The General's Trial: Dallaire X (cont) -- 22 November 2006
[It's stunning how tenaciously the purveyors of the false history that rationalizes military murder and mayhem, while blaming the victims, hang on to their ever more enfeebled, yet always brazen, invalidations of the truth.
As the evidence of the Tutsi-RPF's role in the carnage that accompanied the destruction of the 30-year Rwandan revolution grows from a mere tidal wave to a full-scale tsunami; as all the bloody dots are connected between the 1 October 1990 RPF invasion, through a gruesome series of RPF massacres and political assassinations, all executed without regard for tribal or party affiliations, to the 1994 double presidential assassination, achieved by the RPF's firing two SAMs into the Falcon 50 execu-jet returning Rwanda's Habyarimana and Burundi's Ntaryamira to their respective homes from a trumped-up peace summit in Dar-es-Salam, the dirty trick of a demented RPF patron, Ugandan president Museveni, as a pretext to getting the six RPF kill-teams in place around Kanombe international airport in the Rwandan capital of Kigali to double triangulate the fire in this liquifactionist plot; and as the chaos from this four-year reign of terror begat a final enslaught that emptied Rwanda of superfluous Rwandans and then was called a genocide of the Rwandans by the Rwandans--all quite congruent with the cynical logic of the Humanitarian Centurions that makes killers of the victims and victims of the killers, to the reparative advantage of the real killer-(pseudo)victims as they vandalize and otherwise deface the historical record through mendacious manipulations of the ad hoc 'Victims' reparation courts, like those in The Hague and Arusha: An enormous desparation sets into the geopolitical discourse.
Not just because it was the first nation after the 'fall of Communism', before Iraq or Yugoslavia, to be targeted by global fascism for regime change and absorption into the World Waste Market; not because it was the first 'Genocide' of the now-flourishing 'Victims Rights' era; and not because its being in Black Africa made it disappear into the background of the mawkish concerns of Europeans and Americans: Rwanda is more important today than it was 10 or 15 years ago, because the enormous energy that has been applied to preserving, protecting and defending the historical record in Central Africa--and there is no better example of this Herculean effort than that found in the transcripts of the Military II trial, The General's trial (that'd be General Augustin Ndindiliyimana, in case you're just tuning in to this discussion)--these learnèd and honorable efforts are finally starting to shed a bright light on not only the events of this incredible geopolitical drama, but also on the systemic delusion that has been foisted onto 'the international community' inorder that, by cranking up their high moral ire, they may be tweaked to exhaustion and less critical in accepting this by-now threadbare version of history that promotes not an end to suffering and needless slaughter, but a further militarization, pathological immiseration and murderous mutilation of the daily life of the planet and its people.
I've often wondered if Al Gore factored into his theory on Global Warming the effects of all the ordnanace the First World has ordered burned off in Third World waste dumps like Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan and Central Africa. I bet not. But if you want to read about someone who has considered the dilatory effects of modern waste capitalism, watch this space for the English-language version of the Judge Bruguière report on who were the real horror-meisters and terror-mongers in Rwanda.
For now, here's another episode of Bowling for Victims, or Justice For Dollars. --What's the latest market bid for the human soul? Whatever they paid Dallaire and the prosecution here below, it was too much. --mc ]
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THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA
CASE NO.: ICTR-00-56-T
THE PROSECUTOR CHAMBER II OF THE TRIBUNAL
v.
AUGUSTIN NDINDILIYIMANA
FRANÇOIS-XAVIER NZUWONEMEYE
INNOCENT SAGAHUTU
AUGUSTIN BIZIMUNGU
WEDNESDAY, 22 NOVEMBER 2006
(1508H)
CONTINUED TRIAL
Before the Judges:
Joseph Asoka de Silva, Presiding
Taghrid Hikmet
Seon Ki Park
For the Registry:
Mr. Roger Noël Kouambo (Canada)
Mr. Issa Toure, Mr. Abraham Koshopa
For the Prosecution:
Mr. Ciré Aly Bâ
Mr. Segun Jegede
Mr. Moussa Sefon
Mr. Abubacarr Tambadou (Canada)
Ms. Felistas Mushi
For the Accused Augustin Ndindiliyimana:
Mr. Christopher Black
For the Accused François-Xavier Nzuwonemeye:
Mr. Charles Taku
Mr. Hamuli Rety
For the Accused Innocent Sagahutu:
Mr. Fabien Segatwa
Mr. Seydou Doumbia
For the Accused Augustin Bizimungu:
Mr. Ronnie MacDonald
Court Reporters:
Ms. Sithembiso Moyo
Ms. Eleanor Bastian
Ms. Kirstin McLean
Ms. Leslie Todd
WITNESS
For the Prosecution:
ROMÉO DALLAIRE
Cross-examination by Mr. Taku …………………. 2
Cross-examination by Mr. Segatwa ……………. 32
P R O C E E D I N G S
MR. PRESIDENT:
Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. The Court is in session. The appearances are as before.
Yes, Mr. Taku, you may continue.
MR. TAKU:
Yes, Your Honours --
MR. KOUAMBO:
Roger Kouambo of the registry.
MR. PRESIDENT:
Yes, Mr. Roger.
MR. KOUAMBO:
Thank you, Mr. President. Please allow me to come back to Prosecution Exhibit 120. And then in regard to that document, I just want to say that General Dallaire has informed us that this is an original copy and that a similar copy was made available to us through the same source -- or, rather, it concerns the same information and we thought we should draw the Chamber's attention to that, together with that of the parties. So I will bring some of the copies back to Arusha. I thought I should inform the Chamber of it.
MR. BÂ:
Roger --
Mr. President, with your permission, please.
Roger, can that be faxed to all the parties present in Arusha, so that they should be able to make a comparison, Roger.
MR. KOUAMBO:
Yes, indeed, that is what I am saying, that I will make sure that the Prosecution representative, as well as the representative of the Defence, should make sure that the copy that will be given to me reflects faithfully the original.
MR. PRESIDENT:
That should be all right with the parties. Since the representatives are there, they can compare with the original and certify that it is the original -- copy of the original.
MR. BÂ:
If the Defence is agreeable to this manner of proceeding, that's fine with us. We have no problem with it.
MR. PRESIDENT:
Well, the silence is taken as approval.
Yes, Mr. Taku, you can continue.
MR. TAKU:
Good afternoon, Your Honours.
ROMÉO DALLAIRE,
CROSS-EXAMINATION (continued)
BY MR. TAKU:
Q. Good afternoon, General Dallaire.
MR. TAKU:
Your Honours, I just want to place on record that Ms. Coralie Colson has just joined my team again this morning, so I want her name to be on the record.
Your Honours, I want to be sure that General Dallaire is -- okay, I can see him now.
THE WITNESS:
Yes, I am fine and I hear you very well.
BY MR. TAKU:
Q. As we say, good afternoon from Arusha and good morning in Ottawa, General Dallaire.
A. Good morning.
Q. General Dallaire, yesterday before we closed for the day, you said that the reconnaissance battalion did not collaborate in the implementation of the KWSA; am I right?
A. If I remember clearly, what I indicated was that the reconnaissance battalion, amongst the couple of others, was not the most cooperative in implementing the rules of the KWSA, and so we had a number of events where my subordinate staff would have to discuss, intervene and seek a more cooperative attitude on their part.
Q. Now, General Dallaire, is it from the military observer who was deployed in Camp Kigali where the reconnaissance battalion was situated from whom you got that information?
A. That information was vetted through the Kigali headquarters and also my chief of military observers had sent to me as part of daily information. I did not seek more, nor do I have any more details on such events unless there would have been a major problem, which I then would raise with either the chief of staff of the army or the minister of defence.
Q. General Dallaire, do you know Captain Apedo?
A. The name is familiar, yes.
Q. Now, General Dallaire, this captain, Captain Apedo, was a military observer of the UNAMIR in Camp Kigali from December 1993 to April 1994. Do you understand that?
A. Yes.
Q. Now -- now, General Dallaire, Captain Apedo came here and testified in the Military I trial on the 7th of September 2006, and he testified on this very issue in the transcripts of that particular day.
MR. TAKU:
Your Honours, we gave our copies of the transcript of the 7th September 2006, pages 30 and 31, English version.
BY MR. TAKU:
Q. Now, General Dallaire, listen carefully to what that officer said at paragraphs 11 to 19.
MR. TAKU:
Yours Honours, on page 30, he was asked:
Question: "You told us a while ago that in April 1994 you were specifically in Kigali. From the 25th of December 1993 to April 1994, were you permanently based in Kigali or do you have postings within Rwanda?"
Answer: "I remained in Kigali throughout that period."
Question: "From the time you arrived there up until April 1994, did you keep on performing the duties of military observer?"
Answer: "Yes, sir."
Question: "Please, tell us where you were particularly posted to assume your duties as military observer?"
Answer: "In a team of military observers handling Camp Kigali sector."
Paragraphs 34 to 39, Your Honours.
Question: "Were you present at Camp Kigali since you told us -- were you present at Camp Kigali since you told us your assignment was to monitor weapons, stores and also carry out patrols?"
Answer: "Yes, sir."
Question: "Do you remember how often you checked and monitored those weapons stores?"
Page 31, Your Honour, paragraphs 1 to 13.
Answer: "Well, whenever we were on duty, our assignment was to monitor the stores and weapons."
Question: "Did you have access to all the weapons stores in Camp Kigali?"
Answer: "We monitored all weapons except the weapons stores belonging to the air squadron."
