange things so that I'm alone or something. There has been a problem trying to get him down here. He has now told me he is coming, Monday, but there has been a difficulty with communication with this co-counsel for some period of time. We've asked for him to come down several times. But, now, he's telling me he's coming Monday. So, it is not that we have not been trying to be diligent to get him here, but we haven’t been successful. It is -- and it is really difficult for me. I'm sorry.


MR. PRESIDENT:
Yes, Mr. Taku, you may put your -- give your directions to the registrar, as to what -- how we should set this up.


MR. TAKU:
Yes, Your Honours, as I had indicated yesterday, we had distributed what we would call a free transcription, and at the end of this very short exercise, we pray that you order that formal transcription be done, for the purposes of us supplying for the portion that we use of this CD cassette to be admitted into evidence.

So, if they can put on the screen, Your Honours, the first 50 seconds, that is 0 to 50 seconds of that CD cassette.

(Video cassette played)


MR. TAKU:
Now, Your Honour, they can move to 13 minutes.

Now, first, Your Honour –


ROMÉO DALLAIRE
CROSS-EXAMINATION (continued)


BY MR. TAKU:

Q. Now, General -- first, Your Honour -- General, can you situate your mind now on that interview?

A. Having looked at the cassette here, yes, it happened not very long after my return to Canada.

Q. Thank you, General.


MR. TAKU:
Now, may the technicians focus on the section from 13 minutes 00 seconds, to 15 minutes 41 seconds.

(Video cassette played)


THE ENGLISH INTERPRETER:
Your Honour, there is a slight problem with this, you know, because you know he is going quite fast and normally -- okay.

(Video cassette played)


MR. TAKU:
May the technician, please, focus on the section from 17 minutes 00 seconds to 20 minutes 00 seconds.

(Video cassette played)


MR. TAKU:
Yes, technician, please, may you move to -- from 17 minutes 00, to 20 minutes 00?

(Video cassette played)


MR. TAKU:
Now, you can stop that, technician.


BY MR. TAKU:

Q. Now, General, you gave those candid, succinct, precise and pointed answers about the events you lived, observed, participated in and carefully analysed at the moment the events were still very fresh in your memory; correct?

A. At the time I was -- I had been relieved of my command due to injury. And, so, I was under the effects of that injury, but I was responding to the questions at the time.

Q. General, well-- General Dallaire, we've listened carefully to the questions on that scene and your answers to them. With all the respects due to you, General Dallaire, I beg to ask the same questions, even as we sit in this courtroom, and I hope in all honesty your answers are the same; correct, General Dallaire?

A. Well, if you are asking me the questions, do so, sir, and I will so respond, yes.

Q. I said that -- I reiterate the same questions that you were asked in the interview. I do not intend to waste any further time. We all listened to the questions, we all listened to the answers, and my question is: Do you stand by these answers?

A. I do not stand by the completeness of those answers, no.

Q. General Dallaire, I do not intend to get into a debate on the issues with you. You gave those answers to the world at large. At the time you were not anticipating any proceedings. At the time you were free in your native Canada, and before the world media. And I take it, General Dallaire, that as force commander of the United Nations as someone who was aggrieved of what happened in Rwanda, you were not deliberately misleading the world in the answers you gave to those questions; is that right?

A. I was not?

Q. Misleading the world by the answers you gave; is that correct?

A. I was not misleading. I was providing the information as I felt, with the information at the time, and, also, under the state of health that I had at that point. I have never negated that one. There was initially as I described to my superiors, a political decapitation, in fact, that was the term I used, and, ultimately, a destruction of a philosophy in regards to reconciliation in the country, and, then, I did acquiesce in my reports to my superiors, that we were -- after looking at the conventions provided to me by the International Red Cross representative that we were facing a genocide. The scale of the genocide is what I have, over the years, pondered extensively, as well as at that time.

I could not imagine that we could go and try and plan in detail the slaughter of a million people. However, I never negated the fact that there was a genocide against one ethnicity; that there were exactations and killings done behind the RPF line and I complained about that to Kagame, on a number of occasions; and, that, ultimately, the deployment of the killings was one that was nurtured over a period of time, meaning that it wasn't a spontaneous explosion throughout the country, but at different phases the country fell under this catastrophic failure and that is why I recommended rapidly that I deploy up to 5,000 troops in order to stop that slaughter behind the lines that was continuing to be encouraged by both by the government and by the RTLM.

Q. General Dallaire, since, however, you said you gave that interview shortly after your state of health -- you recovered from your state of health. May I suggest, General Dallaire, that with your state of health which is even more precarious -- so precarious with the malady that you could not even come to Arusha to testify? May I suggest that if that were the case, then your testimony here had been under the influence of your state of health as filed by your doctor before this Trial Chamber? Can we understand that to be the case?

A. I am an individual who is -- has had the injury called, post traumatic stress disorder. That injury did not all of a sudden start overnight. It is an injury that, ultimately, called for me to ask to be withdrawn from my mission, and it is an injury that I will have for life. You have what you have in front of you.


MR. TAKU:
Your Honours, I'm sorry -- Your Honours, we do not need to press him on this particular point that (inaudible) on his health. You have the information before you filed by his own doctors. You appreciate the answers he is giving to this particular point.

Now, Your Honours, we would love to conclude our cross-examination at this point, but we pray respectfully, Your Honours, to tender the cassette -- especially the excerpts of the cassette, which we have, the cassette itself, and we did --


MR. BÂ:
Do have you the cassette itself?


MR. TAKU:
Yes. We will file it.


MR. PRESIDENT:
I think you have to give the translation of the --


MR. KOUAMBO:
Arusha?


MR. PRESIDENT:
You have to give a translation of the English and --


MR. KOUAMBO:
Your Honour, Roger Kouambo -- in Arusha.


MR. BÂ:
What I am going to propose is that he provide a transcript, the full transcript of the tape so that those portions are fitted into the proper context, not just portions that have been selected. At any rate, if he is just tendering this one, we do not have any problem, and General Dallaire's interview is okay with me.

I think the more reliable approach -- or, the least subject to manipulation is to submit the full document, but if he just submits those portions we have no problem with them.


MR. TAKU:
Your Honours, we tender the entire CD for the simple purpose that Your Honours will be able to look at the context in order to appreciate the reason of illness which he purports today. If you look at the context, the full context, Your Honours will be able to appreciate. So, we tender the whole CD.

We, also, apply, Your Honour, that Your Honour will order that the competent services should -- should make a transcription, an official transcription, of that cassette in the English and French, and provide it to the Court, and, also, that the cassette be admit into evidence.


MR. PRESIDENT:
(Inaudible) …Mr. Kouambo, you wanted to say something?


MR. KOUAMBO:
Yes, Your Honour. I wanted to ask, that we need to have the pictures again of the Court so that we can follow the pictures.


MR. PRESIDENT:
Yes. Registrar, please attend to that.


MR. TAKU:
Your Honours, we also want to tender, Your Honour, the transcript of General Dallaire, his testimony in the Military I trial, dated the 19th of January 2004, and the 22 (sic) January 2004, and the specific pages that were referred to under cross-examination, Your Honours.


MR. PRESIDENT:
How do you, what is the -- Mr. Abraham, what is the marking that can be given to the CD cassette?


MR. KOSHOPA:
D. 149, within brackets, Nzuwonemeye.

(Exhibit D. 149 [Nzuwonemeye] admitted)


MR. PRESIDENT:
And transcript of --


MR. TAKU:
We have the relevant pages of the transcripts of the 19th of January 2004, in the Military I trial -- page 28, the cover page on page 28; then the transcript of the 22nd of January 2004, pages 46, 58, 72; and the transcripts of the 23rd January 2003, the same applies, pages 3, 4, 5; the transcripts of the 26th of January 2004, pages 80 and 81.


MR. PRESIDENT:
Altogether, how many documents?


MR. TAKU:
Okay, the registrar will assist.


MR. PRESIDENT:
Do have you any objection to this?

(1400H)

MR. BÂ:
No objection.


MR. PRESIDENT:
D. 150, within bracket, (Nzuwonemeye).

(Exhibit No. D. 150 [Nzuwonemeye] admitted)

MR. PRESIDENT:
Yes, we have --


MR. TAKU:
Yes, Your Honour, we have the SITREP from Mr. Booh-Booh to Kofi Annan. The cover places it at the 12th of April 1994. And the particular sites are K000 -- K000702, covering the period from the 11th of April to the 12th of April, which would (unintelligible).


MR. PRESIDENT:
Yes. This document bears K number K000701. Is that the one?


MR. TAKU:
Yes, Your Honours.


MR. PRESIDENT:
Thank you. The document has several pages, ending with K0000710. This is a situation report written by SRSG Booh-Booh, and recognised by the witness. This document is accepted as D. 151, within brackets, (Nzuwonemeye).

(Exhibit No. D. 151 [Nzuwonemeye] admitted)


MR. BÂ:
Well, Counsel Taku, you need to specify the fact that it is the period from 11 to 12th of April, but then the last page covers 9 to 11 April. Do we agree on that?


MR. PRESIDENT:
Yes, that is the area that we want.


MR. TAKU:
Just one minute.

I think we just admit the whole (unintelligible) as it is, because on the 12th, he forwarded those series of reports.


MR. PRESIDENT:
Yes, that is there, included on the 9th.


MR. TAKU:
And finally, Your Honours, the excerpt of the book by General Dallaire, Shake Hands With the Devil, pages 238 and 239.


MR. PRESIDENT:
Yes. Pages --


MR. TAKU:
It is in the English language, Your Honour.


MR. PRESIDENT:
Yes, pages 238 and 239 of the witness's book. It is tendered --


THE ENGLISH INTERPRETER:
The President's microphone, please. We didn't hear what he said. We're sorry.


MR. PRESIDENT:
Pages of the book written by the witness, pages 238 and 239, is tendered into evidence as D. 152, within brackets, (Nzuwonemeye), accepted.

(Exhibit No. D. 152 [Nzuwonemeye] admitted)


MR. PRESIDENT:
Yes, thank you.


MR. TAKU:
Thank you, Your Honours, for your kind attention.


MR. PRESIDENT:
Yes, Mr. Segatwa, you may start.

Mr. Segatwa, what I told you yesterday was I was thinking of this way: That similar charges are -- almost similar charges are levelled against Mr. Nzuwonemeye's as your Accused. So since Mr. Nzuwonemeye's counsel took a limited number of hours to cover that area, I thought it was prudent for you also to be within that period. That is why I made my comment. Not -- not (inaudible) cutting you short, but I thought that since the charges are similar in nature, that you will have only a limited area to cover. So since you have considered all that, yes, you may continue now.


MR. SEGATWA:
Thank you, Mr. President. In any case, I can assure this Court that I will not repeat what was said by my distinguished colleague, Taku. All the more so as he covered most of my client's interests. However, if I thought I should shorten my cross-examination, it is for other reasons; reasons that you may well guess.


CROSS-EXAMINATION (continued)

BY MR. SEGATWA:

Q. Good morning, General Dallaire.

A. Good morning.

Q. Obviously, as I was saying yesterday, General Dallaire, I would have liked you to be in the courtroom, because I see you as Armstrong on the moon, and hope that next time you will do us the honour of coming into this courtroom.

General Dallaire, did your mission require great neutrality for it to succeed?

A. It is one of the premises of a peacekeeping chapter 6 mission, yes.

Q. Thank you. General, you said that you met, on several occasions, authorities -- if I may so call them, authorities of the RPF. Is that true?

A. Yes, that is correct.

Q. Can I take it that the RPF headquarters was based in Mulindi?

A. Yes, that is correct.

Q. General, is it true that on the 23rd of April, as well as the 24th of April 1994, you were in Mulindi?

A. I'm at a loss to give you an exact response, but I was up there on a number of occasions.

Q. General, do you remember if you testified in the Nkazabera case?

A. Was that a question?

Q. General, I wanted you to confirm whether, before the investigating judge, Silvania Verstreken, you gave testimony against Nkazabera. Nkazabera is spelt as follows: N-K-A-Z-A-B-E-R-A.

A. If you're speaking of one of the defendants in military trial I, and if that is one of the individuals, then yes.


MR. PRESIDENT:
Is he an Accused in Military I? No, he is under the impression that he is one of the accused there.

Mr. Segatwa, where was this testimony given by him?


MR. SEGATWA:
Non, non.


BY MR. SEGATWA:

Q. General, this was against Nkazabera, one of the Interahamwe militiamen. Well, I don't know how to put it, he was one of the Interahamwe leaders. Nkazabera was one of the leaders of the Interahamwe.


MR. PRESIDENT:
That is -- that may be correct, Counsel; you must give him the details, where this inquiry was and in what circumstances he gave evidence.


BY MR. SEGATWA:

Q. General, it was not a trial, it was an interview that was conducted in the premises of the ministry of defence in Ottawa in Canada. And this was related to the carrying out of a commission rogatory. That took place on the 19 December -- 19 September 2006.


MR. BÂ:
Are you sure of the date of the 19th?


MR. SEGATWA:
No, 12th September 2006. That was when the commission rogatory was held.


MR. PRESIDENT:
Is it 12th September 2006? (Microphones overlapping)


MR. SEGATWA:
12 September 2006. That is what is written here. 12 September 2006.

Mr. President, this was a document disclosed by Prosecution, and it was after the departure of Mr. Kouambo. But I believe that if the document is put on the overhead projector --


MR. BÂ:
Mr. Segatwa, the difficulty arises from the names, because I was the one who disclosed this document to you last Friday, but you would note that -- well, the witness says he doesn't remember the names. So it is the name that is causing the problem.


MR. SEGATWA:
Which name?


THE ENGLISH INTERPRETER:
Can Prosecution speak into his microphone, please.


MR. BÂ:
You talked of Ephrem Nkazabera, so I believe it is the name that is causing the problem.


MR. SEGATWA:
I nevertheless think that the general can remember that he was in the premises of the ministry of defence in Ottawa, and that he gave evidence, or testimony, to an investigating judge of the Brussels area.


MR. MACDONALD:
What Mr. Bâ is now saying is not true, Your Honour. I think he's mistaken, because in that document the (French spoken) refers to General Dallaire's book, and she refers to these three names that General Dallaire gave in his book. And what General Dallaire says is that he cannot -- he cannot make any links, physical links -- well, I will read it in French. He says: "I cannot make any physical link between the three persons and the names." (Microphones overlapping) ... he doesn't remember the names. It's not correct.


BY MR. SEGATWA:

Q. General, I just wanted to remind you that before the investigating judge, you said that you were at Mulindi on the night of the 23rd to the 24th of April. I suppose that must have been in the year 1994. (No interpretation)

A. Yes, I remember testifying, and I remember spending a night in Mulindi, and as you're refreshing my memory, be it the 23rd-24th, then so be it, yes.

Q. Thank you. In Mulindi, did you meet General Paul Kagame?

A. I believe the first time I met him after the start of the war was on the 22nd. I went up to Mulindi. Normally if I went to Mulindi it was to meet with the general, that would be quite logical that I would meet with him, as I met with other members of their organisation.

Q. Thank you, General, for those clarifications. Did you have a working session with General Paul Kagame -- who at the time was still a major, I believe.

A. Well, I -- to be quite honest, I don't remember when all of them started to wear general rank, because they were colonels and majors and at one point all of a sudden everybody got promoted. But in that instance he was the commander of the RPF forces, he was in the lead of the operations, and as such he was my primary interlocutor throughout the civil war.

Q. General, do you have with you the book entitled I Shook Hands with the Devil -- the French version, do you have the French version of that book with you?

A. Yes, I have it available.

Q. Please, can you go to page 413?

A. Okay.

Q. General, did you have a discussion, or a working session with General Paul Kagame? This is what is reflected on page 413.

