THE GENERAL'S TRIAL: Transcripts of the Cross-Examination of Alison Des Forges by Me Christopher Black @ the ICTR--Part One: 11, 12 Oct 2006
THE GENERAL'S TRIAL: Transcripts of the Cross-Examination of Alison Des Forges by Me Christopher Black @ the ICTR--Part One: 11, 12 Oct 2006
[WHY IS GENERAL NDINDILIYIMANA STILL NOT FREE?
CM/P's latest post is, in fact, a transcript of proceedings in The General's Trial in Arusha. The General, in case this is the first time you've checked into this blog, is Major-General Augustin Ndindiliyimana, the former chief of the Rwandan National Gendarmerie during the troubles in 1993 and 1994, and currently locked down and on trial at the ICTR in Arusha, Tanzania. He is being defended by that formidable defender of lost causes--and my very own dear friend--Chris Black. And from the sound of these three days of Ultimate Kombat, Chris has taken over where Johnny Cochran left off in the OJ trial (re: the Brentwood genocide of '93) and become the new, undisputed (no-boooollshit) Junkyard Dog of international justice. Now, Chris may not be big'n bad, but the other defense doggies know him and they don't mess--they don't even get off the porch.
(For background see elsewhere on this blog:
The General's Book on Rwanda, Chapt One, http://cirqueminime.blogcollective.com/blog/_archives/2005/5/21/877913.html; Hot-L Rwanda Propaganda Gas Bag . . . http://cirqueminime.blogcollective.com/blog/_archives/2005/4/6/558561.html; or Maitre Black's own work, Dallaire Genocide Fax a Fabrication . . . http://cirqueminime.blogcollective.com/blog/_archives/2005/12/6/1437840.html; among many others).
The very long post (71 pages) which follows this not-so-brief introduction is 'Part One' of Chris' cross examination of Alison Des Forges, Human Rights Watch's African Queen and one of the early propaganda enema nurses sent by Western imperialist interests into post-invasion Rwanda (ca 1992) to fuzz out the devastation of the US/UK/UN-backed (financed, trained and equipped) aggression of 1 October 1990, and to support the so-called 'Tutsi rebels' from Uganda known as the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). Actually, these 4,000 or so invaders--along with 12,000 or so of their infiltrated agents provocateurs already in-country--were, and many still are, card-carrying, active duty National Resistance Army (NRA) cadres under Ugandan president Museveni's command.
Dr. Des Forges, a university professor in the US, was included among several 'Human Rights crusaders', such as Swiss journalist Philippe Dahinden, René Degni-Segui, a jurist from Ivory Coast, dean of the law school in Abidjan and president of the League for Human Rights, Pol Dodinval, a forensic pathologist from Liège, Eric Gillet, a Brussels lawyer and member of the International Federation for Human Rights, Rein Odink, a lawyer from Amsterdam, Halidou Ouedraogo, a judge and president of the Inter-African Union for Human Rights, André Paradis, director of the League for Rights and Freedom in Montreal, and Canadian jurist and law professor William Schabas (actually, the latter, professor to both Chris Black and Tiphaine Dickson, today is considered one of the leading authorities on the new 'Victims' Law' as practiced at the ad hoc tribunals in Arusha and The Hague, and was recently holding forth in Ireland about 'the difficulties' in the Milosevic trial--fucking wanker!), in the formation of a commission to investigate 'Human Rights Violations in Rwanda [ironically enough] after 1 October 1990', and effectively turned the unprovoked foreign aggression that was launched on that date, a primal crime against the Peace, the mother of all other war crimes, according to the judgment at Nuremberg (not the rock musical starring Spencer Tracy and Maximilian Schell, however), into a minor local uprising or, as it is still referred to at the ICTR, a simple 'border violation' or 'trespass'.
Desperately clutching the cynically manipulated premise that all the fighting and killing in Northern Rwanda stemmed from ancient tribal animosities (Black on Black violence, it used to be written off as), draped in the mantels of medievalist nostalgics, pining away for the glorious, martyred Tutsi monarchies d'antan, and goosed on by certain international Zionist organizations to treat the Tutsis as the 'Jews of Africa' (another lost tribe heard from!), it was mere child's play for these Victims' Rightsters, these Holocaust Hustlers, to convince the international community, those who were paying enough attention to Central Africa even to know that Rwanda was not one of the Pointer Sisters, that the subsequent RPF reign of terror, with tens, even hundreds of thousands of Rwandans slaughtered, without regard for tribal affiliation or ethnicity, and more than a million internally displaced, before this HR commission had even drawn its first fetid breath; and that the eventuating assassinations of leading political figures and the excruciatingly long-anticipated murders by SAM, on 7 April 1994, of the leader of the Rwandan revolution, president Juvenal Habyarimana, on the same doomed executive jet with his Burundian Hutu homologue, president Cyprien Ntaryamira; that this 100% made-in-USA, maliciously systematized, cold-bloodedly calculated chaos that brought about the depopulation and physical and political destruction through privatization of this once thriving popular state: all this unholy carnage resulted solely from a general reaction to the racialist or tribalist oppression, the 'tropical naziism', of the Hutu/Habyarimana-led Rwandan government, military and gendarmerie.
This was the genetic fallacy from which Des Forges and her criminal co-conspirators built their African Fables--and their careers. They had been convinced by the Tutsi lobby in the US and Europe that the 'Tutsi Genocide' had begun back in the early 60s with the social revolution that deposed the Tutsi monarchy and installed a 'popular dictatorship' of the Hutu majority. There wasn't a lot of material evidence for this bit of (un)history, but it fit quite neatly into the mind-set of the Human Rights, Victims' Rights, Stop the Fucking Genocide claques of the 80s and 90s. Then they got a bunch of play from some depraved dispatches sent out of Africa by RPF intelligence operatives about how Tutsis were being gratuitously singled out for harassment and arrest--even being massacred--because of the government's over-zealous self-defense, its over-reaction to that trifling 1 October 'border incident' that cost more than 30,000 civilian lives just in the month of October 1990, the skullduggery of the Habyarimana Family's voodoo cult (only Black Magic can produce the kind of 'UnReason' that results in national suicide), and the existence of Rwandan government death squads--some dressed up as RPF.
The HR/RPFers pumped this bilge through the Belgian and French papers employing the services of other 'proto-Tutsi' hacks and flacks like Gasana Ndoba, founder and president of the Committee for the Respect of Human Rights and Democracy in Rwanda (created by francophone Belgians in November 1990 and better known by its French initials, CRDDR--Pierre Paén, in his almost totally with-it 'Noires fureurs, blancs menteurs' {Really Pissed-off Black Cats, Lying Peckerwoods--my trans} describes Ndoba as not just pro-RPF, but as a stone, hope-to-die RPF cadre) and the reprehensible French bounder et arriviste, Jean Carbonare, leader of the anti-Catholic, anti-Mitterand, anti-communist (Hell, anti-French!), but esp anti-Rwandan association, Survie. Then they picked up some fellow-slarvers, like Colette Brackmann and Marie-France Cros and Samatha Power and Pascal Kropp and Jean-Pierre Chretien--ALL HUMAN RIGHTS, ALL THE TIME--,and, through these jaundiced scribblers and snivelers, geezed these false stories into the popular media, infecting the likes of Patrick de St Exupery in Le Figaro and Phillip Gourevitch in The New Yorker--who then exacted a false conversions from the entertainment industry in general and one of my favorite pulp writers, Elmore Leonard, in his Detroit/Rwanda book, Pagan Babies, in particular. And then there's the whole string of unspeakable films like that draw on this ubiquitour false consciousness: Hot'L Rwanda, Shooting Dogs, Rubbing Glands with the Devil, etc.
But as more and more real, hard evidence seeped up through the spurious scum of disinformation spewed by the HRsters, and as their sentimental and solipsistic histories were being contradicted, these false witnesses and burlesque clown experts had to back off of certain key points. The first indicators that the RPF was, in fact, the driving force behind the massacre of civilians and the assassination of presidents Habyarimana and Ntaryamira came in from ICTR investigator Michael Hourigan and then from RPF defectors like Lt. Abdul Ruzibiza (a member of the shoot-down team, 'The Network', that assassinated the Hutu presidents). Then came the results of an French investigation into the 7 April shoot-down on behalf of the families of the flight crew of the presidential Falcom 50 by investigating judge Jean-Louis Brugière (whose, as yet unreleased, report further implicating the 'Tutsi rebels' in the slaughter and forced exile of the Rwandan nation, in their own genocide, as it were, was leaked to Le Monde last year). However, CM/P has, from the jump, depended for its currency on the efforts of dedicated unto obsessed Canadian legal historians like Robin Philpot, Tiphaine Dickson and, the guy who in the following pages is going toe-to-toe with Dr. Des Forges in a totally solid Perry Meyssan impersonation,--that'd be Chris Black--oh yeah, and General Ndindiliyimana, himself, of course.
But evidence has never been a great concern of the ad hocs, and they have gotten along fine without it both in The Hague (re: Yugoslavia) and in Arusha. In fact, in the Milosevic case, they not only got along without evidence of their charges for four years; they got away with murdering 'the accused' by investigating themselves and finding they were not implicated in the death of their prisoner. Their motto has been consistently, No Evidence, No Problem. As in Arusha, when after a dozen years there was NO EVIDENCE to show that the Habyarimana government or its short-lived successors had planned and executed a Genocide: the Tribunal just passed an order stipulating to the fact that, like the sun's rising and setting, it is commonly accepted that the Hutu government of Rwanda murdered 800,000 Tutsi and moderate Hutu between 7 April and 16 July 1994. And with as much invested in such a false (and popular) history, with so much past and future policy riding on it (just as with the false histories of Yugoslavia or 911 or AIDS), there isn't much this side of a C4 suppository that would get these bought-off Erwin Coreys to change their positions.
Here's a sample exchange from the transcript, regarding the shooting down of the presidents' plane, which shows how unfazed Dr Des Forges is by anything like evidence that goes against her thesis:
Q. Madam, you say that determining who shot that plane will change the entire complexion of how people see those events. But if this was confirmed as, I think, has been confirmed, if investigation had been followed up and it was confirmed that the RPF shot down that plane, it would have changed the whole complexion of how you see things, would it not?
A. No, it is a question of enormous importance. It should be resolved ‑‑ it should be resolved for many reasons, but it would not, in my evaluation, change the conclusions that I have drawn based on historical facts about the events of the genocide.
The supposition which was, in my mind, at the time when I worked on this, was that either theory was possible at this point and I am more inclined to the theory of the RPF than I am to the other, but it has not changed my interpretation of the organisation and the implementation of the genocide.
Because Des Forges has bet the whole whorehouse on her fictionalized version of events, she can not back down. When questioned about her position on the Rwandan government, Army and Gendarmerie's killing off important political figures--murders that have long since been laid at the feet of the invading 'Tutsi rebels', all she can do is beg for the court's protection--and, if you read on into the post, you will see just how fey this witness-protection program ICTR-style is with miserable, annoying little piss-ants like the two prosecutors, Mes Bâ and Jegede, administering it:
Q. So, do you have any proof whatsoever today that elements of the army or gendarmes killed any of those people?
A. I understood the Judge to rule that question out of order. Wasn't that what happened a moment ago?
Q. No, not really.
A. Well, then I think we need to go back and read the record.
Q. Do you have proof here with you or do you not; yes or no?
A. Is this question orderly, Your Honour?
Q. It must be. Do you have facts ‑‑ any proof with you right now, to backup your statements?
MR. JEGEDE: I remember he had said that he didn't have the papers with him here, so why are you pushing the question?
THE WITNESS:
I think that is an inappropriate inference to draw, and I ask the Court to enforce its ruling so this can stop.
MR. PRESIDENT: Well, Counsel, you have been just ‑‑
MR. BLACK: Well, I asked that question, Mr. President, well, look, these mens’ lives are at stake here, because of the allegations made by ‑‑ (Micropones overlapping)
MR. PRESIDENT: She has ‑‑
MR. BLACK: Please let me finish, Mr. President, if I could, sir. I don't want to fight with you. We are not going to sit here and have these men condemned on rumour and opinions expressed in here without any factual foundation and backing up with documents. She is very adept and expert in demanding that if we make a suggestion we have got to prove it on a piece of paper. So, what is good for the goose is good for the gander. Where is her proof to backup her opinion? She hasn't got it with her in court. That's it.
MR. PRESIDENT: Well, Counsel, allegations are not proved on her opinion alone. There are other witnesses who will speak to the factual situation. So if they are relying only on her opinion, I think your argument maybe can be sustained.
MR. BLACK: Thank you. I appreciate that.
{You dig? Chris doesn't even take shorts off the President of the court--who, truth be told, is a whole deal better'n the old Norwegian one, Mose.}
So we must again ask the question 'Why is The General Still Locked Down?' And it's not just General Ndindiliyimana, but all these detainees, these alleged 'genocidaires', in Tanzania and Holland, all over Africa and Europe, are representatives, with some status, of the Rwandan or Serbian governments. And all these Hutus and Serbs are being tortured, some, like President Milosevic (a principal exception to Clinton's rule not to assassinate world leaders) being tortured to death, with just the kind of nonsensical non-justice that is reflected in these transcripts.
So, what can you, dear reader, do? Write your Congressperson? Go see the Al Gore movie? Wear a Keith Obermann Rocks t-shirt? Don't Fret or Fuss or Masturbate, Vote for a Clinton in 2008!? Really, about all you can be expected to do is to try and stay well-informed. We hope you will support us here at CM/P as we try to do a little something to push you in all hipness along the road to happy, bullshit-free destiny. --mc]
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[This transcript of the Des Forges cross came to us in a French translation of what had obviously taken place in English. Because this blog pretends to be bilingual I left the French and added, in between [ ], my English translation of the French translation of the original English. Got that? Yeah? Let's go. --mc]
{11 October 2006--Chris Black begins to Cross Examine Alison Des Forges}
Monsieur Black, voulez-vous commencer maintenant ou bien après une courte pause ?
[Mr Black, do you want to begin now or after a short recess?]
Me BLACK :
Je vais me déplacer devant le micro, à la place occupée par Maître Black (sic).
[I'm going to take Mr Black's (sic) place at the microphone.]
M. LE PRÉSIDENT :
Maître Black (sic), veuillez lui céder votre place.
[Mr Black (sic), will you cede your place?]
(Suspension de l’audience : 16 h 5)
[Court is in recess: 4:05 pm]
(Reprise de l’audience : 16 h 20)
[Court resumes: 4:20 pm]
M. LE PRÉSIDENT :
Vous avez la parole, Maître Black.
[You have the floor, Mr Black]
Me BLACK :
Merci. (Suite de l’intervention non interprétée)
[Thank you. (after an uninterpreted exchange.)]
M. LE PRÉSIDENT :
Ayez cela à l’esprit, Madame le Témoin.
[The Witness will bear that in mind.]
CONTRE-INTERROGATOIRE
PAR Me BLACK :
[CROSS EXAMINATION
BY Me Black:]
Q. Madame Des Forges, à la page 34 de votre rapport, vous avez parlé des militaires et des gendarmes qui étaient opposés au génocide ; est-ce que vous y incluiez le général Ndindiliyimana ?
[Question: Madam Des Forges, on page 34 of your report, you speak of the soldiers and gendarmes who were opposed to the genocide: do you include in this group General Ndindiliyimana?]
Mme DES FORGES :
R. Il y a des indications selon lesquelles le rôle du général Ndindiliyimana était complexe et qu’à l’occasion, il a sauvé des gens. Mais je dirais que, dans mon esprit, il y a des questions concernant certaines activités qui ont peut-être été présentées devant cette Chambre. Je ne sais pas, je n’ai pas lu les transcripts des témoins ; mais, comme je l’ai dit plutôt, il m’est difficile de croire à l’innocence totale de toute personne qui était en vie au Rwanda pendant ces mois-là.
[Answer: There are some indications according to which the role of General Ndindiliyimana was complex and that occasionally he saved people. But I would say that, to my mind, there are some questions concerning certain activities that might have been presented to this court. I don't know, I haven't read the transcripts of the witnesses; but, as I said earlier, it is difficult for me to believe in the complete innocence of anyone living in Rwanda at that during those months.]
Q. Donc, tout le monde est coupable ?
[Q. So, everyone was guilty?]
R. Certainement pas.
[A. Certainly not.]
Q. Quand vous parlez des officiers modérés, vous l’avez toujours inclus dans vos écrits comme étant un officier modéré ; n’est-ce pas ?
[Q. When you speak of moderate officers, you always include him in your writing as being a moderate officer. Is that not so?]
R. Il y a deux choses dans cette question. L’une, c’est : Est-ce que je l’ai fait ou bien est-ce que j’aurais dû…
[A. There are two things in this question. One is: Did I do that or should I have done . . .]
Q. Je vais éclaircir ma question : Vous considérez Ndindiliyimana comme l’un des officiers modérés pendant les événements du Rwanda en 1994 ?
[Q. I'll clarify my question: Do you consider Ndindiliyimana to be one of the moderate officers during the events in Rwanda of 1994?]
R. J’ai dit que son rôle était complexe et que, dans mon esprit, il y a des questions concernant son comportement.
[A. I said that his role was complex and that, to my mind, there are questions concerning his behavior.]
Q. Ce n’est pas ce que vous avez dit auparavant. Dans votre rapport dans l’affaire Bagosora, à la page 42 — je peux vous donner une copie, c’est un paragraphe assez bref —, vous dites ceci :
« Les officiers supérieurs opposés à Bagosora, soit ils ne pouvaient pas joindre leurs forces contre l’ennemi de longue date ou, alors, ils ne pensaient pas qu’ils pouvaient diriger un grand nombre de soldats dans le cadre d’un tel accord. Ils se sont plutôt tournés vers la communauté internationale pour obtenir un soutien.
Dallaire aura… aurait pu aider ce qu’il considérait comme la nouvelle armée, mais il était bloqué par le mandat et par le manque de matériel. Et Ndindiliyimana a exploré la possibilité d’un soutien étranger avec l’ambassadeur belge, dans la soirée du 7 avril. Et Rusatira avait des contacts avec des représentants des États-Unis et avec un général français à Paris.
Les diplomates à Kigali et leurs ministères au pays essayaient d’évacuer les citoyens de leur pays ; et personne n’avait des ressources pour empêcher Bagosora et pour, effectivement, empêcher le massacre des personnes au Rwanda. »
Vous avez écrit cela ?
[Q. This is not what you said earlier. In your report on the Bagosora case, on page 42 -- I can give you a copy, this paragraph is brief enough --, you say this here:
"The superior officers opposed to Bagosora, either they could not get their forces into battle with this long-standing enemy or, then, they didn't think they could direct a great number of their soldiers within the framework of such an accord. Instead they turned toward the international community to obtain support.
Dallaire could have . . . would have helped what he considered the new army, but he was blocked by his mandate and a lack of materiel. And Ndindiliyimana explored the possibility of foreign support with the Belgian ambassador, on the night of 7 April. And Rusatira made contact with representatives of the US and with a French General in Paris.
The diplomats in Kigali and their ministers to the country tried to evacuate their citizens from the country; and no one had the resources to stop Bagosora and to, effectively, stop people being massacred in Rwanda."
Did you write that?
R. Je crois que je l’ai écrit, mais j’aimerais dire ceci : Est-ce que ça fait partie du rapport écrit ou de la déposition ?
[A. I believe that I wrote that, but I would like to say this: Is that part of the written report or of the deposition?]
Q. Ça fait partie de votre rapport ; est-ce que vous pouvez… vous voulez voir une copie ?
[Q. That was part of your report; can you . . . do you want to see a copy?]
R. Ce n’est pas nécessaire.
[A. That's not necessary.]
Q. C’est ce que vous avez écrit dans votre rapport.
[Q. That's what you wrote in your report.]
L’INTERPRÈTE ANGLAIS-FRANÇAIS : [THE ENGLISH-FRENCH INTERPRETER:]
Une fois de plus, les interprètes insistent : Maître Black n’observe pas la pause, c’est impossible de travailler dans ces conditions.
[Once again, the interpreters must insist: Maitre Black is not observing the pause, it's impossible to work under these conditions.]
Me BLACK :
Q. Quand vous avez rédigé ce rapport dans le cadre de l’affaire Militaires I, vous considériez le général Ndindiliyimana comme l’une des personnes qui étaient en dissidence, ce dont vous avez parlé déjà.
[Q. When you wrote this report in the framework of the Military I case, did you consider General Ndindiliyimana to be one of the dissidents, of whom you have just spoken?]
R. Je ne crois pas que vous pouvez le dire. Ce dont nous avons parlé aujourd’hui, c’est ceux qui voulaient organiser une activité militaire continuelle.
[A. I don't believe that you can say that. What we have said today, it is those who wanted to organize a continuous military activity.]
Q. C’étaient les propos de Maître Taku, vous l’avez contredit ; vous avez utilisé le mot de « résistants », donc, ceux qui résistaient, c’est ce que vous avez dit. Donc, c’était l’un de ceux qui résistaient.
[Q. It was the remark of Maitre Taku, you contradicted it; you used the word 'resisters', so, those who resist, that's what you said. So, he was one of those who resisted.]
M. LE PRÉSIDENT :
Maître Black, il faut regarder la lumière dans la cabine des interprètes.
[Maitre Black, you must watch the light in the interpreters booth.]
Mme Des Forges:
R. Dans les premiers jours d’avril, il a semblé que le général Ndindiliyimana a fait des efforts pour organiser une certaine forme d’opposition. Dans des réunions, il s’opposait à Bagosora et a également, au surplus, fait des efforts pour sauver des vies.
[A. In the first days of April, it seemed that General Ndindiliyimana made efforts to organize a certain form of opposition. In the meetings, he opposed Bagosora and also, even more so, made efforts to save lives.]
Me BLACK :
Q. En fait, ce paragraphe est un extrait de votre livre, et je vous cite mot pour mot… Pouvez-vous expliquer à la Chambre pourquoi vous avez inclus ce paragraphe dans votre rapport sur l’affaire des Militaires et produit un rapport différent pour Ndindiliyimana ? Pourquoi Ndindiliyimana n’a pas bénéficié de ce commentaire dans son propre procès ?
[Q. In fact, this paragraphe is an extract from your book, and I cite you word for word. . . . Can you explain to the court why you included this paragraphe dans your report on the Officers' case and produced a different report for Ndindiliyimana? Why didn't Ndindiliyimana benefit from commentary in his own trial?]
R. La demande de préparation d’un rapport d’expertise pour cette affaire n’était pas très précise. Dans la demande initiale, je devais limiter le rapport à la période qui s’achevait au début… dans les premiers mois de 1994. Donc, je ne voulais rien inclure qui concernait la période après avril.
Lorsqu’on est revenu sur la demande, j’ai assez rapidement rédigé les dernières sections en faisant référence au premier texte… à la première version qui traitait de cette période. Alors, je pense que c’est la raison. Je n’avais pas l’intention de changer de position dans l’évaluation que j’ai faite du comportement du général Ndindiliyimana dans ces premiers jours et qui « est » la seule période durant laquelle j’avais des informations substantielles, il y a eu un changement de position.
[A. What was demanded in the preparation of an expert's report for that case was not very precise. The initial demand, I had to limit the report to the period that ended at the beginning . . . in the first months of 1994. So, I did not want to include anything that concerned the period after April.
When we got back to that requirement, I wrote it so quickly that the last sections referred to the first text . . . to the first version that treated of that period. So, I think that's the reason. I didn't intend to change positions in the evaluation that I made of General Ndindiliyimana's behavior in those first days, and which 'is' the only period during which I had substantial information, there was a change in position.]
Q. Vous avez également dit, à la page 41, du rapport sur l’affaire des Militaires, ce qui suit…
Vous êtes autorisés à faire une traduction libre.
« Gatsinzi dirigeait le bataillon… » Et vous parlez également de Bagosora ; ensuite vous avez parlé de Rusatira, Gatsinzi, Ndindiliyimana — et vous dites : « Gatsinzi dirigeait le bataillon qui était à Butare ; Ndindiliyimana commandait des milliers d’éléments de la police nationale. Mais avec la reprise de la guerre, certaines des troupes furent intégrées dans la structure de commandement de l’armée.
En outre, ces troupes n’avaient pas l’expérience du combat et n’avaient pas des armements lourds. En plus, « ils » avaient remis un grand nombre de leurs meilleures armes à la MINUAR dans le cadre du processus de démilitarisation de Kigali, alors que la Garde présidentielle n’avait remis aucune de ses armes. »
Vous avez dit cela dans votre rapport ?
[Q. You also said, on page 41 of the report on the Officers' case, the following . . .
You may do a loose translation.
"Gatsinzi led the battalion . . . " And you also speak of Bagosora; later you spoke of Rusatira, Gatsinzi, Ndindiliyimana -- and you say: "Gatsinzi led the battalion that was in Butare; Ndindiliyimana commanded the thousands of elements of national police. But with the return of the war, certain troops were integrated into the command structure of the Army.
What's more, these troops had no experience of combat and had no heavy arms. And 'they' had turned a large number of their best arms in to the UNAMIR in the campaign to demilitarize Kigali, while the presidential guard had turned in none of its weapons."
Did you say that in your report?
R. Je pense que vous êtes… c’est correct.
[A. I think you are . . . that is correct.]
Q. Vous l’avez extrait de votre rapport pour ce procès ?
[Q. Did you furnish an excerpt from your report for this trial?]
R. Je n’ai rien extrait. Je vais vous expliquer comment j’ai fait ce rapport sans référence consciente au rapport précédent : Étant donné qu’on ne m’avait pas remis des déclarations de témoins ou des procès-verbaux des audiences pour ce procès, donc, je ne me suis pas aventurée à commenter sur des événements que j’ignorais.
[A. I didn't excerpt anything. I'll explain to you how I made up this report without conscious reference to the preceding report: Given that I did not receive any of the witnesses' depositions or their interviews for this trial, I did not venture to comment on events about which I didn't know.]
Q. Vous avez jugé nécessaire de parler, de manière approfondie, de la position du général Ndindiliyimana lors de votre rapport dans le procès des Militaires, alors que dans son propre procès, vous avez omis de faire bénéficier les Juges de ces informations. Ne pensez-vous pas que vous ne rendez pas justice à Ndindiliyimana ? Si vous saviez que j’allais vous contre-interrroger, peut-être que vous l’auriez dit.
[Q. You found it necessary to speak, in depth, of the position of General Ndindiliyimana in your report for the first Officers' trial, yet in his own trial, you have not seen fit to give the Judges the benefits of your information. Don't you think you are doing an injustice to General Ndindiliyimana? If you had know that I was going to cross-examine you, perhaps you would have given it.]
R. Maître, ça fait partie des archives de ce Tribunal, ceci fait partie des écrits, c’est tombé dans le domaine public, et je n’ai jamais tenté de nier cette information qui fait partie des archives que l’histoire retiendra.
[A. Counselor, it is part of the Tribunal's archives, it's part of the writings, it's in the public domain, and I never tried to deny this information which is part of the archives that history retains.]
Q. N’aurait-il pas été plus facile de reproduire ces pages extraites de votre rapport dans l’affaire des Militaires ?
[Q. Was it easier to produce these pages extracted from your report in the Officers' case?]
R. Si j’avais eu le même mandat, c’est probablement ce que j’aurais fait, mais mon rapport n’a pas été préparé sur la base de ces… d’un tel mandat.
[A. If I had had the same instruction, that is probably what I would have done, but my report was not prepared on the basis of these . . . of such an instruction.]
Q. Avez-vous été… Est-ce que le Procureur vous avait… vous a demandé de ne pas extraire du rapport précédent…
[Q. Were you . . . Did the Prosecutor . . . ask you not to excerpt your previous report . . .]
R. Certainement pas. Mais, si on me l’avait demandé, j’aurais certainement refusé.
[A. Certainly not. But, if someone had asked that, I would most certainly have refused.]
M. BÂ :
Maître Black, est-ce qu’on peut avoir une copie du rapport dont vous parlez ?
[Maitre Black, could we have a copy of the report you're referring to?]
Me BLACK :
(Intervention non interprétée)
[No interpretation]
M. BÂ :
Je l’ai au bureau, mais si vous avez une copie disponible…
[I have it in my office, but if you have a copy available . . .]
Me BLACK :
O.K. Je peux vous donner des extraits et des pages où Ndindiliyimana est mentionné.
[O.K. I can give you some extracts and some pages where Ndindiliyimana is mentioned.]
M. BÂ :
Ah ! Je ne savais pas que vous aviez distribué des documents à cette fin. C’est une première. D’habitude…
[Ah! I didn't know that you had distributed these documents for this purpose. This is a first. Usually . . .]
M. JEGEDE :
Non, il n’a pas distribué de document, ce sont nos propres documents.
[No, he didn't distribute the document, these are own documents.]
(Rires dans la salle d’audience)
[Laughter in the courtroom]
Me BLACK :
Monsieur Bâ, si vous le souhaitez, j’ai des documents à votre disposition.
[Mr Bâ, if you wish, I have some documents to give you.]
M. JEGEDE :
Nous les avons, épargnez-vous cette peine.
[We have them, don't bother.]
Me BLACK :
Q. Vous conviendrez avec moi que c’était un officier modéré, mais vos conclusions sont étranges. Vous dites dans votre livre, à la page 193, version anglaise…
Et, excusez-moi, Messieurs, Mesdames les Interprètes ; vous allez devoir faire une traduction libre,
j’ai une copie.
[Q. You agree with me that he was a moderate officer, but your conclusions are strange. You say in your book, on page 193, the English version . . .
And, excuse me, Ladies and Gentlmen in the translation booth, you're going to have to do a loose translation, I have a copy.]
L’INTERPRÈTE ANGLAIS-FRANÇAIS : [English-French translators:]
Ce serait bien qu’on l’ait.
[That would be good to have.]
Me BLACK :
Vous dites ce qui suit à la… en bas de page : « Gatsinzi étant nominalement aux commandes des forces armées, lui, Rusatira et Ndindiliyimana ont cherché à retirer ce contrôle à Bagosora lorsque le comité de crise s’est réuni à la veille du 6 avril, ils lui ont refusé la présidence de la réunion. Il a insulté les autres, particulièrement Rusatira, et a boycotté le reste de la réunion.
Les autres ont dressé des plans pour mettre la Garde présidentielle sous contrôle et « de » mettre en place un Gouvernement sur la base des Accords d’Arusha. »
[Mr Black: You said the following on . . . at the bottom of the page: "Gatsinzi being putatively in command of the armed forces, he, Rusatira and Ndindiliyimana attempted to retake this control from Bagosora during the Crisis Committee meeting in the evening of 6 April, they refused to allow him to preside over the meeting. He insulted the others, especially Rusatira, and boycotted the rest of the meeting.
The others set out plans to bring the Presidential Guard under control and 'pull' the government into the framework of the Arusha Accords."]
Q. Vous avez écrit cela ?
[Q. Did you write that?]
R. Ça me semble familier. Pourquoi ne me donnez-vous pas la version anglaise ?
[A. That sounds familiar. Why don't you give me the English version?]
Q. Je le ferai. Vous, vous… En français ou en anglais ?
[Q. I will. You, you . . . In French or in English?]
R. C’est bien en anglais.
[A. In English is fine.]
Q. Et dans la même page, vous (inaudible) des mots qui figurent dans le rapport, notamment dans la remise des armes à la MINUAR ; et, à la page 195, vous répétez que Ndindiliyimana a rencontré l’ambassadeur belge pour requérir une assistance internationale afin de pouvoir contrôler la situation. Est-ce que cela n’atténue pas vos propos ? N’était-il pas un officier modéré ?
[Q. And on the same page, you (inaudible) some words that figure in the report, notably in the turning over of arms to the UNAMIR; and, on page 195, you repeat that Ndindiliyimana met the Belgian ambassador to ask for international assistance in order to be able to control the situation. That isn't a distortion of your remarks is it? Wasn't he a moderate officer?]
R. Maître, vous vous concentrez sur une courte période de temps.
[A. Counselor, you are concentrating on a short period of time.]
Q. Je suis d’accord.
[Q. I agree.]
R. Une période de trois mois. Et je vous dis que mes préoccupations ne concernaient pas ce qui a pu ou n’a pas pu se passer pendant cette période. On doit parler des événements antérieurs et postérieurs à cette période.
[A. A period of three months. And I told you that my preoccupation is not with what could or could not have happened during that period. We have to speak about the events before and after this period.]
Q. Très bien. À la page 268, vous mentionnez ceci :
« Bien que leur position n’était pas favorisée, certains officiers de haut rang ont essayé de mettre un terme aux attaques contre les civils le 6 avril. Rusatira a contacté le Premier Ministre intérimaire et le Ministre de la défense à Murambi pour leur dire que le départ du Gouvernement de Kigali avait entraîné des violences aussi bien à Kigali qu’à Gitarama, il les a incités à arrêter les tueries.
Six jours plus tard, Rusatira est revenu, c’était le 22, Rusatira a contacté Ndindiliyimana pour que l’on convainque les dirigeants politiques que le génocide démoralisait les troupes, l’armée. Ils ont dit que ces massacres allaient conduire à la défaite. »
Et vous dites que les politiciens avaient insisté… que les tueries avaient été faites en autodéfense.
Avez-vous écrit cela en référence à Ndindiliyimana ? Est-ce que cela n’atténue pas certaines de vos préoccupations quant à sa… aux positions que vous avez tenues ?
[Q. Very well. On page 268, you mention this:
"Whereas their position was not popular, certain high-ranking officers tried to put a stop to attacks on civilians on 6 April. Rusatira contacted the interim Prime Minister (Jean Kambanda?) and the Minister of Defense in Murambi in order to tell them that the government leaving Kigali had led to violence in Kigali as well as in Gitarama, he pushed them to put a stop to the killings.
Six days later, Rusatira returned, this was the 22nd, Rusatira contacted Ndindiliyimana to get him to convince the political leaders that the genocide was demoralizing the troops, the army. They said that these massacres were going to lead to their defeat."
And you said that the politicians insisted . . . the the killings were acts of self-defense.
Did you write that in reference to Ndindiliyimana? Does this diminish any of your preoccupations as to his . . . to the positions that you held?
R. En toute conscience, Maître, je ne peux pas dire que je suis convaincue de l’innocence d’une personne qui occupait un haut rang et dont… et pour « lequel » je n’ai pas mené de recherche sur ses actions. Et on m’a posé une question à propos de Rusatira : « Était-il sans reproche ? » J’ai dit que je ne pouvais pas dire s’il était innocent ou coupable.
[A. In good conscience, Counselor, I can not say that I am convinced of the innocence of anyone who held high office and whose . . . and about whom I did not conduct research into his actions. And you asked me a question about Rusatira: "Was he without sin?" I said that I could not say if he was innocent or guilty.]
Q. Et… Mais vous n’avez pas dit la même chose concernant Ndindiliyimana ? Mais vous n’avez… vous ne pouvez pas dire que vous n’êtes pas convaincue qu’il est coupable à 100 % ; vous pouvez également dire que vous ignorez tout de sa culpabilité.
[Q. And . . . But didn't you say the same thing about Ndindiliyimana? But you didn't . . . you can't say that you are convinced that he is !00% guilty; you can likewise say that you don't know everything about his guilt.]
R. C’est différent. Le chef d’état-major de la Gendarmerie était impliqué dans l’autodéfense civile. Rusatira, comme vous le savez, ne faisait pas partie de l’état-major. Ce plan — on en a discuté en audience — ce plan avait été identifié clairement par le Premier Ministre comme étant la base des tueries qui se sont déroulées. C’est une de mes préoccupations.
[A. It's different. The Chief of Staff of the Gendarmerie was involved in civilian self-defense. Rusatira, as you know, was not part of the General Staff. This set-up -- as we discussed in the interview -- this set-up was identified by the Prime Minister as being at the very heart of the killings that were taking place. This is one of my concerns.]
Q. Vous auriez pu avoir ces mêmes préoccupations concernant Gatsinzi et Rusatira, ils étaient dans l’armée. Et d’après ces actions… ces actions — Ndindiliyimana, Ndindiliyimana —, pendant ces jours, indiquent qu’il n’était pas… qu’il était opposé à ce plan et qu’il a toujours été opposé à ce plan.
[Q. You could have had these same concerns about Gasinzi and Rusatira, they were in the army. And by these actions . . . these actions -- Ndindiliyimana, Ndindiliyimana --, during these days, indicated that he was not . . . that he was opposed to this plan and that he always had been opposed to this plan.]
R. Yes. Pendant cette période, cela semblait être le cas, mais mes préoccupations touchent à la facette… à la période antérieure, mes préoccupations touchent également aux actions des gendarmes après le 6 avril, qui ont activement participé aux tueries dans bon nombre de localités au Rwanda. Le général Ndindiliyimana était l’officier supérieur de la Gendarmerie.
[A. Yes. During this period, that seemed to be the case, but my concerns were with that facet . . . of the period before, my concerns were also about the actions of the gendarmes after the 6 April, who actively participated in the killings in a large number of localities in Rwanda. General Ndindiliyimana was the superior officer of the Gendarmerie.]
Q. De même, Rusatira et Gatsinzi étaient des hauts commandants de l’armée ; et vous n’avez pas eu les mêmes préoccupations pour Rusatira et vous l’avez… vous avez aidé à son exonération ? Et je reviendrai à la Gendarmerie.
[Q. All the same, Rusatira and Gatsinzi were top commanders of the Army; and you didn't have the same concerns about Rusatira and you . . . you helped exonerate him?]
R. Avant d’aller plus loin, je voudrais que l’on soit clairs. J’ai expliqué que lorsque j’ai appris que le colonel Rusatira était sous le coup d’un Acte d’accusation, j’avais des informations à ma disposition qui indiquaient qu’il y avait des contrevérités dans l’Acte d’accusation.
C’est parce que l’Acte d’accusation ne faisait référence qu’à une période de trois heures. Et, étant donné que j’avais des documents qui indiquaient, de manière précise, où se trouvait Rusatira pendant ces trois heures, j’aurais été négligente, en tant que personne humaine et en tant que militante des droits de l’homme, si j’avais conservé ces informations par-devers moi, si je n’avais pas agi. J’ai remis ces informations au Procureur en lui disant que détenir Rusatira serait indécent et illégal.
[A. Before going too far, I would like us to be clear. I explained that when I learned that Colonel Rusatira was being charged with a crime, I had information at my disposition that indicated that there were untruths in these charges.
It's because these charges referred only to a period of three hours. And given that I had documents that indicated, in a precise way, where Rusatira had been during those three hours, I would have been negligent, as a human being as well as as a militant for Human Rights, if I had kept this information to myself, if I hadn't acted. I gave this information to the Prosecutor, telling him that to hold Rusatira would be indecent and illegal.]
Q. Dans votre lettre au Procureur, je suis sûr que vous n’avez pas suggéré que ces accusations n’étaient pas correctes, mais qu’il pouvait être coupable.
[Q. In your letter to the Prosecutor, I am sure that you didn't suggest that these charges were not right, but that he could be guilty.]
R. Maître Black, vous ne pouvez pas savoir ce que j’ai écrit dans ma lettre.
[A. Maitre Black, you can not know what I wrote in my letter.]
Q. Mais vous nous avez dit que vous avez écrit, envoyé une correspondance au Procureur ; et je suis sûr que ce que je vous oppose, vous ne l’avez pas écrit, vous n’aviez pas le moyen de le savoir. Si vous voulez la lettre, il y a des procédures établies, cette lettre n’est pas votre affaire. Nous sommes dans un procès pénal.
[Q. But you told us that you wrote, sent a correspondence to the Prosecutor; and I am sure that what I suggested to you, you did not write, you had no way of knowing. If you want the letter, there a established procedures, this letter is not your private business. We are involved in a criminal trial.]
R. Et je n’ai pas écrit cette lettre contre votre Accusé.
[A. And I did not write this letter against your client.]
Q. Vous avez parlé de cette lettre, je suis en train d’attaquer votre crédibilité.
Passons à autre chose. Je vais vous lire quelque chose d’autre. Page 269, vous dites ceci :
« À la mi-avril, le général Ndindiliyimana et le colonel Gatsinzi ainsi que Rusatira ont convoqué Gaspard Gahigi « à » la RTLM ainsi que Jean-François Nsengiyumva de Radio Rwanda, à l’École militaire de Kigali. Il semble que les autorités leur ont dit que la radio devait arrêter d’inciter à la violence contre les Tutsis et de discréditer les militaires.
Ruggiu a contesté les intentions de Rusatira qui contactait régulièrement Dallaire. Et dans une autre annonce, la RTLM a incité pour qu’on attaque Ndindiliyimana que l’on accusait d’avoir transporté des éléments du FPR, on a même indiqué sa plaque d’immatriculation et, pourtant, il a aidé des Tutsis à s’échapper. »
Avez-vous écrit cela ?
[Q. You spoke of this letter, I am attacking your credibility.
Let's move on to something else. I am going to read you something else. Page 269, you say this:
"In mid-April, General Ndindiliyimana and Colonel Gatsinzi as well as Rusatira met with Gaspard Gahigi 'of' RTLM along with Jean-François Nsengiymva of Radio Rwanda, at the Military Academy in Kigali. It seems that the authorities told them that the radio must stop inciting violence against the Tutsis and discrediting the soldiers.
Ruggiu questioned the intentions of Rusatira who was in regular contact with Dallaire. And in another announcement, RTLM urged an attack on Ndindiliyimana whom they accused of having transported elements of the RPF, going so far as to give his license number and, more importantly, that he'd helped Tutsis to escape."
Did you write that?
R. Oui. J’ai déjà fait des commentaires sur cela il y a quelques minutes.
[A. Yes. I already commented on this a few minutes ago.]
Q. N’est-ce pas que ce sont des actions, des actes qui ont été posés par un homme que l’on accuse de génocide ?
[Q. Are these the actions, the acts of someone we'd accuse of genocide?]
R. C’étaient des actes qui n’étaient pas continus, qui… certaines personnes qui ont participé au génocide ont également sauvé des Tutsis. Donc, on ne peut pas parler… si vous voulez discuter sur la continuité, c’est votre affaire.
[A. These were acts that did not continue, that . . . certain people who participated in the genocide also saved some Tutsis. So, we can't speak . . . if you want to discuss the continuity, that's up to you.]
Q. Je vais vous presser sur cette question. Est-ce que quelqu’un… Est-ce que ces actions inscrites dans la continuité, on peut les opposer à quelqu’un qui a essayé de sauver des vies ?
[Q. I am going to press you on this question. Is someone . . . Are these actions that continued, can we ascribe these actions to someone who tried to save lives?
R. Oui, ces actions pouvaient être cohérentes et continues en ce qu’elles ont aidé à sauver des Tutsis.
[A. Yes, these actions could be consistent and continuous on the part of those who helped save Tutsis.]
Q. Page 270, vous poursuivez… Je ne vais pas lire tout le paragraphe. Vous dites :
« Le 29 avril, le chef de l’état-major de l’armée a adressé une lettre au Ministre de la défense, se plaignant que la Gendarmerie n’était pas très efficace aux combats ; et il y avait des sentiments hostiles entre les officiers. Et ces sentiments ont été exacerbés par la RTLM qui accusait la police d’être tolérante… trop tolérante envers les Tutsis. »
L’avez-vous écrit ?
[Q. Page 270, you go on . . . I'm not going to read the whole paragraph. You say:
"29 April, the Chief of Staff of the Army addressed a letter to the Minister of Defense, complaining that the Gendarmerie was not very effective in combat; and there were some hostile feelings between the officers. And these feelings were exacerbated by RTLM accusing the police of being tolerant . . . too tolerant toward the Tutsis."
You wrote that?
R. Oui.
[A. Yes.]
Q. Donc, à travers votre livre, le général Ndindiliyimana est décrit comme quelqu’un qui était modéré ? En me fondant sur les informations contenues dans votre livre, je ne fais pas de spéculation.
[Q. So, throughout your book, General Ndindiliyimana is described as someone who was moderate? Based on the information in your book, I am not speculating.]
R. Bon nombre de Rwandais m’ont encouragée à ne pas utiliser le mot « modérés », en décrivant des militaires ou des personnes appartenant à un groupe ethnique quelconque, en raison des implications que cela génère.
Pour ce qui ne tombe pas dans… sous cette étiquette, je me suis concentrée sur des actes et les actes dont nous venons de… les actions dont nous venons de parler découlent d’informations honnêtes et fiables sur le comportement du général Ndindiliyimana à cette époque.
[A. A goodly number of Rwandans encouraged me not to use the work 'moderates', in writing about the officers or of people belonging to whatever ethnic group, because of the implications it generated.