Question: "As part of your activities from the period December '93 to April '94, did you observe any violations of the Arusha Accords or of the regulations which you had to enforce, violations on the part of the Rwandan government forces based at Camp Kigali?"
Answer: "Well, let's start with monitoring weapons stores. I think on two occasions the storekeeper of the headquarters company had opened the store without our approval. Secondly, the unit based at Camp Kigali had to retreat but up until April it had not retreated, it was still over Mt. Kigali."
Question: "Apart from those two incidents which you just mentioned, were there other problems posed by the Rwandan government forces to the team of military observers of which you were a member?"
Answer: "There were never any problems. All the unit commanders and senior officers cooperated with our mission."
BY MR. TAKU:
Q. Now, question: Do you, General Dallaire -- you just heard, General Dallaire, what Captain Apedo said under oath before Trial Chamber I of this Honourable Tribunal. I put to you, General Dallaire, that you have not testified truthfully about this issue because, according to the military observers who were in Camp Kigali, the reconnaissance battalion cooperated fully with the military observers, together with other senior officers who were in Camp Kigali. Do you hear that suggestion, Captain Apedo, . . . er, ah . . . General Dallaire? Sorry.
A. Yes.
Q. Now, let me move on to some other issues, General Dallaire. When did you learn about the shooting down of the presidential plane?
A. As I indicated previously, I heard from my headquarters after 8 o'clock on the 6th, that they had an explosion in the area of Camp Kanombe and then later, I heard, to the best of my recollection, from the prime minister that, apparently, the presidential plane had crashed and then that was confirmed later when I was at the army headquarters. And also over the phone, if I remember well, from Colonel Rwabalinda, that the presidential plane had crashed and at that time there was not an argument or a comment that I remember, that it was shot down.
Q. How did you feel, General Dallaire, upon hearing about that news?
A. My reaction was one of grave concern, as this was obviously going to create an incident of major proportions in regard to the advancement of the peace agreement under Arusha and that in the first instance, it was a hope that we would not see the situation degenerate into chaos, as we already had a high level of tension ongoing, particularly in the capital.
Q. Is it not true, General Dallaire, that the Kanombe international airport zone was under the control of UNAMIR?
A. No, that is not true. I had throughout attempted to work a much more effective ultimate arrangement and memorandum of understanding between the RGF and my forces but, ultimately, we worked on the premise that it was a joint operation in which I had forces there who monitored the operations of the airfield. The air defence battalion equipment responded, as everyone else was supposed to, to the KWSA rules in regard to the control of ammunition and the weapons system. The airport still remained under the control of the Rwandan government and we conducted patrols in the perimeter of it in regard to the assurance that we didn't have any weapons or any subversive activities in regard to possibly weapon systems being moved in and out of the airfield. I also had observers there who monitored all aircraft coming in, including civilian aircraft, in regard to whether in the cargo of aircraft, possibly ammunition, weapons, whatever, could be brought into the country or brought out.
Q. Now, just a reminder. Just a reminder, General Dallaire, that question was brief and called for a very brief answer whether, yes or no, whether the Kanombe international airport was under the control of UNAMIR. It didn't call for a long exposé, and I would remind you that we have constraints of time. You should be very brief, unless the Honourable Judges want you to expatiate on particular areas for their kind attention.
A. May I respond to you, sir, in saying that when you use the term "control" in military parlance, you are into a fundamental instrument of command and the response to that has a whole series of instructions and orders that flow from that and so it is not a yes or no answer. I am afraid that I can’t give you an answer to that question in any way.
Q. Before I continue, General Dallaire, you may expatiate, but you ask leave of Their Lordships to say, "May I expatiate", and they will rule on that. You don't just talk and talk and talk.
Now, the next question. In your capacity as the commander of the UN forces, what military measure did you take as a result of the tragic accident -- the tragic incident, I am sorry, not accident?
A. Well, my instructions were to ask the Kigali headquarters to send a group of soldiers in order to secure the crash site, in order to permit investigation, and all my forces at that time were put on what I called "red alert" so they were in their positions, be they defensive positions in their local areas.
Q. Now, General Dallaire, do you agree with me, General, that the shooting down of the presidential plane took place around 20:30 hours, Kigali time?
A. Yes.
Q. Is it not true that there was no curfew within that period and that at that hour most people had not gone to bed and that life was intensive, mostly in drinking spots, which were numerous within Kigali and its outskirts?
A. Well, I didn't run around town so I don't know what was going on. In regard to social life, there was a lot less activity, generally speaking, because of the insecurity in the city and certain areas, and apart from that, my only knowledge of whatever might be going on in the airport areas was the fact that I had a Belgian Hercules aircraft that was due at about the same time with troops coming back from Belgium.
Q. Is it not true, General, that that plane was shot down on its final approach to landing at the runway of the airport?
A. There not having been a full investigation, the information as best was described to me is that there were two seemingly rockets that were fired towards the aircraft and there was a -- the aircraft exploded in the air and then crashed. Apart from that, I have no other information.
Q. Do you agree, General, that this landing position of that plane was vertical to the presidential residence at Kanombe?
A. Would you mind repeating that, if you please?
Q. Do you agree, General, that the final landing position of the plane was vertical to the presidential residence at Kanombe?
A. Yes, the crash site included parts of the presidential palace compound.
Q. Do you agree, General, that witnesses, in particular persons who were at the presidential residence at Kanombe, soldiers of the Presidential Guard who were waiting for the president at the airport and soldiers at the Camp Kanombe were able to observe what had happened to the presidential plane?
A. Well, of course, it is quite possible anybody looking into the sky at that time could have seen what was happening. The Presidential Guard normally went to the airfield and waited for the president's plane and went to the other side, to the zone hanger area and -- I mean, of course, people could be looking into the sky at that time. I have no answer to that.
Q. Now, I ask this question, General, whether it is not true that the airport zone was under the control of UNAMIR or at least there was military presence at the Kanombe airport?
A. You are absolutely correct. The airport was what I called in military parlance my vital ground, that is to say, the essential link of my mission to the outside world, and that is why I deployed a number of troops there in order to ensure that we worked with the Rwandan forces. Remember, we -- my mandate is to assist in the security of Rwanda in its work towards these peace agreements, and so I had forces there, I had observers in the main terminal who kept observing the to-ing and fro-ing of the people and particularly looking for military activities. And so that was ongoing at that time, yes.
Q. General, may I suggest to you that, whatever the case, information about the shooting down of the presidential plane must have been given to the army headquarters by the Presidential Guard and the soldiers at Camp Kanombe even before RTLM or Radio Rwanda broadcast the news. What do you say to that, General?
A. Well, I have no documented proof but I would suspect that in good military order an incident that happened, military would pass it on to the chain of command through people on duty to the appropriate authorities.
Q. Would I be correct, General, to say that it could be reasonably stated that the fact that the plane was shot down in a zone under control of UNAMIR greatly undermines the credibility of UNAMIR?
A. Well, firstly, the airport was not under my control. It was under joint supervision of the security between the Rwandan authorities, military and gendarmerie and UNAMIR, and that yes, subsequent to that, the presentation or what was said over RTLM that the Belgians had shot it down, that, of course, created a risk to the mission and I remember wanting to be able to rectify that information on it. I remember I couldn't even get to the radio station, so the information that was passed on was what, in fact, was heard by the population, whoever was listening to that radio station.
Q. The question, General, is, did the fact that the plane was shot down in the zone under the control of UNAMIR greatly undermine the credibility of the UNAMIR? That is the question. You have answered about something else. This is the question. What is your answer to this question?
A. My answer is 'no' because the airport was not under my control.
Q. General, did you meet General Kagame during the months of February and March 1994?
A. I suspect, yes. I don't have any specific recollection but I met him on a number of occasions through January, February and March, yes.
Q. Is it not true, General, that at one moment he explicitly informed you that he was preparing for the failure of the political process of the Arusha Accords and you asked him to give you 24 hours' notice prior to his offensive to enable you to protect your men?
A. That is absolutely correct. It was early April upon my return and he indicated that if this impasse was not solved the situation would fall more than likely into crisis, and I requested from him a guarantee that should he conduct any offensive operations, which I took as normal contingency planning at that stage by a military commander, that I would be advised 24 hours in advance in order to ensure that my forces were not targeted or caught in the middle of a potential fire fight between the two armies.
Q. In effect, General, when you testified on the 22nd of January 2004 in the Military I trial -- the transcripts are with the registrar, if you request, if you want to refresh your memory, he can give that to you, but let me say what you said.
MR. KOUAMBO:
Mr. President, the registry is in Arusha. I am in Ottawa and I don't have those documents here in Ottawa.
MR. TAKU:
I am sorry about that, Your Honours, they are not working with the transcripts of his testimony. Whatever the case, Your Honours, I will read out what he said. If that's what he said, he will be able to say, yes or no, essentially as admitted to --
BY MR. TAKU:
Q. Now, let me put the question, General. Is it not true, General, that General Kagame told you that he was fast approaching the final solution where one or the other would be the victor. That is to be found in the transcript of your testimony, General, dated 22nd January 2004, Military I trial, English version, at page 46, lines 23 to 26, Your Honours. So let me read that out, Your Honours, for -- to refresh his memory.
So, what I want to tell you is that -- that is the question, that was the question. So, what I want to tell you is that the 2nd of April -- the 4th of April people you described as moderates were saying that they were on the verge of war, but that's not evidence -- but that's not evidence that they were extremists.