A. Yes, okay.

Q. On the first line you said: "We started discussing the situation of the battle itself." Are you following that?

A. Yes.

Q. General, I'm quoting from your book. You said: "We started discussing the situation of the battle itself. I spread my military map between him and myself on the ground." Are you following?

A. Yes, absolutely.

Q. Now, my question: The map that you spread out on the ground between yourself and him, were these maps from staff headquarters? I mean, maps from your headquarters?

A. No, it was my personal -- what we call, in NATO parlance, my personal battle map.

Q. Thank you for that clarification; that is what I wanted to know. General, I will continue reading. You said as follows -- I quote: "It was clear that Kagame had blocked, without any major effort, a number of battalions of the Rwandan government forces who were defending Hutu heartland, namely, Ruhengeri. That enabled Kagame, once Byumba town was taken, as well as the main road leading to the east, that enabled him, as I said, to go to the south right down to the border with Tanzania and to sort of end at the river. He also caused his army to advance to the west just below Kigali on the main road leading to the capital city." I -- I close the quote here.

Now comes my question: Did you discuss with Paul Kagame the war plan?

A. My map had absolutely no markings on it, as it is normal procedure for a commander not to have his map marked but to have it in his mind, in case it falls into wrong hands as he moves about the battlefield. Secondly, what I described there is what Kagame is -- I'm saying what I saw of him, and I conducted exactly the same activities with General Bizimungu when I met with him.

Q. General, in your book you continued and said the following -- I quote: "Once we completed our working session, he requested me to stay the night in his house. We shook hands heartily and we extended good wishes to one another. Then I was escorted out of his office." End of quote.

Question: In your understanding, what could be -- what could Paul Kagame have -- what could he have wished most at that time?

A. I have absolutely no comprehension of your question. My remaining in -- in Mulindi was a security measure because I did not want to travel at night through the battle lines, and secondly my shaking of hands with him is a normal process that I've done with everybody else. And it wasn't in his home, it was in a bungalow that was beside the headquarters staff and also residences of staff officers.

Q. Thank you for the clarifications, General.


MR. BÂ:
I would like to point out that the original of the book is in English, so if you could also refer to the English passages that you are reading because there are some passages in the French -- in the French version that are poorly translated. I would like to bring that to your attention.


MR. SEGATWA:
Prosecution, I think it is up to General Dallaire to say that the translation was not (sic) poorly done.


MR. BÂ:
I just want to draw your attention to the fact that this book is originally in English.


BY MR. SEGATWA:

Q. General, you said that it was normal, for security purposes, to stay in Mulindi; I understand that. But what I do not understand is that you further said as follows -- I quote: "The following day in Arusha the diplomats did what they could, but the dice were cast already." That is what you say, and it is true.

General, did you mean to say by that -- or, do you mean to say by that that RPF forces were getting ready to conquer Kigali while the RPF was getting ready to meet in Arusha?

A. No, what I said in this is the fact that Kigali was already being surrounded, and the operations that I describe above were in fact the continuum of the offensive by the RPF in which Kigali was a main objective and that the operation was in full swing. It is and was normal for me to discuss matters, at least on the map, in order to acquire for myself a feel for what was happening on the ground as the humanitarian situation required me to know where the battle lines were in order to be able to assist the humanitarian effort and also to get a better feel for the humanitarian situation, be it internally displaced refugees, pockets of people isolated, and the like.

Q. I understand very well, General, but once more, what I do not understand is that you said -- and once more I'm quoting you: "In the course of our discussions I asked Kagame why he did not directly grab his enemies by their throat."

Question: Perhaps grabbing one's enemies by their throat is a military term. Can you explain to us civilians what you meant by that?

A. Yes. In previous operations, the RPF had succeeded in coming close to Kigali in a very short period of time; in fact, in a couple of weeks. We were already in a couple of weeks plus of the civil war, there was operations going on in the surroundings of the capital, that is to say the east and the south-east, and then moving west, with a slow envelopment of the capital. And so it seemed to me that there was a -- for him, operationally, if he wanted to succeed his operations in the swiftest amount of time possible, and wanting to save as many people as possible which was the reason why they said they started this war, and in order to stop the continuous exodus out of Kigali, that he would conduct a significant operation directly related -- or, against the capital and thus make the capital fall. And, in my estimation, that would then ultimately stop the war.

Q. So, General, if I understood you correctly, you were in agreement with that military scenario; is that right?

A. Absolutely not. I had no agreement or disagreement. I was doing nothing more than enquiring on his concept of operations, or at least what was going on for me to try and continue my work in order to bring about a ceasefire. For I can't negotiate a ceasefire if I don't know where they are and what they plan to do and what their future operations are.

Q. General, if I've understood your book clearly, you're the one who said: "In the course of our discussions I asked Kagame, why he did not jump directly on the throats of his enemies? Why were you delaying the attack, or assault on Kigali?" You're the one saying so.

A. Yeah.

Q. Thank you, General. And you go on in your book and you say -- and I quote:

"I found my officers having a drink in a tiny canteen located within the camp. Pasteur Bizimungu who, after RPF's victory would become the president of the Republic of Rwanda" -- close the parenthesis -- "was there with some politicians, and I sat next to him close to the canteen while my men and those of the RPF appeared to agree with each other and were spending some good time" -- or, "spent some time together, quite some time together as soldiers alone know how to do."

And there I end the quote.

My question, General: When you say that only soldiers are capable of doing so, you are referring to whom and to what group of people?

A. Comrades who are in uniform from various countries have, amongst the ethos of the military, a similar basis of their profession, and as such have a mutual respect of their background capabilities. Such actions of communicating and cooperation were conducted on all sides, as was required in our mandate to maintain the best possible communications with the ex-belligerents in order to gain their trust and also acquire the information needed to do our job.

Q. So as far as you are concerned, General, these were no longer rebels, these were genuine soldiers who had come to an agreement with the members of your force. That's what I understood.

A. It had a long time previous to that, during the actual reconnaissance, although the RPF were called a rebel force they were, in my estimation, quite a professional, structured, disciplined, trained light military force that had all the structures that one would expect of any professional or any national military capability. So the term "rebel", in my estimation, was one of a political nature and not one of a military one. It is also of note in the book that on several occasions, when the militaries of both the RGF, the gendarmerie, and the RPF met in informal moments, they communicated and treated each other in the most fraternal of fashions, which often created for me a complex situation of trying to understand how in one moment they can be such aggressive belligerents, and yet at the other moment be so rather fraternal.

Q. Thank you, General. And while you were there, you dealt with some political matters. I continue with your book -- and you say: "For one hour Pasteur and myself spoke about his past, the disaster or the catastrophe that we were experiencing, spoke about Booh-Booh, the special representative of the secretary general of the United Nations, about the international community and the future of Rwanda in the event RPF won the war."

General, could you say briefly what you said -- could you tell us briefly what you said about Booh-Booh, about the international community, and Rwanda's future in the event RPF won the war?

A. Well, let me see. Twelve years later, attempting to go into a detailed conversation regarding something I've written four years ago, nearly five, at best that I can recall the international community was a question of whether or not the recognition of the situation in regards to what sort of political structure would end up running the country. Also the fact that the international community had demonstrated such an adverse desire to get involved in any significant way to try to stop the catastrophe. Mr. Booh-Booh, the situation in which the RPF were very virulent in not wanting to negotiate any more with him and what could be done about that, as he was my political leader and the number one of the mission. And post the RPF, should it achieve its aim, because it was fighting to win -- I don't suspect anybody would start a war and not want to win it -- was in more the arenas of reconciliation, for Pasteur Bizimungu was a Hutu and operating within a predominantly Tutsi organisation.

Q. Thank you, General. Were you in Rwanda in 2004?

A. I was there in April during the 10th anniversary memoriam (sic) of the genocide.

Q. General, are you aware of what happened to Bizimungu, who had to become president of the republic in the event the RPF were to win the war?

A. Would you mind rephrasing that? I'm not exactly sure what your question is.

Q. General --


MR. BÂ:
Mr. Segatwa --


BY MR. SEGATWA:

Q. I want to find out what you would know, what happened to Bizimungu today, that is, the Bizimungu you met in Mulindi at that point in time.

A. Well, all I know is what -- in the newspapers, that he was president for a while, that he was brought up on charges of fraud, I think, or something of that nature, and I think he was in jail. I'm not sure.

Q. When you visited Rwanda, you didn't seek to find out about his -- what has happened to him?

A. I didn't seek to find out what happened to a lot of people, him or anyone else. And for that matter I went there as part of a personal pilgrimage in going to the different places where events had happened, to participate in the memoriam of the genocide, and to essentially then return home.

Q. General, let me put a question to you that would touch on your deepest conviction, or belief. Now, if you had known that Pasteur Bizimungu was jailed, or was in jail, would you have gone to visit him in prison to raise his past with him, and the future of Rwanda after RPF's victory?

A. Well, I was in Rwanda as a Canadian civilian. I had absolutely no authority to immerse myself in the internal operations of the Rwandan government, or judicial system. And I was saddened by the fact that he was no more president, but I was in no way going to move into any of the various post-Rwanda situations, or post-genocide situations, be it what happened to Pasteur Bizimungu, to Faustin Twagiramungu, to Seth, to a number of other people. I simply was there as a civilian attending the ceremonies and attempting to reconcile with that terrible past.


MR. PRESIDENT:
Counsel, are these things really relevant to your defence?


MR. SEGATWA:
Mr. President, can I just crave your indulgence? I will soon be concluding. In 15 minutes I think I will have concluded. Can I seek your patience, then.


BY MR. SEGATWA:

Q. General, let's go back to your book on page 414, 4-1-4, towards the end of that page, towards the end of that page, 414. And you say at the end of the day Pasteur Bizimungu took you to the guest room and you were still at the headquarters of Paul Kagame. And you say in a rather romantic manner -- and I quote:

"The military bed had white sheets and a superb pillow case under a mosquito net. And then I slept, felt slightly guilty, thinking about my soldiers in (sic) Brent in Kigali, but I was really full of joy because of the scent of clean sheets, the warmth of the blanket, and the beautiful meal that I had ate, or had, and I slept that night in what appeared to me to be a brief moment of paradise on earth." End of quote.

General, do you still have that feeling of paradise on earth in respect of the time you spent in Mulindi?

A. By that time I had been sleeping on the floor of my office since the 7th of April, not having been able to get back to my bungalow. I had been sleeping with a curtain from my office as a blanket. I had been living with so many others, the sound of war and bombardments, the smell of rotting bodies and burning bodies with diesel fuel, and there I was on the top of a hill in what is called paradise on earth, Rwanda, amongst the trees and the fresh scent and fresh sheets. And, yes, for a simple soldier, that was paradise at that time.

Q. Thank you, General. The next question is one of finding out whether you've ever been that happy with the Rwandan government forces? That is, if you have spent a single night at the headquarters of the Rwandan government forces?

A. I didn't have to; I had my own headquarters. And the only night where I gained particular support from the Rwandan forces was the first night when General Ndindiliyimana provided me with his escort. There was no need for me to do that and, anyways, their headquarters was right in the middle of the war.

Q. General, let me take up your book again on page 3-0-6, 306 of the French version, and 309 of the same book. It was the day after the attack on the plane of the president, Juvénal Habyarimana. Page 66 were being -- last --


MR. BÂ:
You said 66?


THE ENGLISH INTERPRETER:
306, he meant.


BY MR. SEGATWA:

Q. Last bit, one paragraph. Middle or towards the end of that paragraph.

"I still had a mandate since RPF continued to comply with the terms of the agreements. Only the delinquent units of the Rwandan government forces were violating the said accords, or agreements."

That description that you provide with respect to the Rwandan government forces, would that description not be unfair when compared to your treatment or your reference or description of the RPF?

A. I absolutely do not see any link between either one. The RPF at that time had not gone beyond the confines of the CND, nor did I have any information that they had crossed into the DMZ. And so they were still meeting the peace agreement requirements, and it was the units inside of Kigali that, as far as I could determine, were the only ones transgressing.


MR. BLACK:
I must intervene. I'm sorry, Mr. President, I know I'm -- I don't feel well, but I don't think I'm so ill that I'm hallucinating, but I have the impression I am, and that I'm sitting on the Prosecution side of the courtroom. Because again this entire line of questioning has been to support General Dallaire and his professed neutrality against all the evidence, and to portray his experience with the RPF as paradise on earth but the RGF is something very different. I cannot understand how counsel for the Defence can ask questions which have the objective of assisting General Dallaire in portraying his version of events, in assisting the Prosecution, and in trying to disarm the potential cross-examination of myself and Mr. MacDonald.

I am extremely concerned by this continued strategy by my learned friend to my left. And object to it -- I object to it, it's prejudicial to my client and his defence, and I said yesterday that this demonstrated a strategy -- at least, the effect of it was to assist not only General Dallaire but also the Prosecution -- may compound me to ask for a severance of my case from this trial, which I know will be very difficult. And you will probably deny such a motion at this stage because of your completion strategy. So what am I to do? What is General Ndindiliyimana to do, General Bizimungu to do when faced with Defence counsel who engage in a strategy which does not assist them but in fact assists the other side? I don't know what to do at this point.

But I have to say --


MR. PRESIDENT:
(Microphones overlapping)


MR. BLACK:
-- that this is, I believe, unethical under the terms of -- terms of ethics of the statute and the rules of procedure we are required to follow. Because it's not helping his client. In fact, it's damaging his own client, and it's certainly damaging me and General -- and my client, General Bizimungu. And I don't know why I have to put up with this, because it's not fair.

We can continue to play the game that we're all here doing our job and doing the right thing for each person's client, but that's not the reality. I'm going to call a spade a spade. This is not what's happening here. I don't know why Mr. Segatwa and Mr. Seydou Doumbia engage in these lines of questions, but the effect is very damaging for the other -- for the rest of us, and I don't know why we should put up with it --


MR. PRESIDENT:
Counsel --

MR. BLACK:
-- and there has to be a solution. I don't know what it is, Mr. President. But I'm going to have to consult my client and determine what to do, because I can't continue two more years with this sort of manoeuvre going on behind the scenes. And I -- I refuse to play the game that this is all sort of kosher and it's just the way he's doing things. Because that's not the way it's happening and everybody knows it who's paying attention here.


MR. SEGATWA:
Mr. President, the problem with my learned colleague, Counsel Black, is that he's not patient; he's not willing to wait for me to conclude. If he's patient, if he waits just for five minutes, he's going to find out if I agree or I'm arguing the Prosecution's case. We need to be patient, and no one can dictate the conduct or the strategy of someone else. Let him be patient. By interrupting the cross-examination, my cross-examination, he's cut off -- my line of thinking is interrupted.

Be that as it may, he will have his own time, he will rectify matters in the event I have committed any mistakes. I would want to continue. I don't have any more than ten minutes, Mr. President.

Oh, sorry.


BY MR. SEGATWA:

Q. General Dallaire, when --


MR. BLACK:
I'm sorry, Mr. Segatwa, and I'm sorry, Mr. President. But my role here is to defend my client. I can't defend my client when my client's being attacked by counsel for the Defence on the same side of the -- on the same bench here. And I don't intend to play that game. You know, in boxing there's a term for this, it's called taking a dive, looking like you're defending -- fighting the other opponent, but not really. And I don't want to accuse him of taking a dive because I don't know why they're doing this. But the effect is -- that's the effect, and already the damage to my client's interests is pretty serious --


MR. PRESIDENT:
Well --


MR. BLACK:
-- 'cause you're only going to give me one day --


MR. SEGATWA:
(No interpretation)


MR. BLACK:
Sorry. You're only going to give me one day -- Mr. President, you're only going to give me one day -- one full day to cross-examine General Dallaire. Because of that I was going to engage in a certain line of questions which would maybe take one day, because I didn't think General Dallaire was going to say a lot of these things. But now counsel for the Defence here has drawn out all sorts of things which assist the Prosecutor and try and back up the alleged neutrality of General Dallaire, and I don't have the time -- you won't give me the time to counterattack and to try and neutralise this.