For those who didn't fall into . . . didn't fit that category, I concentrated on the acts and the acts which we come to . . . the actions which we come to speak of as flowing from honest and reliable information on the behavior of General Ndindiliyimana during this period.]
Q. Je vais vous lire un autre passage, extrait du rapport dans l’affaire Bagosora, sur l’opposition à l’armée, et vous citer une lettre du 12.
Je m’excuse auprès des interprètes.
Vous avez commencé par parler de Bagosora, de l’installation d’un Gouvernement intérimaire, et vous dites également… parlez de l’opposition des dirigeants militaires et vous dites : « Le 12 avril… »
[Q. I am going to read another passage, extracted from the report in the Bagosora case, on the opposition in the Army, and you cite a letter of the 12th.
I beg the pardon of the interpreters.
You began by speaking of Bagosora, of the installation of the Interim Government, and you speak also . . . you speak of the opposition of the military leader and you say: "The 12th of April . . ." Page 46.
M. JEGEDE :
Quelle page ?
[What page?]
Me BLACK :
Page 46. Rapport dans l’affaire Bagosora, titre : « Opposition militaire ».
Monsieur Jegede, est-ce que vous avez ce rapport ?
[Page 46. Report in the Bagosora case, titled: "Military Opposition".
Mr. Jegede, do you have this report?"]
M. JEGEDE :
Yes.
[Yes.]
Me BLACK :
Vous dites : « Le 12 avril, Rusatira qui s’était présenté devant des diplomates étrangers comme l’agent de liaison du nouveau Gouvernement trois jours plus tôt, a décidé qu’il devait être mis… il devait essayer d’arrêter les massacres. Ce jour-là, il a escorté des douzaines de personnes qu’il abritait chez lui — à Kigali — à Gitarama.
En route, Rusatira a vu plusieurs cadavres, y compris ceux des deux policiers… deux gendarmes qui avaient été abattus parce qu’ils étaient tutsis ou parce qu’ils avaient essayé de défendre des civils. À Gitarama, il est allé à la recherche des dirigeants politiques pour les persuader d’arrêter les tueries.
Lorsque Rusatira est arrivé à Kigali, il a fait en sorte que neuf autres officiers signent un document qu’il a signé… à signer un document.
La déclaration a été diffusée à la radio, appelant à la fin de cette tragédie et, ceci, sans l’accord du Gouvernement. Ils ont pensé qu’une trêve avec le FPR pouvait contribuer à la mise en place d’un Gouvernement de transition à base élargie et d’éviter le bain de sang inutile. »
Vous poursuivez : « Cet effort est arrivé trop tard. Bagosora et ses supporters ont été outragés par cette initiative et en ont conclu que Rusatira était un traître. Rusatira a été informé qu’un escadron de garde devait… avait été commis pour l’assassiner et il s’est caché. Un peu plus tard, Rwabakuba, un leader du MDR, Shingoro (phon.), Bonoyumbutwa (phon.) ont dénoncé le contenu de la déclaration. »
Et vous avez une note en bas de page et, dans la note de bas de page 133 (sic), vous dites :
« Ndindiliyimana avait, semble-t-il, appuyé la déclaration. »
[Me Black: You say: "The 12th of April, Rusatira, who had presented himself to foreign diplomats as an agent of the new Government three days before, decided that there must be an end . . . there must be an attempt to put a stop to the massacres. On this day, he escorted dozens of people whom he'd sheltered at his place -- to Kigali -- to Gitarama.
En route, Rusatira saw several corpses, including those of two police officers . . . two gendarmes who had been killed because they were Tutsis or because they had tried to defend civilians. In Gitarama, he went looking for political leaders to persuade them to stop the killings.
When Rusatira got to Kigali, he saw to it that nine other officers signed a document that he had signed . . . to sign a document.
The declaration was broadcast on the radio, calling for an end to this tragedy and, this was done without the agreement of the Government. They thought that a truce with the RPF would help put a broad-based transition government in place and avoid a needless bloodbath."
You go on: "This effort came too late. Bagosora and his supporters were outraged by this initiative and concluded that Rusatira was a traitor. Rusatira was informed that a squadron of guards must . . . had been ordered to assassinate him and he went into hiding. A little later, Rwabakuba, a leader of the MDR, Shingor (phon.), Bonoyumbutwa (phon.) denounced the contents of the declaration."
And you have a footnote and in the footnote on page 133 (sic), you say:
"Ndindiliyimana, it seems, supported the declaration."]
L’INTERPRÈTE ANGLAIS-FRANÇAIS : [English-French interpreter:]
Maître Black devrait remettre une copie, ne serait-ce qu’en anglais, aux interprètes.
[Maitre Black should have given a copy, if only in English, to the interpreters.]
Me BLACK :
Q. Vous avez écrit cela ?
[Q. You wrote that?]
R. Oui, je l’ai fait.
[A. Yes, I did.]
M. BÂ :
C’est la question que j’allais vous poser : Est-ce que Ndindiliyimana a signé cette déclaration ?
[This is the question I was going to ask you: Did Ndindiliyimana sign that declaration?]
L’INTERPRÈTE ANGLAIS-FRANÇAIS : [English-French interpreters:]
Votre micro, Monsieur Bâ.
[Your mike, Mr Bâ.]
M. BÂ :
La question que j’allais vous poser, c’était : Est-ce qu’il était dit dans ce passage que Ndindiliyimana avait signé cette déclaration ?
[The question I was going to ask you was: Did it say in that passage whether Ndindiliyimana signed that declaration?]
Me BLACK :
Dans la note de bas de page, il semble que Ndindiliyimana était en faveur de la déclaration. Je peux vous remettre cette lettre.
[In the footnote, it seems that Ndindiliyimana was in favor of the declaration. I can give you this letter.]
M. BÂ :
Elle n’est pas signée par Ndindiliyimana.
[It is not signed by Ndindiliyimana.]
L’INTERPRÈTE ANGLAIS-FRANÇAIS : [English-French interpreter:]
Est-ce que Maître Black peut remettre une copie de ce document en anglais aux interprètes ?
Monsieur Bâ, Monsieur… Monsieur Bâ, demandez qu’on nous remette une copie, ne serait-ce qu’en anglais.
[Could Maitre Black give a copy of this document in English to the interpreters?
Mr Bâ, Mr . . . Mr Bâ, ask someone to give us a copy, even if only in English.]
M. BÂ :
Et vous savez bien… Mais, je ne veux commenter, on le fera plus tard.
[And you know well . . . But, I don't want to comment, we will do that later.]
Me BLACK :
Q. C’est une preuve que la position du général Ndindiliyimana était qu’il était opposé au génocide et aux massacres des Tutsis. Et il a tout fait pour essayer de stopper cela, tout au moins, ce jour-là ; n’est-ce pas ?
[Q. This is proof that the position of General Ndindiliyimana was that he was opposed to the genocide and to the massacres of Tutsis. And that in fact he did everything to stop this, at least, on this day; is that not so?]
R. Les actions que nous avons évoquées sont des actions qui peuvent être interprétées dans ce sens. Étaient-ce les seules actions à ce moment-là, ou avant ou après ? Bon, ça reste une question ouverte pour moi.
[A. The actions that we have brought up are action that could be interpreted in this sense. Were they the only actions at this particular moment, or before or after? Fine, that remains an open question to me.]
Q. O.K.
[Q. O.K.]
(Diffusion d’un signal sonore)[A bell sounds] --The fire alarm
M. LE PRÉSIDENT :
(Intervention non interprétée)
[Not interpreted]
(Suspension de l’audience : 17 heures) [Court is adjourned at 5:00 pm]
(Pages 53 à 70 prises et transcrites par Pius Onana, s.o.)
{12 October 2006}
WITNESS
For the Prosecution:
ALISON DES FORGES
Cross-examination by Mr. Black (continued)… 1
P R O C E E D I N G S
MR. PRESIDENT:
Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. The Court is in session.
Appearances as before.
Yes, Mr. Black.
ALISON DES FORGES,
CROSS‑EXAMINATION (continued)
BY MR. BLACK:
Q. Dr. Des Forges, I just want to continue with the discussion we had yesterday which was interrupted by the fire alarm. In your book, you make reference at page 153 to answers to questions submitted to Major General Dallaire by the judge advocate general of the military court in Belgium. So, did you have a copy of that entire question and answer session when you reviewed it? Was it complete, as far as you know, or can you remember? Because we have ‑‑ we have part of it. We hadn't seen the whole thing.
A. I don't recall having the impression that it was complete. My impression ‑‑ my recollection is that the document of perhaps 15 to 20 pages, certainly not something in hundreds of pages, but I do recall having an impression that it was only partial.
Q. All right. Perhaps I interrupt you ‑‑
MR. BLACK:
Mr. President, the Prosecution has ‑‑ or I obtained from them what they disclosed to us on a CD‑ROM, that question and answer session with General Dallaire, but it ends at page 35, just when it starts getting interesting for us. And it doesn't continue past that on the CD‑ROM, so I am asking Mr. Bâ if he can provide us with the rest of it. We have up to page 35, at which point there is a question, number 3 to General Dallaire, what contacts did he have with Augustin Ndindiliyimana and so on, but that is truncated. So we would like them to provide us with the rest. They must have it somewhere. If they could undertake to do that, that would be very helpful.
MR. BÂ:
When was that disclosed to you? When was that made available to you?
MR. BLACK:
I am not sure. It is on one of those many CD‑Roms we have had, but it's ‑‑ I will give you the K‑number.
MR. BÂ:
Yes, give the K‑number.
MR. BLACK:
I can give you a copy as well.
MR. PRESIDENT:
He said they received only part.
MR. BLACK:
K0078808, it is 35 pages, but the pages which concern General Ndindiliyimana have been removed.
MR. BÂ:
(Microphone not activated)
THE ENGLISH INTERPRETER:
Microphone.
MR. BÂ:
It is not usual for us to disclose and then hold back anything, but I will check. I will check if there are some pages missing. I will check.
MR. BLACK:
Thank you, because it may be when they put them onto the CD‑ROM they missed some pages, I don't know. But I will try and work with what I have got.
BY MR. BLACK:
Q. Perhaps I can ‑‑ I will put this to you, Dr. Des Forges, (Inaudible) ... I am going to ask you a series of questions and I am not going to make any tricks. I am going to ask you a series of questions that ‑‑ since you do have some remaining concerns about General Ndindiliyimana's role during the war, you don't know everything about what he did. I am going to put to you some other facts and ask you if that would be consistent with what I suggested yesterday that he would not ‑‑
MR. JEGEDE:
Sorry, Mr. Black, what is the connection of this document with page 5 -- 530, of 'Leave None to Tell the Story'?
MR. BLACK:
I am sorry, page 153. There is a footnote in which she refers to this document in one of her sources. So I am sure she had the whole thing, but at some point ‑‑ but we don't have it.
BY MR. BLACK:
Q. Anyway, Dr. Des Forges, I am sorry. I remember your saying you may have some concerns about somebody with a high command responsibility like General Ndindiliyimana, but let me just start this exercise.
In ‑‑ and I can show you this page, if you want. Perhaps the first page doesn't concern us. It's the second page, which is page 35 of that question and answer session, and ‑‑
MR. PRESIDENT:
Just an observation. Yesterday I think one of the counsels produced this document which ‑‑
MR. BLACK:
(Inaudible) the same document.
MR. PRESIDENT:
‑‑ the last, it bears K‑number K0232089 ‑‑
MR. BLACK:
I think that's ‑‑ you got that confused, but Judge Hikmet seems to have the right one. I think that one you've got is not the right one. I am sorry, sir. Maybe you can ‑‑
BY MR. BLACK:
Q. Anyway, Dr. Des Forges, just for the record, I would read this because it has to be shown on the record. The question asked of General Dallaire by the judge advocate general was as follows: "What contacts did he have with Augustin Ndindiliyimana? What did Mr. Ndindiliyimana say during those encounters? What position did Mr. Ndindiliyimana take after the attack on the presidential airplane, and what does Major Dallaire know about the role played by Mr. Ndindiliyimana in the subsequent events? When did Mr. Ndindiliyimana learn that the blue helmets were in difficulties, and what did he do at that time?
In response, Dallaire says: "The force commander held regular contacts with Mr. Ndindiliyimana, the chief of staff of the gendarmerie, a moderate who had relations with both moderate and hardliner political leaders. Mr. Ndindiliyimana appeared to the force commander to be sincere "‑‑ sorry.
MR. BÂ:
Counsel Black, I think you are reading too fast.
MR. BLACK:
You have copies. I will try and read it more slowly.
BY MR. BLACK:
Q. "Mr. Ndindiliyimana appeared to the force commander to be sincere, when on 7th April 1994, he told him that they were doing all they could to save the Belgian soldiers in Camp Kigali."
Next paragraph: "The chief of staff was known to the force commander as an intelligent and cooperative officer who seemed genuinely loyal to the peace process. The force commander received information which possibly linked the chief of staff with the weapons cache. However, his involvement with the affair was never confirmed. After receipt of that information, the force commander treated the chief of staff with certain elements of suspicion. During the war he saved a number of Rwandans and was always as responsible as possible to the force commander. The chief of staff fled in late June as extremists were eliminating suspected moderates and he was being targeted."
And then he gets into the details and then it is truncated. So we don't know the rest of it. But again, there weren't ‑‑ perhaps I would just go through a series of things and then put to you a general question, if that is okay with you? . . . I would like to read to you. You said ‑‑ excuse me. I had also a letter ‑‑
MR. BÂ:
Counsel Black ‑‑ Mr. President, why should this witness answer to what General Dallaire thinks or says? General Dallaire is somebody who is a scheduled witness, a Prosecution witness. If you have to read Dallaire's writings, you might wish to read what he says about General Ndindiliyimana in his book, and then you also said it is not complete. You don't know what is at the end. I can produce pages, quite significant, quite relevant, who was always after Bagosora, who represented, as far as he was concerned, an enigma. You could read those sections. You have the book. Everyone knows that your client was one who was playing on both sides of the fence, who was associating with everyone, hook line and sinker.
MR. BLACK:
Mr. President, I am going to ask them to be sanctioned for getting up and giving a speech like that and testifying. Interfering with my cross‑examination is totally improper and totally prejudicial to my client.
MR. PRESIDENT:
Yes, Counsel, I think it is not proper to say what Dallaire says from the Bench. If Dallaire is coming as scheduled to come, let him say what he has to say.
MR. BLACK:
It's the last comment he threw that he knows that ‑‑ he says my client was playing a double game, that's totally prejudicial and totally false. Man, I am going ‑‑ I am going to be very angry ‑‑ I am sorry, Mr. President, I am going to be angry and lose my temper if he keeps on ‑‑
MR. BÂ:
Oh, yeah, you can get angry. Please do get angry. What Dallaire says is in the public domain; and secondly, Dallaire is the proper person to say what he thinks of Ndindiliyimana. So why are we trying to put the question to someone to say what is her opinion on Ndindiliyimana?
MR. PRESIDENT:
I think, Mr. Black ‑‑
MR. BLACK:
I am not complaining about General Ndindiliyimana's comments ‑‑
MR. PRESIDENT:
Mr. Black, I think so far you have got something favourable from this witness. So is it advisable to probe deep into it?
MR. BLACK:
Yes, because ‑‑
MR. PRESIDENT:
View it as it is and get the benefit.
MR. BLACK:
I am going to do that, and I have no problem with General Dallaire. My problem is Mr. Bâ's statement.
MR. JEGEDE:
Your Honour, Mr. Bâ has not said anything that is out of line with what he has read out. Here he says the force commander (microphones overlapping) ... information which possibly linked the chief of staff with weapons cache.
MR. BLACK:
No, no. This can't be allowed. He is interpreting my own questions.
MR. JEGEDE:
No, no, it's not ‑‑ it has nothing to do with your questions.
THE ENGLISH INTERPRETER:
This is difficult to interpret, Mr. President.
MR. BÂ:
(Microphones overlapping)
MR. PRESIDENT:
Okay. Mr. Bâ, take your seat.
MR. BÂ:
Mr. President, I know you don't want me to speak. But in the documents it is also said that he was in touch with the hardliners.
MR. PRESIDENT:
Well, Counsel, I think ‑‑
MR. BLACK:
(Inaudible) taken and –
MR. PRESIDENT:
Mr. Black, you must not get involved in this. You have a job to do, please do it.
MR. BLACK:
Please, can you try and control your side? All right.
BY MR. BLACK:
Q. Now, let me just (inaudible) Dr. Des Forges, and see if you can help me. Is she coming back? I can't see her overhead. We will do it the hard way. I was trying to save you time, Dr. Des Forges, so I will do it the long way.
What I just read to you from the statement by General Dallaire in response to those questions, would it also be consistent with a man who had ‑‑ was not part of the conspiracy to commit genocide, had no intention of committing genocide or tolerating such crimes, would that be consistent -- apart from the reference of the weapons cache, of course?
A. The characterisation that Dallaire gives is of someone who appears to have relations with both sides. In having relations with the group that Dallaire has characterised as hardliners, what exactly was the comportment of General Ndindiliyimana? To what extent was he or did he appear compliant with them in their plans and their strategies? That is something that I cannot say. All I can say is that there were indications from the documents that established the so‑called plan for civilian self‑defence, that they were counting on the cooperation of the gendarmerie force commander. There were people excluded from their planning, including the prime minister, but there were people who were included, like the commander of the gendarmerie.
Now, when the situation came to actuality, would he then back away from the position that they thought he held? Did he not really hold that position? What position did he hold? I cannot say.
Q. Well, we are going to get into his involvement or noninvolvement in the civil defence later. But just that last line on paragraph 78, that the chief of staff fled in late June as extremists were eliminating suspected moderates and he was being targeted, wouldn't that indicate that it would be consistent with his role as a so‑called moderate, quote and unquote, that he was being targeted and had to flee the country?
MR. JEGEDE:
Your Honours, that's assuming if the statements were to be true. You also have to add that rider. You can't put it as an absolute.
MR. BLACK:
Well, since you called General Dallaire as a Prosecution witness (inaudible) credibility, so you can attack it now.
MR. PRESIDENT:
(Microphones overlapping) … without any malice, I will say that when a person tries to play football, sometimes you get played out by both sides.
MR. BLACK:
This is General Dallaire's statement, not my man's statement. This is General Dallaire's statement. That is his view of the situation. All right.
BY MR. BLACK:
Q. Okay. And I have a letter dated June 25th, 1995, by Gatsinzi to Professor Reyntjens.
A. Excuse me, Counsel, did you want me to answer that question or has that ‑‑
Q. (Microphones overlapping) ... interrupted, but you can go on and say something else, if you wish.
A. No, I had not commented on that final line which you read.
Q. I was going to say, wouldn't that indicate what General Dallaire says is true, that that would indicate that General Ndindiliyimana was one of these so‑called moderates?
A. It would certainly indicate that he was taken as an opponent or an enemy by the people who then controlled the regime. On what basis he was taken as an opponent or enemy, would still be in question in my mind. Was it because he was seen as a moderate who attempted to stop the genocide? Was it because he was from Butare and they preferred only a certain crew of people from Butare and he was not among them? What exactly was the basis of their opposition to him? Although the overwhelming division and question that people were forced to take a position on was the question of killing or not killing Tutsis. There were other cross-currents that had to do with regional and political loyalties, and there were people from the MRND and the MDR, for example, who were agreed on the genocide, but were busy trying to knock each other off for partisan political reasons. So it was an extremely fluid political situation. I think -- in general, yes, it is not unfair to suggest that he was being targeted because he was seen -- I think it is completely justified to say he was being targeted because he was seen as an opponent to the people in power. But I cannot conclude from that that that was the reason he was seen as an opponent to the people in power.
Q. Okay. Fair enough. Perhaps I can help you with that. This letter from Gatsinzi to Professor Reyntjens in June 25th, 1995, I am going to read you some handwritten -- and very bad handwriting about – page 18, he states that "Regarding the April 12th letter -- he confirms that ‑‑ I will try and read it with my bad French.
MR. BÂ:
Please, could you just show us what you are reading? Could you show us?
MR. BLACK:
I can't show you this document. I can show you the page, if you wish, but not the rest of the letter.
MR. JEGEDE:
Your Honour, that is completely inappropriate. You can't read something into the record ‑‑
MR. BLACK:
Yes, I can.
MR. JEGEDE:
‑‑ that we don't know the provenance of the document. We don't even know whether it is your own product.
MR. BLACK:
Oh, it comes from you.
MR. JEGEDE:
So what is it?
MR. BLACK:
I just told you. Weren't you listening?
Mr. President, tell him to wake up. It is a letter dated June 25th, 1995, from Gatsinzi to
Professor Reyntjens supplied by ‑‑
THE ENGLISH INTERPRETER:
Slowly, slowly, please for the interpreters.
MR. PRESIDENT:
Is it reproduced in Professor Reyntjens' book or –
MR. BLACK:
I don't know. It makes reference to it in another –
MR. PRESIDENT:
So how do we know it is Gatsinzi's letter?
MR. BLACK:
Well, this is what ‑‑ I don't have ‑‑ I am not trying to deposit the document. I am not filing the document, I am just referring to the letter.
MR. JEGEDE:
You can't read it on to the record.
MR. BLACK:
I can. I can say anything by any witness anywhere, it actually ‑‑
MR. JEGEDE:
(Inaudible)
MR. BLACK:
Oh, stop it. This is crazy.
MR. JEGEDE:
That is not allowed. You can't read it on to the record.
MR. BLACK:
Yes, I can. I know you are afraid of it, you don't want a fair trial ‑‑
MR. JEGEDE:
(Inaudible)
MR. PRESIDENT:
Nothing is getting into the record if you try to argue this way. So you ‑‑
MR. BLACK:
I am saying I got a letter from Gatsinzi to Reyntjens. It is produced by them to me.
MR. JEGEDE:
Your Honours, I know ‑‑
MR. BLACK:
Just a minute. I am not filing it as an exhibit, and you referred to it with another witness, and it was allowed. There was no objection. I read it before. I read the same passage with the Prosecution witness several months ago, and they had no objection.
MR. JEGEDE:
Your Honours, there is no way a document that is used by counsel can go into the record on his own steam without going through the proper channels of admissibility. We have to look at the document. We have to know what it is before it is admitted.
MR. BLACK:
All right. I will just do it out of my head.
MR. PRESIDENT:
Carry on, that is okay.
BY MR. BLACK:
Q. Professor ‑‑ Colonel Gatsinzi at that time ‑‑
MR. BÂ:
And I would add that the witness is not bound to answer if she doesn't have the document before her. She may keep quiet if you don't show her the document; that doesn't explain anything.
MR. PRESIDENT:
Counsel is not going into the document now, he is only suggesting.
BY MR. BLACK:
Q. Anyway, Dr. Des Forges, in this letter which -- maybe you have also seen, Gatsinzi confirms that General Ndindiliyimana was an intended signatory of the letter of April 12th, and that he could not sign it because he was down south involved in other activities, but he confirms that, in fact, Ndindiliyimana heard about the letter, became aware of the letter, totally supported its issuance and the content. And then he states -- concerning him particularly, he says that, in brief, General Ndindiliyimana was very correct as an officer and he even saved the lives of many people threatened by others in the war, and he was a partisan, a dialoguer and a moderate. I can show you the letter.
MR. BÂ:
Mr. President, is it Counsel Black testifying? This is a document no one sees. He reads what he wants to read, nobody understands, and that's going on to the record? Is he testifying? Then show us the document.
MR. PRESIDENT:
Right. Counsel, if you want something to be admitted ‑‑
MR. BLACK:
I don't want it to be admitted. I am using it as a reference to cross‑examine her.
MR. PRESIDENT:
But still we don't know who has written it, the authenticity of the document.
MR. BLACK:
Is there ‑‑ is there Prosecution Witness E1?
MR. PRESIDENT:
Someone may have sent a letter to them and -- they are under obligation to give it to you.
MR. BLACK:
That's right. So we purport there is a letter from Gatsinzi to Professor Reyntjens and that I can show it to the witness.
MR. JEGEDE:
Your Honour, the problem here is –
MR. BLACK:
The problem here, Mr. President, is that they are interfering with my cross‑examination because they are afraid of what's in this document.
MR. PRESIDENT:
Well, Counsel, if you give the document to them, there is no problem, just to desist from the purpose of examining it, that is all.
MR. BLACK:
They can see it, but I want her to see it, too.
And don't lose my markers, please. (Microphone not activated)
MR. PRESIDENT:
Counsel, if the Defence uses the document and fails to produce it, you are entitled to produce it if you think that there is something to be produced.
MR. BLACK:
They can call Gatsinzi and examine him on that. That is Gatsinzi's statement to them.
I am referring to two passages in that letter.
MR. PRESIDENT:
Yes, we could have avoided all this if you had given them ‑‑ you should have told them earlier that you were going to use that document.
MR. BLACK:
There are certain reasons that I want to do this and I don't agree with signalling to the Prosecution my cross‑examination. I have never done that in my entire life and I wouldn't do it now.
BY MR. BLACK:
Q. Anyway, Dr. Des Forges, maybe we can save some time if you remember what I read. Assuming what I read is ‑‑ assuming that letter is authentic and assuming what I read was correct, would that also alleviate any concerns about General Ndindiliyimana's role as expressed by General Dallaire, that he was trying to stop people from being killed and was a party to that April 12th letter?
A. Counsel, this is not new information for me, and ‑‑
Q. Maybe for the Judges it is.
A. Fine. But your question was, did this make it easier for me to adopt a certain position, and my answer is that it does not materially change things for me because I was aware of this information before this whole affair began.
Q. But it does go, doesn't it, to adding on the balance scales, adding to the side of the scales which indicate that General Ndindiliyimana was opposed to killings by the so‑called hardliners or extremists? How do you want to term it?
MR. JEGEDE:
Asked and answered, Your Honour. The witness has answered the question sufficiently.
MR. BLACK:
Not necessarily ‑‑ we don't use those terms.
MR. JEGEDE:
Your Honours, the witness has answered the question.
MR. BLACK:
What was the answer? What was the answer?
MR. JEGEDE:
It means nothing to her. This document means nothing to her.
MR. BLACK:
Stop trying to give her things to say. Stop trying to put answers into her mouth, Mr. Jegede. She's not that stupid, she is a very intelligent woman who can't be manipulated by you.
MR. JEGEDE:
Your Honours ‑‑
MR. PRESIDENT:
At no time, I don't think anyone can try to manipulate her. (Microphones overlapping) ... you ‑‑
MR. JEGEDE:
Your Honours ‑‑
BY MR. BLACK:
Q. I am sorry. So you were going to say, Dr. Des Forges ‑‑
A. If you recall, yesterday I said that the actions which I knew about concerning General Ndindiliyimana for the very brief period when I knew of his actions, which was mostly in early April, not exclusively, but mostly in early April, seem to me a period when he was not in favour of the genocide. So this is part of the information I took into account when I was making a conclusion, and it does not deal with my concerns about other periods and other actions.
Q. Okay. Do you remember you used to have a copy -- in case the Prosecution can't produce the rest of General Dallaire's question and answer session, do you still have a copy of that document, that we could possibly get from you in your records somewhere?
A. I should have what I originally had, yes. It came from the Belgians.
Q. All right.
A. And I think we should get it from them also, but I am certainly happy to look and see if I can locate it.
Q. If we can't get it from the Belgians, we could maybe contact you later, it would be helpful.
MR. BLACK:
Are you finished with that letter?
BY MR. BLACK:
Q. You've read a ‑‑ have you read General Dallaire's book in either English or French,
'Shake Hands with the Devil'?
A. I did read it, yes.
Q. Okay. I just want to ask you if you were aware of certain passages, because you had certain concerns about his justification or other justifications for not being able to do certain things.
At page 190 in the English version, General Dallaire speaks about a meeting between him, Dallaire, Colonel Marchal, Bizimana, the minister of defence, and Ndindiliyimana and Faustin Munyazesa, the minister of interior at that time, about controlling demonstrations and things. And Dallaire says this:
"I told Ndindiliyimana that the gendarmes were not doing enough to help my troops get a grip on the riots. In defence, he confessed that he didn't really know what to do. His men were burnt out, their vehicles were breaking down, and they were almost out of fuel. Besides, he added with the significant glance at the minister of the interior, he wasn't getting any political direction of the use of lethal force. His men had no other way to disperse the crowds, no riot gear, no tear gas or water cannons. He also needed reinforcements to weather the crisis."
You are aware of that when you read the book, that Dallaire wrote that and ‑‑
A. I am sorry, Counsel, I cannot say that I recall that passage.
Q. All right. Now, assuming that General Ndindiliyimana was informing General Dallaire correctly, would that alleviate any ‑‑ or somewhat alleviate any concerns you had about the resources he had available to him under his command to try and control the situation later?
A. We have talked previously about this explanation that resources were inadequate to control violence, and my answer to that is that I am sure that in some circumstances resources were very strictly limited, but if the resources were used to promote killing rather than to stop it, then this argument, to me, has no validity, and in many cases resources were used to promote disorder rather than to control it.
Q. Okay. At page 202 of the book, he is talking about another meeting with Bizimana and Nsabimana and Ndindiliyimana about the general situation, and he says this:
"Then Ndindiliyimana again tried to insist that since his gendarmerie was overtaxed, I should allow him to beef up his force with RGF troops. That would breach the KWSA agreement, I said no."
So you have a situation where Ndindiliyimana is asking permission from General Dallaire to bring in RGF forces to bolster his force, and he is refused. Would that not indicate, first, since he is asking permission of General Dallaire, that he is cooperative and wants to work with him, and (b), that he does need reinforcements, that his view of the situation was that he couldn't cope.
A. What would be the date?
Q. I believe ‑‑ excuse me, that's February 28th, oh, sorry, March 1st, March 1st, that meeting took place.
A. I think it was the impression of General Dallaire and others in the UNAMIR force that General Ndindiliyimana was responsive and helpful to the extent possible, and they continued to hold that impression, I believe, except for the questions about the arms caches through the early days of the violence, and even in those early days, there were joint patrols set up, but I think they began to ask questions when those arrangements promised by the head of the gendarmerie did not materialise. So the suggestion you make that to General Dallaire he appeared responsive and helpful and cooperative, I think was the case probably as well on March the 1st as in early April, that he did give that impression, but that, at least, in early April, he did not deliver, and that was, I think, at that point that questions about his comportment became more serious.
Q. Okay. … (inaudible) Ndindiliyimana, but at page 224, referring to April 6th, the meeting of the officers, Dallaire says this. He says ‑‑ he is talking about Bagosora and he switches to Ndindiliyimana.
"I turned to Ndindiliyimana, who said he wanted to place gendarmerie guards at Radio Rwanda, the telephone exchange and the utilities and a few complexes. These were sensible sites to secure … that everything be coordinated with Kigali secteur under the rules of the KWSA agreement. Ndindiliyimana agreed.
I had always found his loyalties an enigma. Until now, I had assumed he is a friend of Bagosora."
And later, I direct -- on page 225,
"I directed Luc -- Luc Marshal -- to link up with Ndindiliyimana to work out the details of joint patrols and joint security of vital points."
And then later,
"Luc had worked out a comprehensive plan for joint patrols with Ndindiliyimana. The trouble was the plan called for a lot of Belgian troops to be moving around town at night, which I thought would be a provocation, so I asked them to cut back."
So isn't that an example where Ndindiliyimana on April 6th, 7th, was, indeed, cooperating with MINUAR or UNAMIR?
MR. JEGEDE:
Your Honours, I appreciate that counsel is doing his job trying to defend his client. But if he is reading from a book, like he's just done, he should do it faithfully. Now, he glossed over part of the reading which does not support his case. Counsel is not supposed to do that. So if you want the witness to comment, read the whole thing to her.
MR. BLACK:
Mr. President, I have referred to passages strictly referring to General Ndindiliyimana. There are three pages in between which have nothing to do with him. I don't want to waste the Court's time. And if my friend wants to point out something negative about General Ndindiliyimana in those two pages, let him point them out, because I am not aware of them.
MR. JEGEDE:
There is a portion where you refer to Ndindiliyimana as an enigma, that's in certain passages he did not read. He should read that part out.
MR. BLACK:
I read that part out.
"I always found his loyalty as an enigma and until now, I assumed he is a friend of Bagosora."
That is the end of the sentence.
BY MR. BLACK:
Q. So the fact that Ndindiliyimana and Dallaire and Luc Marchal agreed to setting up gendarme guards at certain key points together and that it wasn't the gendarmerie that cut back those patrols, it was General Dallaire, himself, would that not indicate that again ‑‑ would that not alleviate some of your concerns about his real role in somewhere, at least?
A. No, it would not because I knew of this and, as I said in my previous answer, it was not that he failed to make the promises but that he failed to deliver; and it may have been that concerns for UNAMIR forces led to a desire to reduce them on the side of General Dallaire. But I believe that even what was agreed to, what did get planned was not implemented on a number of occasions by the gendarmes who were supposed to be there.
Q. All right. In this same source, we have Ndindiliyimana working with Dallaire and Marchal, 6th and 7th. Ndindiliyimana and Marchal worked out the joint patrols and the guards, and Dallaire casts them back, not Ndindiliyimana, so that's my point. Just that simply by itself.
MR. PRESIDENT:
Counsel, I think the conduct of your client will be up to the people who associated with him. So it is easy to -- does it really matter for this witness to comment on that?
MR. BLACK:
Yes, because she's giving a report concerning all the gentlemen here. She is a historian and she ‑‑
MR. PRESIDENT:
Yes, she has to keep open as far as your person is concerned. So ‑‑
MR. BLACK:
Why not ask if I can't understand why it is open? (Microphones overlapping) … that is what my point is. I am trying to, maybe it could come my way, but maybe I won't succeed, but let me try it.
BY MR. BLACK:
Q. Again, at 292, he is speaking about the April 12th letter. He says this:
"That evening Brent -- [I think it is Major Beardsley] ‑‑ Brent brought me a copy of a communiqué, commandement des forces armèes Rwandaises. It pleaded for a face‑to‑face meeting between Rusatira (sic) and Kagame under UNAMIR auspices and was signed by Rusatira, Gatsinzi, five colonels and three lieutenant colonels of the RGF, including a liaison officer Ephrem Rwabalinda. They stated there had been too much killing, and they were submitting to an unconditional surrender as of 1200 hours tomorrow, April 13th. They wanted to establish the BBTG. I wondered why General Ndindiliyimana's signature was not on the communiqué, but I found out from him the next day that he had been stuck in Butare helping some Tutsis escape from the country and hadn't been able to get back in time to sign."
So the fact that at that time he told Dallaire ‑‑ and Gatsinzi says the same thing, that he was busy saving Tutsis. Wouldn't that indicate that he had no part in the plan to commit genocide and the willingness to become part of the plan, no toleration of such a plan? Wouldn't that be consistent again? I am sorry, it goes to the same formula, but we always have to do these things.
A. I believe, Counsel, virtually every person who had any form of power in Rwanda during this period saved someone, regardless of his or her stance, otherwise. So much as we should rejoice on every human life saved, I don't know that we can count that as an exclusive quality for General Ndindiliyimana. I am also somewhat puzzled by this reference to it being in Butare because my understanding was that on the 12th he was in Gitarama helping to establish the quarters and the security for the government's move from Kigali. Perhaps he went on to Butare, but it was my understanding that he was in Gitarama that day occupied with the installation of the interim government.
Q. Well, we can ask General Dallaire about that later, and General Ndindiliyimana, but the fact that he was helping Tutsis escape and was to be signatory, but couldn't get back in time, but that initiative by those other officers would indicate that, would it not, that he had no part of such a plan, had no intention to participate in such a plan, did not tolerate such a plan?
MR. PRESIDENT:
I think, Counsel, my understanding is that Dallaire is merely reporting what Ndindiliyimana told him.
MR. BLACK:
That's true. But it's also confirmed by Gatsinzi said the same thing. So they both support each other. It's very strange that Gatsinzi would say the same thing as ‑‑
MR. BÂ:
That is what he told them. That is what Ndindiliyimana told them.
MR. BLACK:
Yes, Mr. Bâ, it was confirmed by Marcel Gatsinzi. If you want to call Marcel Gatsinzi here to refute that, go ahead. I am quite willing to have him here. It is up to you. You can call him and if you don't call him, I guess you are not refuting.
BY MR. BLACK:
Q. On page 293 ‑‑ let me continue, Dr. Des Forges, just to continue our discussion.
MR. BÂ:
I am not opposed to you calling him. You can even do it by subpoenaing him.
MR. BLACK:
Mr. President, it is not for me to refute my own evidence. If he wants to refute it, he can call him. If he doesn't, he knows what the Canon law says about that.
MR. PRESIDENT:
He has exhausted his witnesses, Counsel.
MR. BLACK:
I guess it's not the number, I guess.
BY MR. BLACK:
Q. Page 293, General Dallaire says this ‑‑ well, he says this:
"So I faced three known extremist leaders: Bizimana, Bizimungu, Bagosora. And Ndindiliyimana, who was somehow hanging on to his job and was no match for the hardliners."
Doesn't that indicate that he was not, at least by Dallaire, considered to be one of the hardliners?
A. I think you will establish that, Counsel.
Q. Yes, I know, but I have to be (Microphones overlapping) ... so I only get this chance once. Excuse me.
At page 334, there is something that supports Ndindiliyimana's statement, Dallaire and Gatsinzi's letter, which I haven't gotten back yet.
MR. BLACK:
Can I get back that letter, please? Who has got that letter?
MR. PRESIDENT:
Mr. Black, they returned it to you.
MR. BLACK:
Okay. It is very important.
MR. BÂ:
Also with reference to the document you requested of us, our case manager has gone to check, but we have nothing else. The document we have stops at the same place as yours. I can provide you with a copy so that you can compare it. It is Dallaire's answers to the Prosecutor. It comes from what is known as a Belgian file and this is all we have.
MR. BLACK:
Thank you.
BY MR. BLACK:
Q. At page 334 Dallaire says, quote
"I had ‑‑ " [and the date of this was April 25th.] "I had a report from Gatsinzi that Ndindiliyimana was in the south actually helping people escape, and there existed a number of RGF officers who were disgusted with the way things were going."
And he recommended to New York that these moderates get some assistance. Would that again advance my case and alleviate some of your concerns about the role of Ndindiliyimana as of April 12th ‑‑ sorry, April 25th, Gatsinzi reports to Dallaire that Ndindiliyimana was in the south helping people escape?
MR. PRESIDENT:
What was Gatsinzi at that time, 25th of April?
MR. BLACK:
I am not sure because he was no longer commander of the army. He should be just reverting back to his function as head of the ETO school and the venue was ‑‑
MR. PRESIDENT: And if you remember that --
MR. BLACK:
I think he reverted back to that command.
THE WITNESS:
I think he was on temporary duty as a negotiator involved in various ceasefire initiatives.
BY MR. BLACK:
Q. Thank you. But again, maybe you heard about this, but would that not alleviate some of your concerns about the role of General Ndindiliyimana in late April?
A. If, in fact, it was established that he was saving lives in Butare on April 25th, that would be certainly useful information, but I don't yet have the proof of that.
Q. And the fact that Dallaire recommends to New York that these moderates, including Ndindiliyimana, should be provided with protection, it says:
"As they could prove to be useful in the post-crisis period."
I don't think New York would want to support people who are committing genocide, correct?
A. There were various attempts, I believe, to identify either political or military leaders who could be useful in the post-conflict period as legitimate officials, yes.
Q. Okay.
MR. BLACK:
Excuse me, I am just trying to find something else.
BY MR. BLACK:
Q. I have also here a statement by the Belgian ambassador, Johann Swinnen. And this is also disclosed by the Prosecution, it's a pro justitia statement and it is identified as the Belgian GBT, that was its code name for the ‑‑ no, sorry, Belgian government SWINJOH‑1. And he talks about many things, many personalities in the statements, and when he gets to Augustin Ndindiliyimana -- and he says the following.
MR. JEGEDE:
Your Honour, even if counsel is not showing the documents or he doesn't want to show it, as he's been doing, he should at least show it to the witness.
MR. BLACK:
I can show it to the witness. Let me read it on to the record, otherwise, it is not of any worth, because I am not going to file these documents.
And I apologise to the interpreters, I forgot to get a copy of it. Okay. He just says this:
"It is a general of the general staff of the national gendarmerie. He had been promoted to that rank very recently. Earlier, he had been minister of defence, minister of transport, and minister in the presidency. Ndindiliyimana was more specifically responsible for defence and security matters within that government. As chief of general staff he was ‑‑ or chief of staff, he was responsible for national security until my departure. I often had favourable comments on the conduct of the gendarmerie, and I do not want to generalise here. For example, UNAMIR was glad about the relatively good working relationship with the gendarmerie. I cannot make a categorical statement about the conduct of General Ndindiliyimana during the days following the assassination of the president. . . . I recall a very long conversation by telephone the night of the 6th to the 8th ‑‑ of the 7th or 8th or the 8th to the 9th of April, and during that conversation, he expressed his concerns as to the possible evacuation of the Belgians. He felt that an international presence would act as a deterrent that was needed beside the leaders and people of Rwanda so as to avoid reprisals on both sides. He was a member of the crisis committee that had been set up following the assassination of the president. He was also ‑‑ other members of that crisis were Colonel Gatsinzi. . . . You asked me -- or asked me whether the gendarmerie could have opposed the massacres perpetrated by the army, the Presidential Guard and militias of various parties. My knowledge of the relations between these various bodies or forces is not adequate enough for me to comment on the matter. One must not forget that there was total chaos in the country. It is hard to imagine to what extent disorder prevailed in Rwanda. No one knew who controlled what or how they did so. Ndindiliyimana was considered a wise man or well‑behaved, courteous, charming, but I do not know what his real authority was over the gendarmerie. He comes from the south, which was an important factor in the power dynamic within Rwanda. It is not impossible or inconceivable, as you requested of me or suggested to me, that he may not have been able to stop the massacres. I had very positive relations with him, both as minister and chief of staff of the gendarmerie. I viewed him as a pro‑Belgian. I noticed this during the joint commission meetings in terms of military and technical cooperation. I also remember his quick intervention or the quick and effective intervention or a favour of Belgian missionaries who had been arrested by the military."
So would that alleviate or put more on the scales or balance in his favour, the fact he had had a conversation with the Belgians asking them not to withdraw ‑‑ and this is on the night of the 7th or 8th or 9th, we don't know.
MR. JEGEDE:
Your Honour, the problem with what he has read is ‑‑ the portion he has read contains a lot of information. Now, he is trying to lump everything together and obtain the comments of the witness to a host of facts contained in that reading. So how does she respond to that?
MR. BLACK:
Well, I could give it to her and ask her just to assist.
MR. PRESIDENT:
(Microphones overlapping)
BY MR. BLACK:
Q. Just with respect to the conversation he had with Johann Swinnen, would that now indicate that he couldn't be part of any conspiracy or plan to commit genocide or crime against humanity when he is asking the Belgians,
"Don't leave, we need you here"?
MR. PRESIDENT:
I think this document also shows that the same contents that the witness says, that this person is also having concerns with regard to the place where ‑‑
MR. BLACK:
No, it doesn't say that, sir. What it says is, I can't ‑‑ he is a man, I can't say what he did after a certain date, I wasn't there. But what I know is this, he is not saying (inaudible) it is a slightly different thing, sir.
MR. PRESIDENT:
Yes.
BY MR. BLACK:
Q. But that conversation, and Swinnen is not sure whether it's 9th or 7th, or 8th or 9th, would that not again indicate that he is a man totally opposed to genocide or committing war crimes or anything else like that?
A. That could be one interpretation. There could also be the interpretation that he was simply seriously concerned and frightened by the people who have taken power and who appeared to be completely in a dominant position. You have to recall that on April 3rd or 4th, there was a report on radio RTLM about a supposed corps meetings of officers from the south supposedly linked to the prime minister and to the extent that Ndindiliyimana was identified as an officer of the south, although he was not present at this meeting. I think he had been put into a very difficult position and, of course, the people had shown -- the people who were taking power had shown themselves to be completely ruthless by the way they were eliminating anyone opposed to them. So one can understand that purely from an operational point of view, he would be anxious for the introduction of a community to remain in the country in order to minimise the killing of people like himself, as well as people of a different ethnic group. So I think it does reveal, probably ‑‑ no, I think it does reveal certainly a sincere desire for the international forces to remain there. The question is why?
Q. Why? I accept your point, but you said that he will ‑‑ if he was personally afraid, it would be because he was opposed to what people termed the hardliners, and he was opposed to their plans. So he may be in personal danger. That would be consistent with that, wouldn't it? So I think you would agree on that?