MR. TAKU:
I am reading what is on the transcript, Your Honours. I presume he said that.
Question: "Is that not evidence that they were extremists?"
Answer at line 25, Your Honours: "No, Kagame himself told me that they were moving very fast towards the final solution, one way or the other."
BY MR. TAKU:
Q. You heard that, General?
A. Yes, I won't forget that.
Q. General, is it not true that you met the Rwandan minister of defence on the 2nd of April 1994?
A. I don't -- I mean, I don't have my papers. I don't have anything to say, yes or no. I met with those people quite often and that is quite possible that they asked. I don't specifically remember that meeting, I am afraid.
Q. General, is it not true that he told you that as a result of the blockage they put into place of the transitional institutions, Rwanda was at the verge of conflict and war between the RPF and Rwandan government forces? General, you testified to this on the 22nd of January 2004 in the Military I trial.
MR. TAKU:
Your Honours, page 46, at -- that's again, the English versions, lines 5 to 10.
THE WITNESS:
Absolutely, I have no problems with that information. As I indicated previously, the situation had, in my opinion, moved to a state of incredible tension and that something was absolutely going to happen and that both sides indicate that was confirmation or reaffirmation for me that we were not headed towards an easy solution unless something particularly innovative on the political side was going to come about.
BY MR. TAKU:
Q. Is it not true, General, that your analysis of the situation was the same, and in your reports to New York to your superiors, you indicated that it needs just a spark for the situation to explode?
A. Yes, I remember that, yes.
Q. Do you agree then, General, that during the months February and March 1994, the RPF was preparing to launch an offensive against the Rwandan army forces?
A. No, I totally disagree with that.
Q. Is it not true, General, that President Habyarimana was the only transitional organ put in place pursuant to the Arusha Accords?
A. According to the Arusha Accords, the only member of the BBTG that was established was, of course, on the 5th of January the president.
Q. And did the assassination not signal the collapse of the Arusha Accords?
A. No, I did not analyse that as the collapse. I thought that as a significant and potentially catastrophic situation that had to be accounted for and hopefully responded to by the political leaders in how to continue to keep the Arusha Accords before the whole thing went catastrophic.
Q. Do you agree, General, that when the president of the country is assassinated, the intention is to create a great upheaval within the institutions, in other words, cause a coup d'état?
A. Well, you are certainly making a series of deductions. The president if he is killed accidentally, I would find that difficult to say that it is a coup d'état. If it is a deliberate attempt that is likely to kill him, then certainly, that option would have to be considered and why or who would gain and so on, of course.
Q. My question, General Dallaire, is, if a president is assassinated, I didn't ask you the option of an accident. So if the president is assassinated, the intention -- it's not the intention to create a great upheaval within institutions, in other words, cause a coup d'état? That is my question, General Dallaire.
A. I would respond, a great upheaval, yes.
Q. General, in this context where the RPF is ready to launch offensive operations, the president's plane is shot down within the nose and barb of UNAMIR, considering the situation created by the sudden or unexpected death of the president under such circumstances, Prosecution witnesses have testified that under the circumstances, the headquarters of the Rwandan government army put the army on alert in order to face any eventuality. Is that not justified, General Dallaire?
A. We were still in the process of a peace agreement. My mandate was to assist both sides in advancing a peace agreement. We had a major incident. We had had other incidents between the government forces and the RPF. We still had political people negotiating, and in that circumstance my mandate was to attempt to continue to advance the peace accord according to my duties in supporting the Rwandans moving towards that peace accord, and under those circumstances my duties were to attempt to salvage what is salvageable of the peace accord.
Q. The question, General Dallaire, which, unfortunately, you haven't answered, is -- let me repeat it again. In this context where the RPF was ready to launch offensive operations, the president's plane is shot down within the nose and barb of UNAMIR, considering the situation created by the sudden or unexpected death of the president under such circumstances, Prosecution witnesses have testified that under the circumstances, the headquarters of the Rwandan government army put the army on alert in order to face any eventuality. Is that decision not justified, General Dallaire? That is the question.
A. No, I had no information that, in fact, the Rwandans -- correction, the RPF were on a launch to their operation. I had information on actions being taken that I described previously, but I could not tell you at that time that they were ready to launch. At that time we didn't know the plane had been shot down. And so when I linked up with the government forces and none of that information was confirmed, so alert by the government forces could have been an order they issued out, but there was no indication by the authorities that evening that they had put their forces on alert.
Q. General Dallaire, in order not to waste further time, I take it that you have not answered the question because you are talking about your actions, what you did. You are not answering the question, and I will put on record that you have not answered that question. And let me proceed to something else.
A. I am sorry to respond to you, but I cannot speculate on what the Rwandan forces did or would do. I am here to testify on the facts of the information that I know only.
Q. Again, General Dallaire, I put it to you, that is not an answer to my question. You evaded the question. Let me proceed to some other points.
MR. BÂ:
Well, Counsel Taku, he has answered your question. Maybe that's not the question -- the answer that you expected. Well, you take the answer the way it is.
MR. TAKU:
My answer to this is simple. He has merely said about what he did or what he was supposed to do. He has not responded to my question, and I want to place that on the record and move to something else. If not, I will ask that question five, six, seven times and it would not advance the proceedings.
Now, Your Honours, let me move on to some other theme.
BY MR. TAKU:
Q. General Dallaire, you took part in a meeting with officers of the Rwandan armed forces during the night of the 6th to the 7th of April 1994, correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Who conveyed you to this meeting?
A. My RGF liaison officer, Lieutenant Colonel Ephrem Rwabalinda.
Q. How were you conveyed to this meeting?
A. I received a phone call from him at my residence at about 10 o'clock, I forget the exact timing, where he indicated that there was a meeting of senior military people at the headquarters and they would like me very much to attend.
Q. Once more, General Dallaire, my question is, how were you conveyed to this meeting?
A. I understand, by telephone.
Q. My question, General Dallaire, how were you conveyed to this meeting?
MR. PRESIDENT:
Counsel, I think when you say "conveyed", I think the witness does not understand. Would you want to ask him, how did he go to this meeting?
MR. TAKU:
With your permission, Your Honours, just one minute.
MR. PRESIDENT:
(Inaudible)
MR. TAKU:
Your Honours, let me just proceed and not to waste further time, because we will be here --
BY MR. TAKU:
Q. General Dallaire, at what hour did you arrive at the army headquarters?
A. I estimate before 11 o'clock, sometime between 10:30 and 11:00, I gather.
Q. At your arrival, what was -- what climate reigned amongst the participants?
A. In the room when I arrived, there was no tension. There seemed relatively -- I mean, they sat relatively calmly, it was orderly and they -- it was evident that there had been meetings for a while. I mean, there were some papers and stuff on the table and I was greeted from his chair. I think he stood up by Colonel Bagosora when I entered the room.
Q. Who presided over the meeting?
A. The chief -- the chef de cabinet of the minister of defence, retired Colonel Bagosora.
Q. General, did the fact that you were invited to this meeting not show the willingness of the army corps to collaborate with the UN to solve problems of any nature provoked by the assassination of the president?
A. I absolutely agree with the fact that in accordance with my raison d'être there, I was quite happy to -- to have received that invitation and to go -- and to assist them in continuing to keep the situation in hand, yes. I -- however, at that time, the term "assassination" was not within the context.
Q. What were the subjects on the agenda of the meeting?
A. We went through a series of points regarding the risk of the impact of the president and now being killed with the chief of staff also, the fear of the Arusha Accords not continuing, a concern to ensure that the population did not over-react, that we would jointly attempt to inform and together maintain as best as possible an atmosphere of security. It was also then raised the whole question of the continuance of the Arusha situation, my -- and them indicating that they wanted this sort of military structure to be a very expedient one until they could hand over as soon as possible to a political structure, to which I responded in regard to the availability of Madam Agathe, the prime minister of the interim government -- of the coalition government, sorry, and the number of exchanges in that light and a brief exchange with colonel -- General Ndindiliyimana on the possibility of joint operations. Then my desire to talk to my political leader in order to brief him on what was going on and seek his advice, Colonel Bagosora asking to see him and then we proceeded to the SRGS's residence.
Q. General, did you discuss in that meeting -- did you discuss about the security of sensitive and strategic points in the capital? And this question, General --
A. I remember in the course of that evening and later in the night, that -- the requirement to ensure that vital points be guarded, such as radio stations, power stations, the civil defence structures, things of that nature, should be ensured, yes.
Q. Did you discuss -- did you discuss about how to manage the political crisis caused by the death of the president, since there was no person who was occupying a position pursuant to the Arusha Accords?
A. I am not sure I got the question, but, essentially, we pursued with the discussion and at their behest, that the Arusha Accords be continued and that the mission remain to assist them and that on the political front my intervention was one of indicating that -- to me they should turn towards the prime minister as the senior person to assist them in providing the state of political oversight that should exist.
Q. Is it not true, General, that the president of the meeting told you that attempts to implement the Arusha Accords should be pursued?
A. Yes, he did say so.
Q. Is it not true, General, that you raised the issue of collaboration between the army and the government and not really with the prime minister?
A. Would you rephrase that, please?
Q. Is it not true, General, that you raised the issue of collaboration between the army and the government and notably with the prime minister?
A. I raised the issue of us working with the gendarmerie and the security forces and the military forces in continuing our roles to maintain the atmosphere of security. And I also raised the political situation in regard to the prime minister in response to the chairman, Colonel Bagosora, saying that he wanted to hand over as soon as possible to a political organisation.