And I want that on the record, that something's happening here, I don't know what it is and who's arranging it, but the effect is very damaging to my client's interests, and very prejudicial to my client's interests, and again I don't see how we can continue with a combined trial like this, a joint trial like this.

(1500H)

MR. PRESIDENT:
Counsel, I think you also must realise that the other counsel also have their own client, so they must, as the senior attorney, think that what they are doing is for the benefit of their client, so we can't -- I can't tell him, don't do this, don't do that. I cannot. If necessary, which I did yesterday, I can just say, "These are the charges against your client, so please try to confine your questioning within that." So other than that, I think as a counsel, he's entitled to put questions to the witness that the witness has referred to in the course of the examination.


MR. BLACK:
Well, I agree he has the right to defend his client's interest. That is not what is happening here. Mr. Taku did an excellent job of that yesterday, defending both Captain Sagahutu and Major Nzumonemeye. In fact, he gave them almost a complete defence, in my view, to the charges against them. But these lines of questions don't help his client and they are only meant to damage the interests of General Bizimungu and General Ndindiliyimana. I mean, is easier for me with General Ndindiliyimana because of what General Dallaire said about my man before and his relationship with him.


MR. PRESIDENT:
Well, Counsel --


MR. BLACK:
(Microphones overlapping) … and the army in general, it is very damaging what he is doing -- and I know you can't direct him to do anything, but I just want to put it on the record that something is going on here which is very strange.


MR. PRESIDENT:
Well, Counsel -- yes, Mr. Segatwa? You are going to take a few minutes, at least finish it, and then we can give you the floor.


MR. SEGATWA:
Mr. President, if he had not interrupted me, I would have concluded. I -- there needs to be an iota of patience. Can I proceed, Mr. President?


MR. PRESIDENT:
Yes.


BY MR. SEGATWA:

Q. General Dallaire, can you hear me?

A. Yes.

Q. When you went into the ESM hall where you found officers at a meeting, were you properly welcomed?

A. Yes.

Q. Why then, General, do you say in your book on page 309, I quote:

"Nevertheless, the assembly or gathering was not quite sympathetic"?

A. Well, it quite simply is that Colonel Bagosora did turn and did come forward and shake my hand and so on, but there was in the assembly a -- a reaction of not of welcome outright but of stirrings that to me was not necessarily reflective of a positive atmosphere. Although Colonel Bagosora was very polite and forthright, I was interrupting him in what he was doing, and then I was shown to my seat, and the proceedings carried on. So, I mean, that was my impression.

Q. General, you talked about Mr. Booh-Booh. I'm not saying that you talked about him during this session. Now, do you know Mr. Booh-Booh?

A. No. I know him only through the professional encounters we had and a number of conversations that we had about his -- on one occasion he described to me his extensive industry, banana industry, I gather, in Cameroon, and how he was away from it and that was a concern for him; that he was an ambassador to the United Nations; that he knew the secretary general, Boutros-Ghali, when he was also foreign minister for Egypt. I don't remember the details of his family, but there was informal conversation on a couple of occasions, at best.

Q. Am I mistaken if I say that he was the head of mission?

A. When he arrived in mission area, I relinquished my responsibilities of head of mission and did not resume them until he left the mission area, and I forget exactly the dates. It was there in May sometime.

Q. But while he was head of mission, he was, nevertheless, your boss; is that right?

A. Undeniably. Absolutely.

Q. General, did you read Booh-Booh's -- I'm sorry, I think I'm mixing up things. Did you read Booh-Booh's book, the book entitled, Dallaire's Boss Speaks? That is a free translation of the title.

A. No. I've seen excerpts of it, but I have not read the full book.

Q. Amongst the excerpts, were you able to read the heading of chapter 10 in which he says, I quote: "Dallaire is in support of peace" or, rather, "against peace"?

A. I don't recall reading any of that.

Q. General, I will request you to read that book. But the attitude that you had in relation to the RPF which was taking you to paradise and the attitude which you had regarding the government forces, in your opinion, wasn't that attitude biased?

A. No.

Q. Why do you say no, given that you described some of them as true soldiers and the others as not being true soldiers? And when Dallaire says -- or when Booh-Booh says that you joined or you allied with the RPF in order to fight against peace -- that is what Booh-Booh says -- Booh-Booh says that you allied with the RPF against peace, how do you explain that?

A. Booh-Booh can say whatever he wants to say. That is his prerogative as a free citizen of his country. We have not discussed in detail the operational capabilities of the government forces, and as such you can't say that I treated one as a professional army and the other one as something else. If we want to discuss the professional capabilities of the government forces, we can do so, and then conclude with that.

Q. General, in your testimony in the Akayesu case, you yourself said that the interim government attacked you as being an RPF ally and you gave as an example that whenever UNAMIR arrived somewhere the RPF also arrived there two, three or five days later on. What do you say to that?

A. Well, sir, if you have read the complete book, you will see that I describe that because I'm running after the government and its leadership, they are continuously moving and withdrawing, and so I go to meet them, and the next time when I want to meet them, they are no more there because they have withdrawn due to the advance of the RPF and at that point their obvious inability to stop that advance. And so it is an easy extrapolation to say that I was, in fact -- I think, if I recall well, the reconnaissance element of the RPF, well, when you are on the losing side of a battle, you will grasp at any straw in order to excuse the operational ineffectiveness of that time. And so that is my pure analysis of that point.

Q. General, I wanted to conclude by asking you one more question, a question that always comes to my mind. You are surrounded by many people, many people from the international community and also people from your country. Is that because of your status as a retired general or your status as a senator, or is it due to the fact that you have -- you successfully carried out your mission in Rwanda?

A. The support I'm getting is a support that I expect any officer of the Canadian forces, serving or retired, would receive in front of any international tribunal, and, as such, that is the norm that this country has established.

Q. General, I will nevertheless end this examination by bringing to mind a letter by Kouchner who said that with the capabilities that you had you would have been able to stop the massacres in a few days. What do you say to that?

A. Well, I say to that when Mr. Kouchner becomes a general he can give me his military assessment, and until then it is worth what it is worth. And in the same vein, I'm certainly not going to assess his capabilities as the founder of Médicins sans frontières or any of his political duties.


MR. SEGATWA:
General, I have no further questions for you. I thank you.


MR. PRESIDENT:
Thank you. We will take a break now, half an hour, and then come back at 3:45. The Court is adjourned for a half an hour.

General, you can have a cup of tea and then come back.

(Court recessed from 1515H to 1550H)


MR. BLACK:
Just one thing, Mr. President. I forgot to do a courtesy which I feel bad about. I do have a new legal assistant as of yesterday afternoon, Leopold Nsengiyumva has joined us. He was in the room before. I just wanted to introduce him to you. I'm sorry to him that I didn't do it before.


MR. PRESIDENT:
Yes, Mr. MacDonald, you may start now.


MR. MACDONALD:
Yes, Your Honour. As you know, I had requested earlier on authorisation to go last and I explained why.


MR. PRESIDENT:
Yes. But since Mr. Black is not --


MR. MACDONALD:
Exactly, so I'm not going to make an issue out of this, but in order for me to assess my outline of questions I have for General Dallaire, I would need to know, Your Honour, if you would allow me to cross-examine perhaps on the 5th when we come back, give me time to regroup and allow me time for cross-examination. Because you had allowed, I believe, two half days, and I would be short perhaps of an hour or two, so --


MR. PRESIDENT:
Yes, we will get tomorrow a full day, today, and Tuesday, the 5th, a full day.


MR. MACDONALD:
On the 5th, okay, that will give me time to regroup. Thank you very much.


MR. PRESIDENT:
Then Mr. Black can have the following two days.


MR. BLACK:
Thank you, Your Honour. I need to discuss this with my client, and I don't want to make a promise, but it may be possible since I can't really do the cross-examination I want to do, I can -- I may be able to do a cross-examination beneficial to my client and maybe be able to give some time to him, but I will discuss it with my client first.


MR. PRESIDENT:
Yes, you may if you want, you can apportion the time between you two. We have no problem with that.


MR. BLACK:
Thank you, Your Honour.


MR. MACDONALD:
Now, with respect to kitchen matters, my legal intern is finishing the constitution of the different pile of documents. As you can see, there is an extensive pile, so we need about five or ten minutes. But what I would suggest is I could start with General Dallaire, but unfortunately my legal intern will have to provide this material as we go along, if that is okay with the Court.


MR. PRESIDENT:
Yes.


MR. MACDONALD:
Okay. Thank you.


CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. MACDONALD:

Q. Good day, General Dallaire. I wish to go briefly or return briefly to an excerpt that was shown to you a few minutes ago regarding an interview that you gave to a journalist. I believe it was Jean François Bélanger. Apparently, it was an interview that was granted on the 14th of September 1994. Would that be right?

A. I remember it being relatively close to my return, yes.

Q. Okay. And if I've understood you clearly, at the time you were still a member of the Canadian armed forces; is that correct?

A. I was at the time deputy commander of the Canadian army.

Q. And you also said in your answer you provided to Counsel Segatwa -- sorry, Counsel Taku, rather, my understanding was that your mandate or your assignment in Rwanda was not renewed. Was it at your own request or some pressure excerpted by the United Nations, that the United Nations might have been subjected to as a result of your presence in Rwanda?

A. There had been pressure by a country to have me relieved, but the decision for me to ask to be relieved was based on my ability at the time to continue command, for I felt that I was putting the mission at risk.

Q. So how was that request done? Was it -- I suppose if it was at your own request, it must have been a formal written request addressed to the Canadian army; would that be right?

A. It went on two channels. The first channel was a verbal request sent to General Baril informing him that I felt I was no more in a position to be able to command, and that was followed up by a formal letter to the Canadian chief of the defence staff requesting him that I be relieved of my command and I recommended in the same letter that my deputy take command in my stead.

Q. Now, are you able to tell us, General, as from when you started questioning your ability to be the force commander? You may not be able to recall the exact date, but when, you know, in terms of time?

A. The -- my frame of mind started to shift significantly after the installation of the government that is still in place in Rwanda, seeing the stresses and strains of the conflict that had ended; there were still an enormous amount of frictions going on with the RPF and the humanitarian protection zone in the south; there were the enormous amount of frictions coming in from the legal, administrative gang who were starting to reappear now that it was safe for them to come back. The thought of starting to rebuild again for the third time, a mission with an unwillingness of the international community to provide me with the equipment and quality of personnel, it affected me to the extent where I became impatient, intolerant, lacked objectivity, could not in any way or shape any more sleep or eat properly, and as such this morose attitude that I had was creating uncertainty and escalating to the extent where I realised that I could not command. There was also an incident in which I used my pistol that was inappropriate and that was endangering personnel, and so it was essential that a decision be taken.


MR. PRESIDENT:
General, please go slow. These interpreters will find it difficult otherwise. Please go slow.


THE WITNESS:
Very good.


BY MR. MACDONALD:

Q. Well, the question was just a matter of the time frame, not so much the circumstances that prompted or led to your withdrawal. When did you start doubting your ability? When? A date if you can.

A. I don't have a date but I have a time frame. In the latter part of July and -- well, the latter part of July.

Q. In preparing your testimony, I suppose, General, you were given your testimonies in Military I and Akayesu. Would that be correct?

A. Could you repeat that question?

Q. Definitely. In preparation of your testimony here, that is, in this trial, I assume you were given your testimonies in Military I trial and in the Akayesu trial; is that correct?

A. I mean, I gave my testimony as I'm giving it to you today.


MR. PRESIDENT:
No, whether you read those testimonies before you gave evidence here. That is the question.


THE WITNESS:
No, I have not read the transcripts, although portions of it, but I certainly have not gone to any extent in either one.


BY MR. MACDONALD:

Q. I assumed they talked to you -- the testimony of the mission information officer, Captain Frank Claeys, is that correct?

A. I've read no transcripts of Claeys's testimony. I have some knowledge of it but of no specific nature coming directly out of transcripts.

Q. Anyway, let me spread it out or generalise it. Some excerpts were read out to you, excerpts by Major Beardsley, Captain Claeys, and Madam Alison Des Forges; is that correct? Whether you read it yourself or not, that's not important. What I'm putting to you is, in preparing your testimony, you were informed of excerpts from the testimonies of those people? I'm referring to Beardsley, Claeys, in particular, and Madam Des Forges. Is that correct?

A. You are coming in very intermittent and I'm not able to capture the full extent of your question.


MR. PRESIDENT:
Yes, Mr. MacDonald, you have to repeat that, I think. It's not -- there are breaks it seems. He can't follow.


MR. MACDONALD:
All right.


BY MR. MACDONALD:

Q. General, for the preparation of your testimony for this trial, the evidence you are giving in the course of this trial, I assume you would have been informed of the testimonies of Captain Frank Claeys, Major Beardsley, and the testimony of Madam Alison Des Forges, who has also had to testify in this trial; is that correct?

A. I have taken no notice of those testimonies. And if one remembers my willingness to testify at this time, it was under not duress but certainly under conditions to the fact that I did not believe I had enough time to prepare fully for my testimony. Yet, the Court has imposed that we attempt to do it at this time due to other time limitations, and so I have what preparation I was able to do.

Q. Well, then I will put it to you, General, that you were approached in 2005, remember in 2005, you already knew that you were going to testify at this trial; is that right?

A. I was informed that we would be called forward and the response we gave was that I did not feel, nor did my medical staff feel, able to conduct such witnessing in situ, and we thus awaited a decision on whether or not I would be testifying at all. And during that time frame I continued with my numerous duties, pending the decision that would come forward from the Court.

Q. Very well. In the course of the preparation of your testimony for this trial, you were not told in any manner, directly or indirectly, of the testimony of Major Beardsley or the testimony of Madam Des Forges. That is my understanding. Is that what I'm supposed to understand?

A. I found out about Alison Des Forges's testimony; I did not see any of it. Unless I'm severely mistaken, Major Beardsley has not testified in this court but has done on Military I. And whether or not Claeys did testify in this one or not -- I know he did on the previous one.

Q. Okay. General, have you read the book by Abdul Ruzibiza? It is entitled Rwanda – L’histoire secrete.

A. No, I have not.

Q. You definitely have heard mention made of it, haven't you, General?

A. I've heard mention of it. I even acquired the book but I have not read it.

Q. Can I ask you why? You do know that --

A. Well, Rwanda --

Q. Yes, continue, please.

A. Well, the reason is the Rwandan experience for me was 12 years ago. I kept myself reasonably abreast of the situation. I have conducted my own writings, and there are at least 20, if not 25, books of all types that have been written on Rwanda, and I am quite busy in conducting other duties, including other research.

Q. You will agree with me, General Dallaire, that in the event that you have not read that book by Abdul Ruzibiza, you are familiar with its contents? You know that Ruzibiza was a former member of The Network commando of the RPF, talks in detail about some events that I can characterise as quite important, in particular, the assassination of President Habyarimana, while mention is made in that book of the wherefores and wherewithals of that situation.

A. Until you have just reminded me that he was an RPF commando, I had not remembered it. All I could remember was the title. So I truly have no knowledge of the content of that book.

Q. My colleague, Counsel Segatwa, also talked to you about the book by Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh. It is entitled Le patron de Dallaire parle. It talks about the digressions of a general -- you must have read that book or it must be in your possession, I suppose, General.

A. Yes. The book was acquired in my library. I saw some excerpts of it. I did not read the full book nor have I read the 20 other books that have been produced since 1994 on Rwanda.

Q. Did you read or had you been briefed on the report of Bernard Lugan, I think last week, in the Military I trial. Have you read that, yes or no?