A. Yes, but people who are afraid would also do things that are against their inclination or their desire and they will, simply because they are afraid. It does not need ‑‑ prove decisively what his comportment was. It simply proves to me that he was probably, for a very good reason, afraid.
Q. All right. But he would only be afraid because he is opposed to the plans of others, correct? If he was in line with them, he would never ‑‑ have nothing to fear, wouldn't that be so?
MR. PRESIDENT:
Do you agree that there was a plan there? Do you agree that there was a plan, in your question?
MR. BLACK:
It doesn't prove there was a plan. It presupposes that his attitude would not be appreciated by certain others. Maybe his attitude regarding the tactics and the strategy of the war or the entire politics of the war. It has nothing to do with any planning of the genocide.
BY MR. BLACK:
Q. I will show you something else.
MR. BÂ:
Mr. Black, are you now pleading that there was fear? Are you putting forward a defence of fear?
MR. BLACK:
Madam Des Forges had suggested that he might be afraid. So I am, in my dialog with her, suggesting ‑‑ she was suggesting that he may be just making that phone call for just purely personal reasons.
MR. PRESIDENT:
(Microphones overlapping)
BY MR. BLACK:
Q. Now, I don't know, for my assistant is gone, I was going to go to two more documents, but there are exhibits here and I don't know the numbers. Anyway, perhaps I can give this to you.
I have a letter from ‑‑ you referred to Jean Kambanda from time to time. I shall need this one. When my assistant comes back, I will give you the number. We have a letter from ‑‑ or a statement from Jean Kambanda signed 23rd September 2003 from (inaudible) in which he talks about many things, but also General Ndindiliyimana. And it’s just two paragraphs, so I will read part of the paragraph ‑‑
MR. BÂ:
Mr. Black, is it the letter that Kambanda sent to your client, which you earlier raised here?
MR. BLACK:
Yes, sorry for that. Yes, sir, I think it is filed as an ID document, but I don't remember the number.
BY MR. BLACK:
Q. He says this on paragraph 9, on page 3:
"During my tenure I had no conflict with General Ndindiliyimana, and I can certify that he spared no effort to accomplish his mission, that is, to protect people and defend the territory, especially gendarmerie facilities. The gendarmerie protected people under threats in Kigali, Gitarama, Butare, and elsewhere in the country. It has the defects I raised in my earlier statements. As a result of the insufficient troops in the face of the RPF attacks, and the chaos the RPF brought on."
MR. BÂ:
(Inaudible)
BY MR. BLACK:
Q. Paragraph 11, since ‑‑
"from the 7th of April 1994, Ndindiliyimana suggested to General Dallaire that the RPF be brought to talks on the crisis, together with the Rwandan government forces, but the RPF refused to comply. Thereafter, using the bilateral manoeuvres, the RPF demanded negotiations with the military, which General Ndindiliyimana explained to the government." (Inaudible)
THE ENGLISH INTERPRETER:
Would counsel please repeat that?
BY MR. BLACK:
Q. "They later accepted, but the RPF dodged. I was also informed by my staff that General Ndindiliyimana was running a lot of risks or faced a lot of risks and threats to his life because of his positive attitude towards the restoration of peace, that is, when I decided to appoint him ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany so as to remove him from the danger."
Now, assuming that again is true, what he said, would that not again go to alleviate some concerns about his role during these events?
A. It is certainly useful to have the statement from Kambanda and to indicate his willingness to assist General Ndindiliyimana in getting out of the country. It does raise the question in my mind why it couldn't have been done sooner. He could have been sent abroad to make arms purchases or to engage in public relations activities or something else and then taken the occasion to stay abroad.
Q. Well, that would assume that he was trying to dodge responsibility. Maybe he was trying to perform as far as he could. But did you ever know that in the last weeks in March or so General Ndindiliyimana went to Brussels to speak with certain Belgian generals in order to ask them for further assistance in terms of reinforcements for the Belgian units, and also would they supply him with tear gas and other crowd control equipment in order to try and control events? Were you aware of that trip? He spoke to General Charlie and others and then went on to speak to the French generals about the same request?
A. It was my understanding that General Ndindiliyimana was, indeed, the person who had had those meetings with the Belgians -- I didn't know about the French -- and had made those requests, but I seem to recall that at one point he publicly disavowed my assertions and said that it had not been he, but my information was that, yes, it was he who had been the person who had had that meeting with the Belgians and had asked for help, basically.
Q. Which, again, goes to indicate that, at least, as far as he was concerned, he didn't have the necessary resources to ‑‑ for crowd control. But anyway --
I also have a document here which is filed as ID ‑‑ an identification document, a telegram from the Belgian foreign minister Willy Claeys, the later secretary general of NATO, in Flemish, and I have a -- basically, what it says is that ‑‑ but we still have to follow the official translation, but, generally, it says there is a demand for a visa for General Augustin Ndindiliyimana, this is, to get into Belgium when he is fleeing the country in June. And Willy Claeys says after a meeting with his cabinet and the minister of interior – I will read it in French.
MR. BÂ:
Sorry, Counsel Black. Did he escape from the country or was he appointed ambassador to Germany by the interim government? It’s not the same thing. Did he escape from the country or was he appointed extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador of Kambanda's government in Germany? What is it? When he left in June, he wasn't escaping; he was going to report to his position as ambassador, but the Germany government refused to accredit him there.
MR. BLACK:
We only heard your Prosecution witness (inaudible) testify that he had to flee the country, he left on June 17th into the Congo. And General Ndindiliyimana will state that and Kambanda will agree. As Kambanda's letter indicates, what we just read, you were not listening, he appointed him to that post in order to escape the country, that was the ruse to get him out of the country, to give him some papers to get him out.
Anyway, while he was in Kinshasa, he asked for permission to enter Belgium. The Belgian ambassador to Kinshasa sent this telegram, and I will read it in French:
"After consultations with the cabinet or the minister of the interior, I wish to bring to your attention that you may react positively or affirmatively to the visa request by the person concerned. The person concerned has always demonstrated that he is useful and in order or proper in his conduct towards Belgium. Consequently, during the period of war in Rwanda the person concerned did show that he was a friend of Belgium. In addition, he assisted a lot of Rwandans in finding secure shelter. He also assisted them in escaping from death."
And it continues:
"Please bring to the attention of the person concerned that investigations are being carried out or conducted on ten Belgian Blue Helmets."
It says that in that regard.
BY MR. BLACK:
Q. I can show this to you, but would that, again, go towards alleviating any concerns that the Belgian government viewed him as being a moderate and that he had saved people's lives, Rwandans' lives in Rwanda during that period?
A. Just for the purpose of the record, Counsel, that extract that you read must have been a telegram, I take it, from the Belgian foreign ministry to the ambassador in Kinshasa; is that correct?
Q. Yes, correct. And we also find here a ‑‑ I can't locate it, because my assistant is not here, but there is a very brief one‑paragraph letter from the Belgian ambassador in Kinshasa to Sabina airlines, stating the same thing, that he is well appreciated by the Belgians, please give him a place in the plane, basically. And are you also aware that when he arrived in Belgium, he was met by some very high personages and welcomed? Are you aware of that, when he arrived?
A. I am aware that General Ndindiliyimana was the object of special consideration from various Belgian officials for some period of time, yes. And I think the telegram speaks for itself, the first consideration for the Belgians was he was one of our supporters, he was helpful to us, so we should be helpful to him. And the second consideration was that he had saved lives. I don't take this as measurable to what was known before.
Q. All right.
MR. BLACK:
Excuse me, Mr. President, I can't find my document.
BY MR. BLACK:
Q. You would agree that the bulk of the gendarmerie came under -- in combat zones, those operational sectors came under the control of the army commanders who were there in command of those operational sectors, correct? That is your understanding of the situation?
A. In some cases, yes, but I do not know the exact numbers.
Q. Okay.
A. And in some cases, I believe it was even the contrary, having heard this morning testimony from Colonel Nsengiyumva that soldiers under his command were actually put at the disposition of the gendarmerie in Gisenyi. So there was obviously some movement back and forth of units, but I don't know the exact statistics.
Q. Okay. I have a state patent – an American a state patent, declassified document, in the same vein about General Ndindiliyimana, the first is dated January 1993 and referring to a column returning to the northern communes of Gisenyi, Ruhengeri and Kibuye and they said the following:
MR. JEGEDE:
Can we have the author of that document?
MR. BLACK:
Let me read it first and I will give it to you. It is from the American embassy in Kigali to the Secretary of State, Washington, priority, then various other embassies in Africa and the American embassy in Paris. This is after a week -- paragraph 2, after a week of violence that left --
MR. BÂ:
What is the date of the document?
MR. BLACK:
I have trouble reading these American code dates, but it is in January 1993, I think the 29th. Yes,
29th January 1993.
"After a week of violence that has left over 300 dead and up to 3,000 displaced" --
THE ENGLISH INTERPRETER:
Slowly, sir.
BY MR. BLACK:
Q. "ICRC protection teams",[ I guess that's the Red Cross], "have visited the affected areas, and gendarmes are making an effort to bring the situation under control. ICRC found the situation in Muhororo and Ngororero extremely difficult. The people are terrorised and the gendarmes had been slow to respond appropriately. An additional company of gendarmes has been sent to Ngororero to reinforce those already there. ICRC chief delegate Stacker met on 29th January with Rwandan gendarmerie head Augustin Ndindiliyimana, who expressed appreciation for ICRC's presence in the affected area and for the information ICRC is providing to him. As a result he is has deployed an additional company of gendarmes to Ngororero, Karere, Nyundo, Kanamakomi and an additional platoon to Giciye commune, G‑I‑C‑I‑Y‑E. . . . He said he has requisitioned additional vehicles from the ministry of agriculture and sent additional communication equipment into the area. Military police had been sent to the Ruhengeri préfecture, more gendarmes can be made available for the trouble spots in Gisenyi préfecture. ICRC said Ndindiliyimana has been receptive to those reports about where the gendarmes had been less than effective in quelling the violence. Comment: It will be a while before the figures would be complete under this unfortunate wake of violence. ICRC has performed its unique role effectively. The Rwandan Red Cross could not enter the area with any assurance of security. The gendarmerie appears to be trying with its limited means to make a positive difference."
Were you aware of that? Have you seen that document before? Were you aware of that document?
A. No, I had not seen that.
[1500H ]
Q. All right. Doesn't that, again, speak to the fact that they had limited resources and ‑‑ okay ‑‑ maybe slow to respond? But General Ndindiliyimana really is trying to do his best to ameliorate things and change things? They speak of his ‑‑ his act to requisition vehicles from the ministry of agriculture.
A. Two points there, Counsel. First of all, if you recall, I made a point very early on that the cases of violence against Tutsi were ‑‑ or political opponents, were ordinarily followed by official apologies and the excuse that the violence simply could not have been controlled for lack of resources. So this explanation given here by General Ndindiliyimana falls in that category. It was the same thing said by everyone, top to bottom, throughout a period of four years of violence, and it was the very same explanation that was put forward by the interim government during the height of the killing. So it's not to say that there was no ‑‑ no factual basis for it. Certainly, there was something of a factual basis, but, as you see ‑‑ and this is my second point ‑‑ when the urgency of saving lives was felt sufficiently, resources could be found. Maybe they had to be borrowed from the ministry of agriculture, but something could be done, if the will were there.
Q. Right. But the Belgian ambassador ‑‑ I mean ‑‑ sorry ‑‑ the American ambassador's appreciation and the International Red Cross's ‑‑ the International Red Cross said Ndindiliyimana has been receptive to its reports about whether gendarmes had been less than effective. And the American embassies's appreciation of the situation ‑‑ and they're on site ‑‑ is
"the gendarmerie appears to be trying, with its limited means, to make a positive difference".
So it doesn't seem to be ‑‑ from the ambassador's point of view, it's not a fake or a facade of trying. In their appreciation, he really is trying; wouldn't you agree?
A. Counselor, the violence began on the 22nd or 23rd. 300 people have been killed. 3,000 people have been displaced. It's a mighty slow response. How far is it from Gisenyi to the capital of Kigali? Two hours by road. How long would it have taken to move the necessary forces into Gisenyi and to have stopped it? 24 hours should have sufficed. Six days is too long. 300 lives is too long.
Q. Well, that may or may not be so. But you weren't on the ground. You don't know the difficulties they faced. And the American ambassador and his staff who are on site in Rwanda don't take that view, don't take the view that he did what he could. And, yes, they were slow. But now he's trying to send extra troops up there to try and control ‑‑ control events. So wouldn't you agree that, at least from the American embassy's point of view, he was really trying, if not yours?
A. The American embassy can speak for itself.
Q. Okay. Another one dated June 1993, 11th of June. And it's a commentary. It's from the ‑‑ again, American embassy, Kigali to Secretary of State, Washington. And they say ‑‑ they ask this question, paragraph 27:
"Are there positive forces for change within the armed forces? Post must note that our access to the officer corps, while good, is still limited. That group of officers considered to be hard‑liners has been especially inaccessible. In past experience, there are a number of good officers" ‑‑ [in their view ]‑‑ "who appear to believe that the changes before then can be positive for the military, or, at least, are not negative enough to be actively opposed. As an example, the current chief of staff of the gendarmerie, Colonel Ndindiliyimana, is widely considered to be an honest soldier‑politician. Since taking the unenviable job in June 1992, he has made significant progress in revamping the image of his force. While there are still several thousand rank‑and‑file gendarmes with no specialised training after boot camp, a good proportion of the 7,000‑strong force has been given specific police training with the goal of changing the mentality from one of, quote unquote, destroy the enemy to that of, quote unquote, protect the population. The chief of staff is having some success in removing his men from combat duties at the front and reinstituting discipline and is, perhaps, the most prominent senior military officer to be generally trusted by opposition parties."
Wouldn't that go, again, to alleviate some of your concerns that he really is trying to change the gendarmerie in the short time he was there, to make it more effective, with the resources that he had?
A. My concerns are not about General Ndindiliyimana's competence. I'm sure he was a competent officer. I'm sure he was committed to making the gendarmerie the best force that it could be under his direction, but that does not deal with the concerns that I have.
Q. Not even the phrase where it says
"the goal of changing it" ‑‑ "he had the goal of changing their mentality from one of destroy the enemy to that of protection of population".
Doesn't that help you lessen some of those concerns you have?
A. Counsel, if I were to base my conclusions on a chance phrase by a diplomat almost a year before the events, I think I would be a lightweight scholar indeed.
Q. But, nevertheless, this is a historical document which you can't ignore; and that's the American embassy's appreciation of him and his efforts at that time.
A. I think I give the American embassy staff due weight in considering their opinions.
Q. Okay. I have one dated 8th April 1994, where it says ‑‑ are you aware of this:
"Major General Ndindiliyimana is negotiating with UNAMIR General Dallaire and RPF elements at an undisclosed location. According to the embassy, the major general is professional and wants ‑‑
THE ENGLISH INTERPRETER: Slow, slow, sir.
BY MR. BLACK:
Q. I'll read it again ‑‑
"has taken control of the" ‑‑ sorry ‑‑ "Major Ndindiliyimana is negotiating with UNAMIR General Dallaire and RPF elements at an disclosed location. According to the embassy, the major general was professional, quote unquote, and wants an end to the fighting."
Would that not, again, indicate, since he wants an end to the fighting and he's willing to negotiate that he ‑‑ he ‑‑ he is opposed is to any plan to take ‑‑ make exactions against the Tutsi population?
A. It's difficult for me to read that into that statement. He was carrying on negotiations as an officer of the Rwandan armed forces at that point. Someone who was in opposition, clearly, to some of the other senior officers who were attempting to and eventually did take control of the armed forces, but that does not tell me anything more than what I previously knew. Again, it has to do with his comportment in the first days of April which, I think, has been relatively well documented.
Q. Okay. And I have one final one. It seems to be a briefing paper. It's not clear. I haven't got the title page. I got just part of it released, dated April 9th, maybe to the White House. I'm not sure. From the department of state. It just says ‑‑ regarding him, my client, that
"General Ndindiliyimana is well regarded by embassy Kigali, but his ability to assert his command over the troops is questionable."
THE ENGLISH INTERPRETER: Again, slow, sir.
BY MR. BLACK:
Q. And I ‑‑ I ‑‑ I haven't got this ‑‑ your reference -- with me because I couldn't find it today ‑‑ but I believe in one of the other trials you made reference to that, that Ndindiliyimana, at one point, even told you that he wasn't sure he even had a command around those first few days of April, but I'm not sure. But the American embassy is saying that. They're not sure he's actually got a command. Were you aware ‑‑
A. Are they ‑‑ are they saying he's not sure ‑‑
Q. Well, they ‑‑ they say his ability to assert his command over the troops is questionable, and that's a different thing.
A. Yeah.
Q. I agree with you.
A. Yeah, I think it's a different thing.
Q. But, at one point, did he not tell you that he ‑‑ during those early days, he wasn't even sure he had a command? Do you remember that reference? I think you said it somewhere, but I haven't got it with me so I can't put it to you. I may be wrong.
A. I'm sorry, Counsel. I don't recall that.
Q. Excuse me. I'm trying to find something here. Oh, okay. Thank you.
MR. PRESIDENT: Court is adjourned for 15 minutes.
(Court recessed from 1512H to 1534H)
MR. PRESIDENT: Yes, Counsel.
BY MR. BLACK:
Q. Do you agree with me that in those situations where gendarmes were requested by a préfet or a bourgmestre, in those circumstances, those gendarme units, when requested, came under the control of that civilian authority?
A. It seems to me that when I read the law, that that is what I said. I'm not a jurist, as we have established here. But my understanding is that that was the case, yes.
MR. BÂ: Objection, Mr. President. The law does not at all say so. They come under the disciplinary authority of their boss or their superior.
MR. BLACK: You can't say that. You're not the expert. She is. He can't give an answer in place of her. I'm asking her. She's the expert. Stop contradicting your own witness.
MR. BÂ: She's not a jurist. She's not an expert in law. We have all those provisions which we have distributed. Why are you putting questions of legal nature to her, whereas she's not a jurist?
MR. BLACK: If he's going to contradict his own witness, I suggest he withdraw right now and retract all ‑‑ and strike the whole thing. He just attacked his own witness.
MR. PRESIDENT: You must not solicit legal opinion from the witness.
MR. BÂ: She's not a jurist.
MR. BLACK: (Inaudible) she's an historian, which means ‑‑ a historian, Mr. President, is versed in all aspects of the history of the country ‑‑ social, political, economic, military, and everything else. That's what a historian does. You take into account everything.
THE WITNESS: If I had been allowed to complete my answer, I was going to say that the texts, whatever they say, are often irrelevant, given the conduct of the forces on the ground. So that the important thing, for me, at least, as a historian, is not to examine the texts, but to look at the way people behaved.
BY MR. BLACK:
Q. Well ‑‑ okay. But you say in the ‑‑ and I believe in the Butare case you testified, on page 25 -- you're asked that very question. The question was by the President of the Court.
MR. PRESIDENT: One second. Mr. Segatwa, for your information, the translation of the motion has been filed today, so please obtain a copy.
MR. SEGATWA: Mr. President, I'm grateful to the registry. They made available a copy to me, and I'll do my best to answer.
BY MR. BLACK:
Q. The President of the Chamber says ‑‑ puts his question, and then you give this answer. He ‑‑ he says:
"Now, having finished this reading, I would like to ask Dr. Des Forges a question in light of what she said yesterday. If I'm not mistaken, if you can inform me that you indicated to us that the bourgmestre had the possibility of directly obtaining, then, the forces that were under the authority of the prefect; is that right?"
And you say in response:
"What I stated was that, indeed, it did take place that there were affairs made by the bourgmestre directly to requisition the gendarmes and the gendarmerie. There was also an element which was reported to me by officials ‑‑ or officers, rather, within the national gendarmerie which I, myself, did not verify. But, in such situations, when the gendarmes are being or are requisitioned by the bourgmestre, they remain under the supervision of the civil authority, that is to say, the bourgmestre, until the time at which the bourgmestre then hands over the right to fire, and then it's up to the gendarmes themselves." So that was your response then. Would you agree ‑‑ you still take that position that if a préfet or a bourgmestre requisitioned gendarmes, those gendarmes came under those civilian authorities and took orders from them, although their pay and administrative (sic) rested with the gendarmerie itself?
A. Up until the point when they actually resort to the use of firearms. And I believe, at that point, that control then reverts to the gendarmerie officer.
Q. Well, but he's obeying ‑‑ if he's told to fire, how he fires and the tactics used are up to him, that just ‑‑ but the actual command is up to the bourgmestre or préfet; is that correct?
A. That was my understanding.
Q. All right. Thank you. Did you ever interview a man named Gaspard Ruhumuliza, minister of tourism, in your research?
A. No, I did not.
Q. Well, he gave a statement to the Prosecutor in which he quotes General Ndindiliyimana stated to him that on April 9th ‑‑ and it's not clear why but ‑‑ he did not know if he had the authority of a general ‑‑ a general anymore. And it's not explained why. I take it ‑‑ it's because he ‑‑
MR. JEGEDE: Can we have more details of that person?
MR. BLACK: Yeah. KO ‑‑ K0125163. It's an interview with your investigators, Melissa Cole (phonetic) and Luc Coté, June 3rd, 1996.
BY MR. BLACK:
Q. And I don't know why he ‑‑ why the general would have said that, but it could be for various reasons. But if that was his point of view, would that assist you in ‑‑ in any concerns you have of a ‑‑ about his capacity to do anything?
MR. PRESIDENT: What is the date that you mentioned?
MR. BLACK: That statement was alleged by ‑‑ to Minister Ruhumuliza on April 9th.
MR. PRESIDENT: 8th or 9th?
MR. BLACK: 9th. It's R‑U‑H‑U‑M‑U‑L‑I‑Z‑A.
THE WITNESS: It was, as I said, a period of considerable dynamism, if you can put it that way, fluidity in power dynamics. And it's not surprising that any one person, particularly in those first three or four days, was not sure, in the end, how it was going to shake out and particularly someone like General Ndindiliyimana, who came from a part of the country that was generally not favoured by those people who were taking control.
MR. PRESIDENT: Is that the date on which the interim government was installed?
MR. BLACK: I think that was correct. I think it was the 8th or the 9th. That's correct.
THE WITNESS: It was on the 9th.
BY MR. BLACK:
Q. I got some other references where you confirm facts about Rusatira and Ndindiliyimana, but I won't go through them again. I won't burden you with that. Just one other document that I want to put to you about him. It's a ‑‑ well, actually, I don't even see it. It's the notes or minutes of a meeting, dated January 18th, a meeting with the minister of defence directed by ‑‑ or chaired by General Ndindiliyimana for action in face of demonstrations between the MRND and CDR ‑‑ on the 19th ‑‑ proposed for the 19th of January, and this meeting takes place on the 18th of January 1993. And in it he discusses what ‑‑ the attitude the gendarmes should take toward the demonstrators. I could show it to you, but he states this at the second to last paragraph. He says ‑‑ sorry, it's in French ‑‑
"The security forces must bear in mind that political problems can only be resolved by politicians. It is in this framework that the conduct of the gendarmes must be characterised by neutrality."
Would that also go to alleviate any concerns you might have about his attitudes and intentions in 19 ‑‑ April ‑‑ April 6 and on?
A. This was a meeting between General Ndindiliyimana and ‑‑
Q. His ‑‑ I can give you the names of people there. There was the G3, Major Rwarakabije, Major Hategekimana, Major Bararwerekana, Captain Havugiyaremye, Captain Nsazabera, Captain Habyarimana, and Lieutenant ‑‑
MR. PRESIDENT: Slowly, Counsel.
MR. BLACK: Sorry. Sorry.
MR. PRESIDENT: Spell those names, I think.
MR. BLACK: Okay. Rwarakabije, R‑W‑A‑R‑A‑K‑A‑B‑I‑G‑E ‑‑ J‑E. Hategekimana, H‑A‑T‑E‑G‑E‑K‑I‑M‑A‑N‑A. Do you want the rest? Major Bararwerekana, B‑A‑R‑A‑R ‑‑ looks like ‑‑ W‑E‑R‑E‑K‑A‑N‑A. Havugiyaremye is H‑A‑V‑U‑G‑I‑Y‑A‑R‑E‑M‑Y‑E. Captain Nsazabera is N‑S‑A‑Z‑A‑B‑E‑R‑A. Captain Habyarimana is H‑A‑B‑Y‑A‑R‑I‑M‑A‑N‑A, and Bizumuremyi, who took the notes, is B‑I‑Z‑U‑M‑U‑R‑E‑M‑Y‑I.
BY MR. BLACK:
Q. I'd like to show you this document, if you wish.
MR. JEGEDE: Can we have the rank of Bizumuremyi?
MR. BLACK: Yes. I'll tell you who they were. Rwarakabije was the G3.
MR. JEGEDE: Yeah.
MR. BLACK: Hategekimana was from office of bureau de trois. Bararwerekana was commander of battalion PM ‑‑ I don't know ‑‑ police militaire. Okay. Havugiyaremye is captain, group Kigali ‑‑ commander, group Kigali. Nsazabera represents the command of the SR company. Habyarimana was representing the command of the 5th battalion, and Bizumuremyi was representing the command mobile (French spoken).
BY MR. BLACK:
Q. And it was the attitude the gendarmes should take in the face of the demonstrators in various situations, what they should do if things were out of hand or peaceful and so on. But his paragraph where he speaks about the gendarmerie or (unintelligible) ‑‑ trying to respect and be ‑‑ remain neutral and politics should be left to politicians. Doesn't that also support the fact that he would ‑‑ his good attitude and good intentions?
A. The struggle between political parties, as I have described, often resulted in violence on a partisan basis. It was a major concern that, on occasion, gendarmes were less than neutral. And I think particularly Lieutenant Bizimuremyi had the reputation of someone who was active in breaking up opposition party meetings. So I would suppose that this was, in that context ‑‑ it was before the major ethnic violence of January 1993 that we were talking about before the break. And so I would suppose that the concern was to ensure or attempt to ensure that the gendarmes were ‑‑ conducted themselves appropriately in the context of political party rivalries, and that, of course, is ‑‑ is a laudable goal. I don't know that it has any particular relationship to the events of April 1994 except to the extent that that also was an event of ‑‑ of highly charged political significance.
Q. Now, did you ‑‑ were you aware of and did you follow or observe in any way the refugee hearing concerning General Ndindiliyimana in Brussels in 1998, I believe?
A. I may, at one point, have seen some of the information related to that hearing, but I don't recall anything specific.
Q. Well, I have ‑‑ perhaps I can give it to you and you can read ‑‑ it's ‑‑ it's a 14‑page document, and I can give you a copy. Perhaps you can follow me.
MR. BÂ: Mr. Black, what document are you referring to?
MR. BLACK: Well, my assistant is not here. Maybe I could defer this until he comes back, because I can't handle it by myself. I might jump to another subject. But what I want to do is come back to ‑‑
MR. PRESIDENT: If you want extra copies, we can get him to put ‑‑
MR. BLACK: I have copies. I just don't know where they are in this pile of paper here. I don't know where my assistant's gone so ‑‑
MR. BÂ: Mr. Black, what document is that?
MR. BLACK: This is the decision of the commission permanente de recours des réfugiés in Brussels, the decision concerning his refugee status in which they canvass all the accusations he now faces before this tribunal and reject them all.
MR. BÂ: There were two decisions. There were two decisions. The final decision.
MR. BLACK: And I want to go into some detail, but I don't have copies to give everybody. Perhaps I can come back to that later.
BY MR. BLACK:
Q. Or, Dr. Des Forges, if you want, I can give a copy you could read this evening and we could talk about it tomorrow. It might save some time, if that would be acceptable to you?
A. That's fine.
Q. All right. I'm going to give you a marked‑up copy. Just ignore the markings. Come to your own conclusions.
MR. JEGEDE: I would like a copy too so I can ‑‑
MR. BLACK: Professor Sindayigaya is not with me, so I don't know where ‑‑ where he's placed them. It'd take ten minutes to find them, but I'll waste court time.
BY MR. BLACK:
Q. Are you aware that several witnesses have come here and testified for the Prosecution that, in fact ‑‑ gendarmes, in fact, did save people in certain places? You're aware that gendarmes, in certain places, did protect refugees, correct; and civilians ‑‑ Hôtel Mille Collines, various churches and various places and so on and so forth?
MR. PRESIDENT: She had not gone through the evidence or the witness statements.
BY MR. BLACK:
Q. No. And, from your knowledge, Dr. Des Forges, although there were allegations that gendarmes committed crimes in certain places, it is also known that gendarmes protected people in other places; isn't that correct?
A. That is correct.
Q. All right. Let me come back to the entire subject later. Let's go back to the beginning. When you were working for the Peace Corps in 1963 ‑‑
A. Excuse me, Counsel. I never worked for the Peace Corps.
Q. Oh, you didn't?
A. Never.
Q. Okay. I'm mistaken. So when you were ‑‑ when you ‑‑ well, not working ‑‑ when you were in Tanzania in the refugee camps in 1963, for which agency were you there? I thought it was part of Peace Corps with Sergeant Shriver.
A. No. It was ‑‑ a small group of approximately 20 university students, most of whom were working to establish a secondary school in Dar es Salaam for South African refugees and two of whom were placed in a refugee camp with Rwandan refugees. I was one of the two.
Q. Okay. And you said in chief that you never discussed with the refugees there ‑‑ mainly Tutsi ‑‑ how they happened to come there, what happened to them.
A. I don't know that I said that I never discussed it. I think I said ‑‑ and perhaps we could look at the record to be sure ‑‑ but I think I said I was too ignorant to appreciate the opportunity to really understand the history of the region, that my knowledge was superficial, and that what I learned was superficial.
Q. All right. But you did talk to the people there, though, what had happened to them in Rwanda and how they ended up in a refugee camp.
A. To the best of my recollection, those discussions were very few and very ‑‑ very limited.
Q. But, nevertheless, they must have told you something. And I put it to you that you had a history degree at that point, did you not, in 1963 or ‑‑
A. No, I did not.
Q. You were on your way to getting one.
A. I was an undergraduate.
Q. All right. But you were studying history?
A. I was studying history, but my knowledge, at that point, was limited, unfortunately, to the history of Europe and the history of North America. I knew virtually nothing about Africa or Asia.
Q. And you're an intelligent lady, obviously, and you must have ‑‑ with a bent for history, you must have asked questions about "How did you get to be in this camp? What happened to you in Rwanda? What happened?" And they must have told you their ‑‑ their point of view, what had happened to them; correct?
A. My recollection was dealing with issues like "how do we get enough water to drink today" and "is there another book that could possibly be used for these schoolchildren?" It was not a time of reflection or historical analysis for me. As I say, I was too ignorant. I was struggling too hard to keep my head above water, in terms of preparing classes. I had never taught before, and I was quite overwhelmed with the medical needs of the refugees, for which there was absolutely no assistance.
Q. But, at some point, you must have had coffee when you're eating meals with these people from time to time ‑‑ or just when you're attending to them in the dispensary, you must have had some conversations about what happened in Rwanda and how they got there.
A. The majority of the people in the refugee camp spoke only Kinyarwanda. The numbers of people who spoke English was, I believe, none. The number of people who spoke French was, perhaps, a dozen. So that gives you an idea of how limited the conversations were.
Q. But, nevertheless, you did have conversations about what had happened to them and how they became refugees, either through interpreters or from what you could pick up. You were there three months, I thought.
A. There were no interpreters. We worked morning till night. I honestly do not recall any conversations of historical content. There was ‑‑ I had a general sense that these refugees were here as the result ‑‑ or were there as the result of political upheavals in Rwanda, but that was, I believe, based, as much as anything, on the information provided by Oxfam ‑‑ the ‑‑ and particularly the Oxfam agent who had requested that we go and work in this camp. I don't know that I ever attempted to learn anything very specific from anyone of the refugees.
Q. And who was in charge of the camp?
A. Hm.
Q. I mean, you don't have to name the person, but was there some sort of official with the group you were serving with there who could speak to the refugees there?
A. No. There were two of us, a fellow student and myself. She knew, perhaps, even less than I did. She was a biology major. There was a Tanzanian official who was the person in charge of the camp who would appear every now and again with the rations for distribution, but I don't recall ever having any conversation with him, except concerning his attempt to engage in sexual harassment of two of the young Rwandan women. If anything, it was the teachers in the community, I believe, who ‑‑ who were what you would describe as the opinion leaders, perhaps. And I believe there were ‑‑ there was probably also another person who was officially the Rwandan leader of the camp, but I honestly do not remember any name or face.
Q. But, nevertheless, your ‑‑ whatever your limited communication you had with these refugees, it was enough to spark your studying the region when you got back to America and switching your studies?
A. The entire experience was such as to convince me of the importance of studying the history of Africa. It was not on the basis of one or another conversation, but simply the experience of being in a completely different culture and attempting to understand what was happening.
Q. Okay. Now, your thesis is that ‑‑ your analysis of the events as ‑‑ as you know them, in Rwanda, for April 6 ‑‑ April 6, 1994, (inaudible) that there was a plan of some sort by some people ‑‑ of some officials to exterminate Tutsis on a grand scale; is that correct?
A. Roughly speaking, yes. Very roughly.
Q. All right. I'm going to put something to you that ‑‑ did you ever meet with Madeleine Albright at any time? I think you mentioned her once.
A. I met once with Madam Albright.
Q. She gave an interview to the BBC on November 9th, 2003, and the question was:
"Which of the many issues that you dealt with are you least proud of?"
And her answer was: ‑‑ I'll try and go slowly. I haven't got one ‑‑ a copy for the translators ‑‑ but I won't read the entire paragraph because ‑‑ I'll get to the main sentence. She says ‑‑ she talks about the UN and her government not doing much:
"I got ‑‑ and I got them changed somewhat, but, in the end, we didn't accomplish anything. I thought about this so much, though I think that we, being the international community in this case, could have gotten our forces there in time to stop what was, basically, a volcanic explosion of anger that led to genocide. But I wish, for my own soul, that we had argued more."
So her view was contrary to yours. It wasn't a plan. It was a volcanic explosion of anger by the population.
A. Counsel, to the best of my knowledge, Madeleine Albright has not studied the history of Rwanda. She has many good qualities, I'm sure, but she is not a historian. And I doubt that she is even very well informed or would claim to be well informed about Rwanda. What she was almost certainly reflecting was the common explanation of the time, particularly among diplomats who sought to avoid responsibility, and that common explanation was "This is an uncontrollable force, and we can do nothing about it."
Q. And yet you're not aware, in your research, of any single written order, communiqué, or any other document from any other government official to any other government official, army or gendarme unit instructing them to kill Tutsis, are you?
A. I'm not terrifically well versed in the history of the Holocaust, but I don't know that any such document exists for the extermination of the Jews either.
Q. All right.
A. I think that's the kind of thing one is unlikely to find, and the planning, to the extent that it was committed to paper and has not been destroyed ‑‑ and I would not exclude the significant destruction of documents ‑‑ I believe, can be traced through the chain of documentation that we have ‑‑ that I have developed here before this Court. I think it's rather remarkable that we have established a paper trail to the extent we have, because, at the start, not all of those documents were available to us.
Q. Well, the ‑‑
A. Many ‑‑ many are still, unfortunately, in the possession of some of the actors and are coming out bit by bit, so let's hope, over time, we'll be able to construct a fuller picture.
Q. But we're not in ‑‑ in this trial engaged in a historical debate or analysis. We're engaged in a criminal trial. And the Prosecution ‑‑ (inaudible) ‑‑ the Prosecution has yet to provide, in this Chamber, any documentation whatsoever, not one order, not one communiqué, not one radio intercept or signal or minutes of meetings or anything where an order is given by the high command of the army or any government official to lower commands to massacres and kill Tutsis or so‑called Hutu moderates? Don't you think that's a big gap and a puzzling one, as a historian?
A. Well, in addition to the remarks I just made previously, it is my understanding that there is at least one communications intercept, which, unfortunately, is in the possession of the United States government, which will not release it, that would, in fact, be quite conclusive proof. And, as I say, perhaps over time, as things become declassified, we'll have the opportunity to add additional detail. But I believe that the framework is sufficient as it stands, and, of course, that depends on the appreciation of the Court.
Q. I thought somewhere you said, in testimony or one of the your reports, that you had listened to radio intercepts, transcripts of radio intercepts; is that true? Did I hear correctly?
A. No.
Q. Okay.
A. I referred to the same ‑‑ probably the same radio intercept that I was referring to. I have not, myself, seen it or heard it, but it was described in a scholarly article by Alan Kuperman, I believe.
Q. (Microphones overlapping)
A. Yes. Spelled K‑U‑P‑E‑R‑M‑A‑N. Alan, A‑L‑A‑N.
Q. But you do refer to the fact, I believe, as Mr. Kuperman does ‑‑ or Dr. Kuperman that the American military intercepted or monitored all radio communications in Rwanda during that period and focussed or set their satellites to take photographs of the ground during this period of time; correct?
A. That is correct. And I have some of those photographs which makes me believe that the rest of the Kuperman's information is likely also to be credible.
Q. But don't you think it establishes the inverse ‑‑ the inverse ‑‑ the obverse, because those documents have not been released and provided to the Prosecution here that, in fact, they don't prove, they don't establish what they allege happened, that that's why they're not being released and produced here in trial to support their case? Couldn't you conclude that?
A. That is one possible conclusion, but, of course, you know as well as I, that people are reluctant to take responsibility for their failure to act or to take responsibility for their actions which are inappropriate. And I would suppose that those American officials who are in possession of this kind of intercept would be very reluctant to let it be publicly known, because that would, indeed, conclusively establish their refusal to act in the face of massive killing of civilians that they knew about.
Q. Have you investigated the ‑‑ let me ask you this: You admit the RPF attacked and wanted to seize power by military means and that their excuse or justification for the offensive on the April 6th, 7th to save Tutsis was ‑‑ was not a front ‑‑ a cover for their real motivation, which was to seize power. Is that correct? I think that's what you said yesterday.
A. What I said was that their primary ‑‑ that their priority appeared to be winning the military victory and that saving civilian lives was clearly secondary to that.
Q. Have you read Wayne Madsen's book “Genocide and Covert Operations in Africa 1993‑1999”? He was a former national security agency intelligence officer at one time and now does a lot of research and writing. Have you read that book? It's quite detailed.
MR. JEGEDE: What's the name again?
MR. BLACK: It's called “Genocide and Covert Operations in Africa 1993‑1999”. Actually, it should be "CIA Operations in Africa".
THE WITNESS: I have read some articles by Mr. Madsen which seem to me not serious efforts of scholarship. I have not read his book.
BY MR. BLACK:
Q. Well, I had a copy once, but somebody took it. It was quite scholarly. It had lots of footnotes and was 540 pages. And he puts forward the thesis in that book that the American government intended to assassinate in that plane, not only President Habyarimana, but also President Mobutu and President Daniel Arap Moi of Kenya at the same time. But they were warned off by General Imran Kombe, the Tanzanian chief ‑‑ the Tanzanian army intelligence here, who was also at the meeting to shoot ‑‑ to arrange the shoot‑down of the plane. Are you aware of that, that thesis?
A. Well ‑‑
Q. The thesis.
A. I think we could ‑‑ we would, first of all, need the exact information to proceed to a careful analysis. But, to begin with, neither Mobutu or Arap Moi was in Tanzania at that point. Of course, I suppose if you carry your conspiracy theory to the ultimate, you could say that they were supposed to attend, but didn't attend. But, then, why go ahead with shooting down the plane, if they weren't in it? I mean, it's a waste of resources, if that's your intention.
Q. Habyarimana was also a target and the ‑‑ and the Burundian president.
A. Well, you know, the problem with this stuff is if you ‑‑ if you look at the communications of the Rwanda army ‑‑ and I'm thinking particularly of a letter from Nsengiyumva, the head of the military intelligence, he identifies the United States as one of the prime supporters of the Habyarimana government. Now, Colonel Nsengiyumva was not a stupid man, and he was somebody who followed the intelligence scene with ‑‑ with a certain ‑‑ a certain attention to detail. So how could he have been so mistaken if the United States was really intent? And what about all of those Rwandan military officers who were trained in the United States, far more than the number of the RPF? I mean, it just ‑‑ the historical facts do not fit, no matter how much you hate the United States.
Q. Who me? I don't hate the United States.
A. Well, there are times when, I must say, there are those of us who have the misfortune of being American citizens who feel that way, but that's beside the point.
Q. Well, I was born in Britain. And when I was a boy ‑‑
MR. PRESIDENT: Fourth theory, Counsel.
MR. BLACK: ‑‑ Britain ruled the world, and everybody hated the British.
MR. PRESIDENT: You know, I was thinking that is the fourth theory now about the plane.
MR. BLACK: No. No. It's part of the same theory. I'm not sure, Your Honour. Let me get to that.
BY MR. BLACK:
Q. Aren't you aware that Judge Bruguière's report states that the CIA was heavily implicated in the shoot‑down of that plane, because the missiles were assembled in a hangar at the airport rented by a CIA Swiss front company? That's contained in Bruguière's report.
A. Ooh, can you give me a copy?
Q. Nobody's got a copy. It's already been leaked in Le Monde, as you know.
A. Oh, but that isn't Le Monde. Where do you get that from? That's ‑‑ that's a wholly new aspect that I haven't seen anywhere.
Q. And Boutros‑Ghali made a statement to Robin Philpot last year that he spoke to Bruguière and Bruguière confirmed that the CIA was heavily implicated in the shootdown of the plane, and Boutros‑Ghali made that statement public last year.
A. Can we have a copy?
Q. I could find it later. It's somewhere at my house. I can bring it to you. It's very interesting. I'll show it to you.
A. I would like to see it.
Q. So ‑‑ and do you know why Lieutenant Colonel Vukovic (phonetic) came from Cameroon -- American army colonel, to ‑‑ to Kigali, on April 5th? Any idea?
A. No. It's a total mystery to me. I suppose it was described as part of his ordinary tour of duty, but I don't know. The thing that's so remarkable is that the contacts I have with people at the US embassy, all I can say is if this was a CIA plot, their fellow employees of the US government must be very angry with them, because they were totally clueless; and I suppose it is conceivable for the CIA to plot to assassinate the president of a country without the diplomatic representatives of the US government in that country being aware. But if you ‑‑ if you read the totally open and frank exchange of diplomatic correspondence at the time, the evidence is clear that the people on the ground, representing the US government, did not know if there were, in fact, such a plot being carried out. And that just seems to me a little improbable, even given the problems between intelligence agents and ordinary diplomats. But still it seems a little unlikely, doesn't it, that nobody in the embassy would know?
Q. Well, I'll tell you. Ambassador Flaten testified here ‑‑ and will testify for General Ndindiliyimana ‑‑ and he said that when he went back to the states after his tour of duty was over and events began happening in ‑‑ in ‑‑ in Rwanda, he felt he was deliberately cut out of the loop and was ‑‑ and they were ‑‑ and certain people were hiding things from him and certain department of state officials, that there were two things going on at the same time. A normal, friendly face to Rwanda, but behind the scenes, there was another group with some other agenda. So you might be right.
A. I ‑‑ I could ‑‑ I could, you know ‑‑ I mean, I could accept that ‑‑ that there were divisions, because that is not infrequent for different power factions to develop in a government, but that one of those divisions would be empowered to actually assassinate foreign heads of state? Remember this is the Clinton years, when Clinton had adopted a policy against assassinating foreign heads of state.
Q. Uh‑huh.
A. And this would be the only case, I think, that could be raised. And then you would have to say, "Why? Out of all of the enemies that the US perceived itself to have at that point, why would they choose Rwanda to be the one case of someone where ‑‑ the one case where they violate Clinton's rule and actually assassinate the head of state? Why ‑‑ why in heaven's name would they do it?
Q. It's all about the Congo; right?
MR. PRESIDENT: By the way, Counsel, you have there suggested a motive to eliminate all these foreign presidents.
MR. BLACK: Yes. To control the resources of central Africa and the Congo. It's worth trillions and trillions and trillions and trillions.
THE WITNESS: The problem ‑‑
BY MR. BLACK:
Q. The mining interests of gold, American Mineral Fields, the royal family in Britain, George Bush, Bill Clinton all have shares in these mining companies.
A. I don't know about Clinton. Bush? Sure. But it wasn't Bush's presidency.
Q. Well, I ‑‑
A. And if this was going to happen, why didn't it happen under George Bush? And I think the focus on Africa, if you look at trade statistics and so on and so forth, would indicate that the US really has relatively ‑‑ or at that time ‑‑ relatively little interest in Congo or in Africa generally. Its focus was elsewhere in the world.