Q. General, I didn't ask any question about the gendarmerie. I asked the question about the collaboration, you, raising the issue of collaboration between the army and the government and notably the prime minister.
Anyway, let me move on. Is it not true, General, that there was divergence on the role of the prime minister, Agathe -- on the role that the prime minister, Agathe, was to play?
A. Absolutely, there was a grave divergence, a near vehement reaction on the part of the chairman of the meeting to the effect that the prime minister of the coalition be the suggested possible political leader, for in his mind, she was ineffective; she could not even get a cabinet together; she did not have the respect of the population and, as such, she had no role to play.
Q. May I suggest to you, General, that since the 4th of April 1994, there was information about meetings held by the prime minister with some officers from her region to stage a coup d'état and RTLM broadcast these allegations. Were you aware of this information?
A. Absolutely, not.
Q. Is it not true, General, that the effective functioning of Agathe's government was partially blocked since February 1994?
A. In fact, she had -- and I had talked about it in February where the MRND ministers were refusing to attend any of her cabinet meetings.
Q. Did you, General, talk about the shooting down of the presidential plane and, in particular, about those events -- those potentially responsible during this meeting on the night of the 7th April 1994?
A. No, only that an investigation would have to be conducted.
Q. Did you talk -- did you talk about the use of the radio station in order to address the population?
A. I don't specifically remember mentioning to the assembly the use of the radio station apart from it being an element that should be secured in the normal procedures of insecurity.
Q. Now, General, let's move to something else.
General, what was the security situation in Kigali the nights that preceded the fateful day of the 6th of April 1994?
A. Am I to understand you want a feeling for the situation of security on the 5th of April?
Q. Yes, that is the night preceding, yes, if you may.
A. On that evening there was continued, escalating use of weapons, light machine guns or rifle fire, pistol fire, grenades, and the -- my residence was also subject to some fire. The general atmosphere was one of considerable tension and concern that had been escalating over the last week about.
Q. The night of the 6th of April 1994, what was the state of security in Kigali?
A. The -- I mean, the sun had just gone down barely a couple of hours. I mean, I can't specifically remember anything different than what I had been living previously. So I must say I can't specifically say anything different than what I have just indicated.
Q. When, General, did you hear for the first time that excesses were being committed in town?
A. I heard that -- that would be very early morning of the 7th.
Q. General, in the execution of the UNAMIR mandate in Rwanda, both the representatives of secretary general and the few commanders routinely sent SITREPS to New York on the situation in Rwanda and Kigali in particular, correct?
A. I am sorry, I didn't -- I couldn't get that. Would you mind repeating it, please?
Q. The question --
MR. PRESIDENT:
Counsel, the question was whether you were sending the situation reports to New York every day.
MR. TAKU:
Yes, Your Honour.
THE WITNESS:
Previous to the start of the civil war and ultimately genocide, we were sending situation reports once a week, and I made telephone calls very early that morning to New York and the first written report was sent in the middle of the afternoon of the 7th.
BY MR. TAKU:
Q. General, in your testimony -- in your testimony before the Honourable Trial Chamber when you testified in-chief, you testified that General Kagame offered to send two battalions to Kigali to assist loyalist forces to neutralise the Presidential Guard, correct?
A. Yes, he offered that in the afternoon of the 7th.
Q. Are you aware that in one of the SITREPS sent to New York covering the period of April 9th to 10th April 1994 --
MR. TAKU:
Mr. Registrar, please, can you hand over Document No. 42 -- Document No. 1, sorry, to General Dallaire.
MR. KOUAMBO:
Just one second, Mr. Taku, the Prosecutor is having a look.
MR. TAKU:
The Prosecution is here, Mr. Bâ.
MR. KOUAMBO:
I mean, the representative for the Prosecutor. That is done. General Dallaire has it now.
BY MR. TAKU:
Q. Let me ask my question. Are you aware, General Dallaire, that in the SITREP that is before you covering the period of 9th April to 10th April 1994, it is stated at paragraph 1 that the general situation after the assassination of the president is "chaotic"; RPF forces engaged the Presidential Guards in order to assist loyal forces and to stop the assassination or massive killings in and around Kigali. Are you aware of that SITREP?
A. I hope you will forgive me for saying so, but the code cable I have in front of me covers the period of 11--0600 to 12--0600 of April 1994. I don't have the one covering the period of 90600 to 100600.
Q. Well, the --
MR. PRESIDENT:
The first page --
MR. TAKU:
The first page.
MR. PRESIDENT:
The first page gives the date as 12th April.
MR. TAKU:
I can see that, Your Honours. I am talking about page, K000706, if you can open to that page.
THE WITNESS:
Very good, I found it. One moment, please. Okay. Thank you.
BY MR. TAKU:
Q. Yes, it describes the general situation after the assassination of the president as "chaotic". RPF forces engaged the Presidential Guards in order to assist loyal forces and to stop the assassination or massive killings in and around Kigali. Do you remember that SITREP?
A. Well, I don't -- I am afraid, I don't specifically remember, but I take note that it was sent by my headquarters and signed by Mr. Booh-Booh and that reflected the information that I was getting from the crisis committee.
Q. General, can you explain to the Court which force is referred to as loyal forces which the RPF attacked the Presidential Guard in order to assist in the halting of the massacres?
A. The loyal forces which I speak of are those that had not as yet gone beyond the rules of KWSA and for which I was taking for granted that the crisis committee still had control over.
(1630H)
BY MR. TAKU:
Q. And still having that SITREP before you -- and keep that SITREP before you, General. Can you confirm, General, that as of the 9th of April 1994, the RPF controlled the vicinity of CND, the Meridien roundabout, the Amahoro vicinity, the road towards the airport? I would refer you to paragraph 3 of that document before you. Can you confirm that fact of the sites I put before you?
A. Yes, I have got no problem with that.
Q. Isn't it correct -- isn't it correct to say --
A. Yes, it is.
Q. Yes, General, is it not correct to say that the RPF also mounted roadblocks in the city of Kigali?
A. Yes. As part of their defensive actions their military manned tactical defensive positions, including roadblocks, in the area they controlled, yes.
Q. Is it not true, that the RPF killed harmless persons who were not taking part in the conflict, an example being the ambush of a civilian vehicle in front of the CND compound by the RPF mentioned in the SITREP before you by Mr. Booh-Booh to New York, in which many civilians were killed?
A. Where can I find that in that information in the SITREP please?
Q. Well, look at paragraph 1, and let me read that out. If you go right down to -- "A first incident just happened in front of the CND compound. A vehicle was ambushed by the RPF. The RPF claimed the vehicle was a blue bus without a Red Cross marking. The RPF claimed -- "
A. Yeah, okay.
Q. Is it not true that they engaged in killing harmless civilians?
A. There were incidents of -- of collateral attacks or events or incidents. I can't negate that. They were conducting operations on both sides inside an urban area, whereas the civilian population is, of course, at risk, yes.
Q. General, let me move to something else. At what time, General, did you learn, General, of the Belgians of the -- of the UNAMIR forces were in danger at Camp Kigali?
A. What time? I know I saw them when I went -- I drove by. I just can't remember whether I knew any information before that. To my recollection, I -- no, I can't tell you. I'm afraid I can't remember.
Q. Is it not true, General, that you saw the corpses of two Belgians lying on the ground, probably dead, by the time -- at that time -- at that moment?
A. Yes. When I drove by -- on my way to the ESM to the meeting chaired by Colonel Bagosora, as I drove by I saw in the second gate of Camp Kigali, two persons in Belgian uniforms who were laying (sic) in the compound at a distance, yes.
Q. General, since you did not know the time you arrived there, let me just say -- state, generally, the time you arrived at the meeting at the ESM. Is it not true that you saw the corpses of two Belgians lying on the ground, probably dead, by that moment?
A. I saw two what looked like Belgian soldiers lying on the ground in the compound, yes.
Q. Is it not true -- is it not true that you did not stop but continued on your way to the military academy?
A. Yes, it's true the vehicle did not stop at my request, and we continued the next 100 or 150 metres, whatever it was, to the ESM.
Q. Can you tell this Honourable Trial Chamber, General Dallaire, why you did not immediately attempt to save these soldiers who were your soldiers?
A. Well, first of all, may I address the leadership of the Court, if I may?
Q. Well, on what subject? Let me know exactly on what, why you want to address the Court. The question is simple. Can you tell this Honourable Trial Chamber why you did not immediately attempt to save these soldiers who were your soldiers? That is a simple question. You know the answer.
A. I would happily answer. I will answer the question after I've had an opportunity to address the presiding Judge.
MR. TAKU:
On what issue, Your Honours, does he intend to address the Chamber?
MR. PRESIDENT:
We will ask him what it is.
Yes, Witness, what did you want to say?
THE WITNESS:
Sir, I am here, of course, as a witness for the Prosecution in regards to these persons who are being held, and in so doing, have demonstrated more than willingness to participate in this significant effort to bring justice. I am a little taken aback of the possibility that, in fact, these -- the line of questioning is going outside, or beyond, or has a difficulty in my comprehending exactly what the aim of this judicial process is. I will be more than happy to respond to that -- to questions that relate, of course, to the incidents and involvement of those who are brought in front of your Court.
MR. PRESIDENT:
Well, Witness, there are charges relating to the death of these Belgian soldiers. So, that is the reason why the counsel is putting questions to you on this.
Yes, you may continue.