A. I know nothing of the individual. I can't recognise the name.

Q. Have you read or have you been told about a report dated 17 November 2006, a report by Jean-Louis Bruguière, president of the high court of (French spoken) of Paris. Have you been informed of that report since it was published or have you read that report since it was published?

A. I only know of what was written in the Canadian newspapers about it.

Q. Let me read the findings following that investigation carried out by Judge Bruguière following a complaint filed by family members of the Falcon 50 crew.


MR. BÂ:
Could we have a copy of that report?


MR. MACDONALD:
I do, indeed, believe that you have not only a copy but you must have read that report.


MR. BÂ:
I have not read it. I listened to Radio France International, heard some comments; a colleague of mine has sent it to me, it is in my computer, but I have not read it.


MR. MACDONALD:
My legal assistant will give you a copy.


MR. BÂ:
Thank you very much.


BY MR. MACDONALD:

Q. I'm referring to the conclusions of the report, General, and that's on page 61. I will spare you some of the factual findings of the report, but I will just read the conclusions. One of the conclusions is, and I will quote:

"Mindful that the RPF officials mentioned hereabove, having participated in conceiving, planning and implementing the attack in the circumstances spelt out above, may be subject to prosecution for assassination, complicity of assassination in connection with a terrorist undertaking, criminal association with a view towards preparing acts of terrorism. Obviously, that investigation was planned and mounted in connection with the assassination of President Habyarimana on the 6th of April 1994."


MR. BÂ:
Can I seek some clarification? Did Judge Bruguière issue that order as the vice president of his court, that is, considering the merits of the case, or merely as an examining magistrate? So is it the examining magistrate or someone presiding over a criminal court?


MR. MACDONALD:
Well, it doesn't matter. It's a mission of enquiry. These are the conclusions of the judge. You could raise it in the course of your cross-examination. These are the conclusions that emanate from an investigation.


BY MR. MACDONALD:

Q. Now, it says that Paul Kagame, president of the Republic of Rwanda, who in that capacity is entitled to the immunity granted in France to heads of state still in office, cannot be prosecuted as part of this procedure; that he could instead be subject to prosecution by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. And I am putting it to you, General, that those findings are unambiguous and do point without the least shadow of doubt that the factual evidence gathered by Judge Bruguière clearly show or demonstrate that Paul Kagame, the man whom you described as an extraordinary man, is the brain behind the assassination of President Habyarimana. And the question I put to you is, General, would you be ready, in the event such a request was made to you, would you be prepared to testify for Judge Bruguière -- or against Judge Bruguière -- I'm sorry -- for or against Paul Kagame? Sorry.

A. I've got no knowledge of the content of the report that you are providing me except for what you are reading. That such actions are taken in France by a judge, fine, and let that process do its course and if appropriate and if I'm called upon, I will take the appropriate decision at the appropriate time.

Q. Are you surprised, General Dallaire, that -- let me say it in English because I -- of the findings made by Judge Bruguière, because, according to him, Kagame is not only responsible for the assassination of President Habyarimana but also is responsible for the Rwandan tragedy?

A. After 12 years there are a variety of several scenarios in which the shooting down of the presidential plane was the key element, the key element inasmuch as that was the start of the catastrophic failure in Rwanda, and as such this is one scenario that is being investigated and so let it do its course. I mean, I've got nothing to say about that.

Q. Well, allow me to go back a bit to Ruzibiza. I have some slight difficulty in understanding. Are you aware of the impact that Habyarimana's murder or assassination had in Rwanda's history? You have some individual by the name Abdul Ruzibiza, one-time member of The Network commando which is a specialised commando unit trained by Kagame, and Ruzibiza appears to narrate in detail the planning and implementation of that Machiavellian plan put together by Kagame in a book which you have in your possession, and so I have a bit of difficulty that you didn't take say five, ten, even a half an hour at least to read that particular portion of the testimony by Ruzibiza in his book. I have some difficulty with that, I must say.

A. Is that a question?

Q. Oh, yes, it is, if you can say something. You have the book in your possession, don't you?

A. Yes, and I have over 2,000 books in my possession which I have not all read, and I do not feel that at this point or, God knows, when in the future that I will go through all of them. And as for your perspective of why I haven't read into it, that is a perspective that you can hold, sir, as I am not involved with the Tribunal or with the catastrophe of Rwanda. I lived with the consequences that it has had on me, but I'm also duty bound to conduct other duties in the Canadian senate and also as a Canadian citizen in my pursuit of family and professional endeavours and so this has not entered into my priority of effort at this time.

Q. I don't know how voluminous your personal library is, but you would agree with me that none of those books is produced by any of those who participated in the assassination of Habyarimana. You would agree with me, don't you?

A. I don't know. Who says this guy is telling the truth in his book? I have no way of assessing whether or not this guy is truthful or not, and not having read the book, I must say I can't give you an answer one way or another.

Q. But all the more so. And I'm respectfully putting it to you, you have no way of determining the credibility or the veracity of the statements made by Ruzibiza, and indeed maybe by reading his book you would be in a position to correct some of the allegations he has made in view of the fact that you yourself were on the ground. Has that ever crossed your mind?

A. Yes. So what? No, it hasn't. And to be quite honest, apart from being called forward in front of this Tribunal, I have been involved in so many other things that, no, it has not come to -- forward that I want to dissect what actually happened on the night of the 6th to 7th. I am quite truthful in telling you that 12 years after that, I have spent a lot of time on the subject but I'm also spending a lot of time on other matters.


MR. MACDONALD:
Your Honour, when I found out that Maître Bâ was examining General Dallaire in chief, I prepared my outline in French, but perhaps if it's convenient with the Court, I might have to switch from French to English, if that is okay with you. Thank you very much.


BY MR. MACDONALD:

Q. Now, with respect to Mr. Booh-Booh's book, who was your boss in Rwanda, again, you said you read certain extracts and because we don't know exactly what extracts you read, sir, I'm afraid I'm going to have to get into certain extracts myself and perhaps you could comment on these extracts.

The first one is page 134.


MR. MACDONALD:
Could I ask that the -- Mr. Registrar to distribute the material. I think Maître Leblanc has a copy for General Dallaire.


BY MR. MACDONALD:

Q. And I would like to tell you, General Dallaire, I wouldn't want you to see this in any way as a general attack from my part. This is what your boss wrote in his book that he published, I believe, approximately 10 years after -- more than 10 years after the events. So I'm just going to read a few extracts and perhaps at the end you could comment on this -- on what Mr. Booh-Booh says. So, first, page 134, I'm going to -- I'm going to skip that one, General, because it's not -- it's not really relevant, and so we will start with 137, sir.

He says, and it is in French, "And so Dallaire is lying when he claims in his book that he exercised" --


THE ENGLISH INTERPRETER:
Could counsel, sir, with respect, be advised to read slowly. And the interpreters do not have a copy of whatever he is reading. The interpreters would need a copy of whatever he is reading.


MR. PRESIDENT:
Since it is in French, you can give this --


THE ENGLISH INTERPRETER:
Could Mr. MacDonald -- we can't even interpret what he is saying because we don't have a copy and he is mumbling, he is not reading clearly. What he is saying is not being interpreted, sir.


MR. PRESIDENT:
Just a second. There is a copy for you there.


MR. MACDONALD:
Would you like me to break for a few minutes?


MR. PRESIDENT:
Yes, just wait until they get the copy.


THE ENGLISH INTERPRETER:
And he will have to start all over again.


(1630H)


MR. MACDONALD:
These extracts are in binder number 2, document number 1.

May I continue, Your Honour?


MR. PRESIDENT:
Yes, yes. Unless the witness wants --


THE WITNESS:
We can carry on, sir. Unless the witness wants –


MR. PRESIDENT:
Okay.


MR. MACDONALD:
(Inaudible) … a copy of that, Your Honour.


THE ENGLISH INTERPRETER:
Sorry, sir, with respect, if Mr. MacDonald could be advised to speak slowly and clearly because sometimes he mumbles and the interpreters can't get him.


BY MR. MACDONALD:

Q. (No interpretation)


THE ENGLISH INTERPRETER:
Could he be asked to start all over because --


MR. PRESIDENT:
Mr. MacDonald, please lift your speaker (sic) and then speak and then start again.


MR. MACDONALD:
That paragraph again?


MR. PRESIDENT:
Yes, please.


BY MR. MACDONALD:

Q. So this is what Booh-Booh says on page 137 -- 139, rather.

"Because his general conduct seriously hurt the reputation of the mission which I headed and seriously undermined our role as neutral arbiters, vis-à-vis the Rwandans."

And I will spare you a reading of the rest of the paragraph, General. But further down on page 139, still, he says the following:

"Furthermore, Dallaire was a serious handicap for UNAMIR because his deeply embedded hostility against the French and the Francophones. He had chosen his camp in the Rwandan crisis. He was allergic to my French-speaking African collaborators, which he nicknamed Franco-Africans or French Africans."

Now, we move on to page 94. Page 94, once more, your boss says the following, this is in paragraph 2 on that page.

"Coming to earn promotion in Africa by climbing on the backs of dead people and returning to Canada as General MacArthur, (ellipsis), that is what -- is that what Dallaire wanted? Let us note that he missed that in view of the mediocre performance of this general who was more wary of political activities than of his military activities for peace. Did that amount to working for peace?"

Two other passages are found on page 120, and there he says as follows -- rather this is on page 121. He comes back, page 120, the last paragraph.

"Here I must clarify the relations I had with RPF which I broached on above." (That is Dr. Booh-Booh who is speaking.) "These relations witnessed a long period of observation during which RPF members, who looked for the witnesses of the interlocutor and his propensity to fail to -- to give in to the famous gifts, that is, the young Tutsi girls."

And Booh-Booh continues by saying that,

"They must have been disappointed not seeing me in the arms of their -- these gifts."

Page 121: "They wanted me to become an unconditional defender of their cause by using -- being or using tricks of blackmailing or harassment, but all of this failed because I did not consider myself less of a prince than they thought they were. Their relations -- the relations between me and them therefore were difficult or not good, unlike the case of Dallaire who was their undercover agent in UNAMIR. It would appear a Tutsi whom he was housing, this levity on the part of this officer cost UNAMIR dearly." I will come back to that.

Now, lastly (sic) on page 123: "Dallaire was not neutral. Rather he acted in connivance with the RPF. This is what enables one to understand this situation. The file on violations of the Arusha Accords by the RPF is empty. It is empty in the archives of the UNAMIR command headquarters."

And, lastly, General Dallaire, on page 124, last paragraph, second line. "Furthermore, he clearly indicated through this personal commitment made openly that he was biased in favour of the RPF and, of course, this hurt the entire operations of UNAMIR. Even though he was committed rightly so and with my support to -- he was committed to unearthing the arms caches of Habyarimana, the MRND military training camps, the death squads in power. He was very discreet, I would even say secretive regarding the supplies of arms to the RPF from Uganda in general and transfer of these arms to Kigali in particular."

Now, the excerpts which I read to you, General Dallaire, are they the excerpts that you read? Did you take the trouble to read these excerpts in the book written by Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh, or is it the first time that you hear of these excerpts?

A. I have heard of allegations but I did not read the content of the book, at least in these areas.

Q. Okay. Thank you, General. Now, looking at the profile of Dr. Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh we know, and I am asking you a question: To your knowledge, does he have a doctorate in law, a career diplomat, several times an ambassador, especially ambassador to Moscow, Paris, UNESCO, minister of external relations in Cameroon for a period of five years? Are you aware of all these facts; do you know the profile of Dr. Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh?

A. Not to that detail, but I knew of his professional background.

Q. General, do you think -- and when one reads your book, your own book, one realises that there were some disagreements between you and your superior, that is, Mr. Booh-Booh. Now, I come to the question. Do you think that the contact or the relations between the two of you got worse because of this perception that Mr. Booh-Booh had of you? And once more, General, these are not personal attacks from me, but once more, I owe it to myself to ask you questions on these very serious charges or accusations levied against you -- levelled against you by Mr. Booh-Booh. There were disagreements between you and Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh. The question is: Do you think that Roger Booh-Booh's views or perception of view may, in the final analysis, have been the cause of these poor relations between the two of you?

A. In your description of Mr. Booh-Booh, you described a -- let me explain this, a politician and diplomat. My knowledge of politics until I became senator and having a responsibility on the political side was limited to when I was head of mission at the start and later on when Mr. Booh-Booh left. However, with that amount of background and with that description of the actions that he says and alleges I had taken, I am absolutely amazed that he didn't fire me outright, which was his duty and responsibility to do, if the force commander was putting at risk the mission and in particular, putting it at risk to the extent where the mission was not considered to be able to function in its primary duty of being transparent and impartial.

And so when I looked at the actions that I took in confining to barracks officers that were fraternisation -- that were fraternising, when I put bars out of bounds, when I put out an edict that said that there is no such thing as consenting adults in a theatre of operations where there is conflict. I find it difficult that with those actions and supported by the Belgian government in its visit even in February, that in the same breath, I am being accused by him of these derelictions.

Now, there is a book, if I may bring it to your attention, I believe by a Professor Glitch (phonetic), who did an analysis of the propaganda and misinformation in Rwanda and raises a number of the points in regards to the methods used for passing information and wrong information for each side’s cause. All this is to say that the disagreements between Mr. Booh-Booh and I from my side, commenced in the latter part of December when, first of all, he refused to take full responsibility of coordinating, resolving and ultimately deciding on internal problems that were ongoing within the mission, be they logistics, be they procedural, be they terms of reference and, of course, I found it difficult to work with the gentleman; one, by his method of work, but also by the fact that we were not finding innovative solutions politically to solve the impasse and ultimately that was putting the whole mission at risk. And in particular my soldiers, which are ultimately, if I may say, his soldiers and, of course, in the last comment was his over disdain for the troops and lack of respect for them in the accomplishment of their duties.

Q. On one particular point, General, and I think you will agree with me that the special representative, Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh, did not have the authority to fire you and you know that, sir.

A. No, that is incorrect. The SRSG works directly for the secretary general, but does his staffing through DPKO. And if he so requests that I be fired and he puts that to the secretary general, who -- he ultimately decides, but he could relieve me of my duties, confine me to my quarters or even ask that I leave the theatre of operation, none of those actions were ever even hinted upon by him.

Q. And that's your answer, sir. But again, you have referred to DPKO, which you call in French the (French spoken) which General Baril, a friend of yours was part, and again, I beg to differ with you, General, that he could not in his authority put you on the sidelines, sir, without having the consent of the secretary general himself. But that perhaps is a question of law and I don't think it could be decided here, but that is my opinion and you are entitled to yours, sir.

A. I am not giving you an opinion, sir. I am giving you facts. And the fact is that if an SRSG -- and it has been done by others -- that if in fact he wants me fired, that is his prerogative to recommend to the secretary general, who takes the decision. And I know for a fact that they knew each other quite well, having worked together previously in other endeavours, like minister of foreign affairs and also ambassador to the UN and had privileged communication with the secretary general.

Q. I agree with you, General, and that's what I am saying. He could not -- he could recommend restitution or you being put on the sidelines, but he cannot, himself, fire you. I think we are speaking the same language on that particular issue. But to say, I agree with you, he has a great deal of power with respect to these recommendations, obviously. Now --

A. Sir, if I may also respond to this -- to the Court, if necessary, is that in January the number three of the mission, which is the chief administrative officer, was fired at his recommendation because Mr. Booh-Booh and he could absolutely not see eye to eye in meeting the requirements and the CAO was replaced within a period of less than a month.