Q. Did you follow the congressional hearings by Cynthia McKinney where the evidence was contrary to that, that the American government and mining interests were heavily involved in what happened in Rwanda?
A. Evidence of what nature presented by whom? Let's see that.
Q. Did you follow those hearings or not?
A. And I'd like to see the evidence presented here.
Q. So you're aware of what was said at those hearings?
A. I am generally aware of them, yes.
Q. All right. And that's what was alleged by certain witnesses?
A. Alleged. Alleged. Yes. Not proven.
MR. JEGEDE: I think we are going too fast. Still, we are enjoying the exchange, but you are going too fast for ‑‑ and for the reporters.
BY MR. BLACK:
Q. Have you seen the copy of what is known as the "Hourigan report", about the shootdown of the plane?
A. I have. At least, I believe that what I have seen is what is known by that name, yes.
Q. All right. And you're aware, then, that Michael Hourigan and (inaudible) and others met with the shootdown team, all RPF, and identified to Louise Arbour that it was the RPF who shot down the plane? You're aware of that being contained in this document; correct? I have a copy here. It's sort of dirty now.
MR. JEGEDE: Your Honours, it's no longer the US anymore? I thought you said the US shot down the plane. Now it's the RPF.
MR. BLACK: Well, you're not listening, Mr. Jegede. The RPF can't work alone. Who's supplying the missiles? Who's supplying the money?
BY MR. BLACK:
Q. But let me get to that before we get to this thing. The RPF attacks from Uganda, who's supplying the money?
A. Well, according to Nsengiyumva's analysis, the chief ‑‑ the chief culprit in that situation was the UK, not the US.
Q. Right. And Britain still supplies 60 per cent, I believe, of Rwanda's external aid; correct ‑‑ or something around that figure?
A. No. No. No.
Q. I got that from a British official, but maybe I'm wrong.
A. I think it's a bit high.
Q. Okay. But it's a large amount?
A. It is a large amount.
Q. And the multiple invasions and attacks by the RPF needed lots of ammunition, lots of weaponry, lots of resources. And we have lots of information, which I'll put to you later that that came from the Ugandan army. But who supplied the Ugandan army with the money and the resources to pass it on to the RPF? Wouldn't it be Britain and the United States?
A. As I say, the Rwandan analysis at the time, I believe, was the UK, not the US. And I think the work that was done by the arms division of Human Rights Watch is fairly conclusive about the importance of Uganda as the supplier of arms and ammunition to the RPF so I, myself, am prepared to accept that.
Q. Okay. Now, this ‑‑
A. Maybe we can save some time that way ‑‑
Q. Sure ‑‑
A. ‑‑ if I accept it. Maybe we don't have to go into it.
Q. That's fair enough. Now, this Hourigan report, so‑called ‑‑ it's got another ‑‑ that's what I call it ‑‑ is dated August 1st, 1997. When did you first become aware of that or see it? Do you remember?
A. No, I don't remember. I don't remember if it was ‑‑ even if I was still working on the book or after that so ‑‑ probably sometime in '98 or '99, not ‑‑ not immediately after it, but close enough after it that Hourigan was still on the public scene, which, I think, he isn't so much anymore.
Q. Let me just read to you ‑‑ for the record ‑‑ it's not in the record yet. If you bear with me. Paragraph 4 says this ‑‑ and they refer to the genocide, which I don't like ‑‑ I'm sorry.
MR. PRESIDENT: When you refer to a name, please spell it.
BY MR. BLACK:
Q. "Of course, the genocide occurred on the evening of the April 6" ‑‑ "April 6, 1994, with the shooting down of the presidential jet returning from Arusha" ‑‑ he got that wrong anyway ‑‑ "President Habyarimana, the president of Burundi, and other leading officials were killed. It was first thought that extremists inside his family circle were involved. Now, our investigators" ‑‑ that's Tribunal investigators ‑‑ "have found three sources in the current Tutsi regime who say that they were part of an elite strike team known as "The Network". And with the assistance of a foreign government shot down the presidential aircraft. They advise that Major General Paul Kagame was the overall operations commander, and they provided accurate descriptions of the operation, together with names, ranks, and roles of each soldier involved. They also advised that they can produce hard‑copy documents of the operation. . . . This information fitted in with claims by the Hutu extremists" ‑‑ as he terms it ‑‑ "that the RPF killed the President. Two of the sources wanted to cooperate with investigations if their safety could be guaranteed. The information request was raised with Judge Arbour. And although she was, at first, very positive, she later advised that this issue was not within the ICTR mandate and would not be investigated."
" . . . But I'm told by Jim Lyons, an FBI agent who worked on that same team, that he was told by her that she stopped it on instructions from the American ambassador in Kigali."
So you've read that, in that report; correct?
A. The part you just referred to, it should be clear on the record, was not part of the report. Your reference to Mr. Lyons ‑‑
Q. That's correct. It's not in the report.
A. And I think ‑‑ I'd be rather surprised that he went so far as to put it quite so baldly as that. I know he expressed to me, at some point, some concern that his telephone conversation or Hourigan's telephone conversation with Judge Arbour had been conducted in the US embassy over a secure line and ‑‑ or supposedly secure line. And his concern was that, somehow, this had ‑‑ had a negative effect on ‑‑ on the desire for an investigation. I don't know that to be a fact, but I think it's important to put on the record that this was a deduction he made from, as far as I can tell ‑‑ from the fact that the telephone call was placed from within the American embassy.
Q. Well, having ‑‑ having then ‑‑ having taken this into account, that the Tribunal investigators themselves met with part of the shootdown team ‑‑ and since that shootdown killed a number of people, important people, two heads of state, which would be a war crime, if you say the war started that day, which I say it does ‑‑ that would be a war crime ‑‑ shooting ‑‑ killing a head of state ‑‑ why haven't you called for the prosecution of Kagame and the others and an investigation as to who that foreign government was so they can be prosecuted as well before the Tribunal, since that would be a war crime within the Tribunal's mandate?
A. You see, that's my problem with you lawyers. I have ‑‑ I have raised this issue with a fair number of lawyers, and I have gotten two very different readings on this. And one of them would conform, I suppose, to the theory adopted by Judge Arbour at that time. The mandate of the Tribunal ‑‑ and you'll have to bear with a layperson's reading here ‑‑ is genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. Shooting down the aeroplane, as you say, presumably would fall under the category of war crimes, rather than anything else. But the question is: If there had been a peace treaty signed on August 4th, as there was, there was, in fact, no state of war. The shooting down of the aeroplane could presumably be described as the initial act of a state of war, but if at the time the missile was fired, there was no state of war, was it, in fact, a war crime?
Now, I don't want to argue this with you, because I'm certainly not going to take the position that this is a rational and justified argument, because to me, it's a little bit of nonsense. But I do have to bring to the attention of the Court that legal authorities who have no desire to favour the RPF have told me that, in fact, the decision not to prosecute this crime is a justified one. But, be that as it may, I have attempted on many occasions to encourage investigation into this crime and prosecution for it. But I'll tell you, you lawyers are not very easy on these points of detail.
Q. Well, it appears that Madam Arbour, who was, by the way, my professor ‑‑
MR. JEGEDE: Your Honours, I'm objecting to this line of questioning.
MR. BLACK: Oh, boy.
MR. JEGEDE: We've gone off on a tangent now completely, and we're dealing with side issues. We are dealing with collateral issues, which have nothing to do with matters in controversy before Your Honours.
MR. PRESIDENT: That is correct, Counsel. I think it is ‑‑ unless you put two or three questions and get on to ‑‑
MR. BLACK: Yeah, I'm going to go on. But my ‑‑ it's not collateral from our point of view. It goes to what this war is really all about, what the intentions of all the parties were, and why hostilities and why civilian casualties took ‑‑ why these killings took place. It's all relevant to me. But ‑‑
THE WITNESS: I would also think if we were to discuss this, it would be necessary for the Court to have a copy of this report, because as I recall, there is a rating given by Hourigan ‑‑
MR. BLACK: That's right.
THE WITNESS: ‑‑ about the credibility of his sources of information. And, as I recall, the rating is not of the highest.
[1630H ]
BY MR. BLACK:
Q. Yes, this rating is number two, probably two is untested as opposed to the number one which is uncorroborated.
A. And who again himself, as you see had some defects as an investigator notably shown here by his saying the aeroplane had come from Arusha. So we need to do more work on this, that is clear.
Q. Well it is quite clear though that Judge Arbour, at that time thought it was relevant to the ICTR mandate in this case, because she ordered the investigation then on the assumption that Hutu extremists so‑called shot down the president. When she found out it was the RPF and company, she killed the investigations? Don't you think that is a bit strange?
A. Do we know that she ordered the investigation? I don't know that. Was this the initiative of these particular investigators who were perhaps the people who were the sources who came and presented themselves? I just don't know. I don't know that there was an investigation ordered, but I simply say that yet needs to be established.
MR. JEGEDE: Your Honour, this kind of problem, when we deal with suppositions and rumours, I think we have much more serious matters to attend to than going into these speculations upon speculations. We should deal with serious issues, Your Honours.
MR. PRESIDENT: It seems since we are not dealing with the death of the president, since we are not inquiring into it, I think we must get on with the charges in this case.
MR. BLACK: That is what we are doing. I can file this, but ‑‑
BY MR. BLACK:
Q. Madam, you say that determining who shot that plane will change the entire complexion of how people see those events. But if this was confirmed as, I think, has been confirmed, if investigation had been followed up and it was confirmed that the RPF shot down that plane, it would have changed the whole complexion of how you see things, would it not?
A. No, it is a question of enormous importance. It should be resolved ‑‑ it should be resolved for many reasons, but it would not, in my evaluation, change the conclusions that I have drawn based on historical facts about the events of the genocide.
The supposition which was, in my mind, at the time when I worked on this, was that either theory was possible at this point and I am more inclined to the theory of the RPF than I am to the other, but it has not changed my interpretation of the organisation and the implementation of the genocide.
Q. Okay, but the relevant side is that the population, when the plane goes down, most of the Hutu population at least, and the military believed that the RPF shot the plane with the help of the Belgians at least, that provoked a great deal of anger and hatred, did it not, that this, a third, three Hutu presidents assassinated in six months by Tutsis. That would justify the cause of a lot of anger and fear, would it not?
A. It is clear that the assassination of President Habyarimana served as a rallying point for a certain number of people; for example, I have testimony that people began to put a portrait pin of President Habyarimana on their clothes, a practice which had been discarded some time before with the introduction of the multiparty politics and certainly, if you listen to the discourse of the RTLM or the national radio of these political leaders, it is repeated without ceasing every time a political meeting begins, there is reference to the shooting down of the president. So, yes, obviously, it is a point of major importance, but how many people actually would pick‑up a machete and go and kill another person, because they believed that the RPF had shot down an aeroplane even if it resulted in the death of Habyarimana, and I think that the assassination of the two presidents of Burundi would not have been a major cause factor in the minds of most Rwandans. It was something that was used to whip up here in that regard and in the use of this as a mobilisation tool, the symbolism of the killing of the president, yes it was of enormous importance, and it was the central part of the propaganda. But how many people spontaneously, and on their own felt so outraged and so angry that they would kill another person, that I really find hard to believe, and having lived through the assassination of a president who was an enormous symbol to me as a young person, I even have someone I identified clearly as an assassin, I doubt that I would have felt provoked to actually going to kill someone over this.
Q. The assassination was not by an enemy force, it was by internal parties, whoever they may be, and we do have an example in American history, don't we, several of them, where a beloved leader was assassinated and the population rose up in rebellion and there was a lot of violence, and I am talking about Martin Luther King's death in particular, in 1968, where black populations in many American cities rose up and two weeks of rioting and fighting with the army and national guard ‑‑ so how can you say you cannot understand how people spontaneously go into the street and attack people belonging to another ethnic group when they believed that their ethnic group had shot their leader? When that happened in the United States, it was so.
A. Two weeks later, in Butare, people, for the first time, were so outraged that they got out and killed?
Q. Well, I have a reference here, if I can find it, there is a situation report saying that the killings were begun as the RPF front moved, and as the infiltrators. And you keep saying that it is ‑‑ you keep portraying like Rwanda -- as if Rwanda is a big country. Butare is only a few dozen miles from Kigali, right ‑‑ 67 miles, may be half of that, depending on where you are in Butare, of course. So, how can you say people will not understand when you are upset and afraid down there in Butare? It is just down the road, it is not like the association of New York and Arizona?
A. Counsel, the people of Butare were not known for their attachment to President Habyarimana. You see, that is the problem with a large check here. If you assume that this is a nation of MRND supporters and people attached to the president, and that was certainly not the case. Everything that has gone into that has shown the complexity of the political situation where MRND people were not even sure that they could rely on the MDR at that point. So to assume that all Rwandans loved their president so much that they would take up arms to avenge his death, was not the case. And, in fact, there was criticism of some Rwandans for celebrating his death.
Q. Can you name any Hutus who celebrated his death?
A. I was not party to celebrations at that time.
Q. Well, since the people believed, generally, that the RPF were perceived as a Tutsi organisation, had murdered the presidents of Burundi and Rwanda and the army chief of staff, and there were some reasons to believe that Kagame was involved in the murder of Burundian president Ndadaye in October 1993 in order to ‑‑ that the general population was afraid that what had happened to their presidents was going to happen to them -- irrational -- rational or not, don't you think as happened with the death -- the assassination of Martin Luther King, there was instantaneous eruption of violence on the streets of American cities across the United States, which was very hard to calm?
A. I don't believe that it was instantaneous.
Q. Well, I remember that very well. TV screens were full of scenes the same night?
A. In any case, in the case we are discussing here, which is Rwanda, it was not spontaneous, that is absolutely clear by historical fact, nor do we know that the population in general believed that it was the RPF that shot down the place. There was sufficient suspicion among MDR people, that, I think, there would have been at least some in positions -- in power who were not a hundred percent themselves sure what had happened. So, and your reference to Paul Kagame being responsible for Ndadaye's assassination, Rwandans had absolutely no proof of that. It was an allegation made on RTLM, which just goes to prove my point that there is manufacturing here and manipulation of public opinion. But it didn't have a hundred percent success, because obviously, not a hundred percent of Rwandan Hutu got up the next morning and killed people. It didn’t happen that way. It was an area where the MRND strength, were the ones that responded first and it took major investment of national resources to make the other people comply.
Q. Well, first of all, Kagame was in Bujumbura the day Ndadaye was killed. He arrived the day before and left next day.
A. I have no proof of that. Have you proof of that?
Q. I have it somewhere.
A. Well, somewhere does not do.
Q. Yet, you say the army killed Prime Minister Agathe, why? Where is your proof of that?
A. Because of numerous testimonies from participants in the crime, and others who were on the scene?
Q. Where and when?
A. Well, the references are in the footnotes of my book. They are sworn statements delivered to the Belgian judicial authorities and Rwanda judicial authorities.
Q. Have you interviewed the UN witnesses ‑‑ witnesses of the UN compound who saw her shot?
A. I have interviewed the US diplomat who lived next door.
Q. So you have not interviewed the people working for the UN itself who saw her coming into the UNDP compound and later saw her shot?
A. I don't believe they saw her shot.
Q. Why not?
A. They might have seen her come into the compound the same way the US diplomat had seen her come into her compound.
Q. You haven't spoken to (inaudible) the UN security coordinator of security in Kigali on that day?
A. I have not. Did he see her shot? I doubt that.
Q. No, but he was an American diplomat.
A. So was the American diplomat.
Q. Have you spoken to Mr. Diakiet; D‑I‑A‑K‑I‑E‑T, whose house she was found in?
A. I have not.
Q. Have you spoken to Mr. Maxim Bampiaeng; B‑A‑M‑P‑I‑A‑E‑N‑G, with whom her husband was hiding, and her children?
A. I have not. I have told you my sources, and I have not claimed to have done a pleasing (inaudible) ‑ of the assassination of the prime minister.
Q. You know when you investigated the death of the prime minister that she was taken out back to her house by the unit of gendarmes, correct?
A. She went over the wall with the assistance of the gendarmes.
Q. Now, they said that they catered ‑‑ I have ‑‑ we have here -- the statements have been filed, of Ghanaian UN services, who left the house, and they are all consistent, five of a them said that around 7 o'clock in the morning she left the house with gendarmes trying to haul her across the back and took her out the back towards the UNDP camp?
A. That must have been after she had attempted to go over the wall into the American compound.
Q. They don't talk about her trying to go over the wall at all. This version does not accord with anything that the Ghanaian saw. They are the only neutral observers we saw ‑‑ we have actually -- at her house, were the five Ghanaian soldiers, and they don't mention her trying to get over the wall to the US residency -- ambassador’s residence.
A. Did anyone ask them? Was that question ‑‑
Q. They state the following: that Bampiaeng's men showed up around 5:30 in the morning, the officer‑in‑charge ‑‑ the then officer‑in‑charge approached the Lieutenant ‑‑ and asked what his mission was because they didn't know that they were coming. His response was, simply, we are here to see the prime minister. Then he turned to the door, the lieutenant knocks on the door, the prime minister refuses to answer the door and never does speak to the Belgians, and about an hour later they take her out at the back, the gendarmes, while there is firing in the area -- so Belgians and the Ghanaians had to hit the ground. They wanted the gendarmes to take her out the back.
A. And where were gendarmes before the arrival of the lieutenant and his men?
Q. They were outside the compound.
MR. PRESIDENT: You have changed roles now, you are giving evidence, and she is questioning you?
MR. BLACK: Well, she said that ‑‑ I asked her opinion because she said it was the army ‑‑ now she has got the army ‑‑ the army killed the guards. I don't know where that comes from.
MR. JEGEDE:
Your Honours, there is no need to go on this voyage of discovery to know who killed the prime minister. We already got cogent and compelling evidence to show who killed the prime minister. So why are we going through this exercise. It is useless.
MR. BLACK: You haven't got any witness, Dr. Des Forges. I will tell you what they brought, they brought two witnesses.
MR. PRESIDENT: To just prove it here ‑‑
MR. BLACK: Well, we only have secondhand evidence about who killed the prime minister. There is no evidence whatsoever, because they refused to bring the people who actually witnessed the killing to court, for some strange reason. Anyway, the witnesses ‑‑ the people in the UNDP compound said that she arrived around 7:00 ‑‑ 7:30, they called the UN in New York, they called the security coordinator and he said he was going to call UNAMIR, and Dallaire admits that he got a call around 9:00 a.m. that she was at the UNDP compound, and they asked ‑‑ the UNDP people asked: "What do we do with her?
MR. JEGEDE: Your Honours, this procedure is baffling. Counsel is testifying. If he wants to give evidence -- you go into the box and give it.
MR. BLACK: I can read extracts on testimony of witnesses ‑‑
MR. JEGEDE: Your Honours, he is only trying to confuse the witness, because the witness has stated the source of her opinion as to who killed ‑‑ (Microphones overlapping)
MR. PRESIDENT: Yes, we have got the evidence before this Tribunal.
BY MR. BLACK:
Q. Doctor, I will make you do as you make us do. Where is the proof? You say the army shot the prime minister, where is the statement, where is the proof of that?
A. Counsel, that is not my obligation.
Q. Well, it is. This is a criminal trial, these mens' lives are at stake.
A. I am not the Prosecutor.
Q. Yes you are. Well, you seem to be.
MR. JEGEDE: Your Honours, she is only an expert. We both have shown witnesses here. Witnesses who saw what happened. They have told us what happened. Why do we have go on with this charade? It is completely useless, Your Honors. I think we should move on.
MR. BLACK: They brought this doctor here to give evidence, because the frailty of their evidence is laughable. They got two very incredible witnesses who just give us hearsay and triple hearsay evidence about who killed Agathe. No direct evidence whatsoever, and then Dr. Des Forges comes and says I know the army killed her, but she is not the one to prove it.
BY MR. BLACK:
Q. But let me present a thesis, at least give us a document, to be precise, tell me ‑‑ let's see the proof ‑‑ I am asking the doctor, where is the proof, where are the statements, where is proof that anybody in the army killed her?
A. There are sworn statements made to legitimate judicial authorities about the facts that I have discussed. There are allegations about the killing of Ndadaye and the presence of Kagame in Bujumbura as far as I know there has been no substantiation whatsoever. You don't see the equivalence in the situation?
Q. Well, I am asking you, since you came here to make these allegations, where is the proof? Because without it, it is just a statement in the air. Did you bring those proofs, did you bring those statements to show us? Because, otherwise, just a statement, means nothing. An opinion without a factual basis is nothing in this court. This is not a debating society, this is a criminal case.
A. Indeed, I am well aware of that, counsel. I am also well aware of what is my role and my responsibilities. It is not my role to prove allegations. It is my role as a historian, to present an interpretation to the court and conclusions based upon my best examination of the evidence that is available to me.
Q. So, you can't prove that the army ‑‑ you have no evidence here with you to prove that the army had or anybody in the army had anything to do with her death?
MR. JEGEDE: Your Honour, objection to this line of questioning. The witness is not here to prove anything. She is not here to prove anything. She is only here to assist the Court in understanding the evidence, the factual evidence before the Court, not to prove anything. So it's an abuse of language to say that the witness, an expert witness, is here to prove a fact. She is here to give you her opinion, Your Honours.
MR. BLACK:
An opinion must be based on facts. She has expressed an opinion that the army ‑‑ she did not identify who shot down the presidents, and I am asking her to give us the proof. Where is it? Because I haven't seen it and I am not going to accept her word for it.
MR. PRESIDENT: Well, Counsel, an opinion is opinion. So it is not substantiated, and then leave it at that.
MR. BLACK: Well it is not substantiated.
BY MR. BLACK:
Q. You can't substantiate it right now, can you, doctor?
A. I prefer to remain within the role which is appropriate for me.
Q. Well, that is a 'no', if you can't say that?
A. I am sure the Court will understand.
Q. You say, in your report, that, for instance, Mr. Kavuruganda ‑‑ the president of the constitutional court, was murdered by elements of the army and gendarmes, correct?
A. Did I say that?
Q. I think you did. Well, is that your position?
A. That is my position.
Q. Do you have any proof for that? Let me say ‑‑ do you have any proof that gendarmes were there?
A. I don't believe I specify which service of the armed forces was involved.
Q. Okay. So who are you saying, then, killed Kavuruganda?
A. I have not attempted to identify or to make any specific allegations about any persons. My role is to point out to the Court, the historical war of various institutions and those people in charge of the institution in carrying out this genocide. It is not to identify the individual officers who pulled the trigger.
Q. So then, you are working on secondhand information about who may have killed Kavuraganda?
A. You know what? I am getting a little tired of this, and I appeal to the Court to please enforce the rule that this is not an appropriate line of questioning.
MR. PRESIDENT: I think, Mr. Black, if you really want that information, I think Kavuraganda's wife will come and do that. She is summoned to come here.
MR. BLACK: Well, she says, in her report, that Kavuraganda was killed by soldiers and gendarmes.
THE WITNESS:
I would like to see the reference.
BY MR. BLACK:
Q. Okay, when I have found it, I will give it to you.
A. Let's not waste time here.
Q. Well, I hoped you would have prepared also, Dr. Des Forges, to backup what you say, but you have not, because you do say that in your report that gendarmes were there, in fact, Madam Kavuraganda complains that there were no gendarmes there?
A. Reference?
Q. Prosecution motion filed a letter from Madam Kavuruganda. They asked for subpoenas for her and through that material they have a statement from her alleging that there were no gendarmes at the house.
A. Do I say there were gendarmes at the house?
Q. I believe you do?
A. Where?
Q. We will bring it up, we will get back to it.
MR. JEGEDE: Your Honours, I protest. I don't think we can go on in this way. You put a particular fact to the witness without being able to substantiate it? This is not a family Court, Your Honour, this is an international court.
MR. BLACK: Well, Mr. President. She has made allegations in her testimony‑in‑chief, that the only elements we have, gendarmerie (Inaudible) could not have participated really in negotiations to peace, because they had assassinated all the politicians ‑‑ the moderate politicians and all the opposition politicians. She says that. I am entitled to cross‑examine what is the basis for you to say that. Where is proof of that?
MR. JEGEDE:
Your Honours, how many witnesses have we brought to this Court? (Microphones overlapping)
THE ENGLISH INTERPRETER: Difficult to interpret, sir. Several people speaking at the same time.
MR. PRESIDENT: We, Counsel, if you want, we can ask her to present where she says she has given all the references upon which she is forming her opinion.
THE WITNESS: Let us put the book into evidence, that will take care of that.
BY MR. BLACK:
Q. The trouble with your book, it is self‑referencing. References of Human Rights Watch. Most of the references are in reference to yourself.
MR. JEGEDE: But you have relied on the book to portray your point here too, haven't you ‑‑
MR. BLACK:
Her own words, I am just quoting her own words to her.
MR. PRESIDENT: Okay, Counsel.
BY MR. BLACK:
Q. So, do you have any proof whatsoever today that elements of the army or gendarmes killed any of those people?
A. I understood the Judge to rule that question out of order. Wasn't that what happened a moment ago?
Q. No, not really.
A. Well, then I think we need to go back and read the record.
Q. Do you have proof here with you or do you not; yes or no?
A. Is this question orderly, Your Honour?
Q. It must be. Do you have facts ‑‑ any proof with you right now, to backup your statements?
MR. JEGEDE: I remember he had said that he didn't have the papers with him here, so why are you pushing the question?
THE WITNESS:
I think that is an inappropriate inference to draw, and I ask the Court to enforce its ruling so this can stop.
MR. PRESIDENT: Well, Counsel, you have been just ‑‑
MR. BLACK: Well, I asked that question, Mr. President, well, look, these mens’ lives are at stake here, because of the allegations made by ‑‑ (Micropones overlapping)
MR. PRESIDENT: She has ‑‑
MR. BLACK: Please let me finish, Mr. President, if I could, sir. I don't want to fight with you. We are not going to sit here and have these men condemned on rumour and opinions expressed in here without any factual foundation and backing up with documents. She is very adept and expert in demanding that if we make a suggestion we have got to prove it on a piece of paper. So, what is good for the goose is good for the gander. Where is her proof to backup her opinion? She hasn't got it with her in court. That's it.
MR. PRESIDENT: Well, Counsel, allegations are not proved on her opinion alone. There are other witnesses who will speak to the factual situation. So if they are relying only on her opinion, I think your argument maybe can be sustained.
MR. BLACK: Thank you. I appreciate that.
BY MR. BLACK:
Q. So, when you expressed your opinion that Prime Minister Agathe was rejected by the military as prime minister; is that correct?
A. Can we have the exact words that I used?
Q. Well, is that not your position? So what is your position? Is it that the army, in the morning of April the 7th, rejected her as prime minister or accepted her to continue as prime minister?
A. I think it is clear from my testimony and from the sworn statements of Colonel Bagosora from the accounts by Dallaire, from the account by Marchal, that it was Colonel Bagosora and those officers supporting him who rejected the prime minister and called her in effect, a whore, and said that in no circumstances would they accept her authority. That is clear.
Q. Well, it's also clear and the evidence will be that officers involved in that meeting, including General Ndindiliyimana, that despite Bagosora's initial opposition, the meeting at large, at the end, accepted her to continue as prime minister. Well, it's not just waving your hands in the air and smiling. There is work to do. They did accept her as prime minister. So there was no need to kill her, because she had been accepted in her role as prime minister and that she would continue in that role ‑‑
MR. PRESIDENT: Do you place that in evidence, Counsel?
MR. BLACK: That is going to be the evidence in defence.
THE WITNESS:
What is the authority for this assertion?
BY MR. BLACK:
Q. General Ndindiliyimana, for one, and other officers there?
A. Which other officers?
Q. Well, let us just have General Ndindiliyimana for now.
A. You see, Counsel, even supposing that this is accurate, even supposing that the majority of officers were agreed to accept Agathe, which is certainly not the testimony of everyone else who was at that meeting, including Colonel Bagosora and Ntabakuze and Dallaire and every one else. Even if that were all false and Agathe was to continue, that would make it all the more important to get rid of her, because she would be an obstacle to carrying out the plan. So, I don't see that really can diminish the motivation of those people who killed her. But in any case, I really find this impossible, given the clear testimony of Bagosora and other army officers and of General Dallaire as to what was the sentiment of that meeting.
Q. Well, that is not what I am told by General Ndindiliyimana who was there in the meeting.
A. Bagosora was and I wasn't. So, let's read Colonel Bagosora.
Q. It's not nothing; it goes against your case, that is why you don't believe the army accepted her in her role as prime minister, despite their reservations about her role in the assassination of the president and legitimate concerns, then your whole thesis of a plan for genocide falls to pieces.
A. No.
Q. Oh, yes, it does, because if they didn't want to kill the prime minister and accepted her, and you know General Dallaire and Marchal conferred with Booh‑Booh, they accepted to have an interim government installed and continue to trying to continue the Arusha Accords so the RPF backup attacks ‑‑
MR. PRESIDENT: Well, Counsel, I think you must not make submissions to this witness. Your submissions must be made to the Court not to the witness.
MR. BLACK: No, I am making a suggestion to her. She is the expert, she says.
THE WITNESS:
Well, I am glad you accept my expertise, and my expertise tells me on the basis of the sworn declarations of people who were very clear in what they said, that there is no way in which the prime minister could be acceptable to them as a continued legitimate authority, and that had been their position for weeks, and the language of Bagosora, which was coarse, I understand, reflected a total rejection of her authority. She was regarded as an RPF sell-out.
BY MR. BLACK:
Q. But as you know, Bagosora was backed into a conner by other officers, including General Ndindiliyimana and was forced to go with General Ndindiliyimana's suggestion with Dallaire to see Booh‑Booh, and Booh‑Booh instructed Bagosora in Dallaire's presence to continue with Agathe, and he agreed.
A. Which made it more important to get rid of her.
Q. And Booh‑Booh ‑‑
A. She was removed from the table, if she wasn't there, there was no question.
Q. If they accepted her, and I put it to you that they did, even if Bagosora was not happy about it, if they accepted her, then she was not killed by the army, she was killed by somebody else. And the question is who and why, and then the whole the idea that they were trying to oppose that these guys wouldn't be nice guys and shot the opposing politicians fell apart -- doesn't it, if what General Ndindiliyimana says to me is correct, that would necessarily follow, correct?
A. No, no, none of it would follow, and none of it is logical. How can you argue that these people were not killed, they were killed. So, who would have killed them?
Q. Well, who was she working with, if she was, you know, involved in a coup on April 4th, an attempt which was rejected. So, she was close to Twagiramungu who was close to the RPF ‑‑ connect the dots?
A. No, please, you do, because, I must say, your connections are so vague and illogical, I can't follow them.
Q. Wasn't Twagiramungu close to her ‑‑
THE ENGLISH INTERPRETER:
The pause, we need the pause.
BY MR. BLACK:
Q. Was Twagiramungu a very close ally, of the RPF?
A. Are you saying she was killed by Twagiramungu?
Q. Yes or no, wasn't Twagiramungu close to the RPF?
A. Twagiramungu was part of a coalition of political leaders who agreed to cooperate with the RPF, yes.
Q. So she was linked directly or indirectly to the RPF?
A. Well, in the mind of Bagosora, for sure, that I think we established clearly, and in the minds of certain other army officers, no doubt.
Q. Who do you think set her up, leaking that information on April 4th to RTLM? Do you know who leaked that information and set her up, and why?
A. No, I don't. Tell me.
Q. Have you ever wondered why?
THE ENGLISH INTERPRETER: We can't follow really, at this stage we can't.
MR. JEGEDE: And if you can start by answering her question, she wanted to know who, we will continue from there.
BY MR. BLACK:
Q. Well, my suggestion to you, madam, is that the army did, again, agree to continue with her despite their reservations. Therefore, there was no need to assassinate her. Therefore, your entire thesis falls to pieces.
A. Are you suggesting to me that Bagosora was either (a) so stupid; or (b) so ill-informed that he didn't understand what happened at the end of that meeting? He didn't grasp that the whole army was going to rally around the prime minister? How could he have been so stupid or so ill-informed to have reached such a conclusion?
MR. PRESIDENT: Well, Witness, the suggestion was that the RPF is wrong. Do you accept that or are you rejecting it?
THE WITNESS:
I am sorry, Your Honour. What was the question?
MR. PRESIDENT: It was not a question. He suggested to you that your theory of getting ‑‑ that there was a coup to get rid of the prime minister was false; would you accept that?
THE WITNESS: No, I do not accept that, because it is clear that the officers who had the predominant power in the situation, including the control over the presidential guard, the reconnaissance battalion and the paratroops. paracommandoes who were the most powerful and elite forces in the capital had rejected her, and that was the conclusion that Bagosora himself puts forward. He never raises the possibility that he somehow misunderstood, and that everyone really was okay with continuing with her as prime minister -- no, no, this is a suggestion which so far ‑‑ which so far betrays the facts that I find it hard to give it any credence whatsoever.
MR. TAKU: Your Honours, I stand up at this point in time and say that this is really new. We didn't raise this. I cross‑examined the witness and I defend General Ndindiliyimana ‑‑ sorry, I defend General –Major Nzuwonemeye. This is entirely new, and for first time I hear that Bagosora said that the reconnaissance battalion was entirely under his control. This has come up for the first time under his cross‑examination and I object very, very radically.
MR. PRESIDENT: No, she never said reconnaissance was under his control.
MR. TAKU: Well, is what she is saying now, that, what I understood, Your Honours, and I think, Your Honours that I have a duty -- I asked precise questions with precise answers, and I think that the Court should direct very, very, closely and questions should be asked and answered with regard to specific accused persons, not questions and answers that are likely to raise new issues where we wouldn't have the opportunity to probe the witness again on those issues. It didn't arise in cross‑examination, it is arising now, I am afraid I might not have the opportunity to deal with that except he wants to prolong to bring me back to question her on those particular aspects ‑‑
MR. PRESIDENT: Yes, Mr. Black, I think we have to leave her ‑‑
MR. ST‑LAURENT: If you allow me, Mr. President, I wish to support what my learned colleague just said. It would go along those lines when you will have to allow us to counter or cross cross‑examine the witnesses.
MR. PRESIDENT: Well, Mr. Black, you keep all these proceedings. Just limit your defence to Ndindiliyimana and then the problems can be solved.
MR. BLACK: Well, that is what I am doing, he was involved in those meetings, that is what she is saying, and therefore, the army did not kill her because they agreed to accept her.
MR. PRESIDENT: Yes, but the army ‑‑ then you are trying to defend the gendarmerie, Counsel.
MR. BLACK: Then what is wrong with what she says? She is wrong in what she says.
BY MR. BLACK:
Q. And it is also confirmed by the facts, madam, that Dallaire was at that meeting and says nothing about Agathe being rejected. He told Bagosora to see Booh‑Booh and everybody agrees with Booh‑Booh's suggestion to continue with the prime minister by trying to keep the broad-based government, trying to get it installed and trying for the Arusha Accords. That is what Booh‑Booh says too?
MR. TAKU: Just one minute. I am sorry to interrupt my friend. We have the transcript of General ‑‑ Colonel Bagosora. He himself said that he rejected the prime minister, but he doesn't think that he did that with my client or any other person. He himself said that. In that regard, Madam Des Forges is right, Bagosora said he rejected the prime minister. That is not in controversy, but he doesn't go as far as to say that he did that with any other person.
THE WITNESS:
If I may comment, Counsel?
MR. BLACK: What I am saying is that Bagosora didn't want her, but that was not the result of the entire meeting.
THE WITNESS: If I may comment, Counsel, I am sorry if you understood me to say that he rejected her with the agreement of your client. I think what I said was that Bagosora and certain other army officers rejected her and that Bagosora appeared to have command at that time of other units, the elite units of the army in the capital, including the paracommandoes and the reconnaissance battalion. I did not attempt ‑‑ well, I hope I did not attempt to suggest a direct connection there between your client and the rejection of the prime minister.
MR. PRESIDENT: She said, "seemed to have control."
MR. BLACK: Well, the evidence will be that she was accepted at the end of the meeting by the officers there, in general. So we can leave that point.
MR. TAKU: I am sorry, Your Honour, but I am still worried, I am still very, very, worried. There was no premise to have mentioned my client. The rules in a joint trial are very clear. The premise is that the answers are given to questions that are posed or asked, and to have made any inference or any connection is already prejudicial.
MR. PRESIDENT: No, Counsel, we understand the answer in the sense that Bagosora seemed to have control. That is the impression that Bagosora had given, the day he had control of ‑‑
MR. TAKU: Okay. Thank you, Your Honours. My colleague himself will admit that I will not, in any way, ask a question that will deal with any person, I asked a question that had a direct inference with Bagosora, but merely said a senior military officer, because I did not want to drag him into these proceedings.
MR. JEGEDE: Your Honour, there are no rules that define the scope of answers of that witness ‑‑ that this was the answer can be given to questions posed by counsel. So she has a wider scope within which to roam. If her answer concerns anybody in the army, she is free to mention the name of that person.
BY MR. BLACK:
Q. Do you have any proof whatsoever that the army or gendarmerie, were involved in any plan to exterminate Tutsis?
A. I have developed in some detail, in my examination‑in‑chief, and in prior questioning by counsel, my position on this issue. I have indicated, not very long ago this afternoon, the existence of the documents, which to me substantiates this conclusion and I think that it is sufficiently well examined that the Court does not need to waste it's time any further.
Q. So you base your analysis on three documents or three things ‑‑ documents, was that it ‑‑ your interpretation of those documents?
A. No, there is the letter of July 27th from Colonel Nsengiyumva, July 27th, 1992, there is the letter 1437 of September 21st 1992, by Colonel Nsabimana. There is letter 1438 of September 21st, 1992 by Colonel Nsabimana; there is the Bagosora diary, there are the various statements, including by person, Habyarimana, in the CDR party, and the ones you have adduced in favour of civilian self‑defence. There is the letter of December 14th, 1993 by Colonel Nsengiyumva, there is the document which Kambanda has made available to the court on the organisation of civilian self‑defence, there is the letter of March the 30th by Nsabimana to Préfet Renzaho. The letter of 31st of March by Renzaho to Nsabimana; there is the May 25th statement by the prime minister; the May 25th statement by the minister of interior, these are 1994. There is the document on the use of funds for civilian self‑defence signed by Minister Karemera some time in May, I don't have the exact date; there is a statement by Minister Mugenzi in a video, where he says the militia are the same thing as the civilian self‑defence. There is a statement by Prime Minister Kambanda, saying the militia are the same thing as civilian self‑defence. At the moment that is what comes to mind, not to mention witness statements.
Q. All right, not to mention witness statements. Right now none of these documents state anything about a text book plan to kill Tutsis, is this your interpretation of those document?
A. We discussed this earlier this afternoon, didn't we?
Q. Yes or no?
A. We discussed this earlier this afternoon and it is in the record.
Q. Yes or no. Answer my question.
A. I don't need to answer any question twice.
Q. You refuse to answer my question?
MR. PRESIDENT: She has already answered that.
MR. BLACK:
Well, I must have her answer.
THE WITNESS:
Well, go back and read the record.
THE ENGLISH INTERPRETER: Counsel, please refrain from exchanging without pauses.
BY MR. BLACK:
Q. What is your answer, madam?
A. Maybe we can ask ‑‑
MR. JEGEDE:
Mr. President has ruled on that. She has already given her answer, as rules the court.
BY MR. BLACK:
Q. I am entitled to my cross‑examination. The question is none of those documents states anywhere in the text, anything about a plan to kill Tutsi, it is just your interpretation of those documents, is it not correct; yes or no?
A. We dealt with this question and the Court has ruled.
Q. You are not the Court.
A. I know, but I am trying to obey the orders of the Court unlike some people here.
MR. PRESIDENT: Well, Counsel, move on.
MR. BLACK: I need an answer to that question.
MR. PRESIDENT: The witness has come here for that purpose, so she has given you the answer.
MR. BLACK: Why is she afraid to say it?
THE WITNESS:
I am not afraid, I am trying to hurry up the proceedings by following the Judge's order.
MR. BLACK: We could hurry up if you could just give an answer. A simple answer, "yes" or "no".
THE WITNESS: I am trying to set a pattern for the future.
MR. PRESIDENT: Counsel, you must not get involved with the witness. You must not argue with the witness. Your role is to put questions to her.
MR. BLACK:
Maybe, probably, Mr. President, tell the witness not to argue with me. I asked her a question, she is compelled to answer unless you tell me not to ask the question, and the question -- My question is a legitimate one.
MR. PRESIDENT: She also has the right to say that she has already answered those questions.
MR. BLACK:
And I have the right to say that she hasn't.
MR. PRESIDENT:
Then in that case we rule that she has already answered the question.
MR. JEGEDE:
Thank you, Your Honour.
MR. BLACK:
Then you give me the answer, Mr. President, because I don't know it.
MR. JEGEDE: Your Honours, this is a serious disobedience to Court's orders.
MR. PRESIDENT: Well, Counsel, if you don't know the answer, we will adjourn now, then you read the proceedings and come tomorrow. Do you really want to have the proceedings tomorrow or Monday?
MR. BLACK: You have just ‑‑
THE WITNESS:
Your Honours, I was never consulted about a final date. I have other obligations, I cannot sit here and be asked repeatedly to answer the same questions and waste my time like this. I just will not do it.
MR. PRESIDENT: The Court's understanding, Witness, is that you will be here until the 20th.
THE WITNESS: I prefer not to be here until the 20th. I have other things to do.
MR. PRESIDENT: We will see how it goes. If we finish early, you can go early.
MR. BLACK: So you say you are going to give me how many more days? That is why I was saying, if she is leaving next week then I don't want to sit tomorrow, so I can consult my client, but if she is leaving, like, on Tuesday, yes, I need Friday, and Mr. Segatwa wants to ask some questions too.
THE WITNESS:
Your Honour ‑‑
MR. PRESIDENT: Well, Monday will be given to Mr. Segatwa. Well, I only had four hours total.
MR. SEGATWA: I think it is up to my co‑counsel to answer, because he will cross‑examine.
MR. DOUMBIA: I think that a day will not be enough for me.
MR. ST‑LAURENT: I am sorry, Mr. President, before Mr. Black speaks again, I would like to tell you that I have an oral motion to present, so we will need 15 minutes, Monday morning for me, to do that beyond the timing for the cross‑examination by my learned friends. I would like to advise you that I need 15 minutes to make our motion.
MR. TAKU: Your Honours, I have a very brief application to make, and I do this under the direction of the Court and with due respect to the witness, but the issue about the assertion that was made that Bagosora seemed to have control, an issue that arose for the very first time. Now, my application is whether I can be given some time to cross‑examine her on that assertion. If Your Honour thinks it is important.
MR. PRESIDENT: We will consider that later.
MR TAKU: Yes, Your Honour.
MR. BLACK: I agree with her to continue tomorrow morning, and maybe I can finish by end of Monday.
MR. PRESIDENT: Monday?
MR. BLACK:
Yes, Your Honour, is it all day Monday?
MR. PRESIDENT:
Monday, it is whole day. If you try to finish by Monday, then Mr. Black can ‑‑
MR. TAKU:
If for any reason, I believe, that it is unnecessary, that no inference was drawn on that, then I will be satisfied.
MR. PRESIDENT:
We will rule on that later; whether to give you or not.
MR. TAKU:
Thank you, Your Honour.
MR. BLACK:
I have to put it on record once more that I really only had four hours in total. Maybe I can be given one more day. Maybe I can finish, but it is just not fair.
MR. PRESIDENT: Counsel, I will ‑‑ it all depends on the reasonable time that is given to the defence. We have given you about ten and half days and even more than that.
MR. BLACK: Yes, but I have only taken four hours.
MR. PRESIDENT:
We are not giving you a limit of four hours. You can have Monday also.
MR. JEGEDE: Your Honour, also we don't have to follow Mr. St‑Laurent, it is not necessary, because we can be as surgical as Mr. Taku and not copy Mr. St‑Laurent.
MR. PRESIDENT: Yes, Mr. Taku was short and sweet.
MR. BLACK: Okay, Your Honour, we will sit tomorrow.
THE WITNESS:
Your Honour, so we will sit tomorrow?
MR. BLACK:
If it is a good shot. We can finish by Monday, but I don't limit that.
MR. PRESIDENT: Witness, do you want to come tomorrow or on Monday?
THE WITNESS:
I would like to sit all day tomorrow, Your Honour, I would like to sit on the weekend to finish with this so I can get on with my work.