MR. TAKU:
Well, Your Honours, I take it he does not want to answer this question. Do I take it as such and proceed?
MR. PRESIDENT:
You just ask the question (inaudible). The reason was provided, so you can go now.
{In Fr transcript reads more like the President says: He just wanted specifics, specifics were given. You can ask the question'-cm/p}
BY MR. TAKU:
Q. Now, General Dallaire, can you tell this Chamber why you did not immediately attempt to save these soldiers who were your soldiers?
A. I did by asking and -- and speaking harshly to the driver of the vehicle who was an officer of the Rwandan forces to stop, because I had just seen a couple of my soldiers there. He said no, there was too much chaos and risk in the camp, and that we would go and proceed immediately to the ESM which was -- by the time we finished saying that we were already at the gates of the ESM, and by that time I had already established that now that my forces were potentially being targeted, that the situation was becoming even more grave in regards to the insecurity that was already being called upon by the information I was receiving at my headquarters, that of having already other soldiers that I was unaccounted for, that we could not find, and those at the airport who were being held under gunfire by the government forces. So, these two confirmed that I, also, was now in a situation of precariousness in regards to the state of insecurity that was on going in Kigali at the time.
Q. Is it not true, General Dallaire, that arriving at the ESM you met Captain Apedo, a military observer of UNAMIR, who briefed you about the situation at Camp Kigali?
A. Yes. He told me that the soldiers -- he approached me as I was moving towards the meeting room. He told me that the soldiers were being beaten and that the situation was chaotic in the camp. I told him to remain there, with the Ghanaians soldiers that were there under the guard of several government forces, and said I would get back to him and went immediately to the meeting.
Q. On your arrival at the ESM had the meeting commenced?
A. Yes, when I entered the room the meeting was already in full, full motion.
Q. Can you tell the Honourable Trial Chamber, General Dallaire, at what time you entered the meeting at the ESM?
A. I can't tell you exactly. I'm wrestling with sometime around 11 o'clock, or something of that nature. I really cannot tell you, I'm sorry.
Q. What did you find in the hall?
A. The hall was not very well lit, but I could see, right from the start, Colonel Bagosora at the podium. I saw General Ndindiliyimana sitting at a table just behind the podium, to the side of it. And, essentially, as best I could see, all of the chairs in the auditorium filled with Rwandan officers of both the gendarmerie and the army.
Q. Is it not true, General Dallaire, that you found persons therein -- the entire army and the general command of the Rwandan army?
A. My estimate of the situation after I sat down and looked around gave me that impression that when they looked at the force structure, if it was not entirely there, you certainly had the vast majority of them, yes.
Q. Is it not true that you were given the floor to address the commanders present, and you did not raise the issue of the problem of Belgian soldiers who were being massacred in Camp Kigali?
A. First of all, I did not have the information that my Belgian soldiers had been massacred in Camp Kigali. Secondly, with the rest of the forces that I already had that were unaccounted for, it was critical that I take a decision, right then and there, of whether or not I would withdraw my mission as we were now being attacked, whether this was simply a situation that had gotten out of hand locally, and in so doing, what would be my subsequent mission in regards to the mandate that I had received regarding in (sic) the Arusha Peace Accords, and in that circumstance I had decided, in spontaneity from my professional background, that I was going to remain in Rwanda and assist, as far as I could, to try to salvage the peace agreement and the Arusha Accords. And although in the back of my mind I remembered that we had received information that the UNAMIR Belgian contingent would be targeted, I still determined that we would remain and assist the Rwandans in trying to gain and maintain control of their forces, and thus not attract the RPF on them commencing operations that, then, ultimately, would put the whole mission in jeopardy.
Q. When you were -- when you took to the floor, General Dallaire, to address the commandants present, did you raise the issue as the problem of those Belgian troops that you had been informed about that were being massacred in Camp Kigali? That is the question, General Dallaire.
A. I don't agree with your question in regards to being -- them being massacred. If you are telling me that I raised the question that I had casualties in Camp Kigali, no, I did not raise it.
Q. Did you -- did you in any manner whatsoever attempt to get them to intervene to save those unfortunate Belgian soldiers?
A. I had decided in the time frame there, that if I launched any operations against forces of -- either belligerent and particularly with the RGF, that I had very low chances of success, that I would incur more casualties, that I would put at risk not only those who were conducting the operation but also the rest of my forces that were in the near totality behind the RGF lines and, as such, that risk was unacceptable, and so I was not going to conduct any rescue mission. I was to continue with the authorities, as I knew them to be, to negotiate to get them out.
Q. Question, General Dallaire: Did you -- while at that meeting at ESM, did you attempt to get them, those assembled there, to intervene to save those unfortunate Belgian soldiers?
MR. PRESIDENT:
Counsel, he has already answered it. He said "no".
MR. TAKU:
Thank you, Your Honours.
BY MR. TAKU:
Q. How long did you remain at the meeting?
A. Oh, I don't know. It seemed three-quarters of an hour, something of that nature, at most, in the ESM, having stayed on for the subcommittee meeting in regards to the statement that was to be announced to the population. I felt that I had to be able, if possible, to input into that in order to indicate our willingness to assist in continuing to stabilise the situation.
Q. And within all this time, General, you did not attempt to halt the meeting in order to get all these commanders to save human lives in danger; is that correct?
A. Well, I mean you are talking about all human life and we already had a bunch of massacres going on, and so on, and reports of such actions. My intervention was with the chief of staff of the gendarmerie where I queried him on what was going on in Camp Kigali, and what actions they were going to take, and he said that they were looking into it and that they had a situation that was difficult to control, but they were going to resolve that problem. That was the action, and the rest of it was attempting to find how we were going to continue to work to bring a stabilising situation in Kigali.
Q. General Dallaire, in your book, Shake Hands with the Devil, page 239 –
MR. TAKU:
That's English, Your Honours, and at page 310, 311, of the French.
MR. TAKU:
Q. You state and I quote, Your Honours --
THE ENGLISH INTERPRETER:
The interpreters do not have the French version of that book to quote from.
MR. TAKU:
Oh, I'm sorry, Your Honour, I have an English version, I just -- I don't have a copy of the French but I will read very slowly for them to be able to assist us, Your Honour.
BY MR. TAKU:
Q. And I quote, Your Honour, the relevance -- the relevant -- the paragraphs that are relevant to this question.
"I did not raise the issue of the Belgian soldiers in that speech because I wanted to discuss it with Bagosora alone. It was that decision, in part, that contributed to the deaths of 10 soldiers under my command. Commanders spend their careers preparing for the moment when they will have to choose between loose -- loose propositions in the use of their troops. Regardless of the decision they make, some of their men will most certainly die. My decision took sons from their parents, husbands from their wives, fathers from their children. I knew the cost of my decision. I was risking the lives of Belgians in Camp Kigali."
Question: Must we understand by that, General Dallaire, that you were, in effect, accepting some responsibility for the tragic death of the Belgian blue helmets?
A. You are absolutely right. I was the commander, and as the commander I have responsibility for all of my troops and whatever happens to them.
Q. General Dallaire, is it not true that Belgian soldiers received orders to move to the house of Agathe, Prime Minister Agathe, at 3:00 a.m., and arrived there at around 5:00 a.m. in the morning?
A. They did receive the orders. I had given those instructions to the Kigali sector commander. As to the exact timings, I don't have.
Q. Did you have to inform the Rwandan army for an eventual coordination of this commission?
A. No, I did not.
Q. General Dallaire, are you aware of the report of the Belgian military called KIBAT -- of the Belgian military called KIBAT?
A. I don't know what you are speaking of; a report?
Q. Are you aware of reports of the Belgian military UNAMIR contingent called KIBAT?
A. KIBAT was the Belgian contingent and battalion committed to the assistance of security in Kigali.
Q. The KIBAT reports -- I'm sorry, please. Are you aware of KIBAT reports?
A. I -- I mean, we were getting KIBAT reports for already nearly four months. Do you have a specific report in question?
Q. I think the report issued by Colonel Dewez, in '95.
MR. BÂ:
Which report?
MR. TAKU:
KIBAT report.
MR. BÂ:
When was it dated? When was it published?
MR. BLACK:
It was filed as an exhibit here. It was presented to you by us. You raised it in questions of one witness. It was filed as an exhibit here. Don't ask questions about us. You know very well what we're talking about.
MR. BÂ:
I am aware of the report. I just want him to be specific as to the date. I know the report. I have it.
MR. BLACK:
Well, then, you know the date.
MR. BÂ:
Does the witness know the date?
MR. TAKU:
Anyway, let me ask the question. Maybe from the question he will be able to understand.
BY MR. TAKU:
Q. In that report, General Dallaire --
MR. BÂ:
Counsel Taku, could you be specific as to the date of that report, when was it published, so that it is clear, at least in the mind of the witness, so you do not drag him aimlessly?
MR. BLACK:
If my memory serves me, it was September of 1995, but I could be wrong -- but it is in this other exhibit here. It is in the files.
MR. PRESIDENT:
Is the report, that is -- Mr. Taku, there is something in your bundle bearing K-number K0002136.
MR. TAKU:
Well, Your Honours, we are looking for the reports. I will move to something else. I will come back to the reports, Your Honour.
BY MR. TAKU:
Q. General, do you agree with me, that before arriving at the prime minister, Agathe's house, at about 5:00 a.m., those Belgian blue helmets passed through several military positions held by the Rwandan government forces?
A. In my report that I remember receiving, it seems to me verbally, was -- that it took them a considerable time to make it there, because they were going through roadblocks already established, yes.