Q. That is right, and I believe you are referring to Mr. Hallquist, correct?

A. That is right.

Q. All right. And I understand, sir, that you couldn't see eye to eye with Mr. Hallquist either; isn't that correct?

A. Mr. Hallquist and I had considerable discussions on the ineptness of the UN administrative and logistic situation that was putting the mission at risk. We had outright tirades, face-to-face, but we subsequently came to agreements and worked to solve them even though we were not always of the same opinion. Such circumstances never presented themselves by Mr. Booh-Booh nor did he ever offer that opportunity to me.

Q. Now, with respect to Mr. Booh-Booh's mission on the terrain, have you read, General, the letter from Mister -- from the secretary general, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, at the time? And that is at page 190 -- 191 of the book, I believe.

A. I have got only to page 171.

Q. I am sorry, General. Okay. Well, basically, I am just going to read out a paragraph from that. The first paragraph and he says the following, General.


THE ENGLISH INTERPRETER:
The interpreters don't have that paragraph.


BY MR. MACDONALD:

Q. It is a letter addressed by Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali to the president of the Republic of Cameroon and says the following:

"Mr. President, at the time when Mr. Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh's assignment is coming to an end as my special representative in Rwanda, I would like to thank you for having kindly put this remarkable diplomat and negotiator at the disposal of the United Nations organisation."

Do you agree with that perception of the secretary general at the time?

A. No.

Q. You do not, sir. Very well. Could you tell us, sir, when did you last speak to Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh? When was your last contact?

A. I am at a loss to say. He left the mission earlier sometime in May ostensibly with the mission to go to African states and try to convince them to provide troops to the new mandate that we had received, that was to increase the size of the force. And so it seems to me in May, mid-May, something like that, where he ultimately set up his headquarters in Nairobi. And then I believe his contract was terminated -- or finished, forgive me, I am not sure of the term there, around the 16th of June and I was ostensibly made head of mission in theatre and then formally as of mid-June.

Q. Thank you, sir. Now, even though you haven't read that book in its entirety, the book of Mr. Booh-Booh, I assume that you have a great deal of people around you, General, your entourage, who surely must have briefed you on these malicious allegations by Mr. Booh-Booh.

Now, the question is this, sir: Have you at any time considered taking action against Mr. Booh-Booh with respect to these allegations?

A. My knowledge mostly came from the reviews that we read, comments, as you say from friends or those interested in the subject, often very succinct comments and I did seek counsel in saying, was there anything in there that would require me to respond in a sort of a legal fashion and receiving no particular direction, one way or another, I felt there was no value in pursuing this thing legally.

Q. I find it odd, strange that you would consult counsel on a book that you haven't read. We would expect you to at least read the book before seeking advice from counsel.


MR. YAROSKY:
It's Harvey Yarosky, General Dallaire's counsel, and I believe it is a matter of privilege, the counsel is not entitled to question General Dallaire on whatever consultation he may or may not have had with legal counsel. He is quite outside the domain that is appropriate to his examination. And I respectfully submit that there is a question of privilege here.


MR. MACDONALD:
Well, that’s right. It's a privilege that belongs to General Dallaire and only General Dallaire. I perfectly agree with Maître Yarosky. If my -- if I was seeking to get into the conversation, we don't know who General Dallaire saw. I didn't ask him and I will not. But the question was basically, did you seek counsel or did you get an opinion as to the possibility of your doing something about that? That was just a simple yes or no question. So, but I will not -- definitely not get into the details if General Dallaire did seek professional advice as to that.


BY MR. MACDONALD:

Q. So my comment, General Dallaire, and again I advise you also not to get into (inaudible) of the -- your discussion with your counsel, if you did seek counsel. But, again, how -- I have difficulties conceiving the fact that you would seek professional advice or some type of advice without reading the entirety of this book which took me approximately maybe an hour and half, two hours to read. How is that?

A. I have had no interest in pursing that apart from the general information that I received, the opinions on the book, whether I had time or wanted to delve into it, I wished only to ensure that there was nothing of a nature that would require a legal action one way or another. There have been other books and articles and opinions and papers published that have differing points of view in regards to me and my conduct in my professional decisions and I haven't read all those and I have no particular intention of doing a self-analysis of the results of all those informations. And so, your -- of course, it can be assessing whether or not I should have read the book, but that is entirely my decision and I did not feel it worthy of me pursuing it.

Q. I have a thought from the top of my head, General Dallaire. I recall reading something and I am sure I have it somewhere, it's here; it's somewhere. On the internet in, I believe, the days after that book of Booh-Booh was put on the market and you will recall, sir, that you were interviewed by some journalist and I recall your comment. You said -- first of all, you discarded these allegations and you said, sir -- and I can find that piece of internet. You said in French -- in French you said, "This would make interesting reading." Do you recall that?

A. No, I don't recall it.

Q. Very well. I will see if I can try to find it. Have you sir, given the seriousness of these allegations by Mr. Booh-Booh, had you responded in any way, type or form in writing or otherwise to these allegations?

A. No, I don't recall going into any specific writing of articles or something, whether I was interviewed on the book amongst other things, it is quite possible. I do interviews nearly daily. It sort of appeared for a very short while on the radar screen and then disappeared. And it took time to be able to get a copy, I remember that, but apart from that, not really, I must say that the extent of the commentary on my sexual exploits were far beyond what I remember people mentioning but then again that's what he is saying and I am saying the contrary.

Q. Very well, sir. Sir, I understand that is a resounding no, you haven't really published anything in reply to these allegations, if I understand you correctly.

A. No, not me specifically, no.

Q. Very well. Now, have any -- to your knowledge, sir, have any of your colleagues, again on the terrain in Rwanda back in 1994 – 1993-94, have they -- I use the term "come to your rescue" with respect to these allegations and one would expect a gentleman like Luc Marchal or Frank Claeys, perhaps or anyone there that served under you, sir, you would expect that they would denounce that vigorously. Now, to your knowledge, again, do you know whether or not that was done by anyone that served under you in Rwanda?

A. Oh, I don't remember the subject being raised. I mean, there was all kind of gutter press going and treks, left, right and centre which were being monitored. There was a history in the country of being quite explicit in its cartoons in regard to sexual connotations with different -- people with different political or whatever sort of divergent points of view. And I remember seeing some of those cartoons in -- subsequently when I participated in a symposium on the media in Rwanda and that was at Kayami (phonetic) … I forget when. But apart from that, my position had been clear in the mission and there was no specific follow-up nor was anything raised by the political staff of Mr. Booh-Booh -- he had an extensive political staff -- nor by Dr. Kabaya, who was the chief of staff regarding that subject.

Q. Okay. I forgot to ask you earlier on about a book that a French journalist, I believe he was French, by the name of Charles Onana. He wrote a book a few years back on Kagame, accusing Kagame of, namely, being responsible for the plane going down, the assassination of President Habyarimana, I forget the name of the book, but actually, I believe it's the first book he wrote on Kagame. Do you recall reading a book, General Dallaire, written by Charles Onana on Kagame?

A. I don't remember the author nor the book at all.

Q. In that particular case, President Kagame was a bit troubled by these serious allegations and decided to seize the authorities, the French authorities and in a nutshell he lost, went on appeal and from my understanding withdrew before the case got to the court of appeal. And again, since you haven't read that book entirely and in its entirety, the book by Mr. Booh-Booh, I suggest to you, sir, that you are the only -- really, you are the only real target in that book, yourself and the RPF. It is just a comment, sir, and again, I am not going to refer to it extensively, but in his book, page 8, Mr. Booh-Booh mentions the reasons why he thought -- the reasons why he felt he had the obligation to write about certain things. And I am just going to read you a brief passage. I am not sure if you have that in front of you, General. It is page 8.

A. Yes, I do.

Q. It is the second to the last paragraph and it goes like this: He says:

"The last ten years I have been quite in order to comply with the obligations of reserve that are inherent in the office of a diplomat, out of humility and respect for the hundreds of thousands of Rwandans killed in the course of the genocide."

What struck me, General Dallaire, is that this is obviously not a spontaneous reaction by Mr. Booh-Booh, his -- in French we say (French spoken) "decanted" his thoughts for ten years. And one would -- one would have to ask why would he say something like that if it is not spontaneous, if it is not a reaction to anything, why would he write something like that ten years after the events? And my suggestion to you, sir, is perhaps you should – or, you have a platform here today to denounce whatever he said about you, but I am sure that you have things to say and perhaps you should -- you should publish eventually. And I understand that your book Shake Hands with the Devil, bears, if I understand correctly, in Military I, I think you said that you were planning on re-editing that particular book; is that correct, sir?

A. The only things that did happen were corrections made to elements in the content, some names and some editorial corrections.

Q. I have a question, I wasn't going to put it to you, but I will but very briefly. You have seen the film Hotel Rwanda, which is a Hollywood fiction of the events that happened in Rwanda. Have you seen the film, sir?

A. Yes, I did.

Q. Okay. What struck me when I saw that film is the act -- actually, we don't know, we were assuming (inaudible) but at no time in that film, unless I am mistaken, at no time in that film is your name mentioned; is that correct?

A. At the Toronto film festival when the film came out, I met with the director of the film who indicated that he had not read my book nor had there been any interviews with me at all to make the film. I made it quite clear that Nick Nolte, who was playing a Canadian colonel, was to reflect a composite of the UN and not as such the force commander.

Q. I see. Okay. And again, the reason I am asking this, sir, and again, I don't want to make an issue out of this, but the rumour had it at one certain point in time that the reason he didn't mention your name is because they didn't have your approval, it seems, on the -- what we call in French, le cache. So you were absolutely not in the case. You were never approached. You were never consulted in any way, from what you say; is that correct?

A. Absolutely.

Q. Now, General, I have a few questions with -- concerning your mission, your reconnaissance mission and I am going to read from that report certain extracts, sir, and ultimately ask you if that was your perception, your factual perception at the time of your -- at the time of your mission. And I understand from your examination-in-chief that the drafting of that report started at the time you were still in Rwanda in the fulfillment of that technical mission; is that correct?

A. The initial draft was not completed as some portions were not finished until we got back, but it was my aim to have the draft before we left Rwanda, yes.

Q. I am sorry. That is document 13, in binder number 2, I have certain extracts of that quote. With respect to dates, General, you didn't seem quite sure whether -- as to whether he'd met certain people. On page 2, I draw your attention to the fact that according to that report on August 27th you would have met with the prime minister-designate, Faustin Twagiramungu; is that correct?

A. Faustin, I remember meeting him, yes, I believe that.

Q. Okay. According to the report it is on August 27th, and on that name --


MR. KOUAMBO:
Mr. MacDonald, please, Kouambo, registry, the document given to us by your assistant, Counsel Natalie, doesn't seem to be the same as the one you are referring to. If you can give us the number, the name at the top of the page so that we can check.


MR. MACDONALD:
Yes, it would appear she has that document. It is S16, S16. There have been various amendments.


MR. KOUAMBO:
We are there. We are there, we got it.


BY MR. MACDONALD:

Q. Do you have it in front of you, General?

A. Yes, I have got it in the listing of those that I met with, yes.

Q. I just wanted to draw your attention on August the 30th, it seemed to be a question mark on that particular point yesterday. You did meet with Prime Minister Agathe on August the 30th, so it seems.

A. Very good.

Q. Now, page 5, General, third paragraph: Views of the FPR. And let me read to you, sir, it is on page 5, paragraph 14, the last 3 lines, and it says the following:

"The representatives of the FPR time and again insisted that they would not return to Kigali if the French troops were still in the capital."

And I would just -- I was thinking about a passage in your book when I read that, which is, I believe 210 of the French version and where you say, General, that following the RPF invasions in the last -- from 1990 to 1993, you seem to say in your book that,

"Had it not been for the French troops, RPF could have won the battle."

In other words, the RPF attacked, the Rwandan army defended obviously, the territory, but with the help of the French troops and had it not been, according to your opinion, anyways, had it not been for the French troops, the RPF would have taken the country even before the 1994.

A. That was a general consensus at the time.

Q. Okay, but you agree with the fact that it's a -- when you say general consensus, that's what you also thought, right?

A. Well, that is to say it was the information I got, so I was taking that from people who had been on the ground or who had thought about it or read about it or seen it or lived it.

Q. I will come back to that question, General, that topic about the French troops in just a little while.

A. Right.

Q. Okay. At page -- in one of the sections, I am not sure which, because the same (French spoken) -- in a few places, but it is page 7 I have, you deal with the topic of the forces, the government forces on the terrain.

A. I wonder, sir, if you wouldn't mind, maybe we could use the last 3 numbers of those code numbers on the top right-hand corner of the -- that might be faster.

Q. Okay the number is L0022656.

A. Okay.

Q. Now, you say -- at paragraph 33 you say the following -- and again, I would like you to tell us if that was your assessment of the situation at the time. "The composition of the Rwandese army had seven operational sectors of 28 infantry battalions, seven special units, six military camp areas and two logistics units. There is a school for officers, non-commissioned officers and other training facilities. The military academy and staff college not operated since the war commenced. Strength: The total strength is approximately 29,000 personnel distributed in combat units between 600 to 800 personnel each."

Now the important part is the following paragraph and you say this – or, your report says that:

"The RPF victory in its last offensive has adversely affected the moral of the RGF forces. The possibility for many soldiers of losing their jobs during the transition to the new army and due to the fact that they will lose many advantages, salary, free food, housing, means they are facing an uncertain future."

With respect to the training, paragraph 35, you say,

"The general standard of training in the RGF is low; the period of rapid expansion from 5,000 to 34,000 during the war was conducted without an effective training base. Soldiers possessed or possess only basic military skills of various standards."

Paragraph 37: "Logistics system is rated as marginally effective. The standard of maintenance is bad. The supply system, the camp provides only basic needs. Transport system is plagued by shortages. The army continues to use civilian and other government vehicles to meet its minimum needs."

Now, with respect to that, these paragraphs, General Dallaire, I understand that was your assessment of the situation at the time, correct?

A. Correct.

Q. Page -- following page number L0022657, paragraph 43, and the report reads as follows:

"Assessment of capability. The capability of the RGF is assessed as medium to low due to poor morale, lack of training, poor equipment, limited service support, lack of finances and war fatigue. The organisation must be rebuilt."

Now, again, that's back in August 1993, your assessment, correct, General?
A. Right.
Q. With respect to -- now, the -- I am just screening as I am going along here, I am sorry. Oh, yes, okay. On page 9, paragraph 46, last 3 numbers, 658 on the right-hand side. And it says this: "Police forces in Rwanda were organised in the same manner as the French or Belgian police and their functions in time of peace and war are similar. At present the Rwandese gendarmerie can be considered to be on the war footing, which means that their various missions ought to be seen as military security missions. The greater part of the Rwandese gendarmerie is deployed on the frontline or is involved in ensuring security of key points."

Again, that was your assessment of the situation, General Dallaire, back in August 1993, correct?

A. That was the assessment at that time, yes.

Q. Finally, on that particular point, paragraph 49, detailed information -- the paragraph starting with detailed information says:

"The current total strength of the Rwandese gendarmerie is 600. Excluding the logistic units, the units deployed on the front and the 2,000 gendarmes currently being trained, there are only -- only 400 gendarmes performing a real peacetime police role."

The following page, General, the last three digits 659, paragraph 56, and you say this about the justice department. You said,

"The justice department does not work efficiently. The prisons are overcrowded and many of the prisoners are able to escape. The public prosecution department is non-existent; the result is a legal system that is completely paralysed."

So again, that was back in August 1993, and I am assuming that was your assessment of the situation and as we say in French, General Dallaire, I think you would agree with me that when the government left Kigali in April, all of Kigali was paralysed; is that correct? The administrative services, and obviously, the justice department which was paralysed even before that, back in August 1993. Do you agree with that, General?