MR. PRESIDENT:
Okay, we will sit at 09:00 to 12:00 tomorrow because of Ramadan. So, we will sit ‑‑ we will adjourn until 09:00 tomorrow.
(Court adjourned at 1730)
End of Part One--to be continued:
[WHY IS GENERAL NDINDILIYIMANA STILL NOT FREE?
CM/P's latest post is, in fact, a transcript of proceedings in The General's Trial in Arusha. The General, in case this is the first time you've checked into this blog, is Major-General Augustin Ndindiliyimana, the former chief of the Rwandan National Gendarmerie during the troubles in 1993 and 1994, and currently locked down and on trial at the ICTR in Arusha, Tanzania. He is being defended by that formidable defender of lost causes--and my very own dear friend--Chris Black. And from the sound of these three days of Ultimate Kombat, Chris has taken over where Johnny Cochran left off in the OJ trial (re: the Brentwood genocide of '93) and become the new, undisputed (no-boooollshit) Junkyard Dog of international justice. Now, Chris may not be big'n bad, but the other defense doggies know him and they don't mess--they don't even get off the porch.
(For background see elsewhere on this blog:
The General's Book on Rwanda, Chapt One, http://cirqueminime.blogcollective.com/blog/_archives/2005/5/21/877913.html; Hot-L Rwanda Propaganda Gas Bag . . . http://cirqueminime.blogcollective.com/blog/_archives/2005/4/6/558561.html; or Maitre Black's own work, Dallaire Genocide Fax a Fabrication . . . http://cirqueminime.blogcollective.com/blog/_archives/2005/12/6/1437840.html; among many others).
The very long post (71 pages) which follows this not-so-brief introduction is 'Part One' of Chris' cross examination of Alison Des Forges, Human Rights Watch's African Queen and one of the early propaganda enema nurses sent by Western imperialist interests into post-invasion Rwanda (ca 1992) to fuzz out the devastation of the US/UK/UN-backed (financed, trained and equipped) aggression of 1 October 1990, and to support the so-called 'Tutsi rebels' from Uganda known as the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). Actually, these 4,000 or so invaders--along with 12,000 or so of their infiltrated agents provocateurs already in-country--were, and many still are, card-carrying, active duty National Resistance Army (NRA) cadres under Ugandan president Museveni's command.
Dr. Des Forges, a university professor in the US, was included among several 'Human Rights crusaders', such as Swiss journalist Philippe Dahinden, René Degni-Segui, a jurist from Ivory Coast, dean of the law school in Abidjan and president of the League for Human Rights, Pol Dodinval, a forensic pathologist from Liège, Eric Gillet, a Brussels lawyer and member of the International Federation for Human Rights, Rein Odink, a lawyer from Amsterdam, Halidou Ouedraogo, a judge and president of the Inter-African Union for Human Rights, André Paradis, director of the League for Rights and Freedom in Montreal, and Canadian jurist and law professor William Schabas (actually, the latter, professor to both Chris Black and Tiphaine Dickson, today is considered one of the leading authorities on the new 'Victims' Law' as practiced at the ad hoc tribunals in Arusha and The Hague, and was recently holding forth in Ireland about 'the difficulties' in the Milosevic trial--fucking wanker!), in the formation of a commission to investigate 'Human Rights Violations in Rwanda [ironically enough] after 1 October 1990', and effectively turned the unprovoked foreign aggression that was launched on that date, a primal crime against the Peace, the mother of all other war crimes, according to the judgment at Nuremberg (not the rock musical starring Spencer Tracy and Maximilian Schell, however), into a minor local uprising or, as it is still referred to at the ICTR, a simple 'border violation' or 'trespass'.
Desperately clutching the cynically manipulated premise that all the fighting and killing in Northern Rwanda stemmed from ancient tribal animosities (Black on Black violence, it used to be written off as), draped in the mantels of medievalist nostalgics, pining away for the glorious, martyred Tutsi monarchies d'antan, and goosed on by certain international Zionist organizations to treat the Tutsis as the 'Jews of Africa' (another lost tribe heard from!), it was mere child's play for these Victims' Rightsters, these Holocaust Hustlers, to convince the international community, those who were paying enough attention to Central Africa even to know that Rwanda was not one of the Pointer Sisters, that the subsequent RPF reign of terror, with tens, even hundreds of thousands of Rwandans slaughtered, without regard for tribal affiliation or ethnicity, and more than a million internally displaced, before this HR commission had even drawn its first fetid breath; and that the eventuating assassinations of leading political figures and the excruciatingly long-anticipated murders by SAM, on 7 April 1994, of the leader of the Rwandan revolution, president Juvenal Habyarimana, on the same doomed executive jet with his Burundian Hutu homologue, president Cyprien Ntaryamira; that this 100% made-in-USA, maliciously systematized, cold-bloodedly calculated chaos that brought about the depopulation and physical and political destruction through privatization of this once thriving popular state: all this unholy carnage resulted solely from a general reaction to the racialist or tribalist oppression, the 'tropical naziism', of the Hutu/Habyarimana-led Rwandan government, military and gendarmerie.
This was the genetic fallacy from which Des Forges and her criminal co-conspirators built their African Fables--and their careers. They had been convinced by the Tutsi lobby in the US and Europe that the 'Tutsi Genocide' had begun back in the early 60s with the social revolution that deposed the Tutsi monarchy and installed a 'popular dictatorship' of the Hutu majority. There wasn't a lot of material evidence for this bit of (un)history, but it fit quite neatly into the mind-set of the Human Rights, Victims' Rights, Stop the Fucking Genocide claques of the 80s and 90s. Then they got a bunch of play from some depraved dispatches sent out of Africa by RPF intelligence operatives about how Tutsis were being gratuitously singled out for harassment and arrest--even being massacred--because of the government's over-zealous self-defense, its over-reaction to that trifling 1 October 'border incident' that cost more than 30,000 civilian lives just in the month of October 1990, the skullduggery of the Habyarimana Family's voodoo cult (only Black Magic can produce the kind of 'UnReason' that results in national suicide), and the existence of Rwandan government death squads--some dressed up as RPF.
The HR/RPFers pumped this bilge through the Belgian and French papers employing the services of other 'proto-Tutsi' hacks and flacks like Gasana Ndoba, founder and president of the Committee for the Respect of Human Rights and Democracy in Rwanda (created by francophone Belgians in November 1990 and better known by its French initials, CRDDR--Pierre Paén, in his almost totally with-it 'Noires fureurs, blancs menteurs' {Really Pissed-off Black Cats, Lying Peckerwoods--my trans} describes Ndoba as not just pro-RPF, but as a stone, hope-to-die RPF cadre) and the reprehensible French bounder et arriviste, Jean Carbonare, leader of the anti-Catholic, anti-Mitterand, anti-communist (Hell, anti-French!), but esp anti-Rwandan association, Survie. Then they picked up some fellow-slarvers, like Colette Brackmann and Marie-France Cros and Samatha Power and Pascal Kropp and Jean-Pierre Chretien--ALL HUMAN RIGHTS, ALL THE TIME--,and, through these jaundiced scribblers and snivelers, geezed these false stories into the popular media, infecting the likes of Patrick de St Exupery in Le Figaro and Phillip Gourevitch in The New Yorker--who then exacted a false conversions from the entertainment industry in general and one of my favorite pulp writers, Elmore Leonard, in his Detroit/Rwanda book, Pagan Babies, in particular. And then there's the whole string of unspeakable films like that draw on this ubiquitour false consciousness: Hot'L Rwanda, Shooting Dogs, Rubbing Glands with the Devil, etc.
But as more and more real, hard evidence seeped up through the spurious scum of disinformation spewed by the HRsters, and as their sentimental and solipsistic histories were being contradicted, these false witnesses and burlesque clown experts had to back off of certain key points. The first indicators that the RPF was, in fact, the driving force behind the massacre of civilians and the assassination of presidents Habyarimana and Ntaryamira came in from ICTR investigator Michael Hourigan and then from RPF defectors like Lt. Abdul Ruzibiza (a member of the shoot-down team, 'The Network', that assassinated the Hutu presidents). Then came the results of an French investigation into the 7 April shoot-down on behalf of the families of the flight crew of the presidential Falcom 50 by investigating judge Jean-Louis Brugière (whose, as yet unreleased, report further implicating the 'Tutsi rebels' in the slaughter and forced exile of the Rwandan nation, in their own genocide, as it were, was leaked to Le Monde last year). However, CM/P has, from the jump, depended for its currency on the efforts of dedicated unto obsessed Canadian legal historians like Robin Philpot, Tiphaine Dickson and, the guy who in the following pages is going toe-to-toe with Dr. Des Forges in a totally solid Perry Meyssan impersonation,--that'd be Chris Black--oh yeah, and General Ndindiliyimana, himself, of course.
But evidence has never been a great concern of the ad hocs, and they have gotten along fine without it both in The Hague (re: Yugoslavia) and in Arusha. In fact, in the Milosevic case, they not only got along without evidence of their charges for four years; they got away with murdering 'the accused' by investigating themselves and finding they were not implicated in the death of their prisoner. Their motto has been consistently, No Evidence, No Problem. As in Arusha, when after a dozen years there was NO EVIDENCE to show that the Habyarimana government or its short-lived successors had planned and executed a Genocide: the Tribunal just passed an order stipulating to the fact that, like the sun's rising and setting, it is commonly accepted that the Hutu government of Rwanda murdered 800,000 Tutsi and moderate Hutu between 7 April and 16 July 1994. And with as much invested in such a false (and popular) history, with so much past and future policy riding on it (just as with the false histories of Yugoslavia or 911 or AIDS), there isn't much this side of a C4 suppository that would get these bought-off Erwin Coreys to change their positions.
Here's a sample exchange from the transcript, regarding the shooting down of the presidents' plane, which shows how unfazed Dr Des Forges is by anything like evidence that goes against her thesis:
Q. Madam, you say that determining who shot that plane will change the entire complexion of how people see those events. But if this was confirmed as, I think, has been confirmed, if investigation had been followed up and it was confirmed that the RPF shot down that plane, it would have changed the whole complexion of how you see things, would it not?
A. No, it is a question of enormous importance. It should be resolved ‑‑ it should be resolved for many reasons, but it would not, in my evaluation, change the conclusions that I have drawn based on historical facts about the events of the genocide.
The supposition which was, in my mind, at the time when I worked on this, was that either theory was possible at this point and I am more inclined to the theory of the RPF than I am to the other, but it has not changed my interpretation of the organisation and the implementation of the genocide.
Because Des Forges has bet the whole whorehouse on her fictionalized version of events, she can not back down. When questioned about her position on the Rwandan government, Army and Gendarmerie's killing off important political figures--murders that have long since been laid at the feet of the invading 'Tutsi rebels', all she can do is beg for the court's protection--and, if you read on into the post, you will see just how fey this witness-protection program ICTR-style is with miserable, annoying little piss-ants like the two prosecutors, Mes Bâ and Jegede, administering it:
Q. So, do you have any proof whatsoever today that elements of the army or gendarmes killed any of those people?
A. I understood the Judge to rule that question out of order. Wasn't that what happened a moment ago?
Q. No, not really.
A. Well, then I think we need to go back and read the record.
Q. Do you have proof here with you or do you not; yes or no?
A. Is this question orderly, Your Honour?
Q. It must be. Do you have facts ‑‑ any proof with you right now, to backup your statements?
MR. JEGEDE: I remember he had said that he didn't have the papers with him here, so why are you pushing the question?
THE WITNESS:
I think that is an inappropriate inference to draw, and I ask the Court to enforce its ruling so this can stop.
MR. PRESIDENT: Well, Counsel, you have been just ‑‑
MR. BLACK: Well, I asked that question, Mr. President, well, look, these mens’ lives are at stake here, because of the allegations made by ‑‑ (Micropones overlapping)
MR. PRESIDENT: She has ‑‑
MR. BLACK: Please let me finish, Mr. President, if I could, sir. I don't want to fight with you. We are not going to sit here and have these men condemned on rumour and opinions expressed in here without any factual foundation and backing up with documents. She is very adept and expert in demanding that if we make a suggestion we have got to prove it on a piece of paper. So, what is good for the goose is good for the gander. Where is her proof to backup her opinion? She hasn't got it with her in court. That's it.
MR. PRESIDENT: Well, Counsel, allegations are not proved on her opinion alone. There are other witnesses who will speak to the factual situation. So if they are relying only on her opinion, I think your argument maybe can be sustained.
MR. BLACK: Thank you. I appreciate that.
{You dig? Chris doesn't even take shorts off the President of the court--who, truth be told, is a whole deal better'n the old Norwegian one, Mose.}
So we must again ask the question 'Why is The General Still Locked Down?' And it's not just General Ndindiliyimana, but all these detainees, these alleged 'genocidaires', in Tanzania and Holland, all over Africa and Europe, are representatives, with some status, of the Rwandan or Serbian governments. And all these Hutus and Serbs are being tortured, some, like President Milosevic (a principal exception to Clinton's rule not to assassinate world leaders) being tortured to death, with just the kind of nonsensical non-justice that is reflected in these transcripts.
So, what can you, dear reader, do? Write your Congressperson? Go see the Al Gore movie? Wear a Keith Obermann Rocks t-shirt? Don't Fret or Fuss or Masturbate, Vote for a Clinton in 2008!? Really, about all you can be expected to do is to try and stay well-informed. We hope you will support us here at CM/P as we try to do a little something to push you in all hipness along the road to happy, bullshit-free destiny. --mc]
*****************************
[This transcript of the Des Forges cross came to us in a French translation of what had obviously taken place in English. Because this blog pretends to be bilingual I left the French and added, in between [ ], my English translation of the French translation of the original English. Got that? Yeah? Let's go. --mc]
{11 October 2006--Chris Black begins to Cross Examine Alison Des Forges}
Monsieur Black, voulez-vous commencer maintenant ou bien après une courte pause ?
[Mr Black, do you want to begin now or after a short recess?]
Me BLACK :
Je vais me déplacer devant le micro, à la place occupée par Maître Black (sic).
[I'm going to take Mr Black's (sic) place at the microphone.]
M. LE PRÉSIDENT :
Maître Black (sic), veuillez lui céder votre place.
[Mr Black (sic), will you cede your place?]
(Suspension de l’audience : 16 h 5)
[Court is in recess: 4:05 pm]
(Reprise de l’audience : 16 h 20)
[Court resumes: 4:20 pm]
M. LE PRÉSIDENT :
Vous avez la parole, Maître Black.
[You have the floor, Mr Black]
Me BLACK :
Merci. (Suite de l’intervention non interprétée)
[Thank you. (after an uninterpreted exchange.)]
M. LE PRÉSIDENT :
Ayez cela à l’esprit, Madame le Témoin.
[The Witness will bear that in mind.]
CONTRE-INTERROGATOIRE
PAR Me BLACK :
[CROSS EXAMINATION
BY Me Black:]
Q. Madame Des Forges, à la page 34 de votre rapport, vous avez parlé des militaires et des gendarmes qui étaient opposés au génocide ; est-ce que vous y incluiez le général Ndindiliyimana ?
[Question: Madam Des Forges, on page 34 of your report, you speak of the soldiers and gendarmes who were opposed to the genocide: do you include in this group General Ndindiliyimana?]
Mme DES FORGES :
R. Il y a des indications selon lesquelles le rôle du général Ndindiliyimana était complexe et qu’à l’occasion, il a sauvé des gens. Mais je dirais que, dans mon esprit, il y a des questions concernant certaines activités qui ont peut-être été présentées devant cette Chambre. Je ne sais pas, je n’ai pas lu les transcripts des témoins ; mais, comme je l’ai dit plutôt, il m’est difficile de croire à l’innocence totale de toute personne qui était en vie au Rwanda pendant ces mois-là.
[Answer: There are some indications according to which the role of General Ndindiliyimana was complex and that occasionally he saved people. But I would say that, to my mind, there are some questions concerning certain activities that might have been presented to this court. I don't know, I haven't read the transcripts of the witnesses; but, as I said earlier, it is difficult for me to believe in the complete innocence of anyone living in Rwanda at that during those months.]
Q. Donc, tout le monde est coupable ?
[Q. So, everyone was guilty?]
R. Certainement pas.
[A. Certainly not.]
Q. Quand vous parlez des officiers modérés, vous l’avez toujours inclus dans vos écrits comme étant un officier modéré ; n’est-ce pas ?
[Q. When you speak of moderate officers, you always include him in your writing as being a moderate officer. Is that not so?]
R. Il y a deux choses dans cette question. L’une, c’est : Est-ce que je l’ai fait ou bien est-ce que j’aurais dû…
[A. There are two things in this question. One is: Did I do that or should I have done . . .]
Q. Je vais éclaircir ma question : Vous considérez Ndindiliyimana comme l’un des officiers modérés pendant les événements du Rwanda en 1994 ?
[Q. I'll clarify my question: Do you consider Ndindiliyimana to be one of the moderate officers during the events in Rwanda of 1994?]
R. J’ai dit que son rôle était complexe et que, dans mon esprit, il y a des questions concernant son comportement.
[A. I said that his role was complex and that, to my mind, there are questions concerning his behavior.]
Q. Ce n’est pas ce que vous avez dit auparavant. Dans votre rapport dans l’affaire Bagosora, à la page 42 — je peux vous donner une copie, c’est un paragraphe assez bref —, vous dites ceci :
« Les officiers supérieurs opposés à Bagosora, soit ils ne pouvaient pas joindre leurs forces contre l’ennemi de longue date ou, alors, ils ne pensaient pas qu’ils pouvaient diriger un grand nombre de soldats dans le cadre d’un tel accord. Ils se sont plutôt tournés vers la communauté internationale pour obtenir un soutien.
Dallaire aura… aurait pu aider ce qu’il considérait comme la nouvelle armée, mais il était bloqué par le mandat et par le manque de matériel. Et Ndindiliyimana a exploré la possibilité d’un soutien étranger avec l’ambassadeur belge, dans la soirée du 7 avril. Et Rusatira avait des contacts avec des représentants des États-Unis et avec un général français à Paris.
Les diplomates à Kigali et leurs ministères au pays essayaient d’évacuer les citoyens de leur pays ; et personne n’avait des ressources pour empêcher Bagosora et pour, effectivement, empêcher le massacre des personnes au Rwanda. »
Vous avez écrit cela ?
[Q. This is not what you said earlier. In your report on the Bagosora case, on page 42 -- I can give you a copy, this paragraph is brief enough --, you say this here:
"The superior officers opposed to Bagosora, either they could not get their forces into battle with this long-standing enemy or, then, they didn't think they could direct a great number of their soldiers within the framework of such an accord. Instead they turned toward the international community to obtain support.
Dallaire could have . . . would have helped what he considered the new army, but he was blocked by his mandate and a lack of materiel. And Ndindiliyimana explored the possibility of foreign support with the Belgian ambassador, on the night of 7 April. And Rusatira made contact with representatives of the US and with a French General in Paris.
The diplomats in Kigali and their ministers to the country tried to evacuate their citizens from the country; and no one had the resources to stop Bagosora and to, effectively, stop people being massacred in Rwanda."
Did you write that?
R. Je crois que je l’ai écrit, mais j’aimerais dire ceci : Est-ce que ça fait partie du rapport écrit ou de la déposition ?
[A. I believe that I wrote that, but I would like to say this: Is that part of the written report or of the deposition?]
Q. Ça fait partie de votre rapport ; est-ce que vous pouvez… vous voulez voir une copie ?
[Q. That was part of your report; can you . . . do you want to see a copy?]
R. Ce n’est pas nécessaire.
[A. That's not necessary.]
Q. C’est ce que vous avez écrit dans votre rapport.
[Q. That's what you wrote in your report.]
L’INTERPRÈTE ANGLAIS-FRANÇAIS : [THE ENGLISH-FRENCH INTERPRETER:]
Une fois de plus, les interprètes insistent : Maître Black n’observe pas la pause, c’est impossible de travailler dans ces conditions.
[Once again, the interpreters must insist: Maitre Black is not observing the pause, it's impossible to work under these conditions.]
Me BLACK :
Q. Quand vous avez rédigé ce rapport dans le cadre de l’affaire Militaires I, vous considériez le général Ndindiliyimana comme l’une des personnes qui étaient en dissidence, ce dont vous avez parlé déjà.
[Q. When you wrote this report in the framework of the Military I case, did you consider General Ndindiliyimana to be one of the dissidents, of whom you have just spoken?]
R. Je ne crois pas que vous pouvez le dire. Ce dont nous avons parlé aujourd’hui, c’est ceux qui voulaient organiser une activité militaire continuelle.
[A. I don't believe that you can say that. What we have said today, it is those who wanted to organize a continuous military activity.]
Q. C’étaient les propos de Maître Taku, vous l’avez contredit ; vous avez utilisé le mot de « résistants », donc, ceux qui résistaient, c’est ce que vous avez dit. Donc, c’était l’un de ceux qui résistaient.
[Q. It was the remark of Maitre Taku, you contradicted it; you used the word 'resisters', so, those who resist, that's what you said. So, he was one of those who resisted.]
M. LE PRÉSIDENT :
Maître Black, il faut regarder la lumière dans la cabine des interprètes.
[Maitre Black, you must watch the light in the interpreters booth.]
Mme Des Forges:
R. Dans les premiers jours d’avril, il a semblé que le général Ndindiliyimana a fait des efforts pour organiser une certaine forme d’opposition. Dans des réunions, il s’opposait à Bagosora et a également, au surplus, fait des efforts pour sauver des vies.
[A. In the first days of April, it seemed that General Ndindiliyimana made efforts to organize a certain form of opposition. In the meetings, he opposed Bagosora and also, even more so, made efforts to save lives.]
Me BLACK :
Q. En fait, ce paragraphe est un extrait de votre livre, et je vous cite mot pour mot… Pouvez-vous expliquer à la Chambre pourquoi vous avez inclus ce paragraphe dans votre rapport sur l’affaire des Militaires et produit un rapport différent pour Ndindiliyimana ? Pourquoi Ndindiliyimana n’a pas bénéficié de ce commentaire dans son propre procès ?
[Q. In fact, this paragraphe is an extract from your book, and I cite you word for word. . . . Can you explain to the court why you included this paragraphe dans your report on the Officers' case and produced a different report for Ndindiliyimana? Why didn't Ndindiliyimana benefit from commentary in his own trial?]
R. La demande de préparation d’un rapport d’expertise pour cette affaire n’était pas très précise. Dans la demande initiale, je devais limiter le rapport à la période qui s’achevait au début… dans les premiers mois de 1994. Donc, je ne voulais rien inclure qui concernait la période après avril.
Lorsqu’on est revenu sur la demande, j’ai assez rapidement rédigé les dernières sections en faisant référence au premier texte… à la première version qui traitait de cette période. Alors, je pense que c’est la raison. Je n’avais pas l’intention de changer de position dans l’évaluation que j’ai faite du comportement du général Ndindiliyimana dans ces premiers jours et qui « est » la seule période durant laquelle j’avais des informations substantielles, il y a eu un changement de position.
[A. What was demanded in the preparation of an expert's report for that case was not very precise. The initial demand, I had to limit the report to the period that ended at the beginning . . . in the first months of 1994. So, I did not want to include anything that concerned the period after April.
When we got back to that requirement, I wrote it so quickly that the last sections referred to the first text . . . to the first version that treated of that period. So, I think that's the reason. I didn't intend to change positions in the evaluation that I made of General Ndindiliyimana's behavior in those first days, and which 'is' the only period during which I had substantial information, there was a change in position.]
Q. Vous avez également dit, à la page 41, du rapport sur l’affaire des Militaires, ce qui suit…
Vous êtes autorisés à faire une traduction libre.
« Gatsinzi dirigeait le bataillon… » Et vous parlez également de Bagosora ; ensuite vous avez parlé de Rusatira, Gatsinzi, Ndindiliyimana — et vous dites : « Gatsinzi dirigeait le bataillon qui était à Butare ; Ndindiliyimana commandait des milliers d’éléments de la police nationale. Mais avec la reprise de la guerre, certaines des troupes furent intégrées dans la structure de commandement de l’armée.
En outre, ces troupes n’avaient pas l’expérience du combat et n’avaient pas des armements lourds. En plus, « ils » avaient remis un grand nombre de leurs meilleures armes à la MINUAR dans le cadre du processus de démilitarisation de Kigali, alors que la Garde présidentielle n’avait remis aucune de ses armes. »
Vous avez dit cela dans votre rapport ?
[Q. You also said, on page 41 of the report on the Officers' case, the following . . .
You may do a loose translation.
"Gatsinzi led the battalion . . . " And you also speak of Bagosora; later you spoke of Rusatira, Gatsinzi, Ndindiliyimana -- and you say: "Gatsinzi led the battalion that was in Butare; Ndindiliyimana commanded the thousands of elements of national police. But with the return of the war, certain troops were integrated into the command structure of the Army.
What's more, these troops had no experience of combat and had no heavy arms. And 'they' had turned a large number of their best arms in to the UNAMIR in the campaign to demilitarize Kigali, while the presidential guard had turned in none of its weapons."
Did you say that in your report?
R. Je pense que vous êtes… c’est correct.
[A. I think you are . . . that is correct.]
Q. Vous l’avez extrait de votre rapport pour ce procès ?
[Q. Did you furnish an excerpt from your report for this trial?]
R. Je n’ai rien extrait. Je vais vous expliquer comment j’ai fait ce rapport sans référence consciente au rapport précédent : Étant donné qu’on ne m’avait pas remis des déclarations de témoins ou des procès-verbaux des audiences pour ce procès, donc, je ne me suis pas aventurée à commenter sur des événements que j’ignorais.
[A. I didn't excerpt anything. I'll explain to you how I made up this report without conscious reference to the preceding report: Given that I did not receive any of the witnesses' depositions or their interviews for this trial, I did not venture to comment on events about which I didn't know.]
Q. Vous avez jugé nécessaire de parler, de manière approfondie, de la position du général Ndindiliyimana lors de votre rapport dans le procès des Militaires, alors que dans son propre procès, vous avez omis de faire bénéficier les Juges de ces informations. Ne pensez-vous pas que vous ne rendez pas justice à Ndindiliyimana ? Si vous saviez que j’allais vous contre-interrroger, peut-être que vous l’auriez dit.
[Q. You found it necessary to speak, in depth, of the position of General Ndindiliyimana in your report for the first Officers' trial, yet in his own trial, you have not seen fit to give the Judges the benefits of your information. Don't you think you are doing an injustice to General Ndindiliyimana? If you had know that I was going to cross-examine you, perhaps you would have given it.]
R. Maître, ça fait partie des archives de ce Tribunal, ceci fait partie des écrits, c’est tombé dans le domaine public, et je n’ai jamais tenté de nier cette information qui fait partie des archives que l’histoire retiendra.
[A. Counselor, it is part of the Tribunal's archives, it's part of the writings, it's in the public domain, and I never tried to deny this information which is part of the archives that history retains.]
Q. N’aurait-il pas été plus facile de reproduire ces pages extraites de votre rapport dans l’affaire des Militaires ?
[Q. Was it easier to produce these pages extracted from your report in the Officers' case?]
R. Si j’avais eu le même mandat, c’est probablement ce que j’aurais fait, mais mon rapport n’a pas été préparé sur la base de ces… d’un tel mandat.
[A. If I had had the same instruction, that is probably what I would have done, but my report was not prepared on the basis of these . . . of such an instruction.]
Q. Avez-vous été… Est-ce que le Procureur vous avait… vous a demandé de ne pas extraire du rapport précédent…
[Q. Were you . . . Did the Prosecutor . . . ask you not to excerpt your previous report . . .]
R. Certainement pas. Mais, si on me l’avait demandé, j’aurais certainement refusé.
[A. Certainly not. But, if someone had asked that, I would most certainly have refused.]
M. BÂ :
Maître Black, est-ce qu’on peut avoir une copie du rapport dont vous parlez ?
[Maitre Black, could we have a copy of the report you're referring to?]
Me BLACK :
(Intervention non interprétée)
[No interpretation]
M. BÂ :
Je l’ai au bureau, mais si vous avez une copie disponible…
[I have it in my office, but if you have a copy available . . .]
Me BLACK :
O.K. Je peux vous donner des extraits et des pages où Ndindiliyimana est mentionné.
[O.K. I can give you some extracts and some pages where Ndindiliyimana is mentioned.]
M. BÂ :
Ah ! Je ne savais pas que vous aviez distribué des documents à cette fin. C’est une première. D’habitude…
[Ah! I didn't know that you had distributed these documents for this purpose. This is a first. Usually . . .]
M. JEGEDE :
Non, il n’a pas distribué de document, ce sont nos propres documents.
[No, he didn't distribute the document, these are own documents.]
(Rires dans la salle d’audience)
[Laughter in the courtroom]
Me BLACK :
Monsieur Bâ, si vous le souhaitez, j’ai des documents à votre disposition.
[Mr Bâ, if you wish, I have some documents to give you.]
M. JEGEDE :
Nous les avons, épargnez-vous cette peine.
[We have them, don't bother.]
Me BLACK :
Q. Vous conviendrez avec moi que c’était un officier modéré, mais vos conclusions sont étranges. Vous dites dans votre livre, à la page 193, version anglaise…
Et, excusez-moi, Messieurs, Mesdames les Interprètes ; vous allez devoir faire une traduction libre,
j’ai une copie.
[Q. You agree with me that he was a moderate officer, but your conclusions are strange. You say in your book, on page 193, the English version . . .
And, excuse me, Ladies and Gentlmen in the translation booth, you're going to have to do a loose translation, I have a copy.]
L’INTERPRÈTE ANGLAIS-FRANÇAIS : [English-French translators:]
Ce serait bien qu’on l’ait.
[That would be good to have.]
Me BLACK :
Vous dites ce qui suit à la… en bas de page : « Gatsinzi étant nominalement aux commandes des forces armées, lui, Rusatira et Ndindiliyimana ont cherché à retirer ce contrôle à Bagosora lorsque le comité de crise s’est réuni à la veille du 6 avril, ils lui ont refusé la présidence de la réunion. Il a insulté les autres, particulièrement Rusatira, et a boycotté le reste de la réunion.
Les autres ont dressé des plans pour mettre la Garde présidentielle sous contrôle et « de » mettre en place un Gouvernement sur la base des Accords d’Arusha. »
[Mr Black: You said the following on . . . at the bottom of the page: "Gatsinzi being putatively in command of the armed forces, he, Rusatira and Ndindiliyimana attempted to retake this control from Bagosora during the Crisis Committee meeting in the evening of 6 April, they refused to allow him to preside over the meeting. He insulted the others, especially Rusatira, and boycotted the rest of the meeting.
The others set out plans to bring the Presidential Guard under control and 'pull' the government into the framework of the Arusha Accords."]
Q. Vous avez écrit cela ?
[Q. Did you write that?]
R. Ça me semble familier. Pourquoi ne me donnez-vous pas la version anglaise ?
[A. That sounds familiar. Why don't you give me the English version?]
Q. Je le ferai. Vous, vous… En français ou en anglais ?
[Q. I will. You, you . . . In French or in English?]
R. C’est bien en anglais.
[A. In English is fine.]
Q. Et dans la même page, vous (inaudible) des mots qui figurent dans le rapport, notamment dans la remise des armes à la MINUAR ; et, à la page 195, vous répétez que Ndindiliyimana a rencontré l’ambassadeur belge pour requérir une assistance internationale afin de pouvoir contrôler la situation. Est-ce que cela n’atténue pas vos propos ? N’était-il pas un officier modéré ?
[Q. And on the same page, you (inaudible) some words that figure in the report, notably in the turning over of arms to the UNAMIR; and, on page 195, you repeat that Ndindiliyimana met the Belgian ambassador to ask for international assistance in order to be able to control the situation. That isn't a distortion of your remarks is it? Wasn't he a moderate officer?]
R. Maître, vous vous concentrez sur une courte période de temps.
[A. Counselor, you are concentrating on a short period of time.]
Q. Je suis d’accord.
[Q. I agree.]
R. Une période de trois mois. Et je vous dis que mes préoccupations ne concernaient pas ce qui a pu ou n’a pas pu se passer pendant cette période. On doit parler des événements antérieurs et postérieurs à cette période.
[A. A period of three months. And I told you that my preoccupation is not with what could or could not have happened during that period. We have to speak about the events before and after this period.]
Q. Très bien. À la page 268, vous mentionnez ceci :
« Bien que leur position n’était pas favorisée, certains officiers de haut rang ont essayé de mettre un terme aux attaques contre les civils le 6 avril. Rusatira a contacté le Premier Ministre intérimaire et le Ministre de la défense à Murambi pour leur dire que le départ du Gouvernement de Kigali avait entraîné des violences aussi bien à Kigali qu’à Gitarama, il les a incités à arrêter les tueries.
Six jours plus tard, Rusatira est revenu, c’était le 22, Rusatira a contacté Ndindiliyimana pour que l’on convainque les dirigeants politiques que le génocide démoralisait les troupes, l’armée. Ils ont dit que ces massacres allaient conduire à la défaite. »
Et vous dites que les politiciens avaient insisté… que les tueries avaient été faites en autodéfense.
Avez-vous écrit cela en référence à Ndindiliyimana ? Est-ce que cela n’atténue pas certaines de vos préoccupations quant à sa… aux positions que vous avez tenues ?
[Q. Very well. On page 268, you mention this:
"Whereas their position was not popular, certain high-ranking officers tried to put a stop to attacks on civilians on 6 April. Rusatira contacted the interim Prime Minister (Jean Kambanda?) and the Minister of Defense in Murambi in order to tell them that the government leaving Kigali had led to violence in Kigali as well as in Gitarama, he pushed them to put a stop to the killings.
Six days later, Rusatira returned, this was the 22nd, Rusatira contacted Ndindiliyimana to get him to convince the political leaders that the genocide was demoralizing the troops, the army. They said that these massacres were going to lead to their defeat."
And you said that the politicians insisted . . . the the killings were acts of self-defense.
Did you write that in reference to Ndindiliyimana? Does this diminish any of your preoccupations as to his . . . to the positions that you held?
R. En toute conscience, Maître, je ne peux pas dire que je suis convaincue de l’innocence d’une personne qui occupait un haut rang et dont… et pour « lequel » je n’ai pas mené de recherche sur ses actions. Et on m’a posé une question à propos de Rusatira : « Était-il sans reproche ? » J’ai dit que je ne pouvais pas dire s’il était innocent ou coupable.
[A. In good conscience, Counselor, I can not say that I am convinced of the innocence of anyone who held high office and whose . . . and about whom I did not conduct research into his actions. And you asked me a question about Rusatira: "Was he without sin?" I said that I could not say if he was innocent or guilty.]
Q. Et… Mais vous n’avez pas dit la même chose concernant Ndindiliyimana ? Mais vous n’avez… vous ne pouvez pas dire que vous n’êtes pas convaincue qu’il est coupable à 100 % ; vous pouvez également dire que vous ignorez tout de sa culpabilité.
[Q. And . . . But didn't you say the same thing about Ndindiliyimana? But you didn't . . . you can't say that you are convinced that he is !00% guilty; you can likewise say that you don't know everything about his guilt.]
R. C’est différent. Le chef d’état-major de la Gendarmerie était impliqué dans l’autodéfense civile. Rusatira, comme vous le savez, ne faisait pas partie de l’état-major. Ce plan — on en a discuté en audience — ce plan avait été identifié clairement par le Premier Ministre comme étant la base des tueries qui se sont déroulées. C’est une de mes préoccupations.
[A. It's different. The Chief of Staff of the Gendarmerie was involved in civilian self-defense. Rusatira, as you know, was not part of the General Staff. This set-up -- as we discussed in the interview -- this set-up was identified by the Prime Minister as being at the very heart of the killings that were taking place. This is one of my concerns.]
Q. Vous auriez pu avoir ces mêmes préoccupations concernant Gatsinzi et Rusatira, ils étaient dans l’armée. Et d’après ces actions… ces actions — Ndindiliyimana, Ndindiliyimana —, pendant ces jours, indiquent qu’il n’était pas… qu’il était opposé à ce plan et qu’il a toujours été opposé à ce plan.
[Q. You could have had these same concerns about Gasinzi and Rusatira, they were in the army. And by these actions . . . these actions -- Ndindiliyimana, Ndindiliyimana --, during these days, indicated that he was not . . . that he was opposed to this plan and that he always had been opposed to this plan.]
R. Yes. Pendant cette période, cela semblait être le cas, mais mes préoccupations touchent à la facette… à la période antérieure, mes préoccupations touchent également aux actions des gendarmes après le 6 avril, qui ont activement participé aux tueries dans bon nombre de localités au Rwanda. Le général Ndindiliyimana était l’officier supérieur de la Gendarmerie.
[A. Yes. During this period, that seemed to be the case, but my concerns were with that facet . . . of the period before, my concerns were also about the actions of the gendarmes after the 6 April, who actively participated in the killings in a large number of localities in Rwanda. General Ndindiliyimana was the superior officer of the Gendarmerie.]
Q. De même, Rusatira et Gatsinzi étaient des hauts commandants de l’armée ; et vous n’avez pas eu les mêmes préoccupations pour Rusatira et vous l’avez… vous avez aidé à son exonération ? Et je reviendrai à la Gendarmerie.
[Q. All the same, Rusatira and Gatsinzi were top commanders of the Army; and you didn't have the same concerns about Rusatira and you . . . you helped exonerate him?]
R. Avant d’aller plus loin, je voudrais que l’on soit clairs. J’ai expliqué que lorsque j’ai appris que le colonel Rusatira était sous le coup d’un Acte d’accusation, j’avais des informations à ma disposition qui indiquaient qu’il y avait des contrevérités dans l’Acte d’accusation.
C’est parce que l’Acte d’accusation ne faisait référence qu’à une période de trois heures. Et, étant donné que j’avais des documents qui indiquaient, de manière précise, où se trouvait Rusatira pendant ces trois heures, j’aurais été négligente, en tant que personne humaine et en tant que militante des droits de l’homme, si j’avais conservé ces informations par-devers moi, si je n’avais pas agi. J’ai remis ces informations au Procureur en lui disant que détenir Rusatira serait indécent et illégal.
[A. Before going too far, I would like us to be clear. I explained that when I learned that Colonel Rusatira was being charged with a crime, I had information at my disposition that indicated that there were untruths in these charges.
It's because these charges referred only to a period of three hours. And given that I had documents that indicated, in a precise way, where Rusatira had been during those three hours, I would have been negligent, as a human being as well as as a militant for Human Rights, if I had kept this information to myself, if I hadn't acted. I gave this information to the Prosecutor, telling him that to hold Rusatira would be indecent and illegal.]
Q. Dans votre lettre au Procureur, je suis sûr que vous n’avez pas suggéré que ces accusations n’étaient pas correctes, mais qu’il pouvait être coupable.
[Q. In your letter to the Prosecutor, I am sure that you didn't suggest that these charges were not right, but that he could be guilty.]
R. Maître Black, vous ne pouvez pas savoir ce que j’ai écrit dans ma lettre.
[A. Maitre Black, you can not know what I wrote in my letter.]
Q. Mais vous nous avez dit que vous avez écrit, envoyé une correspondance au Procureur ; et je suis sûr que ce que je vous oppose, vous ne l’avez pas écrit, vous n’aviez pas le moyen de le savoir. Si vous voulez la lettre, il y a des procédures établies, cette lettre n’est pas votre affaire. Nous sommes dans un procès pénal.
[Q. But you told us that you wrote, sent a correspondence to the Prosecutor; and I am sure that what I suggested to you, you did not write, you had no way of knowing. If you want the letter, there a established procedures, this letter is not your private business. We are involved in a criminal trial.]
R. Et je n’ai pas écrit cette lettre contre votre Accusé.
[A. And I did not write this letter against your client.]
Q. Vous avez parlé de cette lettre, je suis en train d’attaquer votre crédibilité.
Passons à autre chose. Je vais vous lire quelque chose d’autre. Page 269, vous dites ceci :
« À la mi-avril, le général Ndindiliyimana et le colonel Gatsinzi ainsi que Rusatira ont convoqué Gaspard Gahigi « à » la RTLM ainsi que Jean-François Nsengiyumva de Radio Rwanda, à l’École militaire de Kigali. Il semble que les autorités leur ont dit que la radio devait arrêter d’inciter à la violence contre les Tutsis et de discréditer les militaires.
Ruggiu a contesté les intentions de Rusatira qui contactait régulièrement Dallaire. Et dans une autre annonce, la RTLM a incité pour qu’on attaque Ndindiliyimana que l’on accusait d’avoir transporté des éléments du FPR, on a même indiqué sa plaque d’immatriculation et, pourtant, il a aidé des Tutsis à s’échapper. »
Avez-vous écrit cela ?
[Q. You spoke of this letter, I am attacking your credibility.
Let's move on to something else. I am going to read you something else. Page 269, you say this:
"In mid-April, General Ndindiliyimana and Colonel Gatsinzi as well as Rusatira met with Gaspard Gahigi 'of' RTLM along with Jean-François Nsengiymva of Radio Rwanda, at the Military Academy in Kigali. It seems that the authorities told them that the radio must stop inciting violence against the Tutsis and discrediting the soldiers.
Ruggiu questioned the intentions of Rusatira who was in regular contact with Dallaire. And in another announcement, RTLM urged an attack on Ndindiliyimana whom they accused of having transported elements of the RPF, going so far as to give his license number and, more importantly, that he'd helped Tutsis to escape."
Did you write that?
R. Oui. J’ai déjà fait des commentaires sur cela il y a quelques minutes.
[A. Yes. I already commented on this a few minutes ago.]
Q. N’est-ce pas que ce sont des actions, des actes qui ont été posés par un homme que l’on accuse de génocide ?
[Q. Are these the actions, the acts of someone we'd accuse of genocide?]
R. C’étaient des actes qui n’étaient pas continus, qui… certaines personnes qui ont participé au génocide ont également sauvé des Tutsis. Donc, on ne peut pas parler… si vous voulez discuter sur la continuité, c’est votre affaire.
[A. These were acts that did not continue, that . . . certain people who participated in the genocide also saved some Tutsis. So, we can't speak . . . if you want to discuss the continuity, that's up to you.]
Q. Je vais vous presser sur cette question. Est-ce que quelqu’un… Est-ce que ces actions inscrites dans la continuité, on peut les opposer à quelqu’un qui a essayé de sauver des vies ?
[Q. I am going to press you on this question. Is someone . . . Are these actions that continued, can we ascribe these actions to someone who tried to save lives?
R. Oui, ces actions pouvaient être cohérentes et continues en ce qu’elles ont aidé à sauver des Tutsis.
[A. Yes, these actions could be consistent and continuous on the part of those who helped save Tutsis.]
Q. Page 270, vous poursuivez… Je ne vais pas lire tout le paragraphe. Vous dites :
« Le 29 avril, le chef de l’état-major de l’armée a adressé une lettre au Ministre de la défense, se plaignant que la Gendarmerie n’était pas très efficace aux combats ; et il y avait des sentiments hostiles entre les officiers. Et ces sentiments ont été exacerbés par la RTLM qui accusait la police d’être tolérante… trop tolérante envers les Tutsis. »
L’avez-vous écrit ?
[Q. Page 270, you go on . . . I'm not going to read the whole paragraph. You say:
"29 April, the Chief of Staff of the Army addressed a letter to the Minister of Defense, complaining that the Gendarmerie was not very effective in combat; and there were some hostile feelings between the officers. And these feelings were exacerbated by RTLM accusing the police of being tolerant . . . too tolerant toward the Tutsis."
You wrote that?
R. Oui.
[A. Yes.]
Q. Donc, à travers votre livre, le général Ndindiliyimana est décrit comme quelqu’un qui était modéré ? En me fondant sur les informations contenues dans votre livre, je ne fais pas de spéculation.
[Q. So, throughout your book, General Ndindiliyimana is described as someone who was moderate? Based on the information in your book, I am not speculating.]
R. Bon nombre de Rwandais m’ont encouragée à ne pas utiliser le mot « modérés », en décrivant des militaires ou des personnes appartenant à un groupe ethnique quelconque, en raison des implications que cela génère.
Pour ce qui ne tombe pas dans… sous cette étiquette, je me suis concentrée sur des actes et les actes dont nous venons de… les actions dont nous venons de parler découlent d’informations honnêtes et fiables sur le comportement du général Ndindiliyimana à cette époque.
[A. A goodly number of Rwandans encouraged me not to use the work 'moderates', in writing about the officers or of people belonging to whatever ethnic group, because of the implications it generated.
For those who didn't fall into . . . didn't fit that category, I concentrated on the acts and the acts which we come to . . . the actions which we come to speak of as flowing from honest and reliable information on the behavior of General Ndindiliyimana during this period.]