Q. Do you agree with me that if orders had been given to kill them, they would have been killed at any of the defence positions of the government forces?
A. I can't believe the question you've just asked me. I mean, who -- who is ordering who? What? What units were conducted? Was it the full Rwandan army to be put on alert and if they saw Belgians they'd shoot them. I had Belgians all over the city. I already had Belgians, over 35 of them, held under custody at the airport. I had Belgians moving towards the crash site. I had Belgians at -- around the Kigali headquarters. I had Belgians, if I am not mistaken -- I mean; I can't answer a question like that.
Q. General, is it not true that -- well, the figure of 10 was disputed, but let me just put the question that these Belgians troops were taken away from Agathe's house by soldiers of the Rwandan army.
A. Yes. That is the information from the investigations that I received, yes.
Q. Do you agree with me -- do you agree with me that if the orders had been given to kill them? They would have been killed in the prime minister's residence?
A. No, I don't agree with that at all.
Q. General, is it not true that there were Belgian troops at Kanombe airport?
A. Absolutely.
Q. And is it not true that they had problems with Rwandan soldiers who detained them at the airport during the night of the 6th of April 1994?
A. I received a report in the morning that, yes, a group of them, about a platoon, had been held up by armed government forces.
Q. Do you agree with me that if there were orders to kill the Belgian UNAMIR soldiers, the Rwandan army would have killed those at the airport?
A. No, not necessarily.
Q. Do you know Ngango, Felicien?
A. I do not recall the name.
Q. In any case, since you do not recall the name, Captain Lemaire, I think he is now major, came and testified here for the Prosecution on the 7th of April 1994, that that individual, Ngango, Felicien, was guarded by Belgian soldiers and that the Rwandan soldiers neither killed nor wounded those soldiers but, unfortunately, were attacked by the family of Ngango. Do you agree that if there had been orders to kill Belgian blue helmets, the Rwandan soldiers who came to Ngango's place, would have killed those who were guarding the Ngango family?
A. I -- I have never heard of the incident you speak of. And I'm not really sure I really understood what the incident really was. If you might want to repeat it.
Q. Well, let's take that as your answer, because you never heard about it. Let me move to something else.
General, isn't it true that you ordered an enquiry into the death of the Belgians, that is a board of enquiry under Colonel Dounkov.
MR. TAKU:
Mr. Registrar, put before the general document number 13, K0002136.
THE WITNESS:
I have the document and I have perused it.
BY MR. TAKU:
Q. Yes, General, that document if you look at page K002141, it was signed on the 10th of May 1994 in Kigali, Rwanda. And I draw your attention, General, to paragraph 2 at page K002141, subtitled -- is -- there is "Conclusions of the board". Paragraph 2, with permission, I will read:
"There is no evidence, so far, of direct participation of the RGF --
MR. BÂ:
Which paragraph were you reading?
MR. TAKU:
Paragraph 2, Learned Prosecutor, At page K002141, that is, the last page.
MR. PRESIDENT:
Last page, paragraph 2, Mr. Bâ.
MR. BÂ:
Thank you.
BY MR. TAKU:
Q. It says -- General, let me read that out; 2,
"There is no evidence, so far, of direct participation of the RGF officers in killings. Moreover, some of the officers sought to persuade the angry soldiers to disperse and stop the massacre. However, all the attempts were in vain."
MR. PRESIDENT:
Counsel, the witness is waiting for your question.
BY MR. TAKU:
Q. Is it not true -- correct, that these reports support the finding -- these reports of the board of enquiry that some of the officers, among them Colonel Lubaha, tried to persuade, agitated officers to disperse and stop the massacres and all of the attempts were in vain?
A. Yes, this was the information that I had also received verbally from other sources, and the board concluded the same -- the same matter. You are correct.
Q. Do you agree, General, that if orders have (sic) been given to kill the Belgians, these officers would never have intervened to try to save them?
MR. PRESIDENT:
Well, Counsel, you have just thrown in the name of Colonel Lubaha, which I can't find here.
MR. TAKU:
Well -- one, minute, Your Honours.
MR. TAKU:
Your Honours, it is another report that came to the same conclusion, which we have here, another report that investigated and came to the same conclusion and said Colonel Lubaha and a number of people --
MR. PRESIDENT:
The witness is looking at this document now.
MR. TAKU:
Okay, Your Honours we will come back to that --
BY MR. TAKU:
Q. Now, the question was -- okay, he has already answered.
MR. TAKU:
One minute, Your Honour.
BY MR. TAKU:
Q. Do you -- do you agree, General, that rumours circulated in which it was alleged that it was the Belgians who had shot down the plane, killing President Habyarimana and his Burundian counterpart, The president of Burundi?
A. Yes, and I heard it when I was talking with Colonel Bagosora that it came over the RTLM, but at my headquarters I, subsequently, was informed that they had heard the same rumours or information that was being spread around of that exact nature.
Q. Now, General, in the light of these elements -- now, General, in the light of these elements, may I suggest to you that what took place in Camp Kigali in which 10 Belgian elements of UNAMIR were massacred was a mutiny, and was thus -- and was thus not an execution of any order. I have before me, General, the transcripts of your deposition in the Military I, on the 23rd January 2004, at page 4, lines 7 to 10. And you were asked:
"Now, with regard to those elements, and with regard to what happened on the night of the 6th and the 7th, can we not accept the theory that the 10 blue helmets that were massacred at Camp Kigali could have reflected a mutiny of soldiers without there being any order which was being executed?"
And your answer, General, was, line 10, "Yes".
A. Yes, absolutely, and imagine if I'd attacked the camp only to find out that it was only some mutinous soldiers that actually conducted that operation and the results that that would have caused.
Q. Now, General, I just want to ask, if your answer here to that question is the same as the one you gave in the Bagosora trial and in which you said "yes"?
A. Yes, I agree, it is the same, that is, the theory. That is a possibility.
Q. Thank you, General, thank you so much.
General Dallaire --
MR. BÂ:
My request, Counsel, was to make your questions much simpler because often they are too long and that is why sometimes you have answers that do not correspond to your questions.
MR. TAKU:
Thank you, Mr. Bâ. Thank you so much for your intervention.
BY MR. TAKU:
Q. Now, General Dallaire, on the 7th of April 1994, you sent a report to a Mr. Baril at the UN in New York about the grave events that shook the town of Kigali; correct?
A. I -- I'm not certain if I sent it to General Baril, but I sent it to DPKO. I -- I didn't sign it because I wasn't there, but I delegated that to my subordinates to do, yes.
MR. TAKU:
Your Honours, do we continue or do we have a short break?
MR. PRESIDENT:
At 5:30, we will take a break.
MR. TAKU:
When, Your Honour?
MR. PRESIDENT:
At 5:30, we'll take a break.
MR. TAKU:
How many?
MR. PRESIDENT:
At 5:30, we'll take a break for 30 minutes.
MR. TAKU:
Thank you, Your Honours.
So, may I continue? But I was asking for a brief --
MR. PRESIDENT:
Now?
MR. TAKU:
Yes, now.
MR. PRESIDENT:
So we will take the break now and come back at 5:45.
MR. TAKU:
Thank you, Your Honour.
MR. PRESIDENT:
Court is adjourned for half an hour.
(Court recessed from 1713H to 1747H)
MR. PRESIDENT:
Yes, Mr. Taku, you can continue.
MR. TAKU:
I wanted to see him on -- come on the screens, Your Honours, that is why.
Thank you, Your Honour.
BY MR. TAKU:
Q. General Dallaire, you said that during the meeting held at the army headquarters the night of the 6th of April 1994, you requested to establish contact with Prime Minister Agathe, but the president of the meeting opposed the idea, correct?
A. That is correct.
Q. Did you get in contact with the prime minister to inform her about the situation? If "yes", at what moment?
A. I'm not -- well, I'm at a bit of a loss. Did I talk to her before going to Mr. Booh-Booh. I believe I did because I discussed the subject of Madam Agathe going to the radio station with him, and the content of the discussion was that she had to speak even if the comité de crise was not present.
Q. Who, General Dallaire -- who took the decision that the prime minister should address the Rwandan nation?
A. Again, from my memory it came as a mutual decision. I must say, we had discussed that – or, it happened before in February. And as such, it seemed like a normal process at the time and so I must -- I must say -- I am not sure if she raised it or I raised it, but it was raised in the conversation.
Q. Knowing the opposition expressed a desire to collaborate with her, General Dallaire, you nevertheless decided to get the prime minister to deliver a speech over the radio -- over Radio Rwanda, correct?
A. That is correct.
Q. Can you tell the Honourable Trial Chamber why?
A. In my duties as the UN mission to assist in Rwanda, my analysis of the situation in regards to the ongoing political situation was such that it seemed totally illogical that they would not seek to go to a political person in authority. However, that was my assessment as a soldier in the circumstance, and that is why I went with Colonel Bagosora to the special representative and discussed the point with him.
Q. General, did you inform the military authorities about your decision to get the prime minister to address the nation? Indeed, on the 22nd of January 2004 the transcripts, Military I, page 72, Yours Honours lines 10 to 11 you were asked this question, And your answer was "no".
A. It remains the same.
Q. Is it you, General Dallaire, who gave the necessary orders for the Belgian contingent to provide the escorts?
A. I gave the orders, instructions to the Kigali sector commander, Colonel Marchal, to do exactly that.
Q. General, did you inform the Rwandan military authorities that an armed detachment of the Belgian contingent was going to deploy at the centre of the town to safeguard the speech of the PM?