A. I must defer, sir, in the following fashion. The assessment that we did was an assessment of a 10-day period of time on the ground with different staff and I stand by the assessment and that's the information that we had, we received, and of what we were able to collaborate parts of it and other parts. It was simply information provided to us. In regard to the state of affairs in the country, by the time I hit the ground on the 22nd of October and over the time frame was gathering more detailed information on the deployment of forces as an example, the gendarmerie had a number of troops in Kigali, in Jolibois companies which, in fact, supported us and vice-versa. So the scenario was changing. We were getting better information which would require certainly an update to this document. However, if you are talking about the night of the 6th of April when the presidential plane was shot down, we have, as I indicated, the period of enormous intensity. We have had riots, we've had civil servants not paid, school teachers not paid, the troops not getting food, not getting their two beers a day, as an example. And we got a process that is moving towards paralysis because of the broad-based transitional government not being effective. So there is a sort of a better assessment of their capabilities, but that capability was degenerating as we continued to have that political impasse. So that's a bit of a clarification, if I may, to your question.


(1730H)


MR. MACDONALD:

Q. Thank you, sir. Now, page --


MR. BÂ:
Some clarification, Counsel MacDonald. I heard something like compagnie Joli. Could it be compagnie Jali?

Well then, General, it is not my time to put questions to you; just to shed light is it Jali or Joli?


BY MR. MACDONALD:

Q. Is it Jali or Joli, General?


MR. BÂ:
Well, it is of no significance to me. I mean if it is to stay that way, let it be. Is it Jali or Joli?


THE WITNESS:
It is -- I have sometimes an ability to stay stuck on a name, and the first time I heard it I had understood Joli, but you are quite right it is Jali. But it was a continuous point with General Ndindiliyimana that I was calling that rapid reaction force.


MR. MACDONALD:
Joli not Jali?


BY MR. MACDONALD:

Q. Page 1, -- we are revisiting the question about the French troops on the Rwandan soil and you say this at paragraph 7, you say:

"The withdrawal of foreign troops is required as part of the peace agreement under article 72 of the protocol of the integration of armed forces. The article states that the withdrawal shall take place after the deployment of the neutral international force, NIF, or the expanded NMOG -- whatever that means -- under the command and control of the United Nations."

Now, given the fact that -- and I'm assuming you knew at the time, General Dallaire -- in August 1993, you knew that RPF had not been able to take the country because of the intervention of these French troops. Didn't red flags come up -- or, didn't you in any way evaluate that withdrawal as being precarious for the country and, basically, didn't you see in that prerequisite from the RPF that the French leave the country -- "we're not doing anything, we're not talking, until the French leave the country". Didn't you see that that could be somewhat of a ruse from the RPF to get the French out of the country so they could ultimately take the country, which they did? You would have to agree with me on that? Did --

A. I have got to --

Q. I'm sorry, General?

A. I -- I have got to -- maybe -- if I may bring a point in regards to what we are speaking of. We are speaking about a country that has been at war, signed a peace agreement, went to the UN, asked it to send a peacekeeping force because they convinced the UN that both sides wanted peace and that all they needed was a referee there without a penalty box to be able to assist them in observing and reporting in regards to any possible deviations from the peace agreement.

We're not in an exercise of analysing whether or not these guys are going back to war or not, or what are the context of potentially war. We are implementing a peace agreement, and it is within the context of a normal peace agreement that if you do have foreign forces on the ground, that have no role within the peace process, that they, in fact, leave and evacuate, which became a point of contention when the French military advisers that were within all of the elite units, as well as the Belgian military advisers who were in different command and training establishments, were permitted to stay.

Q. Well, I understand that -- but, with all due respect, General, in my opinion, that's rather a theoretical and simplistic approach because we know now, today, that the RPF never had any intentions whatsoever of going through with this -- these Arusha Accords, I mean it was a whole frame up.

A. But sir --

Q. They knew that the only way that they could take the country was by force. Everybody knows that. (Microphones overlapping) … I'm sorry, General. Go ahead.

A. I am not involved, sir, I don't think, in a Monday morning quarterback exercise. I am involved in providing you with information of the facts of the specific times to the best of my recollection, and in that position I would only like to also emphasise that the French military attaché when I presented my concept of operation which called for a minimum of 2,600 UN troops, told me that that was far beyond the need. All I needed was 500 unarmed observers, and, also, the French had told the UN that they were very keen on getting their forces out of there as soon as possible, and that is why they were supporting so strongly that the UN agree to a peacekeeping force. That's the information I had.

Q. But again, sir -- again I have to use my -- my French expression, à plus forte raison, didn’t you think that if the purpose of the exercise was to obtain ultimate peace, why would the RPF insist on that particular condition of having the French troops leave the country. I mean, obviously, there must have been red flags that popped up, at least in your mind, when you saw the insistence and the persistence of the RPF with that particular clause 72, and a gentleman of your experience should -- could not have not seen that, sir, as a proposition.

A. Well, my experience -- what it looked to me like is that we were moving down a peace agreement, and one of the forces that had been considered an enemy force previously, to the RPF, was still on the ground. That force had not signed the peace agreement and so had absolutely no role there, and so, it would seem to me very logical that one of the belligerents who had considered the French as an enemy would certainly not be keen on having them sitting there for no specific role whatsoever and not under the control of the peace agreement.


MR. PRESIDENT:
Mr. MacDonald, if you want to take a break you can. At any --


MR. MACDONALD:
Yes, if you wish, Your Honour.


MR. PRESIDENT:
-- at any convenient time.


MR. MACDONALD:
Yes, it is convenient for me.


MR. PRESIDENT:
If it is convenient, we will adjourned for half an hour.


MR. MACDONALD:
Yes.


MR. BÂ:
What time will we resume?


MR. PRESIDENT:
Half an hour.

(Court recessed from 1740H to 1810H)


MR. PRESIDENT:
Yes. Good afternoon.

Yes, Mr. MacDonald, you can start.


MR. MACDONALD:
Yes, thank you, Your Honour.


BY MR. MACDONALD:

Q. General Dallaire, are you there? Can you hear me, General Dallaire?

A. Yes, sorry. Yes, I can hear you quite clearly.

Q. Following a bit of insight -- I would just like to rewind a bit on the persistence and insistence of the French of the -- sorry the RPF, with respect to the withdrawal of the French troops.

Now, again the -- your explanation, General, is rather rational and again a bit theoretical, and as a tactician and as a strategist yourself, your explanation is based on the fact that both parties -- or had bona fides intention. Now, again, as an expert in tactical questions and strategic questions, you must have asked yourself, General, you must have said, what if, what if the RPF is not entering this very complex process with bona fides intentions. Surely you must have asked yourself that?

A. I mean we -- we wonder if the worst case scenario happens what we would do, yes.

Q. But again, by -- by asking yourself or by -- by trying to determine what that worst case scenario could be and by not eliminating that worst case scenario, again, with respect to that persistent condition on the part of the RPF with respect to the French troops, didn't -- didn't that question, "What if, they are not entering this process with bona fides intentions?" Doesn’t that raise a --

A. Sorry, I seem to be interrupting you before you have finished your questions. Forgive me.

Q. No problems.

It is just on that question, you have anticipated the worst case scenario, obviously, and, of course, one of these scenarios, the premise of one of these scenarios would be that one of the parties, let's say for instance the RPF was not entering this complex process with bona fides intentions. Now, if you are anticipating that or questioning that, these intentions from the RPF, then surely with -- with that condition imposed by the RPF, namely, the withdrawal of the French troops, you must have had -- you must have thought, at least assessed the possibility that that could be -- that could be a ruse by (sic) the part of the RPF to get the French troops out to -- for ultimately taking the country by arms, because, again, you're there under Chapter 6 and would not be any help to the government forces if the RPF decides to resort to arms. So, what if?

A. Forgive me. I keep interrupting you. I am not sure when the question ends, but if I may respond at this point?

Q. Yes, sir.

A. The worst case scenario -- first of all, it is my mission, I need an evacuation plan which must be prepared. And, secondly, the worst case scenario is that is why I had Belgian troops at the airport for, that was my vital ground that I had to maintain in order to be able to evacuate the forces, civilians and so on. In regards to the forces or the ex-belligerents the worst case scenario in which you mention, the RPF launch an assault, or an altercation starts up again, and the RPF come in. The presence of 300 very lightly armed French soldiers was not really a factor, because, first of all, it would be far too weak to be of any consequence in tipping the balance of the situation, particularly it being in Kigali and with limited transport. However, the French in Bangi, and a couple of other bases, maintain about 12,000 troops in Africa, of which a number of them are paracommandos, and they could be in Rwanda within hours and we see that within the first 48 hours of the start of the genocide, I have over 600 paracommandos deployed even before I have any real chance of bringing forth any comment because the only warning I got was 45 minutes. However, they were able to warn air defence batteries around the airfield, not to shoot them down. So, I think that the worst case scenario, sir, is an operation by the RPF which would need at least a minimum of a couple of days, the last time was more than a week, nearly 10 days. That gave ample time for a substantial French force to be deployed.

Q. Well, it seems that it was not sufficient because that is exactly what they did, that is exactly what the RPF did. They had as much as 600 -- or, over 600 men, some say as much as 3,000, some say as much as 10,000, on April the 6th in Kigali. So why wasn't that effort deployed at that particular time, on April the 6th and April the 7th, and the following days?

A. Well, we are in an interesting exercise here of what if's, and if we want to pursue that, then the 2,500 troops that ultimately were made available to pull out the expatriates, of which over 600 were French, 800 on the ground were Belgian, with another nearly 800 waiting in the wings, over 300 marines standing by in the area of Bujumbura, and on top of that there was a marine amphibious unit off of Addis Abba of about 1200. So, they actually came in and refused to be part of the fight. So, if the question is why didn't they come in and stop it, well, then, sir, it is to the political leaders of those countries that those questions should be raised.

Q. Had that particular scenario been -- to your knowledge, had that been discussed with these political authorities? I mean, it is one thing to have people around, men ready to come in, but if political authorities don't agree on that, then they're calling the shots and as far as you know, given the fact that these troops -- these different troops, were ready to intervene, did you have the political ascentment (sic) that these people would come in if -- if need be?

A. I just can't figure out exactly what we're talking about here. We have a UN peacekeeping mission on the ground. The plan is to make it work. There was absolutely no will by the international community, at first, even to participate in the peacekeeping mission. I had to pull teeth to even get the troops that I ultimately had and they were ill-equipped apart from that half battalion of Belgians. The French had demonstrated they were absolutely not interested in participating in this exercise in the initial phases.

The Security Council, which had the overarching authority on Rwanda in regards to the international community, of which the French, and the Brits, and the Americans and all are sitting on the Security Council, none of them demonstrated a desire to go in and to stop the altercation that was going on. That was my whole point, within the first 48 hours, although I called for reinforcements, the Belgians had decided to withdraw and convinced everybody else not to come in and let Rwandans fight it out and ultimately see what happens. And that's essentially what they decided, even after I got authority for -- on the 17th of May, for an increase of 5,000 troops. It still took two months before they ever came in, and so the deployment of the French of 300 lightly armed troops in Kigali and their departure is of absolutely no significance when one looks at the scale of requirement and the capabilities, one, the French had, and, secondly, their will of not wanting to come in and stop the situation.

Q. But again why, if that's the case, why the persistence and the insistence of the RPF to have these troops leave before they enter into any negotiations --

A. Very clearly, --again forgive me for interrupting you.

Q. It is all right. Go ahead.

A. Very clearly, the French were an enemy. They had fought with the government forces. They had not signed the peace agreement. They have (sic) no role there and, on the contrary, can be a significantly destabilising element in the balance of forces on the ground, and so it was with full logic that they had to leave.

Q. So, basically, you never -- just a second. So basically you never, you never saw that condition or that insistence on the part of the RPF in any way. You never saw that as a possible ruse, again, on the part of the RPF to eventually take over the country because when you say, sir, that these 300 troops had no significant importance, I have to -- I have to disagree with you because again in your book you say it; these troops are the reason why the RPF did not take over the country before 1994, so they must have --

A. Wait a minute now. The troops that were on the ground when the operation took place were estimated at about 1500. So, I mean 1500 heavily-armed troops coming in to fight, and 300 lightly armed troops that had been doing nothing more than guarding roadblocks and buildings are two different force capabilities.

Q. Well, they played a significant role back in 1992, 1993. All right, so --


THE ENGLISH INTERPRETER:
Mr. President, the interpreters are requesting a pause between the questions and answers.


THE WITNESS:
It is different force capability.


MR. PRESIDENT:
Yes, Counsel.


BY MR. MACDONALD:

Q. Page 663, the chapter concerning the internal security situation, Colonel, and you say --

A. What are we doing?

Q. We're still on the reconnaissance report, page 663.

A. Just wait up. Very good.

Q. It is paragraph 77. You say: "The peace agreement signed in Arusha is a significant achievement and has brought Rwanda back from the very brink of chaos and civil war. It is anticipated that the security situation will, in fact, worsen for a period of time now that the peace treaty has been signed." Again, that was your assessment and opinion at the time, General; correct?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. And on the following paragraph, 78, you specifically deal with these security threats, and, namely, at paragraph B, you mention army -- I'm sorry, armed banditry currently carried out by deserters from the Rwandese army and the gendarmerie. So, you had the information at the time back in August 1993, that that was a problem. There were many deserters from the -- either the Rwandese army or the gendarmerie. That would constitute a threat, correct?

A. That was related to me by the Rwandans, themselves, of their concern about these deserters that exist. We never quantified a number. It was just a factor in the security situation.

Q. But I am assuming that the numbers were significant enough.


MR. PRESIDENT:
Mr. MacDonald, keep a pause.


MR. MACDONALD:
I'm sorry.


BY MR. MACDONALD:

Q. On that particular point, General, I'm assuming even though we do not have specific numbers that the amount of these -- the number of these deserters was significant enough to constitute a serious threat?

A. It was a security threat.

Q. That's right. Paragraph E, you mention the easy availability of weapons. Right?

A. Yes.

Q. And to that effect, I have information from diverse sources that perhaps you can buy hand grenades for the equivalent of $3, US$3. Do you agree with that?

A. That is correct.

Q. And, finally, on that page, paragraph H – or, subparagraph H, again dealing with security threats, you mention the inability of the Rwandese government to effectively cope with rising crime in the country, and in particular Kigali.

A. That was provided to us by the Rwandan authorities.

Q. Okay. And, again, paragraph 88, with respect to armed banditry by army and gendarmerie deserters, you say that the more effective and better trained units were dispatched to the front -- to the front line to stem the RPF advance. So that, again, these were numbers provided to you at the time and that was your assessment; correct?

A. That was the assessment and the actions taken at the last altercation in '92, yes.


(1830H)


BY MR. MACDONALD:

Q. Okay. And paragraph 89, you say: "A similar influx of poorly-trained recruits were brought into the army, and the level of discipline and morale of the forces sank lower. Numbers of gendarmes and soldiers deserted and formed loosely-knit groups of bandits. These bandits gravitated towards Kigali where they could more easily blend in with the large numbers of armed men in uniforms, and have been responsible for much of the attacks on the roads and against houses in and around Kigali."

So that assessment, back in -- again, August 1993, you don't have any information that that particular situation, paragraph 89, infiltration of deserters? You have no indication that that was not the situation back in April of 1994; correct?

A. This -- wait a minute, this is relayed to me by the Rwandan authorities in 1993, August of '93. And their concern about the security situation due to the impact of three years of civil war.

Q. That's right.

A. When I arrived in October, there were very few cases of altercations that were going on, but that situation escalated with the months as the political process was stagnating and became a crisis point in early April.

Q. Okay, thank you, sir. And I'm just about over with that report. Referring you to paragraph 93 again, on the same page, that's where I'd gotten the information about $3 grenades at the market.