Q. Je vais vous lire un autre passage, extrait du rapport dans l’affaire Bagosora, sur l’opposition à l’armée, et vous citer une lettre du 12.
Je m’excuse auprès des interprètes.
Vous avez commencé par parler de Bagosora, de l’installation d’un Gouvernement intérimaire, et vous dites également… parlez de l’opposition des dirigeants militaires et vous dites : « Le 12 avril… »
[Q. I am going to read another passage, extracted from the report in the Bagosora case, on the opposition in the Army, and you cite a letter of the 12th.
I beg the pardon of the interpreters.
You began by speaking of Bagosora, of the installation of the Interim Government, and you speak also . . . you speak of the opposition of the military leader and you say: "The 12th of April . . ." Page 46.
M. JEGEDE :
Quelle page ?
[What page?]
Me BLACK :
Page 46. Rapport dans l’affaire Bagosora, titre : « Opposition militaire ».
Monsieur Jegede, est-ce que vous avez ce rapport ?
[Page 46. Report in the Bagosora case, titled: "Military Opposition".
Mr. Jegede, do you have this report?"]
M. JEGEDE :
Yes.
[Yes.]
Me BLACK :
Vous dites : « Le 12 avril, Rusatira qui s’était présenté devant des diplomates étrangers comme l’agent de liaison du nouveau Gouvernement trois jours plus tôt, a décidé qu’il devait être mis… il devait essayer d’arrêter les massacres. Ce jour-là, il a escorté des douzaines de personnes qu’il abritait chez lui — à Kigali — à Gitarama.
En route, Rusatira a vu plusieurs cadavres, y compris ceux des deux policiers… deux gendarmes qui avaient été abattus parce qu’ils étaient tutsis ou parce qu’ils avaient essayé de défendre des civils. À Gitarama, il est allé à la recherche des dirigeants politiques pour les persuader d’arrêter les tueries.
Lorsque Rusatira est arrivé à Kigali, il a fait en sorte que neuf autres officiers signent un document qu’il a signé… à signer un document.
La déclaration a été diffusée à la radio, appelant à la fin de cette tragédie et, ceci, sans l’accord du Gouvernement. Ils ont pensé qu’une trêve avec le FPR pouvait contribuer à la mise en place d’un Gouvernement de transition à base élargie et d’éviter le bain de sang inutile. »
Vous poursuivez : « Cet effort est arrivé trop tard. Bagosora et ses supporters ont été outragés par cette initiative et en ont conclu que Rusatira était un traître. Rusatira a été informé qu’un escadron de garde devait… avait été commis pour l’assassiner et il s’est caché. Un peu plus tard, Rwabakuba, un leader du MDR, Shingoro (phon.), Bonoyumbutwa (phon.) ont dénoncé le contenu de la déclaration. »
Et vous avez une note en bas de page et, dans la note de bas de page 133 (sic), vous dites :
« Ndindiliyimana avait, semble-t-il, appuyé la déclaration. »
[Me Black: You say: "The 12th of April, Rusatira, who had presented himself to foreign diplomats as an agent of the new Government three days before, decided that there must be an end . . . there must be an attempt to put a stop to the massacres. On this day, he escorted dozens of people whom he'd sheltered at his place -- to Kigali -- to Gitarama.
En route, Rusatira saw several corpses, including those of two police officers . . . two gendarmes who had been killed because they were Tutsis or because they had tried to defend civilians. In Gitarama, he went looking for political leaders to persuade them to stop the killings.
When Rusatira got to Kigali, he saw to it that nine other officers signed a document that he had signed . . . to sign a document.
The declaration was broadcast on the radio, calling for an end to this tragedy and, this was done without the agreement of the Government. They thought that a truce with the RPF would help put a broad-based transition government in place and avoid a needless bloodbath."
You go on: "This effort came too late. Bagosora and his supporters were outraged by this initiative and concluded that Rusatira was a traitor. Rusatira was informed that a squadron of guards must . . . had been ordered to assassinate him and he went into hiding. A little later, Rwabakuba, a leader of the MDR, Shingor (phon.), Bonoyumbutwa (phon.) denounced the contents of the declaration."
And you have a footnote and in the footnote on page 133 (sic), you say:
"Ndindiliyimana, it seems, supported the declaration."]
L’INTERPRÈTE ANGLAIS-FRANÇAIS : [English-French interpreter:]
Maître Black devrait remettre une copie, ne serait-ce qu’en anglais, aux interprètes.
[Maitre Black should have given a copy, if only in English, to the interpreters.]
Me BLACK :
Q. Vous avez écrit cela ?
[Q. You wrote that?]
R. Oui, je l’ai fait.
[A. Yes, I did.]
M. BÂ :
C’est la question que j’allais vous poser : Est-ce que Ndindiliyimana a signé cette déclaration ?
[This is the question I was going to ask you: Did Ndindiliyimana sign that declaration?]
L’INTERPRÈTE ANGLAIS-FRANÇAIS : [English-French interpreters:]
Votre micro, Monsieur Bâ.
[Your mike, Mr Bâ.]
M. BÂ :
La question que j’allais vous poser, c’était : Est-ce qu’il était dit dans ce passage que Ndindiliyimana avait signé cette déclaration ?
[The question I was going to ask you was: Did it say in that passage whether Ndindiliyimana signed that declaration?]
Me BLACK :
Dans la note de bas de page, il semble que Ndindiliyimana était en faveur de la déclaration. Je peux vous remettre cette lettre.
[In the footnote, it seems that Ndindiliyimana was in favor of the declaration. I can give you this letter.]
M. BÂ :
Elle n’est pas signée par Ndindiliyimana.
[It is not signed by Ndindiliyimana.]
L’INTERPRÈTE ANGLAIS-FRANÇAIS : [English-French interpreter:]
Est-ce que Maître Black peut remettre une copie de ce document en anglais aux interprètes ?
Monsieur Bâ, Monsieur… Monsieur Bâ, demandez qu’on nous remette une copie, ne serait-ce qu’en anglais.
[Could Maitre Black give a copy of this document in English to the interpreters?
Mr Bâ, Mr . . . Mr Bâ, ask someone to give us a copy, even if only in English.]
M. BÂ :
Et vous savez bien… Mais, je ne veux commenter, on le fera plus tard.
[And you know well . . . But, I don't want to comment, we will do that later.]
Me BLACK :
Q. C’est une preuve que la position du général Ndindiliyimana était qu’il était opposé au génocide et aux massacres des Tutsis. Et il a tout fait pour essayer de stopper cela, tout au moins, ce jour-là ; n’est-ce pas ?
[Q. This is proof that the position of General Ndindiliyimana was that he was opposed to the genocide and to the massacres of Tutsis. And that in fact he did everything to stop this, at least, on this day; is that not so?]
R. Les actions que nous avons évoquées sont des actions qui peuvent être interprétées dans ce sens. Étaient-ce les seules actions à ce moment-là, ou avant ou après ? Bon, ça reste une question ouverte pour moi.
[A. The actions that we have brought up are action that could be interpreted in this sense. Were they the only actions at this particular moment, or before or after? Fine, that remains an open question to me.]
Q. O.K.
[Q. O.K.]
(Diffusion d’un signal sonore)[A bell sounds] --The fire alarm
M. LE PRÉSIDENT :
(Intervention non interprétée)
[Not interpreted]
(Suspension de l’audience : 17 heures) [Court is adjourned at 5:00 pm]
(Pages 53 à 70 prises et transcrites par Pius Onana, s.o.)
{12 October 2006}
WITNESS
For the Prosecution:
ALISON DES FORGES
Cross-examination by Mr. Black (continued)… 1
P R O C E E D I N G S
MR. PRESIDENT:
Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. The Court is in session.
Appearances as before.
Yes, Mr. Black.
ALISON DES FORGES,
CROSS‑EXAMINATION (continued)
BY MR. BLACK:
Q. Dr. Des Forges, I just want to continue with the discussion we had yesterday which was interrupted by the fire alarm. In your book, you make reference at page 153 to answers to questions submitted to Major General Dallaire by the judge advocate general of the military court in Belgium. So, did you have a copy of that entire question and answer session when you reviewed it? Was it complete, as far as you know, or can you remember? Because we have ‑‑ we have part of it. We hadn't seen the whole thing.
A. I don't recall having the impression that it was complete. My impression ‑‑ my recollection is that the document of perhaps 15 to 20 pages, certainly not something in hundreds of pages, but I do recall having an impression that it was only partial.
Q. All right. Perhaps I interrupt you ‑‑
MR. BLACK:
Mr. President, the Prosecution has ‑‑ or I obtained from them what they disclosed to us on a CD‑ROM, that question and answer session with General Dallaire, but it ends at page 35, just when it starts getting interesting for us. And it doesn't continue past that on the CD‑ROM, so I am asking Mr. Bâ if he can provide us with the rest of it. We have up to page 35, at which point there is a question, number 3 to General Dallaire, what contacts did he have with Augustin Ndindiliyimana and so on, but that is truncated. So we would like them to provide us with the rest. They must have it somewhere. If they could undertake to do that, that would be very helpful.
MR. BÂ:
When was that disclosed to you? When was that made available to you?
MR. BLACK:
I am not sure. It is on one of those many CD‑Roms we have had, but it's ‑‑ I will give you the K‑number.
MR. BÂ:
Yes, give the K‑number.
MR. BLACK:
I can give you a copy as well.
MR. PRESIDENT:
He said they received only part.
MR. BLACK:
K0078808, it is 35 pages, but the pages which concern General Ndindiliyimana have been removed.
MR. BÂ:
(Microphone not activated)
THE ENGLISH INTERPRETER:
Microphone.
MR. BÂ:
It is not usual for us to disclose and then hold back anything, but I will check. I will check if there are some pages missing. I will check.
MR. BLACK:
Thank you, because it may be when they put them onto the CD‑ROM they missed some pages, I don't know. But I will try and work with what I have got.
BY MR. BLACK:
Q. Perhaps I can ‑‑ I will put this to you, Dr. Des Forges, (Inaudible) ... I am going to ask you a series of questions and I am not going to make any tricks. I am going to ask you a series of questions that ‑‑ since you do have some remaining concerns about General Ndindiliyimana's role during the war, you don't know everything about what he did. I am going to put to you some other facts and ask you if that would be consistent with what I suggested yesterday that he would not ‑‑
MR. JEGEDE:
Sorry, Mr. Black, what is the connection of this document with page 5 -- 530, of 'Leave None to Tell the Story'?
MR. BLACK:
I am sorry, page 153. There is a footnote in which she refers to this document in one of her sources. So I am sure she had the whole thing, but at some point ‑‑ but we don't have it.
BY MR. BLACK:
Q. Anyway, Dr. Des Forges, I am sorry. I remember your saying you may have some concerns about somebody with a high command responsibility like General Ndindiliyimana, but let me just start this exercise.
In ‑‑ and I can show you this page, if you want. Perhaps the first page doesn't concern us. It's the second page, which is page 35 of that question and answer session, and ‑‑
MR. PRESIDENT:
Just an observation. Yesterday I think one of the counsels produced this document which ‑‑
MR. BLACK:
(Inaudible) the same document.
MR. PRESIDENT:
‑‑ the last, it bears K‑number K0232089 ‑‑
MR. BLACK:
I think that's ‑‑ you got that confused, but Judge Hikmet seems to have the right one. I think that one you've got is not the right one. I am sorry, sir. Maybe you can ‑‑
BY MR. BLACK:
Q. Anyway, Dr. Des Forges, just for the record, I would read this because it has to be shown on the record. The question asked of General Dallaire by the judge advocate general was as follows: "What contacts did he have with Augustin Ndindiliyimana? What did Mr. Ndindiliyimana say during those encounters? What position did Mr. Ndindiliyimana take after the attack on the presidential airplane, and what does Major Dallaire know about the role played by Mr. Ndindiliyimana in the subsequent events? When did Mr. Ndindiliyimana learn that the blue helmets were in difficulties, and what did he do at that time?
In response, Dallaire says: "The force commander held regular contacts with Mr. Ndindiliyimana, the chief of staff of the gendarmerie, a moderate who had relations with both moderate and hardliner political leaders. Mr. Ndindiliyimana appeared to the force commander to be sincere "‑‑ sorry.
MR. BÂ:
Counsel Black, I think you are reading too fast.
MR. BLACK:
You have copies. I will try and read it more slowly.
BY MR. BLACK:
Q. "Mr. Ndindiliyimana appeared to the force commander to be sincere, when on 7th April 1994, he told him that they were doing all they could to save the Belgian soldiers in Camp Kigali."
Next paragraph: "The chief of staff was known to the force commander as an intelligent and cooperative officer who seemed genuinely loyal to the peace process. The force commander received information which possibly linked the chief of staff with the weapons cache. However, his involvement with the affair was never confirmed. After receipt of that information, the force commander treated the chief of staff with certain elements of suspicion. During the war he saved a number of Rwandans and was always as responsible as possible to the force commander. The chief of staff fled in late June as extremists were eliminating suspected moderates and he was being targeted."
And then he gets into the details and then it is truncated. So we don't know the rest of it. But again, there weren't ‑‑ perhaps I would just go through a series of things and then put to you a general question, if that is okay with you? . . . I would like to read to you. You said ‑‑ excuse me. I had also a letter ‑‑
MR. BÂ:
Counsel Black ‑‑ Mr. President, why should this witness answer to what General Dallaire thinks or says? General Dallaire is somebody who is a scheduled witness, a Prosecution witness. If you have to read Dallaire's writings, you might wish to read what he says about General Ndindiliyimana in his book, and then you also said it is not complete. You don't know what is at the end. I can produce pages, quite significant, quite relevant, who was always after Bagosora, who represented, as far as he was concerned, an enigma. You could read those sections. You have the book. Everyone knows that your client was one who was playing on both sides of the fence, who was associating with everyone, hook line and sinker.
MR. BLACK:
Mr. President, I am going to ask them to be sanctioned for getting up and giving a speech like that and testifying. Interfering with my cross‑examination is totally improper and totally prejudicial to my client.
MR. PRESIDENT:
Yes, Counsel, I think it is not proper to say what Dallaire says from the Bench. If Dallaire is coming as scheduled to come, let him say what he has to say.
MR. BLACK:
It's the last comment he threw that he knows that ‑‑ he says my client was playing a double game, that's totally prejudicial and totally false. Man, I am going ‑‑ I am going to be very angry ‑‑ I am sorry, Mr. President, I am going to be angry and lose my temper if he keeps on ‑‑
MR. BÂ:
Oh, yeah, you can get angry. Please do get angry. What Dallaire says is in the public domain; and secondly, Dallaire is the proper person to say what he thinks of Ndindiliyimana. So why are we trying to put the question to someone to say what is her opinion on Ndindiliyimana?
MR. PRESIDENT:
I think, Mr. Black ‑‑
MR. BLACK:
I am not complaining about General Ndindiliyimana's comments ‑‑
MR. PRESIDENT:
Mr. Black, I think so far you have got something favourable from this witness. So is it advisable to probe deep into it?
MR. BLACK:
Yes, because ‑‑
MR. PRESIDENT:
View it as it is and get the benefit.
MR. BLACK:
I am going to do that, and I have no problem with General Dallaire. My problem is Mr. Bâ's statement.
MR. JEGEDE:
Your Honour, Mr. Bâ has not said anything that is out of line with what he has read out. Here he says the force commander (microphones overlapping) ... information which possibly linked the chief of staff with weapons cache.
MR. BLACK:
No, no. This can't be allowed. He is interpreting my own questions.
MR. JEGEDE:
No, no, it's not ‑‑ it has nothing to do with your questions.
THE ENGLISH INTERPRETER:
This is difficult to interpret, Mr. President.
MR. BÂ:
(Microphones overlapping)
MR. PRESIDENT:
Okay. Mr. Bâ, take your seat.
MR. BÂ:
Mr. President, I know you don't want me to speak. But in the documents it is also said that he was in touch with the hardliners.
MR. PRESIDENT:
Well, Counsel, I think ‑‑
MR. BLACK:
(Inaudible) taken and –
MR. PRESIDENT:
Mr. Black, you must not get involved in this. You have a job to do, please do it.
MR. BLACK:
Please, can you try and control your side? All right.
BY MR. BLACK:
Q. Now, let me just (inaudible) Dr. Des Forges, and see if you can help me. Is she coming back? I can't see her overhead. We will do it the hard way. I was trying to save you time, Dr. Des Forges, so I will do it the long way.
What I just read to you from the statement by General Dallaire in response to those questions, would it also be consistent with a man who had ‑‑ was not part of the conspiracy to commit genocide, had no intention of committing genocide or tolerating such crimes, would that be consistent -- apart from the reference of the weapons cache, of course?
A. The characterisation that Dallaire gives is of someone who appears to have relations with both sides. In having relations with the group that Dallaire has characterised as hardliners, what exactly was the comportment of General Ndindiliyimana? To what extent was he or did he appear compliant with them in their plans and their strategies? That is something that I cannot say. All I can say is that there were indications from the documents that established the so‑called plan for civilian self‑defence, that they were counting on the cooperation of the gendarmerie force commander. There were people excluded from their planning, including the prime minister, but there were people who were included, like the commander of the gendarmerie.
Now, when the situation came to actuality, would he then back away from the position that they thought he held? Did he not really hold that position? What position did he hold? I cannot say.
Q. Well, we are going to get into his involvement or noninvolvement in the civil defence later. But just that last line on paragraph 78, that the chief of staff fled in late June as extremists were eliminating suspected moderates and he was being targeted, wouldn't that indicate that it would be consistent with his role as a so‑called moderate, quote and unquote, that he was being targeted and had to flee the country?
MR. JEGEDE:
Your Honours, that's assuming if the statements were to be true. You also have to add that rider. You can't put it as an absolute.
MR. BLACK:
Well, since you called General Dallaire as a Prosecution witness (inaudible) credibility, so you can attack it now.
MR. PRESIDENT:
(Microphones overlapping) … without any malice, I will say that when a person tries to play football, sometimes you get played out by both sides.
MR. BLACK:
This is General Dallaire's statement, not my man's statement. This is General Dallaire's statement. That is his view of the situation. All right.
BY MR. BLACK:
Q. Okay. And I have a letter dated June 25th, 1995, by Gatsinzi to Professor Reyntjens.
A. Excuse me, Counsel, did you want me to answer that question or has that ‑‑
Q. (Microphones overlapping) ... interrupted, but you can go on and say something else, if you wish.
A. No, I had not commented on that final line which you read.
Q. I was going to say, wouldn't that indicate what General Dallaire says is true, that that would indicate that General Ndindiliyimana was one of these so‑called moderates?
A. It would certainly indicate that he was taken as an opponent or an enemy by the people who then controlled the regime. On what basis he was taken as an opponent or enemy, would still be in question in my mind. Was it because he was seen as a moderate who attempted to stop the genocide? Was it because he was from Butare and they preferred only a certain crew of people from Butare and he was not among them? What exactly was the basis of their opposition to him? Although the overwhelming division and question that people were forced to take a position on was the question of killing or not killing Tutsis. There were other cross-currents that had to do with regional and political loyalties, and there were people from the MRND and the MDR, for example, who were agreed on the genocide, but were busy trying to knock each other off for partisan political reasons. So it was an extremely fluid political situation. I think -- in general, yes, it is not unfair to suggest that he was being targeted because he was seen -- I think it is completely justified to say he was being targeted because he was seen as an opponent to the people in power. But I cannot conclude from that that that was the reason he was seen as an opponent to the people in power.
Q. Okay. Fair enough. Perhaps I can help you with that. This letter from Gatsinzi to Professor Reyntjens in June 25th, 1995, I am going to read you some handwritten -- and very bad handwriting about – page 18, he states that "Regarding the April 12th letter -- he confirms that ‑‑ I will try and read it with my bad French.
MR. BÂ:
Please, could you just show us what you are reading? Could you show us?
MR. BLACK:
I can't show you this document. I can show you the page, if you wish, but not the rest of the letter.
MR. JEGEDE:
Your Honour, that is completely inappropriate. You can't read something into the record ‑‑
MR. BLACK:
Yes, I can.
MR. JEGEDE:
‑‑ that we don't know the provenance of the document. We don't even know whether it is your own product.
MR. BLACK:
Oh, it comes from you.
MR. JEGEDE:
So what is it?
MR. BLACK:
I just told you. Weren't you listening?
Mr. President, tell him to wake up. It is a letter dated June 25th, 1995, from Gatsinzi to
Professor Reyntjens supplied by ‑‑
THE ENGLISH INTERPRETER:
Slowly, slowly, please for the interpreters.
MR. PRESIDENT:
Is it reproduced in Professor Reyntjens' book or –
MR. BLACK:
I don't know. It makes reference to it in another –
MR. PRESIDENT:
So how do we know it is Gatsinzi's letter?
MR. BLACK:
Well, this is what ‑‑ I don't have ‑‑ I am not trying to deposit the document. I am not filing the document, I am just referring to the letter.
MR. JEGEDE:
You can't read it on to the record.
MR. BLACK:
I can. I can say anything by any witness anywhere, it actually ‑‑
MR. JEGEDE:
(Inaudible)
MR. BLACK:
Oh, stop it. This is crazy.
MR. JEGEDE:
That is not allowed. You can't read it on to the record.
MR. BLACK:
Yes, I can. I know you are afraid of it, you don't want a fair trial ‑‑
MR. JEGEDE:
(Inaudible)
MR. PRESIDENT:
Nothing is getting into the record if you try to argue this way. So you ‑‑
MR. BLACK:
I am saying I got a letter from Gatsinzi to Reyntjens. It is produced by them to me.
MR. JEGEDE:
Your Honours, I know ‑‑
MR. BLACK:
Just a minute. I am not filing it as an exhibit, and you referred to it with another witness, and it was allowed. There was no objection. I read it before. I read the same passage with the Prosecution witness several months ago, and they had no objection.
MR. JEGEDE:
Your Honours, there is no way a document that is used by counsel can go into the record on his own steam without going through the proper channels of admissibility. We have to look at the document. We have to know what it is before it is admitted.
MR. BLACK:
All right. I will just do it out of my head.
MR. PRESIDENT:
Carry on, that is okay.
BY MR. BLACK:
Q. Professor ‑‑ Colonel Gatsinzi at that time ‑‑
MR. BÂ:
And I would add that the witness is not bound to answer if she doesn't have the document before her. She may keep quiet if you don't show her the document; that doesn't explain anything.
MR. PRESIDENT:
Counsel is not going into the document now, he is only suggesting.
BY MR. BLACK:
Q. Anyway, Dr. Des Forges, in this letter which -- maybe you have also seen, Gatsinzi confirms that General Ndindiliyimana was an intended signatory of the letter of April 12th, and that he could not sign it because he was down south involved in other activities, but he confirms that, in fact, Ndindiliyimana heard about the letter, became aware of the letter, totally supported its issuance and the content. And then he states -- concerning him particularly, he says that, in brief, General Ndindiliyimana was very correct as an officer and he even saved the lives of many people threatened by others in the war, and he was a partisan, a dialoguer and a moderate. I can show you the letter.
MR. BÂ:
Mr. President, is it Counsel Black testifying? This is a document no one sees. He reads what he wants to read, nobody understands, and that's going on to the record? Is he testifying? Then show us the document.
MR. PRESIDENT:
Right. Counsel, if you want something to be admitted ‑‑
MR. BLACK:
I don't want it to be admitted. I am using it as a reference to cross‑examine her.
MR. PRESIDENT:
But still we don't know who has written it, the authenticity of the document.
MR. BLACK:
Is there ‑‑ is there Prosecution Witness E1?
MR. PRESIDENT:
Someone may have sent a letter to them and -- they are under obligation to give it to you.
MR. BLACK:
That's right. So we purport there is a letter from Gatsinzi to Professor Reyntjens and that I can show it to the witness.
MR. JEGEDE:
Your Honour, the problem here is –
MR. BLACK:
The problem here, Mr. President, is that they are interfering with my cross‑examination because they are afraid of what's in this document.
MR. PRESIDENT:
Well, Counsel, if you give the document to them, there is no problem, just to desist from the purpose of examining it, that is all.
MR. BLACK:
They can see it, but I want her to see it, too.
And don't lose my markers, please. (Microphone not activated)
MR. PRESIDENT:
Counsel, if the Defence uses the document and fails to produce it, you are entitled to produce it if you think that there is something to be produced.
MR. BLACK:
They can call Gatsinzi and examine him on that. That is Gatsinzi's statement to them.
I am referring to two passages in that letter.
MR. PRESIDENT:
Yes, we could have avoided all this if you had given them ‑‑ you should have told them earlier that you were going to use that document.
MR. BLACK:
There are certain reasons that I want to do this and I don't agree with signalling to the Prosecution my cross‑examination. I have never done that in my entire life and I wouldn't do it now.
BY MR. BLACK:
Q. Anyway, Dr. Des Forges, maybe we can save some time if you remember what I read. Assuming what I read is ‑‑ assuming that letter is authentic and assuming what I read was correct, would that also alleviate any concerns about General Ndindiliyimana's role as expressed by General Dallaire, that he was trying to stop people from being killed and was a party to that April 12th letter?
A. Counsel, this is not new information for me, and ‑‑
Q. Maybe for the Judges it is.
A. Fine. But your question was, did this make it easier for me to adopt a certain position, and my answer is that it does not materially change things for me because I was aware of this information before this whole affair began.
Q. But it does go, doesn't it, to adding on the balance scales, adding to the side of the scales which indicate that General Ndindiliyimana was opposed to killings by the so‑called hardliners or extremists? How do you want to term it?
MR. JEGEDE:
Asked and answered, Your Honour. The witness has answered the question sufficiently.
MR. BLACK:
Not necessarily ‑‑ we don't use those terms.
MR. JEGEDE:
Your Honours, the witness has answered the question.
MR. BLACK:
What was the answer? What was the answer?
MR. JEGEDE:
It means nothing to her. This document means nothing to her.
MR. BLACK:
Stop trying to give her things to say. Stop trying to put answers into her mouth, Mr. Jegede. She's not that stupid, she is a very intelligent woman who can't be manipulated by you.
MR. JEGEDE:
Your Honours ‑‑
MR. PRESIDENT:
At no time, I don't think anyone can try to manipulate her. (Microphones overlapping) ... you ‑‑
MR. JEGEDE:
Your Honours ‑‑
BY MR. BLACK:
Q. I am sorry. So you were going to say, Dr. Des Forges ‑‑
A. If you recall, yesterday I said that the actions which I knew about concerning General Ndindiliyimana for the very brief period when I knew of his actions, which was mostly in early April, not exclusively, but mostly in early April, seem to me a period when he was not in favour of the genocide. So this is part of the information I took into account when I was making a conclusion, and it does not deal with my concerns about other periods and other actions.
Q. Okay. Do you remember you used to have a copy -- in case the Prosecution can't produce the rest of General Dallaire's question and answer session, do you still have a copy of that document, that we could possibly get from you in your records somewhere?
A. I should have what I originally had, yes. It came from the Belgians.
Q. All right.
A. And I think we should get it from them also, but I am certainly happy to look and see if I can locate it.
Q. If we can't get it from the Belgians, we could maybe contact you later, it would be helpful.
MR. BLACK:
Are you finished with that letter?
BY MR. BLACK:
Q. You've read a ‑‑ have you read General Dallaire's book in either English or French,
'Shake Hands with the Devil'?
A. I did read it, yes.
Q. Okay. I just want to ask you if you were aware of certain passages, because you had certain concerns about his justification or other justifications for not being able to do certain things.
At page 190 in the English version, General Dallaire speaks about a meeting between him, Dallaire, Colonel Marchal, Bizimana, the minister of defence, and Ndindiliyimana and Faustin Munyazesa, the minister of interior at that time, about controlling demonstrations and things. And Dallaire says this:
"I told Ndindiliyimana that the gendarmes were not doing enough to help my troops get a grip on the riots. In defence, he confessed that he didn't really know what to do. His men were burnt out, their vehicles were breaking down, and they were almost out of fuel. Besides, he added with the significant glance at the minister of the interior, he wasn't getting any political direction of the use of lethal force. His men had no other way to disperse the crowds, no riot gear, no tear gas or water cannons. He also needed reinforcements to weather the crisis."
You are aware of that when you read the book, that Dallaire wrote that and ‑‑
A. I am sorry, Counsel, I cannot say that I recall that passage.
Q. All right. Now, assuming that General Ndindiliyimana was informing General Dallaire correctly, would that alleviate any ‑‑ or somewhat alleviate any concerns you had about the resources he had available to him under his command to try and control the situation later?
A. We have talked previously about this explanation that resources were inadequate to control violence, and my answer to that is that I am sure that in some circumstances resources were very strictly limited, but if the resources were used to promote killing rather than to stop it, then this argument, to me, has no validity, and in many cases resources were used to promote disorder rather than to control it.
Q. Okay. At page 202 of the book, he is talking about another meeting with Bizimana and Nsabimana and Ndindiliyimana about the general situation, and he says this:
"Then Ndindiliyimana again tried to insist that since his gendarmerie was overtaxed, I should allow him to beef up his force with RGF troops. That would breach the KWSA agreement, I said no."
So you have a situation where Ndindiliyimana is asking permission from General Dallaire to bring in RGF forces to bolster his force, and he is refused. Would that not indicate, first, since he is asking permission of General Dallaire, that he is cooperative and wants to work with him, and (b), that he does need reinforcements, that his view of the situation was that he couldn't cope.
A. What would be the date?
Q. I believe ‑‑ excuse me, that's February 28th, oh, sorry, March 1st, March 1st, that meeting took place.
A. I think it was the impression of General Dallaire and others in the UNAMIR force that General Ndindiliyimana was responsive and helpful to the extent possible, and they continued to hold that impression, I believe, except for the questions about the arms caches through the early days of the violence, and even in those early days, there were joint patrols set up, but I think they began to ask questions when those arrangements promised by the head of the gendarmerie did not materialise. So the suggestion you make that to General Dallaire he appeared responsive and helpful and cooperative, I think was the case probably as well on March the 1st as in early April, that he did give that impression, but that, at least, in early April, he did not deliver, and that was, I think, at that point that questions about his comportment became more serious.
Q. Okay. … (inaudible) Ndindiliyimana, but at page 224, referring to April 6th, the meeting of the officers, Dallaire says this. He says ‑‑ he is talking about Bagosora and he switches to Ndindiliyimana.
"I turned to Ndindiliyimana, who said he wanted to place gendarmerie guards at Radio Rwanda, the telephone exchange and the utilities and a few complexes. These were sensible sites to secure … that everything be coordinated with Kigali secteur under the rules of the KWSA agreement. Ndindiliyimana agreed.
I had always found his loyalties an enigma. Until now, I had assumed he is a friend of Bagosora."
And later, I direct -- on page 225,
"I directed Luc -- Luc Marshal -- to link up with Ndindiliyimana to work out the details of joint patrols and joint security of vital points."
And then later,
"Luc had worked out a comprehensive plan for joint patrols with Ndindiliyimana. The trouble was the plan called for a lot of Belgian troops to be moving around town at night, which I thought would be a provocation, so I asked them to cut back."
So isn't that an example where Ndindiliyimana on April 6th, 7th, was, indeed, cooperating with MINUAR or UNAMIR?
MR. JEGEDE:
Your Honours, I appreciate that counsel is doing his job trying to defend his client. But if he is reading from a book, like he's just done, he should do it faithfully. Now, he glossed over part of the reading which does not support his case. Counsel is not supposed to do that. So if you want the witness to comment, read the whole thing to her.
MR. BLACK:
Mr. President, I have referred to passages strictly referring to General Ndindiliyimana. There are three pages in between which have nothing to do with him. I don't want to waste the Court's time. And if my friend wants to point out something negative about General Ndindiliyimana in those two pages, let him point them out, because I am not aware of them.
MR. JEGEDE:
There is a portion where you refer to Ndindiliyimana as an enigma, that's in certain passages he did not read. He should read that part out.
MR. BLACK:
I read that part out.
"I always found his loyalty as an enigma and until now, I assumed he is a friend of Bagosora."
That is the end of the sentence.
BY MR. BLACK:
Q. So the fact that Ndindiliyimana and Dallaire and Luc Marchal agreed to setting up gendarme guards at certain key points together and that it wasn't the gendarmerie that cut back those patrols, it was General Dallaire, himself, would that not indicate that again ‑‑ would that not alleviate some of your concerns about his real role in somewhere, at least?
A. No, it would not because I knew of this and, as I said in my previous answer, it was not that he failed to make the promises but that he failed to deliver; and it may have been that concerns for UNAMIR forces led to a desire to reduce them on the side of General Dallaire. But I believe that even what was agreed to, what did get planned was not implemented on a number of occasions by the gendarmes who were supposed to be there.
Q. All right. In this same source, we have Ndindiliyimana working with Dallaire and Marchal, 6th and 7th. Ndindiliyimana and Marchal worked out the joint patrols and the guards, and Dallaire casts them back, not Ndindiliyimana, so that's my point. Just that simply by itself.
MR. PRESIDENT:
Counsel, I think the conduct of your client will be up to the people who associated with him. So it is easy to -- does it really matter for this witness to comment on that?
MR. BLACK:
Yes, because she's giving a report concerning all the gentlemen here. She is a historian and she ‑‑
MR. PRESIDENT:
Yes, she has to keep open as far as your person is concerned. So ‑‑
MR. BLACK:
Why not ask if I can't understand why it is open? (Microphones overlapping) … that is what my point is. I am trying to, maybe it could come my way, but maybe I won't succeed, but let me try it.
BY MR. BLACK:
Q. Again, at 292, he is speaking about the April 12th letter. He says this:
"That evening Brent -- [I think it is Major Beardsley] ‑‑ Brent brought me a copy of a communiqué, commandement des forces armèes Rwandaises. It pleaded for a face‑to‑face meeting between Rusatira (sic) and Kagame under UNAMIR auspices and was signed by Rusatira, Gatsinzi, five colonels and three lieutenant colonels of the RGF, including a liaison officer Ephrem Rwabalinda. They stated there had been too much killing, and they were submitting to an unconditional surrender as of 1200 hours tomorrow, April 13th. They wanted to establish the BBTG. I wondered why General Ndindiliyimana's signature was not on the communiqué, but I found out from him the next day that he had been stuck in Butare helping some Tutsis escape from the country and hadn't been able to get back in time to sign."
So the fact that at that time he told Dallaire ‑‑ and Gatsinzi says the same thing, that he was busy saving Tutsis. Wouldn't that indicate that he had no part in the plan to commit genocide and the willingness to become part of the plan, no toleration of such a plan? Wouldn't that be consistent again? I am sorry, it goes to the same formula, but we always have to do these things.
A. I believe, Counsel, virtually every person who had any form of power in Rwanda during this period saved someone, regardless of his or her stance, otherwise. So much as we should rejoice on every human life saved, I don't know that we can count that as an exclusive quality for General Ndindiliyimana. I am also somewhat puzzled by this reference to it being in Butare because my understanding was that on the 12th he was in Gitarama helping to establish the quarters and the security for the government's move from Kigali. Perhaps he went on to Butare, but it was my understanding that he was in Gitarama that day occupied with the installation of the interim government.
Q. Well, we can ask General Dallaire about that later, and General Ndindiliyimana, but the fact that he was helping Tutsis escape and was to be signatory, but couldn't get back in time, but that initiative by those other officers would indicate that, would it not, that he had no part of such a plan, had no intention to participate in such a plan, did not tolerate such a plan?
MR. PRESIDENT:
I think, Counsel, my understanding is that Dallaire is merely reporting what Ndindiliyimana told him.
MR. BLACK:
That's true. But it's also confirmed by Gatsinzi said the same thing. So they both support each other. It's very strange that Gatsinzi would say the same thing as ‑‑
MR. BÂ:
That is what he told them. That is what Ndindiliyimana told them.
MR. BLACK:
Yes, Mr. Bâ, it was confirmed by Marcel Gatsinzi. If you want to call Marcel Gatsinzi here to refute that, go ahead. I am quite willing to have him here. It is up to you. You can call him and if you don't call him, I guess you are not refuting.
BY MR. BLACK:
Q. On page 293 ‑‑ let me continue, Dr. Des Forges, just to continue our discussion.
MR. BÂ:
I am not opposed to you calling him. You can even do it by subpoenaing him.
MR. BLACK:
Mr. President, it is not for me to refute my own evidence. If he wants to refute it, he can call him. If he doesn't, he knows what the Canon law says about that.
MR. PRESIDENT:
He has exhausted his witnesses, Counsel.
MR. BLACK:
I guess it's not the number, I guess.
BY MR. BLACK:
Q. Page 293, General Dallaire says this ‑‑ well, he says this:
"So I faced three known extremist leaders: Bizimana, Bizimungu, Bagosora. And Ndindiliyimana, who was somehow hanging on to his job and was no match for the hardliners."
Doesn't that indicate that he was not, at least by Dallaire, considered to be one of the hardliners?
A. I think you will establish that, Counsel.
Q. Yes, I know, but I have to be (Microphones overlapping) ... so I only get this chance once. Excuse me.
At page 334, there is something that supports Ndindiliyimana's statement, Dallaire and Gatsinzi's letter, which I haven't gotten back yet.
MR. BLACK:
Can I get back that letter, please? Who has got that letter?
MR. PRESIDENT:
Mr. Black, they returned it to you.
MR. BLACK:
Okay. It is very important.
MR. BÂ:
Also with reference to the document you requested of us, our case manager has gone to check, but we have nothing else. The document we have stops at the same place as yours. I can provide you with a copy so that you can compare it. It is Dallaire's answers to the Prosecutor. It comes from what is known as a Belgian file and this is all we have.
MR. BLACK:
Thank you.
BY MR. BLACK:
Q. At page 334 Dallaire says, quote
"I had ‑‑ " [and the date of this was April 25th.] "I had a report from Gatsinzi that Ndindiliyimana was in the south actually helping people escape, and there existed a number of RGF officers who were disgusted with the way things were going."
And he recommended to New York that these moderates get some assistance. Would that again advance my case and alleviate some of your concerns about the role of Ndindiliyimana as of April 12th ‑‑ sorry, April 25th, Gatsinzi reports to Dallaire that Ndindiliyimana was in the south helping people escape?
MR. PRESIDENT:
What was Gatsinzi at that time, 25th of April?
MR. BLACK:
I am not sure because he was no longer commander of the army. He should be just reverting back to his function as head of the ETO school and the venue was ‑‑
MR. PRESIDENT: And if you remember that --
MR. BLACK:
I think he reverted back to that command.
THE WITNESS:
I think he was on temporary duty as a negotiator involved in various ceasefire initiatives.
BY MR. BLACK:
Q. Thank you. But again, maybe you heard about this, but would that not alleviate some of your concerns about the role of General Ndindiliyimana in late April?
A. If, in fact, it was established that he was saving lives in Butare on April 25th, that would be certainly useful information, but I don't yet have the proof of that.
Q. And the fact that Dallaire recommends to New York that these moderates, including Ndindiliyimana, should be provided with protection, it says:
"As they could prove to be useful in the post-crisis period."
I don't think New York would want to support people who are committing genocide, correct?
A. There were various attempts, I believe, to identify either political or military leaders who could be useful in the post-conflict period as legitimate officials, yes.
Q. Okay.
MR. BLACK:
Excuse me, I am just trying to find something else.
BY MR. BLACK:
Q. I have also here a statement by the Belgian ambassador, Johann Swinnen. And this is also disclosed by the Prosecution, it's a pro justitia statement and it is identified as the Belgian GBT, that was its code name for the ‑‑ no, sorry, Belgian government SWINJOH‑1. And he talks about many things, many personalities in the statements, and when he gets to Augustin Ndindiliyimana -- and he says the following.
MR. JEGEDE:
Your Honour, even if counsel is not showing the documents or he doesn't want to show it, as he's been doing, he should at least show it to the witness.
MR. BLACK:
I can show it to the witness. Let me read it on to the record, otherwise, it is not of any worth, because I am not going to file these documents.
And I apologise to the interpreters, I forgot to get a copy of it. Okay. He just says this:
"It is a general of the general staff of the national gendarmerie. He had been promoted to that rank very recently. Earlier, he had been minister of defence, minister of transport, and minister in the presidency. Ndindiliyimana was more specifically responsible for defence and security matters within that government. As chief of general staff he was ‑‑ or chief of staff, he was responsible for national security until my departure. I often had favourable comments on the conduct of the gendarmerie, and I do not want to generalise here. For example, UNAMIR was glad about the relatively good working relationship with the gendarmerie. I cannot make a categorical statement about the conduct of General Ndindiliyimana during the days following the assassination of the president. . . . I recall a very long conversation by telephone the night of the 6th to the 8th ‑‑ of the 7th or 8th or the 8th to the 9th of April, and during that conversation, he expressed his concerns as to the possible evacuation of the Belgians. He felt that an international presence would act as a deterrent that was needed beside the leaders and people of Rwanda so as to avoid reprisals on both sides. He was a member of the crisis committee that had been set up following the assassination of the president. He was also ‑‑ other members of that crisis were Colonel Gatsinzi. . . . You asked me -- or asked me whether the gendarmerie could have opposed the massacres perpetrated by the army, the Presidential Guard and militias of various parties. My knowledge of the relations between these various bodies or forces is not adequate enough for me to comment on the matter. One must not forget that there was total chaos in the country. It is hard to imagine to what extent disorder prevailed in Rwanda. No one knew who controlled what or how they did so. Ndindiliyimana was considered a wise man or well‑behaved, courteous, charming, but I do not know what his real authority was over the gendarmerie. He comes from the south, which was an important factor in the power dynamic within Rwanda. It is not impossible or inconceivable, as you requested of me or suggested to me, that he may not have been able to stop the massacres. I had very positive relations with him, both as minister and chief of staff of the gendarmerie. I viewed him as a pro‑Belgian. I noticed this during the joint commission meetings in terms of military and technical cooperation. I also remember his quick intervention or the quick and effective intervention or a favour of Belgian missionaries who had been arrested by the military."
So would that alleviate or put more on the scales or balance in his favour, the fact he had had a conversation with the Belgians asking them not to withdraw ‑‑ and this is on the night of the 7th or 8th or 9th, we don't know.
MR. JEGEDE:
Your Honour, the problem with what he has read is ‑‑ the portion he has read contains a lot of information. Now, he is trying to lump everything together and obtain the comments of the witness to a host of facts contained in that reading. So how does she respond to that?
MR. BLACK:
Well, I could give it to her and ask her just to assist.
MR. PRESIDENT:
(Microphones overlapping)
BY MR. BLACK:
Q. Just with respect to the conversation he had with Johann Swinnen, would that now indicate that he couldn't be part of any conspiracy or plan to commit genocide or crime against humanity when he is asking the Belgians,
"Don't leave, we need you here"?
MR. PRESIDENT:
I think this document also shows that the same contents that the witness says, that this person is also having concerns with regard to the place where ‑‑
MR. BLACK:
No, it doesn't say that, sir. What it says is, I can't ‑‑ he is a man, I can't say what he did after a certain date, I wasn't there. But what I know is this, he is not saying (inaudible) it is a slightly different thing, sir.
MR. PRESIDENT:
Yes.
BY MR. BLACK:
Q. But that conversation, and Swinnen is not sure whether it's 9th or 7th, or 8th or 9th, would that not again indicate that he is a man totally opposed to genocide or committing war crimes or anything else like that?
A. That could be one interpretation. There could also be the interpretation that he was simply seriously concerned and frightened by the people who have taken power and who appeared to be completely in a dominant position. You have to recall that on April 3rd or 4th, there was a report on radio RTLM about a supposed corps meetings of officers from the south supposedly linked to the prime minister and to the extent that Ndindiliyimana was identified as an officer of the south, although he was not present at this meeting. I think he had been put into a very difficult position and, of course, the people had shown -- the people who were taking power had shown themselves to be completely ruthless by the way they were eliminating anyone opposed to them. So one can understand that purely from an operational point of view, he would be anxious for the introduction of a community to remain in the country in order to minimise the killing of people like himself, as well as people of a different ethnic group. So I think it does reveal, probably ‑‑ no, I think it does reveal certainly a sincere desire for the international forces to remain there. The question is why?
Q. Why? I accept your point, but you said that he will ‑‑ if he was personally afraid, it would be because he was opposed to what people termed the hardliners, and he was opposed to their plans. So he may be in personal danger. That would be consistent with that, wouldn't it? So I think you would agree on that?
A. Yes, but people who are afraid would also do things that are against their inclination or their desire and they will, simply because they are afraid. It does not need ‑‑ prove decisively what his comportment was. It simply proves to me that he was probably, for a very good reason, afraid.