A. That was not within the KWSA procedures, and so there was no requirement to do so.
Q. Is it not true, General, that when you were going to the meeting at the ESM, on the morning of 7th April 1994, you were already aware that the prime minister was in danger and had taken refuge in a UNDP complex?
A. I was informed that a very VVIP by a UNDP security person -- said that that person was in the UNDP compound and when I went to the centre of town, after pushing my way through the guards and -- and the vehicles that were there at the Mille Collines, my first stop was at the UNDP headquarters. I jumped the fence, went inside, went knocking around and so on. There was no response. That was not to be so unusual because people were afraid of people coming around and knocking and then opening the doors. So that, at that point with no more information there, I carried on with my primary function of going to the ministry of defence.
Q. Did you inform the military commanders whom you found at the meeting about this situation of the PM at the UNDP complex?
A. At that time the VVIP to me was not defined as the prime minister. So, I did not raise that point.
Q. General Dallaire, considering the circumstances, that is, the assassination of President Habyarimana, do you think -- don't you think that these clandestine arrangements could have given the impression that it was rather you who had staged the coup d'état in favour of the prime minister, Agathe?
A. That had never entered my mind.
Q. Now, let's move to something else.
General, is it not true that you were -- you were a commander of a military base comprising more than 600 persons, among them civilians?
MR. PRESIDENT:
Mr. Taku, did you put a question?
MR. TAKU:
Yes, I asked him whether it was true that he was a commander of a military base comprising more than 600 persons, among them civilians.
THE WITNESS:
I have over 30 years of command responsibilities, and have commanded military and civilian structures of that number and more. Can you be more specific on what you are asking me, please?
BY MR. TAKU:
Q. Now, you testified in Military I, on the 25th of January 2004, page 80, lines 33 to 37, and let me just read it out to him, that may assist you.
MR. BÂ:
Which page?
MR. TAKU:
Eighty.
MR. BÂ:
Thank you.
(1800H)
BY MR. TAKU:
Q. Question -- that's paragraph 33.
Question: "The thing that I wanted to establish with you is that, when you are in base, you are the commander of the base?"
Answer: "Yes."
Question: "Of course, you are responsible for everything that goes on in that base?"
Answer: "Accountable and responsible."
So, you say for over 30 years of military career, you have been a commander of military base or military camp at some point in time of your 30 years. Is that correct, General Dallaire?
A. Yes, at various times in my career, yes.
Q. And I would ask the same question you were asked in Military I. Is it not true that when one is a commander of a military base, or a military camp, that person is responsible for all that takes place within the said camp? In Military I your answer was: "Of course" -- it was: "Yes, accountable and responsible". Do you maintain the same answer, General Dallaire?
A. Yes, if I have command of a specific base, then I am accountable for all decisions and actions on that base.
MR. TAKU:
Now, Your Honour, we'll pass to the next team -- and I will ask the -- I will ask the technicians to assist. But before then, let me ask this question to General Dallaire.
BY MR. TAKU:
Q. General, would I be correct to say that you granted an interview on Canadian radio in which you were asked questions about the events that took place in Rwanda while you were the UNAMIR field commander?
MR. TAKU:
It's a list of documents -- were handed over to the registrar, Your Honours. It's --
MR. PRESIDENT:
Mr. Taku, why don't you clarify when this interview was held?
MR. TAKU:
Well, we will show it to him and he will identify whether it was held or not, Your Honour. One minute, Your Honours.
That is number C, we will hand over a CD to the -- to the registrar. He has a copy in The Hague (sic), and I will ask the technicians to help us to put that on the screen, and I will ask (sic) them which portions are relevant to my question.
Your Honours, the technicians have said that -- ask, crave your indulgence, if you give them five minutes to put that CD on the screen.
MR. PRESIDENT:
And in such time why don't you get on to something else and then come back to it?
MR. TAKU:
Well, Your Honours, I think, as you will see that after that CD, that will be -- we will be coming to an end, we will be ending. This would be the end.
MR. PRESIDENT:
Meanwhile, Mr. Taku, why don't you introduce the document, if you want to tender it into evidence?
MR. TAKU:
It is not a document, it is a CD.
MR. PRESIDENT:
No, no, other documents that you referred to in the meantime.
MR. TAKU:
Really, we wouldn't bother you with that, Your Honour.
THE ENGLISH INTERPRETER:
Roger Kouambo from Ottawa.
MR. KOUAMBO:
Mr. President.
MR. PRESIDENT:
Yes, we can hear you.
MR. KOUAMBO:
I simply wish to say to the Court that our technician here has informed us that in case of difficulty with Arusha, they can show that film from here. That's one option that I am trying to inform the Court about.
MR. PRESIDENT:
Yeah, we are waiting for you to show it to us.
Mr. Taku, they are ready.
MR. TAKU:
Yeah, you can show it please.
Yeah, Your Honours, we would like him to -- well, just in the first 50 seconds of the interview, in particular the section starting from 13 minutes 00SS to 15 minutes 41. And thereafter from 17 minutes 00SS to 20 minutes 00SS. Those are the two areas that are of interest to us.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER:
Can you repeat it, please, Mr. Taku (Microphones overlapping).
MR. TAKU:
Yeah, okay, 13MN00SS --
THE ENGLISH INTERPRETER:
Slowly, sir; slowly, sir.
MR. TAKU:
That is the first 50 seconds of the interview. The first 50 seconds of the interview. Then the technicians should focus on the section from 15MN -- no, from 13MN00SS-15MN41SS, and then 17MN00SS-20MN00SS.
The first 50 seconds; start with that.
MR. PRESIDENT:
Yes, you can commence.
MR. TAKU:
We want the sound. There is no sound.
We are not getting any sound, Mr. Kouambo.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER:
We can't get sound.
MR. KOUAMBO:
We haven't managed to get the sound -- we have not managed to get the sound here in Ottawa. Could you give us a bit more time so that the technicians can try to secure that sound?
MR. TAKU:
We crave the indulgence of Your Lordships to give the technicians some time to get the sound on.
MR. PRESIDENT:
Mr. Taku, do you have the CD here?
MR. KOUAMBO:
Mr. President?
MR. PRESIDENT:
Yes -- yes?
MR. KOUAMBO:
The technicians are telling us that there is some incompatibility, and unfortunately we won't be able to obtain the sound.
MR. TAKU:
Your Honour, we would like to know the problem with the technicians in Arusha, why -- why can't the technicians in Arusha not --
MR. PRESIDENT:
You should have organised it with the technicians (unintelligible), Counsel.
MR. TAKU:
Why? We handed it over to the registrar, we filed it within time, and we thought that -- I do not really know anything about this -- this technology. The registry is supposed to know.
MR. KOUAMBO:
Well, the tape that was given to me -- or, CD, had to be handed over to General Dallaire --
MR. TAKU:
Your Honours, I --
MR. KOUAMBO:
-- just to preview it before it is run out here.
MR. TAKU:
Oh, well -- what? If they did that, if the registry did that, it's okay, then there will be no problem. If there was a preview by General Dallaire, then there would be that the test, the -- the CD and these problems ought not to arise. But I filed it as one of the -- the -- the documents, or the CD that I was going to refer to, or to use it in the course of these proceedings, pursuant to your order. And if there was any problems that were drawn my attention to that, then unfortunately -- even here in Arusha the technician whom we met, he came here and just disappeared. And he has not been seen ever since.
MR. PRESIDENT:
Well, Counsel, I think we will do it this way: I will give you ten minutes, later, just to cover this particular point. We will get the next person to continue with this witness. Once the technical problem is resolved, maybe either tomorrow or at subsequent stage, only for this purpose.
MR. TAKU:
It's okay with me, Your Honours.
MR. PRESIDENT:
Otherwise we will be just wasting time.
MR. TAKU:
Yeah. Yeah, but, Your Honours, we -- we apply for a specific order for the technician --
MR. PRESIDENT:
Yeah, I --
MR. TAKU:
-- to ensure within the shortest -- the shortest possible ...(Microphones overlapping).
MR. PRESIDENT:
I am clueless about these technical ...(Microphones overlapping).
MR. TAKU:
Yes, Your Honours.
MR. PRESIDENT:
Anyway, I will let them find some way of getting it out.
So until such time, Mr. Segatwa, you can take over.
MR. SEGATWA:
Much obliged, Mr. President.
CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. SEGATWA:
Q. Good afternoon -- or, good morning, General Dallaire.
A. Good morning, Counsel.
Q. General, as you have noticed, you are a material witness. You have been -- you are privileged, you have been assigned a counsel, and even a co-counsel in the course of your testimony before this Court. Which obviously --
MR. BÂ:
Objection. I think he is distorting the facts, because the counsel and co-counsel have not been assigned only for this case. He has had them for a long time back. So I don't know how such digression can make us make progress during the course of these proceedings.
MR. SEGATWA:
Prosecutor, I don't think it is any digression, just preliminary remarks, maybe to shower some flowers on him. I was saying, and I believe you agree with me, that it is all the same an important witness if at each time he needs to be assisted by two persons. And that's why, for the purpose of --
MR. YAROSKY:
Mr. President, it's Mr. Harvey Yarosky speaking.
MR. PRESIDENT:
Yes.
MR. YAROSKY:
Again to correct something, General Dallaire has one counsel, and I am that counsel.
MR. PRESIDENT:
Yes. Yes --
MR. YAROSKY:
Thank you.