A. Mmm-hmm.

Q. And also I understand there was a -- easy access or availability of Kalashnikov rifles as well on the market?

A. Yeah, we had not witnessed any of that. That was one of the reports, or verbal reports that we were receiving. The government had itself stated that it had distributed weapons amongst the civilian population in both the previous altercations, and so you had an ability to buy weapons and also an already distributed amount of weapons amongst the general population. And that was, of course, a security risk.

Q. But again, General, even though you did not witness that yourself, I'm assuming that you took that information seriously enough to -- to incorporate it into your report, right? There wasn't any doubt in your mind, if...

A. Well, I was -- I had to, as -- in my reconnaissance, take the worst-case scenario that was presented to me, and that's why part of the creation of the weapons secure area was to conduct spot checks, road checks at different times in different places in order to potentially stymie the movement of weapons both in and out of the capital area.

Q. Okay. And also, you agree with the fact that many weapons were distributed to the private sector by the MINADEF, namely, the national guards -- parks national guards and customs officers and so on and so forth. So these people -- these -- these people had weapons also. Correct?

A. And so did the communal police, although --

Q. And so did the communal police.

A. -- they had weapons -- I don't know how much ammunition they had with them. But there was also the distribution at large of weapons to the general civilian population as part of their self-defence concept.

Q. Okay. And to your knowledge these weapons were not -- were still in circulation, or circulation, on April the 6th, right -- 1994, of course?

A. We had hoped that we had stymied what we could in the weapons secure area, but for -- as for the rest of the country, I had no way of determining whether there was that many or more or less.

Q. Okay. And one final point, General: Three last digits, 708, again from your reconnaissance report. And you say -- it's at paragraph C, or subparagraph C of paragraph 253. You say: "The prevalence of arms throughout the country, a history of banditry and death squads, the existence of paramilitary wings to certain political parties, and the total ineffectiveness of the communal police system and the very poor state of what remains of the gendarmerie all compose to escalate the internal tensions amongst the very poor and rural population in general, and in the displaced persons' camps in particular."

Again, same question, General: That was your assessment back in 1993 total, right?

A. According to the information we received, yes.

Q. Okay. On the initial questions I put to you, General, I forgot one point with respect to the preparation of your testimony here. And it concerns your personal notes, sir. Now, we understand that while you were there on the terrain in Rwanda, in 1993-1994, you took some personal notes of the events; is that correct?

A. No, I held a daily agenda of activities that I had to conduct, plus very personal notes of my own volition that involved matters that go well beyond the UN or the mission.

Q. Okay. Now, with respect to your agenda, sir, do you still have that agenda?

A. I possess my agendas, yes.

Q. Okay. Would that constitute a problem or difficulty for you, sir, if we asked you -- if I did, anyways, asked you to give us a copy of that agenda?

A. Yes.

Q. And on what grounds, please?

A. The agendas contain personal notes, personal information, sensitive information that have nothing to do with the mission, and in that regard I consider them to be my own personal possessions and of no consequence to this -- to my testifying here in front of this Tribunal.

Q. But I understand, General Dallaire, that you did refer to that particular agenda in the preparation -- in the course of the preparation of your testimony here today. Isn't that correct?

A. Interestingly, I didn't open one of my agendas throughout the preparation, and one of the primary reasons is I haven't had time to do it. And nor, necessarily, would I refer to them. So, no, I have not used those agendas at all.

Q. But you have -- do you have them with you? Like, in your possession, right now, as we speak?

A. No, I don't have them with me.

Q. Okay, thank you, sir. I'm have --


MR. MACDONALD:
I'm going to have to do this next segment in French, Your Honour, because all the outline's in French and it's going to be too complicated.


MR. PRESIDENT:
Keeping the pause.


MR. MACDONALD:
Yes, sir; yes, sir.


BY MR. MACDONALD:

Q. General Dallaire, in your book you stated that your mission in Rwanda was a failure; is that right?

A. That is correct.

Q. I take it that -- or, rather, I understand that the person who replaced you -- I'm not sure of his rank -- but the person who replaced you was General Tousignant?

A. You were intermittent, but if you're asking me who replaced me, yes, it was General Tousignant.

Q. Okay, thank you. And do you, sir, consider that General Tousignant, who was your successor, would in any way be responsible for that failure? I'm sorry, I'm doing it in English again. Do you agree that General Tousignant was responsible for that failure -- or, according to you, General Tousignant was responsible for that failure; is that right?

Did you get the question there, General?

A. Yes, I got the question, and my response is that I was commanding a peacekeeping mission, and the peacekeeping mission failed because we fell back into a civil war and ultimately a genocide. And so in that context, the mission failed.

Q. But again it's -- don't see this as a personal attack, General, but it seems that throughout your different depositions, throughout your book, you more or less acknowledge a certain part of that failure yourself. Is that correct, sir?

A. Yes, I acknowledge that.

Q. Now, the question is: What about your successor, General Tousignant, do you consider him to be a -- responsible for that effect -- or, that failure, I'm sorry.

A. I'm not sure we're on the same wavelength here. I said that the mission failed because we ended up in a civil war and a genocide, and so the peacekeeping mission ended. We then had a new government that established itself. General Tousignant came in with a different mandate, and he conducted his mission according to what he felt was to be done. I do not see any other links.

Q. But again, I have to press you a bit on this. But haven't you acknowledged or recognised the fact that you, as commander of that force, had some part -- or, an important part to play in that failure, sir?

A. My mission to bring about and assist the Rwandans to bring about a -- a peace agreement ended up in a civil war and a genocide. In that context, my mission was not accomplished. My mission of a peacekeeping force ended up not peacekeeping anymore. That ended.

Q. Okay. But you yourself, sir -- I understand the entity of the mission itself. But you as commander -- and again, don't see that in any way as a blame --

A. Mmm-hmm.

Q. -- do you yourself consider your role to be an important factor in that failure of your mission?

A. I have never assessed it in the context of important, not important, so on. I have done my own self-analysis and my sense of accountability to my mission. I think I could have done a better job in hindsight, and in so doing feel that ultimately my mission did not accomplish what it was supposed to do, and so in so doing it failed. And I was the commander.

Q. I see. Now, again with respect to General Tousignant, do you see any -- could you attribute any part of responsibility of that failure of your mission to him, as your successor?

A. Again -- again, we are on the wrong wavelength. The mission failed on the -- on the 7th of April 1994 when the peace agreement was broken and we fell into civil war and ultimately genocide. That's when that scenario ended.

Q. Okay.

A. Subsequent to that there's a whole series of events, including a new mandate, including a whole new force structure that happened, including a final situation in which we got a new government, and so we're talking apples and oranges completely here.

Q. I get your point. I'm going back to French, sorry.

General, in the past you established that clearly you and your mission were not adequately prepared for what was waiting for you in Rwanda. You also give some reasons in your book. You mentioned, as well, that there were some shortcomings with regard to the documentation that you had, or, rather, the documentation which you had consulted. You also gave evidence-in-chief on the documentation that had been made available to you, and you said that documentation was very limited.

Now, the question is: Did you contact some embassies in Rwanda and North America in order to give you documents that would provide you information on the sociopolitical and military situation? Of course, before you went on your reconnaissance mission.

A. As I indicated previously, I conducted a search of available intelligence information of the information that was available at the UN. I also had the opportunity of speaking to an academic who is known for his knowledge of the region and of Rwanda. I read in to as much as I could what was available of information generally of the media and the like. And also was debriefed by Colonel Tikoka, who was present during most of the deliberations in Arusha. Subsequent to that, in -- once on the ground, well, I was gaining information on a daily basis by my experience with the Rwandan people.

Q. So I take it that the answer is no, you did not obtain documentation from Rwandan embassies?

A. I certainly contacted no Rwandan embassies across the world to find out what was going on in Rwanda. I was debriefed by ambassadors during my reconnaissance of what their assessment of the situation. They --

Q. (No interpretation)

A. -- on numerous occasions participated in debriefing the SRSG and myself on what they knew and what they were willing to tell us, and that was the extent of the information we were building on. Remembering that a peacekeeping mission does not have an authority for any intelligence gathering nor covert operations capability.

Q. Okay, we will get back to that.

One of the criticisms levelled against UNAMIR clearly relates to the issues of partiality. You, General, you are criticised -- I read excerpts of your --

Sorry. You are criticised in particular for not having been neutral, not necessarily on the 6th of April, but as soon as you arrived in Rwanda. Some people even say that this partiality of your mission and -- on your part, is partially attributed to the fact that as soon as you arrived in Rwanda -- and in your specific case we know that you had been in Uganda for some time -- well, some of the criticisms levelled against you once more arise from the fact that -- your lack of neutrality arises from the contacts that you had in the early days of your arrival in Rwanda.

Ruzibiza, that is Abdul Ruzibiza, in his book on page 221 -- this is found in folder 2, it is document number 2 in that folder -- he says that the RTLM had denounced the lack of impartiality of UNAMIR right from the beginning, the lack of impartiality on the part of UNAMIR and its support to the RPF. According to that information, the manipulation of UNAMIR -- the manipulation of UNAMIR was due to Tutsi girls, Landouald Ndasingwa who was married to a Canadian woman who came from the same country as you. Do you remember those allegations made by RTLM? And to give you a context, the period referred to is December 1993-January 1994.

A. No, I don't remember the allegations, and I'm surprised you're going to use RTLM as a reference.

Q. Well, I will get back to RTLM. They had -- some of the RTLM -- what some of the -- some of the things they said were true.

You were also being criticised for the fact that right from the beginning you yourself, as a force commander, you espouse a certain political ideology which was pro-RPF. In particular, you were guided by Anastase Gasana who was at the ministry -- minister of foreign affairs who was clearly RPF, and that you were also influenced by the prime minister, Agathe, by Landouald, Faustin, your friends. And finally, once more, some people attribute this lack of neutrality to these initial contacts you had with these people.

In this regard, General, I just want to refer to an illustration in your book. This is found on page 173, French version. There you say that it was crucial to have Mugenzi on your side. Is that correct?

A. I'm looking for the reference in the book.

Q. Page 173, French version. Fifth line.


THE ENGLISH INTERPRETER:
Page 193, sorry, page 193, French version.


BY MR. MACDONALD:

Q. So you said it was crucial to have him on your side so as to come out of the stalemate. And of course you talk about Mugenzi who, according to you, was a great charmer and very skilful. What I want to address here is your statement that it was important to have him on your side. What are you -- what do you mean exactly by that?

A. I'm trying to garner a response, because I mean, we've covered such a lot of ground here in regards to people's opinion of me, of my lack of impartiality through people that I met and so on. And then we end up with this question on Mugenzi.

And -- first of all, I would like to mention that many of the people that you were mentioning, Agathe and so on, and Faustin never considered themselves as pro-RPF. In fact, their arguments were that they were not pro-RPF, they were a third element within the political debate. You had the MRND presidential position, which is very pro-Hutu; you had the RPF position as the -- one of the ex-belligerents which had its position strongly based on the Tutsi argument of refugees and so on; and then you had the Hutu population that had never been consulted by the MRND, there had been never any real elections, and these nascent parties were identifying themselves as in fact entities that were not RPF, nor were they of the more hardline Hutu orientation.

So we had three bodies of politics going on at that point, and in so doing, in that middle group there were those who were manoeuvring or were being influenced by one side, which is the more hardline Hutu side, and others who were more soft line Hutu, who were more reconciliatory. And Mugenzi was one of those -- was in the midst of all this debate.

I mean, this whole situation of months of debate was based on the fact that we couldn't come to a conclusion in who was going to sit in what ministerial position in order to be able to establish the broad-based transitional government. So people like Mugenzi were in the forefront of us attempting to find a resolution to this absolutely near impossible impasse. As others were also in the middle of that, and so that's why it was important to have him on the side of taking an ultimate decision, and if it was in one side or the other, fine, but we were in -- at a loss of trying to balance out these different parties in order to permit the two harder line sides, the MRND side and the RPF side, from reconciling to bring about the government.


(1900H)

BY MR. MACDONALD:

Q. I have some difficulty following you when you say that Agathe and Faustin Twagiramungu of the MDR were not pro-RPF yet. You knew that the MDR and the RPF allied in Brussels in June 1992, they allied or they came together -- to other parties. Are you aware of that?

A. I am not aware of the detailed negotiations nor toing and froing that was going on in Arusha, let alone what was going on in Brussels. And so the fact that a political party, however, creates an alliance with another one to achieve a specific objective is something that happens in this country every day.

Q. But don't you think that if a party were to be operating hand-in-glove with the RPF against the MRND, wouldn't they be characterised as pro-RPF?

A. I am simply stating that at that point, for whatever the reasons, they created an alliance in achieving their aims with the RPF. Fine. But because they created an alliance with the RPF doesn't make them RPF, which was the argument that the MRND kept saying. In their optics, the MRND saw only two bodies, one was Tutsi and with some Hutus on the RPF side, and all of the other Hutus were on the MRND side, which was, in fact, false, which I had the opportunity of discussing with a couple of those politicians over those months.

Q. General Dallaire, it is alleged that your bias towards RPF even prompted you to get involved deeply in politics in Rwanda, even in situations that were all the more complex. And in that regard I gave to my learned colleague on the other side a report by Bernard Lugan which was turned out in Military I last week. I'm trying to -- I'm sorry -- it's --


MR. BÂ:
Counsel MacDonald, Lugan was a Defence witness.


MR. MACDONALD:
But until now he was a Prosecution Witness. You know that, Mr. Bâ. He changed his position radically.


MR. BÂ:
I merely sought that clarification.


MR. MACDONALD:
Now, it is in folder 2, document number 14.


THE WITNESS:
Your Excellency, sir?


MR. PRESIDENT:
Yes. Yes, General.


THE WITNESS:
I wonder if it is not an imposition on you that, due to the early rise and the length of the testimony so far, if you would not mind if we have a short recess, please.


MR. PRESIDENT:
How long do you need?


THE WITNESS:
Ten minutes maximum.


MR. PRESIDENT:
Yes. The Court is adjourned for 10 minutes.

(Court recessed from 1905H to 1920H)


MR. PRESIDENT:
Yes, General, you are ready?


THE WITNESS:
Thank you very much, sir.


MR. MACDONALD:
Your Honour, we've extensively referred to the reconnaissance report. I understand General Dallaire has that report in front of him, and perhaps we should -- Mr. Black tells me it's been introduced under an ID --


MR. PRESIDENT:
(Microphone not activated)


MR. MACDONALD:
Perhaps we should do it from over there and produce the document that General Dallaire had in front of him, if that is convenient for you.


MR. PRESIDENT:
Okay.


MR. MACDONALD:
Mr. Kouambo?


MR. BÂ:
No objection. But on condition that our representative in Canada looks at it carefully if you are going to tender it from there.


MR. MACDONALD:
Just from -- because we don't have other copies here.


MR. PRESIDENT:
Yes, Mr. Kouambo, you can give the number D. 153. Can you recall the ID number that was given? It doesn't matter.


MR. MACDONALD:
I don't know, Your Honour.


MR. PRESIDENT:
We can put it this way: This document which was marked as D. 153 was earlier given an ID number, and within brackets put ID 153 Bizimungu.

(Exhibit No. D. 153 [Bizimungu] admitted)


MR. MACDONALD:
Clarence Nagia (phonetic) knew that, but he's gone with the note, so, I'm sorry, I don't know the number right now.


MR. PRESIDENT:
Yes.


BY MR. MACDONALD:

Q. General, we are talking about Bernard Lugan's document.


MR. KOUAMBO:
Roger Kouambo. Sir?


MR. PRESIDENT:
Yes.


MR. KOUAMBO:
I didn't get the number. Repeat it, please.


MR. PRESIDENT:
It is D. 153 within the records of Bizimungu.


MR. KOUAMBO:
Okay. Thank you, Your Honour.