Q. All right. But he would only be afraid because he is opposed to the plans of others, correct? If he was in line with them, he would never ‑‑ have nothing to fear, wouldn't that be so?
MR. PRESIDENT:
Do you agree that there was a plan there? Do you agree that there was a plan, in your question?
MR. BLACK:
It doesn't prove there was a plan. It presupposes that his attitude would not be appreciated by certain others. Maybe his attitude regarding the tactics and the strategy of the war or the entire politics of the war. It has nothing to do with any planning of the genocide.
BY MR. BLACK:
Q. I will show you something else.
MR. BÂ:
Mr. Black, are you now pleading that there was fear? Are you putting forward a defence of fear?
MR. BLACK:
Madam Des Forges had suggested that he might be afraid. So I am, in my dialog with her, suggesting ‑‑ she was suggesting that he may be just making that phone call for just purely personal reasons.
MR. PRESIDENT:
(Microphones overlapping)
BY MR. BLACK:
Q. Now, I don't know, for my assistant is gone, I was going to go to two more documents, but there are exhibits here and I don't know the numbers. Anyway, perhaps I can give this to you.
I have a letter from ‑‑ you referred to Jean Kambanda from time to time. I shall need this one. When my assistant comes back, I will give you the number. We have a letter from ‑‑ or a statement from Jean Kambanda signed 23rd September 2003 from (inaudible) in which he talks about many things, but also General Ndindiliyimana. And it’s just two paragraphs, so I will read part of the paragraph ‑‑
MR. BÂ:
Mr. Black, is it the letter that Kambanda sent to your client, which you earlier raised here?
MR. BLACK:
Yes, sorry for that. Yes, sir, I think it is filed as an ID document, but I don't remember the number.
BY MR. BLACK:
Q. He says this on paragraph 9, on page 3:
"During my tenure I had no conflict with General Ndindiliyimana, and I can certify that he spared no effort to accomplish his mission, that is, to protect people and defend the territory, especially gendarmerie facilities. The gendarmerie protected people under threats in Kigali, Gitarama, Butare, and elsewhere in the country. It has the defects I raised in my earlier statements. As a result of the insufficient troops in the face of the RPF attacks, and the chaos the RPF brought on."
MR. BÂ:
(Inaudible)
BY MR. BLACK:
Q. Paragraph 11, since ‑‑
"from the 7th of April 1994, Ndindiliyimana suggested to General Dallaire that the RPF be brought to talks on the crisis, together with the Rwandan government forces, but the RPF refused to comply. Thereafter, using the bilateral manoeuvres, the RPF demanded negotiations with the military, which General Ndindiliyimana explained to the government." (Inaudible)
THE ENGLISH INTERPRETER:
Would counsel please repeat that?
BY MR. BLACK:
Q. "They later accepted, but the RPF dodged. I was also informed by my staff that General Ndindiliyimana was running a lot of risks or faced a lot of risks and threats to his life because of his positive attitude towards the restoration of peace, that is, when I decided to appoint him ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany so as to remove him from the danger."
Now, assuming that again is true, what he said, would that not again go to alleviate some concerns about his role during these events?
A. It is certainly useful to have the statement from Kambanda and to indicate his willingness to assist General Ndindiliyimana in getting out of the country. It does raise the question in my mind why it couldn't have been done sooner. He could have been sent abroad to make arms purchases or to engage in public relations activities or something else and then taken the occasion to stay abroad.
Q. Well, that would assume that he was trying to dodge responsibility. Maybe he was trying to perform as far as he could. But did you ever know that in the last weeks in March or so General Ndindiliyimana went to Brussels to speak with certain Belgian generals in order to ask them for further assistance in terms of reinforcements for the Belgian units, and also would they supply him with tear gas and other crowd control equipment in order to try and control events? Were you aware of that trip? He spoke to General Charlie and others and then went on to speak to the French generals about the same request?
A. It was my understanding that General Ndindiliyimana was, indeed, the person who had had those meetings with the Belgians -- I didn't know about the French -- and had made those requests, but I seem to recall that at one point he publicly disavowed my assertions and said that it had not been he, but my information was that, yes, it was he who had been the person who had had that meeting with the Belgians and had asked for help, basically.
Q. Which, again, goes to indicate that, at least, as far as he was concerned, he didn't have the necessary resources to ‑‑ for crowd control. But anyway --
I also have a document here which is filed as ID ‑‑ an identification document, a telegram from the Belgian foreign minister Willy Claeys, the later secretary general of NATO, in Flemish, and I have a -- basically, what it says is that ‑‑ but we still have to follow the official translation, but, generally, it says there is a demand for a visa for General Augustin Ndindiliyimana, this is, to get into Belgium when he is fleeing the country in June. And Willy Claeys says after a meeting with his cabinet and the minister of interior – I will read it in French.
MR. BÂ:
Sorry, Counsel Black. Did he escape from the country or was he appointed ambassador to Germany by the interim government? It’s not the same thing. Did he escape from the country or was he appointed extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador of Kambanda's government in Germany? What is it? When he left in June, he wasn't escaping; he was going to report to his position as ambassador, but the Germany government refused to accredit him there.
MR. BLACK:
We only heard your Prosecution witness (inaudible) testify that he had to flee the country, he left on June 17th into the Congo. And General Ndindiliyimana will state that and Kambanda will agree. As Kambanda's letter indicates, what we just read, you were not listening, he appointed him to that post in order to escape the country, that was the ruse to get him out of the country, to give him some papers to get him out.
Anyway, while he was in Kinshasa, he asked for permission to enter Belgium. The Belgian ambassador to Kinshasa sent this telegram, and I will read it in French:
"After consultations with the cabinet or the minister of the interior, I wish to bring to your attention that you may react positively or affirmatively to the visa request by the person concerned. The person concerned has always demonstrated that he is useful and in order or proper in his conduct towards Belgium. Consequently, during the period of war in Rwanda the person concerned did show that he was a friend of Belgium. In addition, he assisted a lot of Rwandans in finding secure shelter. He also assisted them in escaping from death."
And it continues:
"Please bring to the attention of the person concerned that investigations are being carried out or conducted on ten Belgian Blue Helmets."
It says that in that regard.
BY MR. BLACK:
Q. I can show this to you, but would that, again, go towards alleviating any concerns that the Belgian government viewed him as being a moderate and that he had saved people's lives, Rwandans' lives in Rwanda during that period?
A. Just for the purpose of the record, Counsel, that extract that you read must have been a telegram, I take it, from the Belgian foreign ministry to the ambassador in Kinshasa; is that correct?
Q. Yes, correct. And we also find here a ‑‑ I can't locate it, because my assistant is not here, but there is a very brief one‑paragraph letter from the Belgian ambassador in Kinshasa to Sabina airlines, stating the same thing, that he is well appreciated by the Belgians, please give him a place in the plane, basically. And are you also aware that when he arrived in Belgium, he was met by some very high personages and welcomed? Are you aware of that, when he arrived?
A. I am aware that General Ndindiliyimana was the object of special consideration from various Belgian officials for some period of time, yes. And I think the telegram speaks for itself, the first consideration for the Belgians was he was one of our supporters, he was helpful to us, so we should be helpful to him. And the second consideration was that he had saved lives. I don't take this as measurable to what was known before.
Q. All right.
MR. BLACK:
Excuse me, Mr. President, I can't find my document.
BY MR. BLACK:
Q. You would agree that the bulk of the gendarmerie came under -- in combat zones, those operational sectors came under the control of the army commanders who were there in command of those operational sectors, correct? That is your understanding of the situation?
A. In some cases, yes, but I do not know the exact numbers.
Q. Okay.
A. And in some cases, I believe it was even the contrary, having heard this morning testimony from Colonel Nsengiyumva that soldiers under his command were actually put at the disposition of the gendarmerie in Gisenyi. So there was obviously some movement back and forth of units, but I don't know the exact statistics.
Q. Okay. I have a state patent – an American a state patent, declassified document, in the same vein about General Ndindiliyimana, the first is dated January 1993 and referring to a column returning to the northern communes of Gisenyi, Ruhengeri and Kibuye and they said the following:
MR. JEGEDE:
Can we have the author of that document?
MR. BLACK:
Let me read it first and I will give it to you. It is from the American embassy in Kigali to the Secretary of State, Washington, priority, then various other embassies in Africa and the American embassy in Paris. This is after a week -- paragraph 2, after a week of violence that left --
MR. BÂ:
What is the date of the document?
MR. BLACK:
I have trouble reading these American code dates, but it is in January 1993, I think the 29th. Yes,
29th January 1993.
"After a week of violence that has left over 300 dead and up to 3,000 displaced" --
THE ENGLISH INTERPRETER:
Slowly, sir.
BY MR. BLACK:
Q. "ICRC protection teams",[ I guess that's the Red Cross], "have visited the affected areas, and gendarmes are making an effort to bring the situation under control. ICRC found the situation in Muhororo and Ngororero extremely difficult. The people are terrorised and the gendarmes had been slow to respond appropriately. An additional company of gendarmes has been sent to Ngororero to reinforce those already there. ICRC chief delegate Stacker met on 29th January with Rwandan gendarmerie head Augustin Ndindiliyimana, who expressed appreciation for ICRC's presence in the affected area and for the information ICRC is providing to him. As a result he is has deployed an additional company of gendarmes to Ngororero, Karere, Nyundo, Kanamakomi and an additional platoon to Giciye commune, G‑I‑C‑I‑Y‑E. . . . He said he has requisitioned additional vehicles from the ministry of agriculture and sent additional communication equipment into the area. Military police had been sent to the Ruhengeri préfecture, more gendarmes can be made available for the trouble spots in Gisenyi préfecture. ICRC said Ndindiliyimana has been receptive to those reports about where the gendarmes had been less than effective in quelling the violence. Comment: It will be a while before the figures would be complete under this unfortunate wake of violence. ICRC has performed its unique role effectively. The Rwandan Red Cross could not enter the area with any assurance of security. The gendarmerie appears to be trying with its limited means to make a positive difference."
Were you aware of that? Have you seen that document before? Were you aware of that document?
A. No, I had not seen that.
[1500H ]
Q. All right. Doesn't that, again, speak to the fact that they had limited resources and ‑‑ okay ‑‑ maybe slow to respond? But General Ndindiliyimana really is trying to do his best to ameliorate things and change things? They speak of his ‑‑ his act to requisition vehicles from the ministry of agriculture.
A. Two points there, Counsel. First of all, if you recall, I made a point very early on that the cases of violence against Tutsi were ‑‑ or political opponents, were ordinarily followed by official apologies and the excuse that the violence simply could not have been controlled for lack of resources. So this explanation given here by General Ndindiliyimana falls in that category. It was the same thing said by everyone, top to bottom, throughout a period of four years of violence, and it was the very same explanation that was put forward by the interim government during the height of the killing. So it's not to say that there was no ‑‑ no factual basis for it. Certainly, there was something of a factual basis, but, as you see ‑‑ and this is my second point ‑‑ when the urgency of saving lives was felt sufficiently, resources could be found. Maybe they had to be borrowed from the ministry of agriculture, but something could be done, if the will were there.
Q. Right. But the Belgian ambassador ‑‑ I mean ‑‑ sorry ‑‑ the American ambassador's appreciation and the International Red Cross's ‑‑ the International Red Cross said Ndindiliyimana has been receptive to its reports about whether gendarmes had been less than effective. And the American embassies's appreciation of the situation ‑‑ and they're on site ‑‑ is
"the gendarmerie appears to be trying, with its limited means, to make a positive difference".
So it doesn't seem to be ‑‑ from the ambassador's point of view, it's not a fake or a facade of trying. In their appreciation, he really is trying; wouldn't you agree?
A. Counselor, the violence began on the 22nd or 23rd. 300 people have been killed. 3,000 people have been displaced. It's a mighty slow response. How far is it from Gisenyi to the capital of Kigali? Two hours by road. How long would it have taken to move the necessary forces into Gisenyi and to have stopped it? 24 hours should have sufficed. Six days is too long. 300 lives is too long.
Q. Well, that may or may not be so. But you weren't on the ground. You don't know the difficulties they faced. And the American ambassador and his staff who are on site in Rwanda don't take that view, don't take the view that he did what he could. And, yes, they were slow. But now he's trying to send extra troops up there to try and control ‑‑ control events. So wouldn't you agree that, at least from the American embassy's point of view, he was really trying, if not yours?
A. The American embassy can speak for itself.
Q. Okay. Another one dated June 1993, 11th of June. And it's a commentary. It's from the ‑‑ again, American embassy, Kigali to Secretary of State, Washington. And they say ‑‑ they ask this question, paragraph 27:
"Are there positive forces for change within the armed forces? Post must note that our access to the officer corps, while good, is still limited. That group of officers considered to be hard‑liners has been especially inaccessible. In past experience, there are a number of good officers" ‑‑ [in their view ]‑‑ "who appear to believe that the changes before then can be positive for the military, or, at least, are not negative enough to be actively opposed. As an example, the current chief of staff of the gendarmerie, Colonel Ndindiliyimana, is widely considered to be an honest soldier‑politician. Since taking the unenviable job in June 1992, he has made significant progress in revamping the image of his force. While there are still several thousand rank‑and‑file gendarmes with no specialised training after boot camp, a good proportion of the 7,000‑strong force has been given specific police training with the goal of changing the mentality from one of, quote unquote, destroy the enemy to that of, quote unquote, protect the population. The chief of staff is having some success in removing his men from combat duties at the front and reinstituting discipline and is, perhaps, the most prominent senior military officer to be generally trusted by opposition parties."
Wouldn't that go, again, to alleviate some of your concerns that he really is trying to change the gendarmerie in the short time he was there, to make it more effective, with the resources that he had?
A. My concerns are not about General Ndindiliyimana's competence. I'm sure he was a competent officer. I'm sure he was committed to making the gendarmerie the best force that it could be under his direction, but that does not deal with the concerns that I have.
Q. Not even the phrase where it says
"the goal of changing it" ‑‑ "he had the goal of changing their mentality from one of destroy the enemy to that of protection of population".
Doesn't that help you lessen some of those concerns you have?
A. Counsel, if I were to base my conclusions on a chance phrase by a diplomat almost a year before the events, I think I would be a lightweight scholar indeed.
Q. But, nevertheless, this is a historical document which you can't ignore; and that's the American embassy's appreciation of him and his efforts at that time.
A. I think I give the American embassy staff due weight in considering their opinions.
Q. Okay. I have one dated 8th April 1994, where it says ‑‑ are you aware of this:
"Major General Ndindiliyimana is negotiating with UNAMIR General Dallaire and RPF elements at an undisclosed location. According to the embassy, the major general is professional and wants ‑‑
THE ENGLISH INTERPRETER: Slow, slow, sir.
BY MR. BLACK:
Q. I'll read it again ‑‑
"has taken control of the" ‑‑ sorry ‑‑ "Major Ndindiliyimana is negotiating with UNAMIR General Dallaire and RPF elements at an disclosed location. According to the embassy, the major general was professional, quote unquote, and wants an end to the fighting."
Would that not, again, indicate, since he wants an end to the fighting and he's willing to negotiate that he ‑‑ he ‑‑ he is opposed is to any plan to take ‑‑ make exactions against the Tutsi population?
A. It's difficult for me to read that into that statement. He was carrying on negotiations as an officer of the Rwandan armed forces at that point. Someone who was in opposition, clearly, to some of the other senior officers who were attempting to and eventually did take control of the armed forces, but that does not tell me anything more than what I previously knew. Again, it has to do with his comportment in the first days of April which, I think, has been relatively well documented.
Q. Okay. And I have one final one. It seems to be a briefing paper. It's not clear. I haven't got the title page. I got just part of it released, dated April 9th, maybe to the White House. I'm not sure. From the department of state. It just says ‑‑ regarding him, my client, that
"General Ndindiliyimana is well regarded by embassy Kigali, but his ability to assert his command over the troops is questionable."
THE ENGLISH INTERPRETER: Again, slow, sir.
BY MR. BLACK:
Q. And I ‑‑ I ‑‑ I haven't got this ‑‑ your reference -- with me because I couldn't find it today ‑‑ but I believe in one of the other trials you made reference to that, that Ndindiliyimana, at one point, even told you that he wasn't sure he even had a command around those first few days of April, but I'm not sure. But the American embassy is saying that. They're not sure he's actually got a command. Were you aware ‑‑
A. Are they ‑‑ are they saying he's not sure ‑‑
Q. Well, they ‑‑ they say his ability to assert his command over the troops is questionable, and that's a different thing.
A. Yeah.
Q. I agree with you.
A. Yeah, I think it's a different thing.
Q. But, at one point, did he not tell you that he ‑‑ during those early days, he wasn't even sure he had a command? Do you remember that reference? I think you said it somewhere, but I haven't got it with me so I can't put it to you. I may be wrong.
A. I'm sorry, Counsel. I don't recall that.
Q. Excuse me. I'm trying to find something here. Oh, okay. Thank you.
MR. PRESIDENT: Court is adjourned for 15 minutes.
(Court recessed from 1512H to 1534H)
MR. PRESIDENT: Yes, Counsel.
BY MR. BLACK:
Q. Do you agree with me that in those situations where gendarmes were requested by a préfet or a bourgmestre, in those circumstances, those gendarme units, when requested, came under the control of that civilian authority?
A. It seems to me that when I read the law, that that is what I said. I'm not a jurist, as we have established here. But my understanding is that that was the case, yes.
MR. BÂ: Objection, Mr. President. The law does not at all say so. They come under the disciplinary authority of their boss or their superior.
MR. BLACK: You can't say that. You're not the expert. She is. He can't give an answer in place of her. I'm asking her. She's the expert. Stop contradicting your own witness.
MR. BÂ: She's not a jurist. She's not an expert in law. We have all those provisions which we have distributed. Why are you putting questions of legal nature to her, whereas she's not a jurist?
MR. BLACK: If he's going to contradict his own witness, I suggest he withdraw right now and retract all ‑‑ and strike the whole thing. He just attacked his own witness.
MR. PRESIDENT: You must not solicit legal opinion from the witness.
MR. BÂ: She's not a jurist.
MR. BLACK: (Inaudible) she's an historian, which means ‑‑ a historian, Mr. President, is versed in all aspects of the history of the country ‑‑ social, political, economic, military, and everything else. That's what a historian does. You take into account everything.
THE WITNESS: If I had been allowed to complete my answer, I was going to say that the texts, whatever they say, are often irrelevant, given the conduct of the forces on the ground. So that the important thing, for me, at least, as a historian, is not to examine the texts, but to look at the way people behaved.
BY MR. BLACK:
Q. Well ‑‑ okay. But you say in the ‑‑ and I believe in the Butare case you testified, on page 25 -- you're asked that very question. The question was by the President of the Court.
MR. PRESIDENT: One second. Mr. Segatwa, for your information, the translation of the motion has been filed today, so please obtain a copy.
MR. SEGATWA: Mr. President, I'm grateful to the registry. They made available a copy to me, and I'll do my best to answer.
BY MR. BLACK:
Q. The President of the Chamber says ‑‑ puts his question, and then you give this answer. He ‑‑ he says:
"Now, having finished this reading, I would like to ask Dr. Des Forges a question in light of what she said yesterday. If I'm not mistaken, if you can inform me that you indicated to us that the bourgmestre had the possibility of directly obtaining, then, the forces that were under the authority of the prefect; is that right?"
And you say in response:
"What I stated was that, indeed, it did take place that there were affairs made by the bourgmestre directly to requisition the gendarmes and the gendarmerie. There was also an element which was reported to me by officials ‑‑ or officers, rather, within the national gendarmerie which I, myself, did not verify. But, in such situations, when the gendarmes are being or are requisitioned by the bourgmestre, they remain under the supervision of the civil authority, that is to say, the bourgmestre, until the time at which the bourgmestre then hands over the right to fire, and then it's up to the gendarmes themselves." So that was your response then. Would you agree ‑‑ you still take that position that if a préfet or a bourgmestre requisitioned gendarmes, those gendarmes came under those civilian authorities and took orders from them, although their pay and administrative (sic) rested with the gendarmerie itself?
A. Up until the point when they actually resort to the use of firearms. And I believe, at that point, that control then reverts to the gendarmerie officer.
Q. Well, but he's obeying ‑‑ if he's told to fire, how he fires and the tactics used are up to him, that just ‑‑ but the actual command is up to the bourgmestre or préfet; is that correct?
A. That was my understanding.
Q. All right. Thank you. Did you ever interview a man named Gaspard Ruhumuliza, minister of tourism, in your research?
A. No, I did not.
Q. Well, he gave a statement to the Prosecutor in which he quotes General Ndindiliyimana stated to him that on April 9th ‑‑ and it's not clear why but ‑‑ he did not know if he had the authority of a general ‑‑ a general anymore. And it's not explained why. I take it ‑‑ it's because he ‑‑
MR. JEGEDE: Can we have more details of that person?
MR. BLACK: Yeah. KO ‑‑ K0125163. It's an interview with your investigators, Melissa Cole (phonetic) and Luc Coté, June 3rd, 1996.
BY MR. BLACK:
Q. And I don't know why he ‑‑ why the general would have said that, but it could be for various reasons. But if that was his point of view, would that assist you in ‑‑ in any concerns you have of a ‑‑ about his capacity to do anything?
MR. PRESIDENT: What is the date that you mentioned?
MR. BLACK: That statement was alleged by ‑‑ to Minister Ruhumuliza on April 9th.
MR. PRESIDENT: 8th or 9th?
MR. BLACK: 9th. It's R‑U‑H‑U‑M‑U‑L‑I‑Z‑A.
THE WITNESS: It was, as I said, a period of considerable dynamism, if you can put it that way, fluidity in power dynamics. And it's not surprising that any one person, particularly in those first three or four days, was not sure, in the end, how it was going to shake out and particularly someone like General Ndindiliyimana, who came from a part of the country that was generally not favoured by those people who were taking control.
MR. PRESIDENT: Is that the date on which the interim government was installed?
MR. BLACK: I think that was correct. I think it was the 8th or the 9th. That's correct.
THE WITNESS: It was on the 9th.
BY MR. BLACK:
Q. I got some other references where you confirm facts about Rusatira and Ndindiliyimana, but I won't go through them again. I won't burden you with that. Just one other document that I want to put to you about him. It's a ‑‑ well, actually, I don't even see it. It's the notes or minutes of a meeting, dated January 18th, a meeting with the minister of defence directed by ‑‑ or chaired by General Ndindiliyimana for action in face of demonstrations between the MRND and CDR ‑‑ on the 19th ‑‑ proposed for the 19th of January, and this meeting takes place on the 18th of January 1993. And in it he discusses what ‑‑ the attitude the gendarmes should take toward the demonstrators. I could show it to you, but he states this at the second to last paragraph. He says ‑‑ sorry, it's in French ‑‑
"The security forces must bear in mind that political problems can only be resolved by politicians. It is in this framework that the conduct of the gendarmes must be characterised by neutrality."
Would that also go to alleviate any concerns you might have about his attitudes and intentions in 19 ‑‑ April ‑‑ April 6 and on?
A. This was a meeting between General Ndindiliyimana and ‑‑
Q. His ‑‑ I can give you the names of people there. There was the G3, Major Rwarakabije, Major Hategekimana, Major Bararwerekana, Captain Havugiyaremye, Captain Nsazabera, Captain Habyarimana, and Lieutenant ‑‑
MR. PRESIDENT: Slowly, Counsel.
MR. BLACK: Sorry. Sorry.
MR. PRESIDENT: Spell those names, I think.
MR. BLACK: Okay. Rwarakabije, R‑W‑A‑R‑A‑K‑A‑B‑I‑G‑E ‑‑ J‑E. Hategekimana, H‑A‑T‑E‑G‑E‑K‑I‑M‑A‑N‑A. Do you want the rest? Major Bararwerekana, B‑A‑R‑A‑R ‑‑ looks like ‑‑ W‑E‑R‑E‑K‑A‑N‑A. Havugiyaremye is H‑A‑V‑U‑G‑I‑Y‑A‑R‑E‑M‑Y‑E. Captain Nsazabera is N‑S‑A‑Z‑A‑B‑E‑R‑A. Captain Habyarimana is H‑A‑B‑Y‑A‑R‑I‑M‑A‑N‑A, and Bizumuremyi, who took the notes, is B‑I‑Z‑U‑M‑U‑R‑E‑M‑Y‑I.
BY MR. BLACK:
Q. I'd like to show you this document, if you wish.
MR. JEGEDE: Can we have the rank of Bizumuremyi?
MR. BLACK: Yes. I'll tell you who they were. Rwarakabije was the G3.
MR. JEGEDE: Yeah.
MR. BLACK: Hategekimana was from office of bureau de trois. Bararwerekana was commander of battalion PM ‑‑ I don't know ‑‑ police militaire. Okay. Havugiyaremye is captain, group Kigali ‑‑ commander, group Kigali. Nsazabera represents the command of the SR company. Habyarimana was representing the command of the 5th battalion, and Bizumuremyi was representing the command mobile (French spoken).
BY MR. BLACK:
Q. And it was the attitude the gendarmes should take in the face of the demonstrators in various situations, what they should do if things were out of hand or peaceful and so on. But his paragraph where he speaks about the gendarmerie or (unintelligible) ‑‑ trying to respect and be ‑‑ remain neutral and politics should be left to politicians. Doesn't that also support the fact that he would ‑‑ his good attitude and good intentions?
A. The struggle between political parties, as I have described, often resulted in violence on a partisan basis. It was a major concern that, on occasion, gendarmes were less than neutral. And I think particularly Lieutenant Bizimuremyi had the reputation of someone who was active in breaking up opposition party meetings. So I would suppose that this was, in that context ‑‑ it was before the major ethnic violence of January 1993 that we were talking about before the break. And so I would suppose that the concern was to ensure or attempt to ensure that the gendarmes were ‑‑ conducted themselves appropriately in the context of political party rivalries, and that, of course, is ‑‑ is a laudable goal. I don't know that it has any particular relationship to the events of April 1994 except to the extent that that also was an event of ‑‑ of highly charged political significance.
Q. Now, did you ‑‑ were you aware of and did you follow or observe in any way the refugee hearing concerning General Ndindiliyimana in Brussels in 1998, I believe?
A. I may, at one point, have seen some of the information related to that hearing, but I don't recall anything specific.
Q. Well, I have ‑‑ perhaps I can give it to you and you can read ‑‑ it's ‑‑ it's a 14‑page document, and I can give you a copy. Perhaps you can follow me.
MR. BÂ: Mr. Black, what document are you referring to?
MR. BLACK: Well, my assistant is not here. Maybe I could defer this until he comes back, because I can't handle it by myself. I might jump to another subject. But what I want to do is come back to ‑‑
MR. PRESIDENT: If you want extra copies, we can get him to put ‑‑
MR. BLACK: I have copies. I just don't know where they are in this pile of paper here. I don't know where my assistant's gone so ‑‑
MR. BÂ: Mr. Black, what document is that?
MR. BLACK: This is the decision of the commission permanente de recours des réfugiés in Brussels, the decision concerning his refugee status in which they canvass all the accusations he now faces before this tribunal and reject them all.
MR. BÂ: There were two decisions. There were two decisions. The final decision.
MR. BLACK: And I want to go into some detail, but I don't have copies to give everybody. Perhaps I can come back to that later.
BY MR. BLACK:
Q. Or, Dr. Des Forges, if you want, I can give a copy you could read this evening and we could talk about it tomorrow. It might save some time, if that would be acceptable to you?
A. That's fine.
Q. All right. I'm going to give you a marked‑up copy. Just ignore the markings. Come to your own conclusions.
MR. JEGEDE: I would like a copy too so I can ‑‑
MR. BLACK: Professor Sindayigaya is not with me, so I don't know where ‑‑ where he's placed them. It'd take ten minutes to find them, but I'll waste court time.
BY MR. BLACK:
Q. Are you aware that several witnesses have come here and testified for the Prosecution that, in fact ‑‑ gendarmes, in fact, did save people in certain places? You're aware that gendarmes, in certain places, did protect refugees, correct; and civilians ‑‑ Hôtel Mille Collines, various churches and various places and so on and so forth?
MR. PRESIDENT: She had not gone through the evidence or the witness statements.
BY MR. BLACK:
Q. No. And, from your knowledge, Dr. Des Forges, although there were allegations that gendarmes committed crimes in certain places, it is also known that gendarmes protected people in other places; isn't that correct?
A. That is correct.
Q. All right. Let me come back to the entire subject later. Let's go back to the beginning. When you were working for the Peace Corps in 1963 ‑‑
A. Excuse me, Counsel. I never worked for the Peace Corps.
Q. Oh, you didn't?
A. Never.
Q. Okay. I'm mistaken. So when you were ‑‑ when you ‑‑ well, not working ‑‑ when you were in Tanzania in the refugee camps in 1963, for which agency were you there? I thought it was part of Peace Corps with Sergeant Shriver.
A. No. It was ‑‑ a small group of approximately 20 university students, most of whom were working to establish a secondary school in Dar es Salaam for South African refugees and two of whom were placed in a refugee camp with Rwandan refugees. I was one of the two.
Q. Okay. And you said in chief that you never discussed with the refugees there ‑‑ mainly Tutsi ‑‑ how they happened to come there, what happened to them.
A. I don't know that I said that I never discussed it. I think I said ‑‑ and perhaps we could look at the record to be sure ‑‑ but I think I said I was too ignorant to appreciate the opportunity to really understand the history of the region, that my knowledge was superficial, and that what I learned was superficial.
Q. All right. But you did talk to the people there, though, what had happened to them in Rwanda and how they ended up in a refugee camp.
A. To the best of my recollection, those discussions were very few and very ‑‑ very limited.
Q. But, nevertheless, they must have told you something. And I put it to you that you had a history degree at that point, did you not, in 1963 or ‑‑
A. No, I did not.
Q. You were on your way to getting one.
A. I was an undergraduate.
Q. All right. But you were studying history?
A. I was studying history, but my knowledge, at that point, was limited, unfortunately, to the history of Europe and the history of North America. I knew virtually nothing about Africa or Asia.
Q. And you're an intelligent lady, obviously, and you must have ‑‑ with a bent for history, you must have asked questions about "How did you get to be in this camp? What happened to you in Rwanda? What happened?" And they must have told you their ‑‑ their point of view, what had happened to them; correct?
A. My recollection was dealing with issues like "how do we get enough water to drink today" and "is there another book that could possibly be used for these schoolchildren?" It was not a time of reflection or historical analysis for me. As I say, I was too ignorant. I was struggling too hard to keep my head above water, in terms of preparing classes. I had never taught before, and I was quite overwhelmed with the medical needs of the refugees, for which there was absolutely no assistance.
Q. But, at some point, you must have had coffee when you're eating meals with these people from time to time ‑‑ or just when you're attending to them in the dispensary, you must have had some conversations about what happened in Rwanda and how they got there.
A. The majority of the people in the refugee camp spoke only Kinyarwanda. The numbers of people who spoke English was, I believe, none. The number of people who spoke French was, perhaps, a dozen. So that gives you an idea of how limited the conversations were.
Q. But, nevertheless, you did have conversations about what had happened to them and how they became refugees, either through interpreters or from what you could pick up. You were there three months, I thought.
A. There were no interpreters. We worked morning till night. I honestly do not recall any conversations of historical content. There was ‑‑ I had a general sense that these refugees were here as the result ‑‑ or were there as the result of political upheavals in Rwanda, but that was, I believe, based, as much as anything, on the information provided by Oxfam ‑‑ the ‑‑ and particularly the Oxfam agent who had requested that we go and work in this camp. I don't know that I ever attempted to learn anything very specific from anyone of the refugees.
Q. And who was in charge of the camp?
A. Hm.
Q. I mean, you don't have to name the person, but was there some sort of official with the group you were serving with there who could speak to the refugees there?
A. No. There were two of us, a fellow student and myself. She knew, perhaps, even less than I did. She was a biology major. There was a Tanzanian official who was the person in charge of the camp who would appear every now and again with the rations for distribution, but I don't recall ever having any conversation with him, except concerning his attempt to engage in sexual harassment of two of the young Rwandan women. If anything, it was the teachers in the community, I believe, who ‑‑ who were what you would describe as the opinion leaders, perhaps. And I believe there were ‑‑ there was probably also another person who was officially the Rwandan leader of the camp, but I honestly do not remember any name or face.
Q. But, nevertheless, your ‑‑ whatever your limited communication you had with these refugees, it was enough to spark your studying the region when you got back to America and switching your studies?
A. The entire experience was such as to convince me of the importance of studying the history of Africa. It was not on the basis of one or another conversation, but simply the experience of being in a completely different culture and attempting to understand what was happening.
Q. Okay. Now, your thesis is that ‑‑ your analysis of the events as ‑‑ as you know them, in Rwanda, for April 6 ‑‑ April 6, 1994, (inaudible) that there was a plan of some sort by some people ‑‑ of some officials to exterminate Tutsis on a grand scale; is that correct?
A. Roughly speaking, yes. Very roughly.
Q. All right. I'm going to put something to you that ‑‑ did you ever meet with Madeleine Albright at any time? I think you mentioned her once.
A. I met once with Madam Albright.
Q. She gave an interview to the BBC on November 9th, 2003, and the question was:
"Which of the many issues that you dealt with are you least proud of?"
And her answer was: ‑‑ I'll try and go slowly. I haven't got one ‑‑ a copy for the translators ‑‑ but I won't read the entire paragraph because ‑‑ I'll get to the main sentence. She says ‑‑ she talks about the UN and her government not doing much:
"I got ‑‑ and I got them changed somewhat, but, in the end, we didn't accomplish anything. I thought about this so much, though I think that we, being the international community in this case, could have gotten our forces there in time to stop what was, basically, a volcanic explosion of anger that led to genocide. But I wish, for my own soul, that we had argued more."
So her view was contrary to yours. It wasn't a plan. It was a volcanic explosion of anger by the population.
A. Counsel, to the best of my knowledge, Madeleine Albright has not studied the history of Rwanda. She has many good qualities, I'm sure, but she is not a historian. And I doubt that she is even very well informed or would claim to be well informed about Rwanda. What she was almost certainly reflecting was the common explanation of the time, particularly among diplomats who sought to avoid responsibility, and that common explanation was "This is an uncontrollable force, and we can do nothing about it."
Q. And yet you're not aware, in your research, of any single written order, communiqué, or any other document from any other government official to any other government official, army or gendarme unit instructing them to kill Tutsis, are you?
A. I'm not terrifically well versed in the history of the Holocaust, but I don't know that any such document exists for the extermination of the Jews either.
Q. All right.
A. I think that's the kind of thing one is unlikely to find, and the planning, to the extent that it was committed to paper and has not been destroyed ‑‑ and I would not exclude the significant destruction of documents ‑‑ I believe, can be traced through the chain of documentation that we have ‑‑ that I have developed here before this Court. I think it's rather remarkable that we have established a paper trail to the extent we have, because, at the start, not all of those documents were available to us.
Q. Well, the ‑‑
A. Many ‑‑ many are still, unfortunately, in the possession of some of the actors and are coming out bit by bit, so let's hope, over time, we'll be able to construct a fuller picture.
Q. But we're not in ‑‑ in this trial engaged in a historical debate or analysis. We're engaged in a criminal trial. And the Prosecution ‑‑ (inaudible) ‑‑ the Prosecution has yet to provide, in this Chamber, any documentation whatsoever, not one order, not one communiqué, not one radio intercept or signal or minutes of meetings or anything where an order is given by the high command of the army or any government official to lower commands to massacres and kill Tutsis or so‑called Hutu moderates? Don't you think that's a big gap and a puzzling one, as a historian?
A. Well, in addition to the remarks I just made previously, it is my understanding that there is at least one communications intercept, which, unfortunately, is in the possession of the United States government, which will not release it, that would, in fact, be quite conclusive proof. And, as I say, perhaps over time, as things become declassified, we'll have the opportunity to add additional detail. But I believe that the framework is sufficient as it stands, and, of course, that depends on the appreciation of the Court.
Q. I thought somewhere you said, in testimony or one of the your reports, that you had listened to radio intercepts, transcripts of radio intercepts; is that true? Did I hear correctly?
A. No.
Q. Okay.
A. I referred to the same ‑‑ probably the same radio intercept that I was referring to. I have not, myself, seen it or heard it, but it was described in a scholarly article by Alan Kuperman, I believe.
Q. (Microphones overlapping)
A. Yes. Spelled K‑U‑P‑E‑R‑M‑A‑N. Alan, A‑L‑A‑N.
Q. But you do refer to the fact, I believe, as Mr. Kuperman does ‑‑ or Dr. Kuperman that the American military intercepted or monitored all radio communications in Rwanda during that period and focussed or set their satellites to take photographs of the ground during this period of time; correct?
A. That is correct. And I have some of those photographs which makes me believe that the rest of the Kuperman's information is likely also to be credible.
Q. But don't you think it establishes the inverse ‑‑ the inverse ‑‑ the obverse, because those documents have not been released and provided to the Prosecution here that, in fact, they don't prove, they don't establish what they allege happened, that that's why they're not being released and produced here in trial to support their case? Couldn't you conclude that?
A. That is one possible conclusion, but, of course, you know as well as I, that people are reluctant to take responsibility for their failure to act or to take responsibility for their actions which are inappropriate. And I would suppose that those American officials who are in possession of this kind of intercept would be very reluctant to let it be publicly known, because that would, indeed, conclusively establish their refusal to act in the face of massive killing of civilians that they knew about.
Q. Have you investigated the ‑‑ let me ask you this: You admit the RPF attacked and wanted to seize power by military means and that their excuse or justification for the offensive on the April 6th, 7th to save Tutsis was ‑‑ was not a front ‑‑ a cover for their real motivation, which was to seize power. Is that correct? I think that's what you said yesterday.
A. What I said was that their primary ‑‑ that their priority appeared to be winning the military victory and that saving civilian lives was clearly secondary to that.
Q. Have you read Wayne Madsen's book “Genocide and Covert Operations in Africa 1993‑1999”? He was a former national security agency intelligence officer at one time and now does a lot of research and writing. Have you read that book? It's quite detailed.
MR. JEGEDE: What's the name again?
MR. BLACK: It's called “Genocide and Covert Operations in Africa 1993‑1999”. Actually, it should be "CIA Operations in Africa".
THE WITNESS: I have read some articles by Mr. Madsen which seem to me not serious efforts of scholarship. I have not read his book.
BY MR. BLACK:
Q. Well, I had a copy once, but somebody took it. It was quite scholarly. It had lots of footnotes and was 540 pages. And he puts forward the thesis in that book that the American government intended to assassinate in that plane, not only President Habyarimana, but also President Mobutu and President Daniel Arap Moi of Kenya at the same time. But they were warned off by General Imran Kombe, the Tanzanian chief ‑‑ the Tanzanian army intelligence here, who was also at the meeting to shoot ‑‑ to arrange the shoot‑down of the plane. Are you aware of that, that thesis?
A. Well ‑‑
Q. The thesis.
A. I think we could ‑‑ we would, first of all, need the exact information to proceed to a careful analysis. But, to begin with, neither Mobutu or Arap Moi was in Tanzania at that point. Of course, I suppose if you carry your conspiracy theory to the ultimate, you could say that they were supposed to attend, but didn't attend. But, then, why go ahead with shooting down the plane, if they weren't in it? I mean, it's a waste of resources, if that's your intention.
Q. Habyarimana was also a target and the ‑‑ and the Burundian president.
A. Well, you know, the problem with this stuff is if you ‑‑ if you look at the communications of the Rwanda army ‑‑ and I'm thinking particularly of a letter from Nsengiyumva, the head of the military intelligence, he identifies the United States as one of the prime supporters of the Habyarimana government. Now, Colonel Nsengiyumva was not a stupid man, and he was somebody who followed the intelligence scene with ‑‑ with a certain ‑‑ a certain attention to detail. So how could he have been so mistaken if the United States was really intent? And what about all of those Rwandan military officers who were trained in the United States, far more than the number of the RPF? I mean, it just ‑‑ the historical facts do not fit, no matter how much you hate the United States.
Q. Who me? I don't hate the United States.
A. Well, there are times when, I must say, there are those of us who have the misfortune of being American citizens who feel that way, but that's beside the point.
Q. Well, I was born in Britain. And when I was a boy ‑‑
MR. PRESIDENT: Fourth theory, Counsel.
MR. BLACK: ‑‑ Britain ruled the world, and everybody hated the British.
MR. PRESIDENT: You know, I was thinking that is the fourth theory now about the plane.
MR. BLACK: No. No. It's part of the same theory. I'm not sure, Your Honour. Let me get to that.
BY MR. BLACK:
Q. Aren't you aware that Judge Bruguière's report states that the CIA was heavily implicated in the shoot‑down of that plane, because the missiles were assembled in a hangar at the airport rented by a CIA Swiss front company? That's contained in Bruguière's report.
A. Ooh, can you give me a copy?
Q. Nobody's got a copy. It's already been leaked in Le Monde, as you know.
A. Oh, but that isn't Le Monde. Where do you get that from? That's ‑‑ that's a wholly new aspect that I haven't seen anywhere.
Q. And Boutros‑Ghali made a statement to Robin Philpot last year that he spoke to Bruguière and Bruguière confirmed that the CIA was heavily implicated in the shootdown of the plane, and Boutros‑Ghali made that statement public last year.
A. Can we have a copy?
Q. I could find it later. It's somewhere at my house. I can bring it to you. It's very interesting. I'll show it to you.
A. I would like to see it.
Q. So ‑‑ and do you know why Lieutenant Colonel Vukovic (phonetic) came from Cameroon -- American army colonel, to ‑‑ to Kigali, on April 5th? Any idea?
A. No. It's a total mystery to me. I suppose it was described as part of his ordinary tour of duty, but I don't know. The thing that's so remarkable is that the contacts I have with people at the US embassy, all I can say is if this was a CIA plot, their fellow employees of the US government must be very angry with them, because they were totally clueless; and I suppose it is conceivable for the CIA to plot to assassinate the president of a country without the diplomatic representatives of the US government in that country being aware. But if you ‑‑ if you read the totally open and frank exchange of diplomatic correspondence at the time, the evidence is clear that the people on the ground, representing the US government, did not know if there were, in fact, such a plot being carried out. And that just seems to me a little improbable, even given the problems between intelligence agents and ordinary diplomats. But still it seems a little unlikely, doesn't it, that nobody in the embassy would know?
Q. Well, I'll tell you. Ambassador Flaten testified here ‑‑ and will testify for General Ndindiliyimana ‑‑ and he said that when he went back to the states after his tour of duty was over and events began happening in ‑‑ in ‑‑ in Rwanda, he felt he was deliberately cut out of the loop and was ‑‑ and they were ‑‑ and certain people were hiding things from him and certain department of state officials, that there were two things going on at the same time. A normal, friendly face to Rwanda, but behind the scenes, there was another group with some other agenda. So you might be right.
A. I ‑‑ I could ‑‑ I could, you know ‑‑ I mean, I could accept that ‑‑ that there were divisions, because that is not infrequent for different power factions to develop in a government, but that one of those divisions would be empowered to actually assassinate foreign heads of state? Remember this is the Clinton years, when Clinton had adopted a policy against assassinating foreign heads of state.
Q. Uh‑huh.
A. And this would be the only case, I think, that could be raised. And then you would have to say, "Why? Out of all of the enemies that the US perceived itself to have at that point, why would they choose Rwanda to be the one case of someone where ‑‑ the one case where they violate Clinton's rule and actually assassinate the head of state? Why ‑‑ why in heaven's name would they do it?
Q. It's all about the Congo; right?
MR. PRESIDENT: By the way, Counsel, you have there suggested a motive to eliminate all these foreign presidents.
MR. BLACK: Yes. To control the resources of central Africa and the Congo. It's worth trillions and trillions and trillions and trillions.
THE WITNESS: The problem ‑‑
BY MR. BLACK:
Q. The mining interests of gold, American Mineral Fields, the royal family in Britain, George Bush, Bill Clinton all have shares in these mining companies.
A. I don't know about Clinton. Bush? Sure. But it wasn't Bush's presidency.
Q. Well, I ‑‑
A. And if this was going to happen, why didn't it happen under George Bush? And I think the focus on Africa, if you look at trade statistics and so on and so forth, would indicate that the US really has relatively ‑‑ or at that time ‑‑ relatively little interest in Congo or in Africa generally. Its focus was elsewhere in the world.
Q. Did you follow the congressional hearings by Cynthia McKinney where the evidence was contrary to that, that the American government and mining interests were heavily involved in what happened in Rwanda?
A. Evidence of what nature presented by whom? Let's see that.
Q. Did you follow those hearings or not?
A. And I'd like to see the evidence presented here.
Q. So you're aware of what was said at those hearings?
A. I am generally aware of them, yes.
Q. All right. And that's what was alleged by certain witnesses?
A. Alleged. Alleged. Yes. Not proven.
MR. JEGEDE: I think we are going too fast. Still, we are enjoying the exchange, but you are going too fast for ‑‑ and for the reporters.
BY MR. BLACK:
Q. Have you seen the copy of what is known as the "Hourigan report", about the shootdown of the plane?
A. I have. At least, I believe that what I have seen is what is known by that name, yes.
Q. All right. And you're aware, then, that Michael Hourigan and (inaudible) and others met with the shootdown team, all RPF, and identified to Louise Arbour that it was the RPF who shot down the plane? You're aware of that being contained in this document; correct? I have a copy here. It's sort of dirty now.
MR. JEGEDE: Your Honours, it's no longer the US anymore? I thought you said the US shot down the plane. Now it's the RPF.
MR. BLACK: Well, you're not listening, Mr. Jegede. The RPF can't work alone. Who's supplying the missiles? Who's supplying the money?
BY MR. BLACK:
Q. But let me get to that before we get to this thing. The RPF attacks from Uganda, who's supplying the money?
A. Well, according to Nsengiyumva's analysis, the chief ‑‑ the chief culprit in that situation was the UK, not the US.
Q. Right. And Britain still supplies 60 per cent, I believe, of Rwanda's external aid; correct ‑‑ or something around that figure?
A. No. No. No.
Q. I got that from a British official, but maybe I'm wrong.
A. I think it's a bit high.
Q. Okay. But it's a large amount?
A. It is a large amount.
Q. And the multiple invasions and attacks by the RPF needed lots of ammunition, lots of weaponry, lots of resources. And we have lots of information, which I'll put to you later that that came from the Ugandan army. But who supplied the Ugandan army with the money and the resources to pass it on to the RPF? Wouldn't it be Britain and the United States?
A. As I say, the Rwandan analysis at the time, I believe, was the UK, not the US. And I think the work that was done by the arms division of Human Rights Watch is fairly conclusive about the importance of Uganda as the supplier of arms and ammunition to the RPF so I, myself, am prepared to accept that.
Q. Okay. Now, this ‑‑
A. Maybe we can save some time that way ‑‑
Q. Sure ‑‑
A. ‑‑ if I accept it. Maybe we don't have to go into it.
Q. That's fair enough. Now, this Hourigan report, so‑called ‑‑ it's got another ‑‑ that's what I call it ‑‑ is dated August 1st, 1997. When did you first become aware of that or see it? Do you remember?
A. No, I don't remember. I don't remember if it was ‑‑ even if I was still working on the book or after that so ‑‑ probably sometime in '98 or '99, not ‑‑ not immediately after it, but close enough after it that Hourigan was still on the public scene, which, I think, he isn't so much anymore.
Q. Let me just read to you ‑‑ for the record ‑‑ it's not in the record yet. If you bear with me. Paragraph 4 says this ‑‑ and they refer to the genocide, which I don't like ‑‑ I'm sorry.
MR. PRESIDENT: When you refer to a name, please spell it.
BY MR. BLACK:
Q. "Of course, the genocide occurred on the evening of the April 6" ‑‑ "April 6, 1994, with the shooting down of the presidential jet returning from Arusha" ‑‑ he got that wrong anyway ‑‑ "President Habyarimana, the president of Burundi, and other leading officials were killed. It was first thought that extremists inside his family circle were involved. Now, our investigators" ‑‑ that's Tribunal investigators ‑‑ "have found three sources in the current Tutsi regime who say that they were part of an elite strike team known as "The Network". And with the assistance of a foreign government shot down the presidential aircraft. They advise that Major General Paul Kagame was the overall operations commander, and they provided accurate descriptions of the operation, together with names, ranks, and roles of each soldier involved. They also advised that they can produce hard‑copy documents of the operation. . . . This information fitted in with claims by the Hutu extremists" ‑‑ as he terms it ‑‑ "that the RPF killed the President. Two of the sources wanted to cooperate with investigations if their safety could be guaranteed. The information request was raised with Judge Arbour. And although she was, at first, very positive, she later advised that this issue was not within the ICTR mandate and would not be investigated."
" . . . But I'm told by Jim Lyons, an FBI agent who worked on that same team, that he was told by her that she stopped it on instructions from the American ambassador in Kigali."
So you've read that, in that report; correct?
A. The part you just referred to, it should be clear on the record, was not part of the report. Your reference to Mr. Lyons ‑‑
Q. That's correct. It's not in the report.
A. And I think ‑‑ I'd be rather surprised that he went so far as to put it quite so baldly as that. I know he expressed to me, at some point, some concern that his telephone conversation or Hourigan's telephone conversation with Judge Arbour had been conducted in the US embassy over a secure line and ‑‑ or supposedly secure line. And his concern was that, somehow, this had ‑‑ had a negative effect on ‑‑ on the desire for an investigation. I don't know that to be a fact, but I think it's important to put on the record that this was a deduction he made from, as far as I can tell ‑‑ from the fact that the telephone call was placed from within the American embassy.
Q. Well, having ‑‑ having then ‑‑ having taken this into account, that the Tribunal investigators themselves met with part of the shootdown team ‑‑ and since that shootdown killed a number of people, important people, two heads of state, which would be a war crime, if you say the war started that day, which I say it does ‑‑ that would be a war crime ‑‑ shooting ‑‑ killing a head of state ‑‑ why haven't you called for the prosecution of Kagame and the others and an investigation as to who that foreign government was so they can be prosecuted as well before the Tribunal, since that would be a war crime within the Tribunal's mandate?
A. You see, that's my problem with you lawyers. I have ‑‑ I have raised this issue with a fair number of lawyers, and I have gotten two very different readings on this. And one of them would conform, I suppose, to the theory adopted by Judge Arbour at that time. The mandate of the Tribunal ‑‑ and you'll have to bear with a layperson's reading here ‑‑ is genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. Shooting down the aeroplane, as you say, presumably would fall under the category of war crimes, rather than anything else. But the question is: If there had been a peace treaty signed on August 4th, as there was, there was, in fact, no state of war. The shooting down of the aeroplane could presumably be described as the initial act of a state of war, but if at the time the missile was fired, there was no state of war, was it, in fact, a war crime?
Now, I don't want to argue this with you, because I'm certainly not going to take the position that this is a rational and justified argument, because to me, it's a little bit of nonsense. But I do have to bring to the attention of the Court that legal authorities who have no desire to favour the RPF have told me that, in fact, the decision not to prosecute this crime is a justified one. But, be that as it may, I have attempted on many occasions to encourage investigation into this crime and prosecution for it. But I'll tell you, you lawyers are not very easy on these points of detail.
Q. Well, it appears that Madam Arbour, who was, by the way, my professor ‑‑
MR. JEGEDE: Your Honours, I'm objecting to this line of questioning.
MR. BLACK: Oh, boy.
MR. JEGEDE: We've gone off on a tangent now completely, and we're dealing with side issues. We are dealing with collateral issues, which have nothing to do with matters in controversy before Your Honours.
MR. PRESIDENT: That is correct, Counsel. I think it is ‑‑ unless you put two or three questions and get on to ‑‑
MR. BLACK: Yeah, I'm going to go on. But my ‑‑ it's not collateral from our point of view. It goes to what this war is really all about, what the intentions of all the parties were, and why hostilities and why civilian casualties took ‑‑ why these killings took place. It's all relevant to me. But ‑‑
THE WITNESS: I would also think if we were to discuss this, it would be necessary for the Court to have a copy of this report, because as I recall, there is a rating given by Hourigan ‑‑
MR. BLACK: That's right.
THE WITNESS: ‑‑ about the credibility of his sources of information. And, as I recall, the rating is not of the highest.
[1630H ]
BY MR. BLACK:
Q. Yes, this rating is number two, probably two is untested as opposed to the number one which is uncorroborated.
A. And who again himself, as you see had some defects as an investigator notably shown here by his saying the aeroplane had come from Arusha. So we need to do more work on this, that is clear.
Q. Well it is quite clear though that Judge Arbour, at that time thought it was relevant to the ICTR mandate in this case, because she ordered the investigation then on the assumption that Hutu extremists so‑called shot down the president. When she found out it was the RPF and company, she killed the investigations? Don't you think that is a bit strange?
A. Do we know that she ordered the investigation? I don't know that. Was this the initiative of these particular investigators who were perhaps the people who were the sources who came and presented themselves? I just don't know. I don't know that there was an investigation ordered, but I simply say that yet needs to be established.
MR. JEGEDE: Your Honour, this kind of problem, when we deal with suppositions and rumours, I think we have much more serious matters to attend to than going into these speculations upon speculations. We should deal with serious issues, Your Honours.
MR. PRESIDENT: It seems since we are not dealing with the death of the president, since we are not inquiring into it, I think we must get on with the charges in this case.
MR. BLACK: That is what we are doing. I can file this, but ‑‑
BY MR. BLACK:
Q. Madam, you say that determining who shot that plane will change the entire complexion of how people see those events. But if this was confirmed as, I think, has been confirmed, if investigation had been followed up and it was confirmed that the RPF shot down that plane, it would have changed the whole complexion of how you see things, would it not?
A. No, it is a question of enormous importance. It should be resolved ‑‑ it should be resolved for many reasons, but it would not, in my evaluation, change the conclusions that I have drawn based on historical facts about the events of the genocide.
The supposition which was, in my mind, at the time when I worked on this, was that either theory was possible at this point and I am more inclined to the theory of the RPF than I am to the other, but it has not changed my interpretation of the organisation and the implementation of the genocide.
Q. Okay, but the relevant side is that the population, when the plane goes down, most of the Hutu population at least, and the military believed that the RPF shot the plane with the help of the Belgians at least, that provoked a great deal of anger and hatred, did it not, that this, a third, three Hutu presidents assassinated in six months by Tutsis. That would justify the cause of a lot of anger and fear, would it not?
A. It is clear that the assassination of President Habyarimana served as a rallying point for a certain number of people; for example, I have testimony that people began to put a portrait pin of President Habyarimana on their clothes, a practice which had been discarded some time before with the introduction of the multiparty politics and certainly, if you listen to the discourse of the RTLM or the national radio of these political leaders, it is repeated without ceasing every time a political meeting begins, there is reference to the shooting down of the president. So, yes, obviously, it is a point of major importance, but how many people actually would pick‑up a machete and go and kill another person, because they believed that the RPF had shot down an aeroplane even if it resulted in the death of Habyarimana, and I think that the assassination of the two presidents of Burundi would not have been a major cause factor in the minds of most Rwandans. It was something that was used to whip up here in that regard and in the use of this as a mobilisation tool, the symbolism of the killing of the president, yes it was of enormous importance, and it was the central part of the propaganda. But how many people spontaneously, and on their own felt so outraged and so angry that they would kill another person, that I really find hard to believe, and having lived through the assassination of a president who was an enormous symbol to me as a young person, I even have someone I identified clearly as an assassin, I doubt that I would have felt provoked to actually going to kill someone over this.
Q. The assassination was not by an enemy force, it was by internal parties, whoever they may be, and we do have an example in American history, don't we, several of them, where a beloved leader was assassinated and the population rose up in rebellion and there was a lot of violence, and I am talking about Martin Luther King's death in particular, in 1968, where black populations in many American cities rose up and two weeks of rioting and fighting with the army and national guard ‑‑ so how can you say you cannot understand how people spontaneously go into the street and attack people belonging to another ethnic group when they believed that their ethnic group had shot their leader? When that happened in the United States, it was so.
A. Two weeks later, in Butare, people, for the first time, were so outraged that they got out and killed?
Q. Well, I have a reference here, if I can find it, there is a situation report saying that the killings were begun as the RPF front moved, and as the infiltrators. And you keep saying that it is ‑‑ you keep portraying like Rwanda -- as if Rwanda is a big country. Butare is only a few dozen miles from Kigali, right ‑‑ 67 miles, may be half of that, depending on where you are in Butare, of course. So, how can you say people will not understand when you are upset and afraid down there in Butare? It is just down the road, it is not like the association of New York and Arizona?
A. Counsel, the people of Butare were not known for their attachment to President Habyarimana. You see, that is the problem with a large check here. If you assume that this is a nation of MRND supporters and people attached to the president, and that was certainly not the case. Everything that has gone into that has shown the complexity of the political situation where MRND people were not even sure that they could rely on the MDR at that point. So to assume that all Rwandans loved their president so much that they would take up arms to avenge his death, was not the case. And, in fact, there was criticism of some Rwandans for celebrating his death.
Q. Can you name any Hutus who celebrated his death?
A. I was not party to celebrations at that time.
Q. Well, since the people believed, generally, that the RPF were perceived as a Tutsi organisation, had murdered the presidents of Burundi and Rwanda and the army chief of staff, and there were some reasons to believe that Kagame was involved in the murder of Burundian president Ndadaye in October 1993 in order to ‑‑ that the general population was afraid that what had happened to their presidents was going to happen to them -- irrational -- rational or not, don't you think as happened with the death -- the assassination of Martin Luther King, there was instantaneous eruption of violence on the streets of American cities across the United States, which was very hard to calm?
A. I don't believe that it was instantaneous.
Q. Well, I remember that very well. TV screens were full of scenes the same night?
A. In any case, in the case we are discussing here, which is Rwanda, it was not spontaneous, that is absolutely clear by historical fact, nor do we know that the population in general believed that it was the RPF that shot down the place. There was sufficient suspicion among MDR people, that, I think, there would have been at least some in positions -- in power who were not a hundred percent themselves sure what had happened. So, and your reference to Paul Kagame being responsible for Ndadaye's assassination, Rwandans had absolutely no proof of that. It was an allegation made on RTLM, which just goes to prove my point that there is manufacturing here and manipulation of public opinion. But it didn't have a hundred percent success, because obviously, not a hundred percent of Rwandan Hutu got up the next morning and killed people. It didn’t happen that way. It was an area where the MRND strength, were the ones that responded first and it took major investment of national resources to make the other people comply.
Q. Well, first of all, Kagame was in Bujumbura the day Ndadaye was killed. He arrived the day before and left next day.
A. I have no proof of that. Have you proof of that?
Q. I have it somewhere.
A. Well, somewhere does not do.
Q. Yet, you say the army killed Prime Minister Agathe, why? Where is your proof of that?
A. Because of numerous testimonies from participants in the crime, and others who were on the scene?
Q. Where and when?
A. Well, the references are in the footnotes of my book. They are sworn statements delivered to the Belgian judicial authorities and Rwanda judicial authorities.
Q. Have you interviewed the UN witnesses ‑‑ witnesses of the UN compound who saw her shot?
A. I have interviewed the US diplomat who lived next door.
Q. So you have not interviewed the people working for the UN itself who saw her coming into the UNDP compound and later saw her shot?
A. I don't believe they saw her shot.
Q. Why not?
A. They might have seen her come into the compound the same way the US diplomat had seen her come into her compound.
Q. You haven't spoken to (inaudible) the UN security coordinator of security in Kigali on that day?
A. I have not. Did he see her shot? I doubt that.
Q. No, but he was an American diplomat.
A. So was the American diplomat.
Q. Have you spoken to Mr. Diakiet; D‑I‑A‑K‑I‑E‑T, whose house she was found in?
A. I have not.
Q. Have you spoken to Mr. Maxim Bampiaeng; B‑A‑M‑P‑I‑A‑E‑N‑G, with whom her husband was hiding, and her children?
A. I have not. I have told you my sources, and I have not claimed to have done a pleasing (inaudible) ‑ of the assassination of the prime minister.
Q. You know when you investigated the death of the prime minister that she was taken out back to her house by the unit of gendarmes, correct?
A. She went over the wall with the assistance of the gendarmes.
Q. Now, they said that they catered ‑‑ I have ‑‑ we have here -- the statements have been filed, of Ghanaian UN services, who left the house, and they are all consistent, five of a them said that around 7 o'clock in the morning she left the house with gendarmes trying to haul her across the back and took her out the back towards the UNDP camp?
A. That must have been after she had attempted to go over the wall into the American compound.
Q. They don't talk about her trying to go over the wall at all. This version does not accord with anything that the Ghanaian saw. They are the only neutral observers we saw ‑‑ we have actually -- at her house, were the five Ghanaian soldiers, and they don't mention her trying to get over the wall to the US residency -- ambassador’s residence.
A. Did anyone ask them? Was that question ‑‑
Q. They state the following: that Bampiaeng's men showed up around 5:30 in the morning, the officer‑in‑charge ‑‑ the then officer‑in‑charge approached the Lieutenant ‑‑ and asked what his mission was because they didn't know that they were coming. His response was, simply, we are here to see the prime minister. Then he turned to the door, the lieutenant knocks on the door, the prime minister refuses to answer the door and never does speak to the Belgians, and about an hour later they take her out at the back, the gendarmes, while there is firing in the area -- so Belgians and the Ghanaians had to hit the ground. They wanted the gendarmes to take her out the back.
A. And where were gendarmes before the arrival of the lieutenant and his men?
Q. They were outside the compound.
MR. PRESIDENT: You have changed roles now, you are giving evidence, and she is questioning you?
MR. BLACK: Well, she said that ‑‑ I asked her opinion because she said it was the army ‑‑ now she has got the army ‑‑ the army killed the guards. I don't know where that comes from.
MR. JEGEDE:
Your Honours, there is no need to go on this voyage of discovery to know who killed the prime minister. We already got cogent and compelling evidence to show who killed the prime minister. So why are we going through this exercise. It is useless.
MR. BLACK: You haven't got any witness, Dr. Des Forges. I will tell you what they brought, they brought two witnesses.
MR. PRESIDENT: To just prove it here ‑‑
MR. BLACK: Well, we only have secondhand evidence about who killed the prime minister. There is no evidence whatsoever, because they refused to bring the people who actually witnessed the killing to court, for some strange reason. Anyway, the witnesses ‑‑ the people in the UNDP compound said that she arrived around 7:00 ‑‑ 7:30, they called the UN in New York, they called the security coordinator and he said he was going to call UNAMIR, and Dallaire admits that he got a call around 9:00 a.m. that she was at the UNDP compound, and they asked ‑‑ the UNDP people asked: "What do we do with her?
MR. JEGEDE: Your Honours, this procedure is baffling. Counsel is testifying. If he wants to give evidence -- you go into the box and give it.
MR. BLACK: I can read extracts on testimony of witnesses ‑‑
MR. JEGEDE: Your Honours, he is only trying to confuse the witness, because the witness has stated the source of her opinion as to who killed ‑‑ (Microphones overlapping)
MR. PRESIDENT: Yes, we have got the evidence before this Tribunal.
BY MR. BLACK:
Q. Doctor, I will make you do as you make us do. Where is the proof? You say the army shot the prime minister, where is the statement, where is the proof of that?
A. Counsel, that is not my obligation.
Q. Well, it is. This is a criminal trial, these mens' lives are at stake.
A. I am not the Prosecutor.
Q. Yes you are. Well, you seem to be.
MR. JEGEDE: Your Honours, she is only an expert. We both have shown witnesses here. Witnesses who saw what happened. They have told us what happened. Why do we have go on with this charade? It is completely useless, Your Honors. I think we should move on.
MR. BLACK: They brought this doctor here to give evidence, because the frailty of their evidence is laughable. They got two very incredible witnesses who just give us hearsay and triple hearsay evidence about who killed Agathe. No direct evidence whatsoever, and then Dr. Des Forges comes and says I know the army killed her, but she is not the one to prove it.
BY MR. BLACK:
Q. But let me present a thesis, at least give us a document, to be precise, tell me ‑‑ let's see the proof ‑‑ I am asking the doctor, where is the proof, where are the statements, where is proof that anybody in the army killed her?
A. There are sworn statements made to legitimate judicial authorities about the facts that I have discussed. There are allegations about the killing of Ndadaye and the presence of Kagame in Bujumbura as far as I know there has been no substantiation whatsoever. You don't see the equivalence in the situation?
Q. Well, I am asking you, since you came here to make these allegations, where is the proof? Because without it, it is just a statement in the air. Did you bring those proofs, did you bring those statements to show us? Because, otherwise, just a statement, means nothing. An opinion without a factual basis is nothing in this court. This is not a debating society, this is a criminal case.
A. Indeed, I am well aware of that, counsel. I am also well aware of what is my role and my responsibilities. It is not my role to prove allegations. It is my role as a historian, to present an interpretation to the court and conclusions based upon my best examination of the evidence that is available to me.
Q. So, you can't prove that the army ‑‑ you have no evidence here with you to prove that the army had or anybody in the army had anything to do with her death?
MR. JEGEDE: Your Honour, objection to this line of questioning. The witness is not here to prove anything. She is not here to prove anything. She is only here to assist the Court in understanding the evidence, the factual evidence before the Court, not to prove anything. So it's an abuse of language to say that the witness, an expert witness, is here to prove a fact. She is here to give you her opinion, Your Honours.
MR. BLACK:
An opinion must be based on facts. She has expressed an opinion that the army ‑‑ she did not identify who shot down the presidents, and I am asking her to give us the proof. Where is it? Because I haven't seen it and I am not going to accept her word for it.
MR. PRESIDENT: Well, Counsel, an opinion is opinion. So it is not substantiated, and then leave it at that.
MR. BLACK: Well it is not substantiated.
BY MR. BLACK:
Q. You can't substantiate it right now, can you, doctor?
A. I prefer to remain within the role which is appropriate for me.
Q. Well, that is a 'no', if you can't say that?
A. I am sure the Court will understand.
Q. You say, in your report, that, for instance, Mr. Kavuruganda ‑‑ the president of the constitutional court, was murdered by elements of the army and gendarmes, correct?
A. Did I say that?
Q. I think you did. Well, is that your position?
A. That is my position.
Q. Do you have any proof for that? Let me say ‑‑ do you have any proof that gendarmes were there?
A. I don't believe I specify which service of the armed forces was involved.
Q. Okay. So who are you saying, then, killed Kavuruganda?
A. I have not attempted to identify or to make any specific allegations about any persons. My role is to point out to the Court, the historical war of various institutions and those people in charge of the institution in carrying out this genocide. It is not to identify the individual officers who pulled the trigger.
Q. So then, you are working on secondhand information about who may have killed Kavuraganda?
A. You know what? I am getting a little tired of this, and I appeal to the Court to please enforce the rule that this is not an appropriate line of questioning.
MR. PRESIDENT: I think, Mr. Black, if you really want that information, I think Kavuraganda's wife will come and do that. She is summoned to come here.
MR. BLACK: Well, she says, in her report, that Kavuraganda was killed by soldiers and gendarmes.
THE WITNESS:
I would like to see the reference.
BY MR. BLACK:
Q. Okay, when I have found it, I will give it to you.
A. Let's not waste time here.
Q. Well, I hoped you would have prepared also, Dr. Des Forges, to backup what you say, but you have not, because you do say that in your report that gendarmes were there, in fact, Madam Kavuraganda complains that there were no gendarmes there?
A. Reference?
Q. Prosecution motion filed a letter from Madam Kavuruganda. They asked for subpoenas for her and through that material they have a statement from her alleging that there were no gendarmes at the house.
A. Do I say there were gendarmes at the house?
Q. I believe you do?
A. Where?
Q. We will bring it up, we will get back to it.
MR. JEGEDE: Your Honours, I protest. I don't think we can go on in this way. You put a particular fact to the witness without being able to substantiate it? This is not a family Court, Your Honour, this is an international court.
MR. BLACK: Well, Mr. President. She has made allegations in her testimony‑in‑chief, that the only elements we have, gendarmerie (Inaudible) could not have participated really in negotiations to peace, because they had assassinated all the politicians ‑‑ the moderate politicians and all the opposition politicians. She says that. I am entitled to cross‑examine what is the basis for you to say that. Where is proof of that?
MR. JEGEDE:
Your Honours, how many witnesses have we brought to this Court? (Microphones overlapping)
THE ENGLISH INTERPRETER: Difficult to interpret, sir. Several people speaking at the same time.
MR. PRESIDENT: We, Counsel, if you want, we can ask her to present where she says she has given all the references upon which she is forming her opinion.
THE WITNESS: Let us put the book into evidence, that will take care of that.
BY MR. BLACK:
Q. The trouble with your book, it is self‑referencing. References of Human Rights Watch. Most of the references are in reference to yourself.
MR. JEGEDE: But you have relied on the book to portray your point here too, haven't you ‑‑
MR. BLACK:
Her own words, I am just quoting her own words to her.
MR. PRESIDENT: Okay, Counsel.
BY MR. BLACK:
Q. So, do you have any proof whatsoever today that elements of the army or gendarmes killed any of those people?
A. I understood the Judge to rule that question out of order. Wasn't that what happened a moment ago?
Q. No, not really.
A. Well, then I think we need to go back and read the record.
Q. Do you have proof here with you or do you not; yes or no?
A. Is this question orderly, Your Honour?
Q. It must be. Do you have facts ‑‑ any proof with you right now, to backup your statements?
MR. JEGEDE: I remember he had said that he didn't have the papers with him here, so why are you pushing the question?
THE WITNESS:
I think that is an inappropriate inference to draw, and I ask the Court to enforce its ruling so this can stop.
MR. PRESIDENT: Well, Counsel, you have been just ‑‑
MR. BLACK: Well, I asked that question, Mr. President, well, look, these mens’ lives are at stake here, because of the allegations made by ‑‑ (Micropones overlapping)
MR. PRESIDENT: She has ‑‑
MR. BLACK: Please let me finish, Mr. President, if I could, sir. I don't want to fight with you. We are not going to sit here and have these men condemned on rumour and opinions expressed in here without any factual foundation and backing up with documents. She is very adept and expert in demanding that if we make a suggestion we have got to prove it on a piece of paper. So, what is good for the goose is good for the gander. Where is her proof to backup her opinion? She hasn't got it with her in court. That's it.
MR. PRESIDENT: Well, Counsel, allegations are not proved on her opinion alone. There are other witnesses who will speak to the factual situation. So if they are relying only on her opinion, I think your argument maybe can be sustained.
MR. BLACK: Thank you. I appreciate that.
BY MR. BLACK:
Q. So, when you expressed your opinion that Prime Minister Agathe was rejected by the military as prime minister; is that correct?
A. Can we have the exact words that I used?
Q. Well, is that not your position? So what is your position? Is it that the army, in the morning of April the 7th, rejected her as prime minister or accepted her to continue as prime minister?
A. I think it is clear from my testimony and from the sworn statements of Colonel Bagosora from the accounts by Dallaire, from the account by Marchal, that it was Colonel Bagosora and those officers supporting him who rejected the prime minister and called her in effect, a whore, and said that in no circumstances would they accept her authority. That is clear.
Q. Well, it's also clear and the evidence will be that officers involved in that meeting, including General Ndindiliyimana, that despite Bagosora's initial opposition, the meeting at large, at the end, accepted her to continue as prime minister. Well, it's not just waving your hands in the air and smiling. There is work to do. They did accept her as prime minister. So there was no need to kill her, because she had been accepted in her role as prime minister and that she would continue in that role ‑‑
MR. PRESIDENT: Do you place that in evidence, Counsel?
MR. BLACK: That is going to be the evidence in defence.
THE WITNESS:
What is the authority for this assertion?
BY MR. BLACK:
Q. General Ndindiliyimana, for one, and other officers there?
A. Which other officers?
Q. Well, let us just have General Ndindiliyimana for now.
A. You see, Counsel, even supposing that this is accurate, even supposing that the majority of officers were agreed to accept Agathe, which is certainly not the testimony of everyone else who was at that meeting, including Colonel Bagosora and Ntabakuze and Dallaire and every one else. Even if that were all false and Agathe was to continue, that would make it all the more important to get rid of her, because she would be an obstacle to carrying out the plan. So, I don't see that really can diminish the motivation of those people who killed her. But in any case, I really find this impossible, given the clear testimony of Bagosora and other army officers and of General Dallaire as to what was the sentiment of that meeting.
Q. Well, that is not what I am told by General Ndindiliyimana who was there in the meeting.
A. Bagosora was and I wasn't. So, let's read Colonel Bagosora.
Q. It's not nothing; it goes against your case, that is why you don't believe the army accepted her in her role as prime minister, despite their reservations about her role in the assassination of the president and legitimate concerns, then your whole thesis of a plan for genocide falls to pieces.
A. No.
Q. Oh, yes, it does, because if they didn't want to kill the prime minister and accepted her, and you know General Dallaire and Marchal conferred with Booh‑Booh, they accepted to have an interim government installed and continue to trying to continue the Arusha Accords so the RPF backup attacks ‑‑
MR. PRESIDENT: Well, Counsel, I think you must not make submissions to this witness. Your submissions must be made to the Court not to the witness.
MR. BLACK: No, I am making a suggestion to her. She is the expert, she says.
THE WITNESS:
Well, I am glad you accept my expertise, and my expertise tells me on the basis of the sworn declarations of people who were very clear in what they said, that there is no way in which the prime minister could be acceptable to them as a continued legitimate authority, and that had been their position for weeks, and the language of Bagosora, which was coarse, I understand, reflected a total rejection of her authority. She was regarded as an RPF sell-out.
BY MR. BLACK:
Q. But as you know, Bagosora was backed into a conner by other officers, including General Ndindiliyimana and was forced to go with General Ndindiliyimana's suggestion with Dallaire to see Booh‑Booh, and Booh‑Booh instructed Bagosora in Dallaire's presence to continue with Agathe, and he agreed.
A. Which made it more important to get rid of her.
Q. And Booh‑Booh ‑‑
A. She was removed from the table, if she wasn't there, there was no question.
Q. If they accepted her, and I put it to you that they did, even if Bagosora was not happy about it, if they accepted her, then she was not killed by the army, she was killed by somebody else. And the question is who and why, and then the whole the idea that they were trying to oppose that these guys wouldn't be nice guys and shot the opposing politicians fell apart -- doesn't it, if what General Ndindiliyimana says to me is correct, that would necessarily follow, correct?
A. No, no, none of it would follow, and none of it is logical. How can you argue that these people were not killed, they were killed. So, who would have killed them?
Q. Well, who was she working with, if she was, you know, involved in a coup on April 4th, an attempt which was rejected. So, she was close to Twagiramungu who was close to the RPF ‑‑ connect the dots?
A. No, please, you do, because, I must say, your connections are so vague and illogical, I can't follow them.
Q. Wasn't Twagiramungu close to her ‑‑
THE ENGLISH INTERPRETER:
The pause, we need the pause.
BY MR. BLACK:
Q. Was Twagiramungu a very close ally, of the RPF?
A. Are you saying she was killed by Twagiramungu?
Q. Yes or no, wasn't Twagiramungu close to the RPF?
A. Twagiramungu was part of a coalition of political leaders who agreed to cooperate with the RPF, yes.
Q. So she was linked directly or indirectly to the RPF?
A. Well, in the mind of Bagosora, for sure, that I think we established clearly, and in the minds of certain other army officers, no doubt.
Q. Who do you think set her up, leaking that information on April 4th to RTLM? Do you know who leaked that information and set her up, and why?
A. No, I don't. Tell me.
Q. Have you ever wondered why?
THE ENGLISH INTERPRETER: We can't follow really, at this stage we can't.
MR. JEGEDE: And if you can start by answering her question, she wanted to know who, we will continue from there.
BY MR. BLACK:
Q. Well, my suggestion to you, madam, is that the army did, again, agree to continue with her despite their reservations. Therefore, there was no need to assassinate her. Therefore, your entire thesis falls to pieces.
A. Are you suggesting to me that Bagosora was either (a) so stupid; or (b) so ill-informed that he didn't understand what happened at the end of that meeting? He didn't grasp that the whole army was going to rally around the prime minister? How could he have been so stupid or so ill-informed to have reached such a conclusion?
MR. PRESIDENT: Well, Witness, the suggestion was that the RPF is wrong. Do you accept that or are you rejecting it?
THE WITNESS:
I am sorry, Your Honour. What was the question?
MR. PRESIDENT: It was not a question. He suggested to you that your theory of getting ‑‑ that there was a coup to get rid of the prime minister was false; would you accept that?
THE WITNESS: No, I do not accept that, because it is clear that the officers who had the predominant power in the situation, including the control over the presidential guard, the reconnaissance battalion and the paratroops. paracommandoes who were the most powerful and elite forces in the capital had rejected her, and that was the conclusion that Bagosora himself puts forward. He never raises the possibility that he somehow misunderstood, and that everyone really was okay with continuing with her as prime minister -- no, no, this is a suggestion which so far ‑‑ which so far betrays the facts that I find it hard to give it any credence whatsoever.
MR. TAKU: Your Honours, I stand up at this point in time and say that this is really new. We didn't raise this. I cross‑examined the witness and I defend General Ndindiliyimana ‑‑ sorry, I defend General –Major Nzuwonemeye. This is entirely new, and for first time I hear that Bagosora said that the reconnaissance battalion was entirely under his control. This has come up for the first time under his cross‑examination and I object very, very radically.
MR. PRESIDENT: No, she never said reconnaissance was under his control.
MR. TAKU: Well, is what she is saying now, that, what I understood, Your Honours, and I think, Your Honours that I have a duty -- I asked precise questions with precise answers, and I think that the Court should direct very, very, closely and questions should be asked and answered with regard to specific accused persons, not questions and answers that are likely to raise new issues where we wouldn't have the opportunity to probe the witness again on those issues. It didn't arise in cross‑examination, it is arising now, I am afraid I might not have the opportunity to deal with that except he wants to prolong to bring me back to question her on those particular aspects ‑‑
MR. PRESIDENT: Yes, Mr. Black, I think we have to leave her ‑‑
MR. ST‑LAURENT: If you allow me, Mr. President, I wish to support what my learned colleague just said. It would go along those lines when you will have to allow us to counter or cross cross‑examine the witnesses.
MR. PRESIDENT: Well, Mr. Black, you keep all these proceedings. Just limit your defence to Ndindiliyimana and then the problems can be solved.
MR. BLACK: Well, that is what I am doing, he was involved in those meetings, that is what she is saying, and therefore, the army did not kill her because they agreed to accept her.
MR. PRESIDENT: Yes, but the army ‑‑ then you are trying to defend the gendarmerie, Counsel.
MR. BLACK: Then what is wrong with what she says? She is wrong in what she says.
BY MR. BLACK:
Q. And it is also confirmed by the facts, madam, that Dallaire was at that meeting and says nothing about Agathe being rejected. He told Bagosora to see Booh‑Booh and everybody agrees with Booh‑Booh's suggestion to continue with the prime minister by trying to keep the broad-based government, trying to get it installed and trying for the Arusha Accords. That is what Booh‑Booh says too?
MR. TAKU: Just one minute. I am sorry to interrupt my friend. We have the transcript of General ‑‑ Colonel Bagosora. He himself said that he rejected the prime minister, but he doesn't think that he did that with my client or any other person. He himself said that. In that regard, Madam Des Forges is right, Bagosora said he rejected the prime minister. That is not in controversy, but he doesn't go as far as to say that he did that with any other person.
THE WITNESS:
If I may comment, Counsel?
MR. BLACK: What I am saying is that Bagosora didn't want her, but that was not the result of the entire meeting.
THE WITNESS: If I may comment, Counsel, I am sorry if you understood me to say that he rejected her with the agreement of your client. I think what I said was that Bagosora and certain other army officers rejected her and that Bagosora appeared to have command at that time of other units, the elite units of the army in the capital, including the paracommandoes and the reconnaissance battalion. I did not attempt ‑‑ well, I hope I did not attempt to suggest a direct connection there between your client and the rejection of the prime minister.
MR. PRESIDENT: She said, "seemed to have control."
MR. BLACK: Well, the evidence will be that she was accepted at the end of the meeting by the officers there, in general. So we can leave that point.
MR. TAKU: I am sorry, Your Honour, but I am still worried, I am still very, very, worried. There was no premise to have mentioned my client. The rules in a joint trial are very clear. The premise is that the answers are given to questions that are posed or asked, and to have made any inference or any connection is already prejudicial.
MR. PRESIDENT: No, Counsel, we understand the answer in the sense that Bagosora seemed to have control. That is the impression that Bagosora had given, the day he had control of ‑‑
MR. TAKU: Okay. Thank you, Your Honours. My colleague himself will admit that I will not, in any way, ask a question that will deal with any person, I asked a question that had a direct inference with Bagosora, but merely said a senior military officer, because I did not want to drag him into these proceedings.
MR. JEGEDE: Your Honour, there are no rules that define the scope of answers of that witness ‑‑ that this was the answer can be given to questions posed by counsel. So she has a wider scope within which to roam. If her answer concerns anybody in the army, she is free to mention the name of that person.
BY MR. BLACK:
Q. Do you have any proof whatsoever that the army or gendarmerie, were involved in any plan to exterminate Tutsis?
A. I have developed in some detail, in my examination‑in‑chief, and in prior questioning by counsel, my position on this issue. I have indicated, not very long ago this afternoon, the existence of the documents, which to me substantiates this conclusion and I think that it is sufficiently well examined that the Court does not need to waste it's time any further.
Q. So you base your analysis on three documents or three things ‑‑ documents, was that it ‑‑ your interpretation of those documents?
A. No, there is the letter of July 27th from Colonel Nsengiyumva, July 27th, 1992, there is the letter 1437 of September 21st 1992, by Colonel Nsabimana. There is letter 1438 of September 21st, 1992 by Colonel Nsabimana; there is the Bagosora diary, there are the various statements, including by person, Habyarimana, in the CDR party, and the ones you have adduced in favour of civilian self‑defence. There is the letter of December 14th, 1993 by Colonel Nsengiyumva, there is the document which Kambanda has made available to the court on the organisation of civilian self‑defence, there is the letter of March the 30th by Nsabimana to Préfet Renzaho. The letter of 31st of March by Renzaho to Nsabimana; there is the May 25th statement by the prime minister; the May 25th statement by the minister of interior, these are 1994. There is the document on the use of funds for civilian self‑defence signed by Minister Karemera some time in May, I don't have the exact date; there is a statement by Minister Mugenzi in a video, where he says the militia are the same thing as the civilian self‑defence. There is a statement by Prime Minister Kambanda, saying the militia are the same thing as civilian self‑defence. At the moment that is what comes to mind, not to mention witness statements.
Q. All right, not to mention witness statements. Right now none of these documents state anything about a text book plan to kill Tutsis, is this your interpretation of those document?
A. We discussed this earlier this afternoon, didn't we?
Q. Yes or no?
A. We discussed this earlier this afternoon and it is in the record.
Q. Yes or no. Answer my question.
A. I don't need to answer any question twice.
Q. You refuse to answer my question?
MR. PRESIDENT: She has already answered that.
MR. BLACK:
Well, I must have her answer.
THE WITNESS:
Well, go back and read the record.
THE ENGLISH INTERPRETER: Counsel, please refrain from exchanging without pauses.
BY MR. BLACK:
Q. What is your answer, madam?
A. Maybe we can ask ‑‑
MR. JEGEDE:
Mr. President has ruled on that. She has already given her answer, as rules the court.
BY MR. BLACK:
Q. I am entitled to my cross‑examination. The question is none of those documents states anywhere in the text, anything about a plan to kill Tutsi, it is just your interpretation of those documents, is it not correct; yes or no?
A. We dealt with this question and the Court has ruled.
Q. You are not the Court.
A. I know, but I am trying to obey the orders of the Court unlike some people here.
MR. PRESIDENT: Well, Counsel, move on.
MR. BLACK: I need an answer to that question.
MR. PRESIDENT: The witness has come here for that purpose, so she has given you the answer.
MR. BLACK: Why is she afraid to say it?
THE WITNESS:
I am not afraid, I am trying to hurry up the proceedings by following the Judge's order.
MR. BLACK: We could hurry up if you could just give an answer. A simple answer, "yes" or "no".
THE WITNESS: I am trying to set a pattern for the future.
MR. PRESIDENT: Counsel, you must not get involved with the witness. You must not argue with the witness. Your role is to put questions to her.
MR. BLACK:
Maybe, probably, Mr. President, tell the witness not to argue with me. I asked her a question, she is compelled to answer unless you tell me not to ask the question, and the question -- My question is a legitimate one.
MR. PRESIDENT: She also has the right to say that she has already answered those questions.
MR. BLACK:
And I have the right to say that she hasn't.
MR. PRESIDENT:
Then in that case we rule that she has already answered the question.
MR. JEGEDE:
Thank you, Your Honour.
MR. BLACK:
Then you give me the answer, Mr. President, because I don't know it.
MR. JEGEDE: Your Honours, this is a serious disobedience to Court's orders.
MR. PRESIDENT: Well, Counsel, if you don't know the answer, we will adjourn now, then you read the proceedings and come tomorrow. Do you really want to have the proceedings tomorrow or Monday?
MR. BLACK: You have just ‑‑
THE WITNESS:
Your Honours, I was never consulted about a final date. I have other obligations, I cannot sit here and be asked repeatedly to answer the same questions and waste my time like this. I just will not do it.
MR. PRESIDENT: The Court's understanding, Witness, is that you will be here until the 20th.
THE WITNESS: I prefer not to be here until the 20th. I have other things to do.
MR. PRESIDENT: We will see how it goes. If we finish early, you can go early.
MR. BLACK: So you say you are going to give me how many more days? That is why I was saying, if she is leaving next week then I don't want to sit tomorrow, so I can consult my client, but if she is leaving, like, on Tuesday, yes, I need Friday, and Mr. Segatwa wants to ask some questions too.
THE WITNESS:
Your Honour ‑‑
MR. PRESIDENT: Well, Monday will be given to Mr. Segatwa. Well, I only had four hours total.
MR. SEGATWA: I think it is up to my co‑counsel to answer, because he will cross‑examine.
MR. DOUMBIA: I think that a day will not be enough for me.
MR. ST‑LAURENT: I am sorry, Mr. President, before Mr. Black speaks again, I would like to tell you that I have an oral motion to present, so we will need 15 minutes, Monday morning for me, to do that beyond the timing for the cross‑examination by my learned friends. I would like to advise you that I need 15 minutes to make our motion.
MR. TAKU: Your Honours, I have a very brief application to make, and I do this under the direction of the Court and with due respect to the witness, but the issue about the assertion that was made that Bagosora seemed to have control, an issue that arose for the very first time. Now, my application is whether I can be given some time to cross‑examine her on that assertion. If Your Honour thinks it is important.
MR. PRESIDENT: We will consider that later.
MR TAKU: Yes, Your Honour.
MR. BLACK: I agree with her to continue tomorrow morning, and maybe I can finish by end of Monday.
MR. PRESIDENT: Monday?
MR. BLACK:
Yes, Your Honour, is it all day Monday?
MR. PRESIDENT:
Monday, it is whole day. If you try to finish by Monday, then Mr. Black can ‑‑
MR. TAKU:
If for any reason, I believe, that it is unnecessary, that no inference was drawn on that, then I will be satisfied.
MR. PRESIDENT:
We will rule on that later; whether to give you or not.
MR. TAKU:
Thank you, Your Honour.
MR. BLACK:
I have to put it on record once more that I really only had four hours in total. Maybe I can be given one more day. Maybe I can finish, but it is just not fair.
MR. PRESIDENT: Counsel, I will ‑‑ it all depends on the reasonable time that is given to the defence. We have given you about ten and half days and even more than that.
MR. BLACK: Yes, but I have only taken four hours.
MR. PRESIDENT:
We are not giving you a limit of four hours. You can have Monday also.
MR. JEGEDE: Your Honour, also we don't have to follow Mr. St‑Laurent, it is not necessary, because we can be as surgical as Mr. Taku and not copy Mr. St‑Laurent.
MR. PRESIDENT: Yes, Mr. Taku was short and sweet.
MR. BLACK: Okay, Your Honour, we will sit tomorrow.
THE WITNESS:
Your Honour, so we will sit tomorrow?
MR. BLACK:
If it is a good shot. We can finish by Monday, but I don't limit that.
MR. PRESIDENT: Witness, do you want to come tomorrow or on Monday?
THE WITNESS:
I would like to sit all day tomorrow, Your Honour, I would like to sit on the weekend to finish with this so I can get on with my work.
MR. PRESIDENT:
Okay, we will sit at 09:00 to 12:00 tomorrow because of Ramadan. So, we will sit ‑‑ we will adjourn until 09:00 tomorrow.
(Court adjourned at 1730)
End of Part One--to be continued:
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