BY MR. MACDONALD:

Q. Now, this is what the expert Bernard Lugan thinks. Your interference – or, UNAMIR's interference in pre-politics in Rwanda, that is 2 -- sorry -- folder 2, document number 14, paragraph 2. And, again, don't consider this as being a personal attack. I'm merely reading the findings of the report. Lugan says,

"Being unable to guarantee the security of his own people, as shown in the case of the Belgian blue helmets,"

--and here they are referring to your book, pages 307 and the following and subsequently, --

"General Dallaire made the Rwandan political situation more complicated by interfering in a manner arrogant and incompetent, getting involved in the constitutional debate, and he contributed to a large extent in transforming it into a tragic situation."

And again Expert Lugan again refers to Roger Booh-Booh in the -- Roger Booh-Booh on page 14 says,

"This officer wanted to carry out or perform a duty for which he was not competent at all, diplomacy and occasionally politics."

General, do you admit that maybe out of interest or for some other reason you tried to grab some competence or -- that you don't have by interfering in the politics of Rwanda?

A. Counsel, if you don't mind, may I request that we use the (inaudible) on the top again, because we lost you in the pages that you were referring to.

However, in regards to the question you pose and the comments by what you are calling a gentleman an expert, I have no way of knowing his expertise or his background or whatever. It is my duty as the number two of the mission to be part of, of course, the decision-making processes of the mission. As you were referring earlier on to page, I believe in the book in French, 193, and if we kept on reading that page and the next page, you will see that although I was approached to facilitate negotiations which did happen, I referred to the SRSG and I asked him to come and to bring solutions or conclusions. The same thing in regards to Madam Agathe. I did not make an arbitrary, independent decision. I made a proposal and I approached my superior with that separately, and he acquiesced to it wholeheartedly. And so it is not me fiddling in politics. I am but being a facilitator in a process to which I refer political decisions to the special representative. As well as during all of the deliberations, and with rare exceptions, the SRSG requested that I sit to his right at all of these meetings of attempting to bring about the political solutions with Faustin Twagiramungu, the designated prime minister, as sitting to his left. At times my role was one of translator as we were lacking a translator in English and in French, but at all times I was there listening and also writing or providing comments to the SRSG.

Q. Indeed, General. In connection with Agathe, your opinion -- and that is what is stated in your book on page 290, your opinion was that as from the 6th of April following the assassination of the president, your position, your personal view, was that Agathe was the legitimate person or authority to replace the president. You also spoke in the course of your evidence-in-chief of the position of Bagosora. In that regard, Lugan, particularly when you say that Bagosora seemed to feel that Agathe could not in those circumstances be granted power, and again in Lugan's report on page 105 and referring to the testimony of Major Beardsley, which Major Beardsley had again on page 105, Beardsley says as follows:

"Just to show that Bagosora had the support of everyone, when he was insisting that Agathe not replace the president," now he said as follows, "the officers just laughed in derision and said that there was no government. They were demonstrating their unhappiness once they heard the name of Agathe."

And again this situation is found in Beardsley's testimony.


THE ENGLISH INTERPRETER:
The interpreter did not get the date at all because Counsel MacDonald was going too fast.


BY MR. MACDONALD:

Q. Now, Lugan explained on page 105 and 106 the reasons why Agathe could not become president. I'll spare you all of that because I will be subsequently tendering the report. And your boss – General Dallaire, now, you said that you were the number two man after the special representative. Now, on the issue of Agathe, even the special representative who supported the political and constitutional argument, according to which the MRND had to do everything in order to find someone to replace President Habyarimana. That is on page 107 of his book. And what emerges from your evidence-in-chief and during the course of cross-examination by my learned colleagues was that you, yourself, General, wanted to use some deviant way or through some deviant manoeuvres to get Agathe to address the people of Rwanda over the radio. You would agree with me, General Dallaire, that it had been agreed that no politician would speak over the radio for as long as a new government had not been formed? And, once again, may I refer you to Expert Lugan's report on page 108 which talks of a statement made by Colonel Kayumba. Kayumba is spelled K-A-Y-U-M-B-A. Lugan makes reference to it again on page 109. There is some excerpt from your cross-examination where it is clearly proven that you had in no manner informed either on the 6th or on the 7th of April, and more particularly the night of the 6th to the 7th of April, you had not in any manner informed the soldiers who moreover had urged you to join them in the night of the 6th to 7th, you had at no time informed those people of your intention to have Agathe broadcast or speak over the radio. Is that the case? Is it correct? It's a mere yes or no, General.


MR. BÂ:
Your question took some 10 minutes. You want a "yes" or "no" answer?


MR. MACDONALD:
Well, I will do it in a more tedious manner.


BY MR. MACDONALD:

Q. General Dallaire, do you agree that the idea behind your head that on the night of the 6th to the 7th of April, namely, to ask Agathe to address the nation, that idea you knew was one that was against what the soldiers felt, that is, the soldiers who were at the crisis committee, which was not a crisis committee, but there were some officers who were present on the night of the 6th or 7th? Did you know it was against their own views or position?

A. I'm wondering if you are telling me if the officers already indicated that they were against the prime minister of the country who had the legal authority in that responsibility in regards to the good governance of the country. The fact that all of a sudden the president is not there does not make her all of a sudden the enemy to those officers. So, no, I took for granted that they were going to accept that a legal authority was still in existence, that they, I will take for granted, were respecting beforehand as the prime minister, would do the same. Now, in regards to the constitutionality of the question, you are quite right in constitutional terms, of which I must say I was not particularly versed in the Rwandan structure -- in constitutional terms, if I'm not mistaken, it fell to the president of the supreme court and then the president of the assembly to take decisions in regards to the continuum of the government and the replacement of the president. In one case he had disappeared and ultimately was killed, and in the case of the president of the assembly, I really don't know what happened to him. But at no time did those officers nor did the chef de cabinet, who is the officer, retired officer, responsible for advising the political person which is the minister of defence, did he ever raise other options or other intermediaries to the table or the assembled crisis committee.

Q. Now, a statement by Colonel Kayumba which was produced in the Military I trial: Now, the colonel says as follows:

"It had been decided that no politician interferes" --


MR. MACDONALD:
On page 108, Counsel Bâ.


BY MR. MACDONALD:

Q. "It was decided that no politician should take the floor or speak at the -- over the national radio prior to the formation of the new government. General Dallaire and Colonel Marchal were informed of that situation."

So my question is simple, yes or no, do you agree with that statement by Colonel Kayumba?

A. I don't even know who this guy is. I don't even know if he was at the meeting. I don't even know when he said that, whether it was before, after the meeting or during.

Q. Well, the statement is simple. You don't need to know the circumstances. Now, isn't it correct, General, that it was decided on the night of the 6th through the 7th of April in front of that committee of officers that no politician would speak over the national radio without the government -- the new government having been formed? Were you aware of that decision having been made by the officers who were present at the headquarters on the night of the 6th and 7th of April? It's a mere yes or no.

A. I do not recall that statement ever being said in my presence.

Q. Yet, when you took the initiative to have Agathe heard over the radio on the 7th of April, isn't it correct that you didn't consult anyone, that you didn't raise the matter with anyone, and your aim was to place these officers who subsequently became members of what was then known as the crisis committee, wasn't your intention to place them before a fait accompli?

A. I consulted with the special representative to seek his advice on whether that should be done, and he, as my political leader and my boss, agreed entirely with it, and so I continued with that initiative.

Q. Did you raise the matter with the soldiers? Yes or no? That's the question. It is simple. Why?

A. The position that I was taking at the time was one of uncertainty in regards to the situation of whether or not I was facing a group of officers that were complicit potentially in a coup d'etat or whether they were simply reacting to the crisis that was at hand and reacting to my own personal background, coming from a liberal democracy in which it seemed to me absolutely illogical that in fact a political leader was not called upon to conduct an action to calm the population, a leader that was recognised by the UN, by the SRGS on the ground as being a legitimate authority within that interim -- that coalition government.

Q. But once more, General, you -- and I'm going to use the same phraseology -- you had soldiers who had just lost a head of state, those soldiers are in a meeting, they take the initiative of asking you to come and attend the meeting, they expressed themselves before you, they accept – or, ask to go and see the special representative of the secretary general, and at the same time you take initiatives which would have grave consequences or implications without even informing them and you put them before a fait accompli. Now, my question is the following: Don't you think, General, that that was a destabilising factor in a situation which was already practically explosive?

A. The destabilising factor, sir, at that moment was the fact that they had no political leadership or did not want to accept one. The UN was there in assisting the Rwandan government in bringing about and hopefully implementing a peace agreement. It was my estimation, and supported by the SRSG, that the leader at that moment of that government to which we were there to support was Madam Agathe, and under that condition I proposed that she be given the opportunity not to create havoc, not to incite people to kill, not, in fact, to escalate the tension but, in fact, as she had done previously, to go on to the radio and, in fact, encourage people to remain home, calm, and wait for the due process to happen. To me, I am at a loss to see how that scenario exacerbated the situation in regards to the tension and the subsequent actions.

Q. General Dallaire, I understand that that was your intention. I also understand your motives, but I hardly understand why you tried to do that, why you tried to place those people before the fait accompli. Why did you not discuss that issue with the soldiers that were present? I would even say that the special representative was in agreement with the position of the soldiers at the time the special representative said that it was up to the MRND to replace the president. That was the key to solving that problem. It was the MRND who had to replace the president. And this is what is reflected in page 505 where it is written, and I quote -- sorry, I'm not going to quote the whole paragraph, but it is the last paragraph where it can be read as follows:

"Booh-Booh asked Colonel Bagosora to enter into contact with political parties and in particular with the MRND so that this party in pursuance of the Arusha Accords, because at that time it was not known whether it was the Arusha Accords or the constitution that had to be applied, and that the MRND should designate the new president of the republic." Of course you were not in agreement with that view, General Dallaire, yes or no?

A. Wait a minute. Now, we are not going to permit that you put words into my mouth and that you tell me what my statements were. No. First of all, I do not recall having sat through the discussions between Bagosora and the SRSG and that, in fact, the question of the MRND was raised. It was a process in which Bagosora was convincing the special representative that they wanted a political solution but that they militarily would keep control and how could the special representative assist them in that. And ultimately the special representative, through phone calls, organised that that following morning there would be a meeting of the key ambassadors at the American ambassador's residence with Bagosora to work out, in fact, what that political process could be. That meeting never happened.

In regards to me and Agathe, unless I'm mistaken, but in previous testimony and in writing, I mention that on a number of occasions during that meeting at the crisis committee, I raised the argument with them that, through transparency and through what we saw as the authority of government, that Madam Agathe be called to take over the political process, and vehemently that was refused by those same officers. My question is why did they refuse a political person who was quite prepared, and had been previously, to speak to the people to calm them? What was their problem? And by the by, how did she end up dead a couple of hours later by the Presidential Guard?


(1940H)


BY MR. MACDONALD:

Q. And in this connection, on page 115 says the following:

"In view of the political situation of the country, General Dallaire, in the final analysis tried to impose Agathe on soldiers whom, as we saw, logically did not want to deal with her. His responsibility, therefore, is blatant in the unfolding events that happened in Rwanda. His crude intervention or (inaudible) illustrated by incoherent statements before the ICTR. "

A. Is that a question? If that's the question, my --

Q. It is a comment, General, it is not a question.


MR. BÂ:
Are we here to quote from Lugan or to ask questions? Because if it is a matter of making comments, I have just one question for you. In a republic, is it soldiers who should dictate their will to the government or the reverse? In a viable republic, is it the soldiers who command civilians or vice -- or the other way around?


MR. MACDONALD:
Prosecution, I am reading the opinion of your expert. Lugan was your expert for many years. So if you have any comments to make, please wait for your turn to re-examine.


BY MR. MACDONALD:

Q. Now, General Dallaire, this is the comment that you made. This is found on page -- it is in your testimony of 22 January 2004 and Lugan referred to this on page 111. And you said that --


THE ENGLISH INTERPRETER:
Can Counsel slow down please, especially if he is reading from a document which we don't have.


MR. MACDONALD:
I am sorry, Your Honours.


THE ENGLISH INTERPRETER:
We don't know what counsel said. Can he repeat that?


MR. PRESIDENT:
Counsel, you are inaudible.


MR. MACDONALD:
I am sorry.


BY MR. MACDONALD:

Q. "At that time, all aspects of the Rwandan constitution, I did not master them. I tried to manoeuvre inside. I tried to know how it evolved, but very soon it became non-existent because with the transitional -- broad-based transitional government, things changed. To me, Agathe represented the government and the president did not exist. As prime minister, she had authority or legitimacy."

That is what you thought at that time, General Dallaire.

A. I am trying to respond to a question that has extensive comments attached to it upon which I gather you are premising your question, and in attempting to respond to that, I am absolutely at a loss, sir, to be able to comprehend the question inasmuch as my recommending Agathe to go to the radio station, an event that eventually never happened. That did not in any way, shape or form affect that those military leaders did or had to do. Why is it that one can deduct that ultimately that initiative, which that was never implemented, could bring about catastrophic failure, for Madam Agathe never went to the radio station? She was killed and -- attacked at her residence and killed next door to it. The military commanders continued to do their duty. I ended up with a serious problem in regard to my military forces, not just because of the soldiers who were killed at that camp in her protection, but a whole bunch of other ones who had been attacked and beaten up and taken away. And so again, I understand in no way the links that are going to be made here and in so doing, if I was constitutionally erroneous, then those officers and particularly, Bagosora, had to simply say that that was inappropriate, this is the constitutional position and we are taking that position which was never, ever raised.

Q. That is not what Lugan says.

A. (Inaudible)

Q. Isn't it true, General, that you even said in your testimony of 19th January 2004 that Agathe was an elected person, didn't you say that?

A. If I said that, it was a comment then inasmuch as elected or agreed to by all the different players who were at the Arusha Peace Agreement. For I was very much aware of the fact that there had not been democratic elections and my mission was ultimately to assist the peace process to bring about in two years hence a democratically supervised election in the country.

Q. Mrs. Agathe was never elected because she was a designated prime minister, not a prime minister who came out of an election.


MR. BÂ:
Mr. President, can I ask for a favour. Today we started rather early. It is 10 minutes to 8 p.m. Can our witness be allowed to go and rest, please? I would thank you for your understanding.


MR. MACDONALD:
I just have one more question to conclude on this point. I would like his comment. I would give a chance to General Dallaire to explain.


BY MR. MACDONALD:

Q. Once more, General, whatever be the legitimacy of your motives, you would agree with me that your ambition, your exacerbated ambition to make Agathe accede to power makes you -- made you lack discernment?

A. Absolutely not.

Q. General, do you agree today that the military position, as well as the political position, not to recognise the political legitimacy of Agathe was well-founded and this is the opinion, in particular, of Lugan, Reyntjens, and all of this is contained in Lugan's report.

A. I don't know where this guy is coming from, but I absolutely disagree with any of that sort of inventive concept of a proper distribution of power of government or system of government that he is proposing.

Q. I will have to come back to that in a moment.


MR. PRESIDENT:
Okay. Court is adjourned till 1 p.m. tomorrow.

(Court adjourned at 1950H)



C E R T I F I C A T E

We, Eleanor Bastian, Kirstin McLean, Leslie Todd and Sithembiso Moyo, Official Court Reporters for the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, do hereby certify that the foregoing proceedings in the above-entitled cause were taken at the time and place as stated; that it was taken in shorthand (stenotype) and thereafter transcribed by computer; that the foregoing pages contain a true and correct transcription of said proceedings to the best of our ability and understanding.


We further certify that we are not of counsel nor related to any of the parties to this cause and that
we are in nowise interested in the result of said cause.



___________________________ Eleanor Bastian


___________________________ Kirstin Mclean


___________________________ Leslie Todd


___________________________ Sithembiso Moyo