MR. PRESIDENT:
Yes, Mr. Segatwa, why don't you get to the main thing and ask questions from this witness.
MR. SEGATWA:
Obliged, Your Honour.
BY MR. SEGATWA:
Q. General, I am sorry those preliminary remarks were not properly done. My name is Segatwa; I am appearing for Innocent Sagahutu, the Accused, who unfortunately is not in the courtroom. And let me commend you for making yourself available to this Court in pursuit of a demonstration of the truth.
MR. SEGATWA:
Your Honour, to ensure that we proceed properly with the cross-examination, I would like -- I would ask the English (sic) interpreter to switch off his -- in the English booth to switch off his mike when he finishes so I can know when I start.
BY MR. SEGATWA:
Q. General Dallaire, you were dispatched by the United Nations for purposes of maintaining peace in Rwanda, right?
A. Not with the mandate to maintain peace, I was to assist the Rwandan ex-belligerents to creating an atmosphere of security to implement the peace accords under the mandate of the UN that I was given.
Q. Grateful for that clarification, General. Were you aware, or did you have some idea of the circumstances under which you were appointed to lead the UN forces?
A. What I am aware of are the normal procedures in which a nation is approached at the behest and agreement of both ex-belligerents to provide officers, troops, civilian personnel. Those countries then decide whether they want to participate. They send the names to the UN, and then the UN send it forward to the ex-belligerents for their acquiescence or comment, and ultimately the decision is taken by the secretary general to forward the names to the Security Council who takes the final decision.
Q. General, I would like to know, for purposes of clarification, whether it was the belligerents who proposed your name, or whether it was some other country that submitted your candidature?
A. I have no technical or documented information apart from conversations, and the conversations reflected that DPKO drew, as it normally does, a list of countries that might be able to provide someone for this mission as a force commander. The overriding criteria being they wanted an officer who was perfectly bilingual, mastering both English and French, and so DPKO approached other countries as well as Canada, and Canada responded in the affirmative. And then it went back to the ex-belligerents, who, from what I gather, seemed to agree, and then Canada was asked to officially provide, and my name was then put forward, and from then on I'm not sure what the procedure is.
Q. Again, thank you, General. Because I had always thought that you were nominated by the United States to that position.
General, how far back does your experience go on the battlefield?
A. Canada has been at peace since 1945. It had troops in Korea for four years, had peacekeeping troops committed to 17 or 18 UN missions since 1956, was involved in altercations in the early '60s in the Congo, again in Cyprus in 1974, and apart from that there has been no operational -- by 1993, anyways -- no other operational theatre in which Canadian troops fought.
Q. So, if I've understood you clearly, you have not come up against enemy fire?
A. Until I served in Rwanda, no.
Q. General, before moving to Rwanda, if, as you say, you didn't even know where that country was located, did you bother about ascertaining, or being interested in what the media were saying about Rwanda?
A. Once given the mission for Uganda in late June, I started to read in and asked our intelligence organisations to provide me with information. And then when it was indicated that, should there be a peace agreement signed for the Rwandan civil war, that I would be considered to be the officer for either force commander or deputy force commander, and so at that time started to read in on information that was made available.
The only media information that I remember were some media clips at the UN talking about the stalling of the peace negotiations in July, much around the arguments around the prime minister, who would be the prime minister of the coalition. That's all I recall, really.
Q. General, apart from the media reports and some strands of information you might have had about Rwanda, which other authority -- whether it be of the United Nations, Canada, or some other source, which authority briefed you on the situation in Rwanda and its set-up or composition of its population, the origins of the war, and the parties in conflict?
A. In regards to general information on Rwanda, the national headquarters in Ottawa provided me with an unclassified intelligence summary, which is a normal review, which was not particularly complete as Rwanda was not in the area of specific interest to the Canadian forces. I spent an afternoon with a professor from the University of Ottawa who was a resident expert on the Great Lakes region who provided me with a background, and essentially some readings that I was able to gather and some verbal briefings by a Colonel Tikoka who was a UN member of the team that had been at the Arusha peace talks.
Q. General, one of the officers of your force -- I'm referring to Luc Marchal -- said that before coming to Rwanda he had been conditioned by the media environment, in other words, the view that prevailed at that time was that the RPF, a movement that represented the minority, was, by definition, on the side of those considered to be good, whereas the others were necessarily on the side of those considered to be the bad guys. Was that also the view you had before landing in Rwanda?
A. No, I had no such detailed information. Belgium was the ex-colonial power and still had troops on the ground supporting the government forces, so I'm not surprised they had information. But such nuanced information was not made available to me.
Q. When you arrived in Rwanda, what was your perception of the two belligerents? Could one of them be considered as the good guys and the other as the bad guys?
A. I cannot say that in any way, shape, or form. At that point, with my reconnaissance, if that's where we are at in the discussion here, I came away with the following information: One, I had had cooperation and support from the RPF; however, as a rebel force they were rather secretive, or security conscious in mind. On the government side there were elements that were very cooperative, quite supportive of the movement, be it politically or militarily. As an example, General Ndindiliyimana and the gendarmerie were particularly forthcoming; and others were also reticent, as -- the chief of staff of the army, the minister of defence; Colonel Bagosora was borderline confrontational.
And the only aspect that left me with a bit of a sour taste was the fact that I had to ultimately insist on a meeting with the president to at least introduce myself and ultimately give him a feel of what my report would be. And that's what I left Rwanda with.
Q. General Dallaire, this perception of things, did it evolve over time?
A. As the situation evolved over the following months, after my return to Rwanda as head of the mission and then as force commander, that situation evolved into one where we had, on the one side, the RPF, a rather hard-nosed, inflexible organisation that still was secretive in nature and not necessarily always forthcoming with information. And on the government side we saw a clear demarcation between those who demonstrated an overt will to want to make the peace agreement advance and cooperate with the mission, and others who demonstrated certain hostility toward the mission and what it wanted to do, and uncooperativeness, and unwillingness also to demonstrate flexibility in coming with the solution. This evolved over time into a sense that there was -- and as the secretary general himself in his interventions indicated -- there was an ill-will on all sides, it seemed, to bring about the solution and the advancement of the peace agreement.
Q. General, you arrived on 19 October 1993; is that right?
A. No, I arrived on the 22nd of October. I had left my headquarters in Kabale, Uganda, on the 19th.
Q. Thank you for that clarification. But apparently when you arrived in Rwanda, the signs were not positive for you. You arrived next door in Burundi, there were Tutsi soldiers who just killed the president who had just been democratically elected, even though Burundi was portrayed as an example of a healthy transition from a dictatorship to democracy. Did you not have the feeling, after your arrival, that democracy in the Great Lakes countries would not -- was not functioning smoothly?
A. My reaction that same morning, as I landed, was one of grave concern as I had, as you've indicated, based a lot of the concept of operations on the fact that we had a very secure and even exemplary southern flank, which is the border with Burundi. And as such I would need very little monitoring of that region, as the friction was far more into the middle and the north of the country. So this coup d'état immediately created a sense of concern for me, and within three days we ended up with about 300,000 Burundian refugees in the south, thousands of bodies floating down rivers, people fleeing, and comments to the effect that the Tutsis had sort of moved towards a hegemony type of context. That was a point that grew continuously over the months, as well as from the Tutsi side, an argument of Tutsi -- of Hutu hegemony in the Great Lakes region.
Q. Yes, indeed, General, did you not have the feeling that the events in Burundi were going to play a negative role regarding both sides, because the RPF was considered to be a Tutsi entity, and the RGF were, rightly or wrongly, perceived as a Hutu entity?
A. I would respond yes, and to the extent even that the UN in February ordered me to go and send an advance party into Bujumbura to look into the possibility of creating another UN peacekeeping force in that country, which would have meant I would have a force in southern Uganda, in Rwanda, and then also in Burundi.
Q. In view of all these events, what was your assessment of the risk of a failure or chances of success for your mission?
A. On a number of occasions I reported directly to New York, as well as to my superior, the SRSG, Mr. Booh-Booh, that on the military side we did not have the resources to be able to meet the challenges of assisting the ex-belligerents in advancing with the peace agreement, that the insecurity that was created, particularly in the capital, was undermining the ability to advance the process. But that insecurity was directly related to the political impasse in regards to resolving some of those ministerial positions in a couple of the parties and the intransigence of the more left and right hardline sides in finding compromises.
Q. General, were you aware that the Rwandan war was not just a war between and amongst Rwandans, but a war that had extensive regional and international implications?
A. Well, the coup in Burundi opened that dimension, but already, because I had been in Uganda, met with President Museveni, had deployed troops in the southern part of his country, we could readily see that we were into a region or subregion arena. The fact that the president of Tanzania had been the facilitator and that the regional organisation was involved in the negotiations for the peace agreement also was indicative of the fact that we were in a regional concern, although the heart of the matter was concentrated at that time in Rwanda and southern Uganda.
Q. Apart from that subregional dimension, didn't you have a clear impression that there was also, outside Africa, countries that were interested, or had a stake, so to speak, in the Rwandan war?
A. In my reconnaissance where I met with a number of the high commissioners, or ambassadors from the countries like the United States, France, Belgium, Germany, even at the time the ambassador from Burundi, the only country that demonstrated a particular interest, which was reinforced during the three weeks I was back in New York with the report, was France, who had a half-battalion on the ground and demonstrated a keenness to pull them out. But also the staff in DPKO had told me that no one is really interested in Rwanda, they've got many more other regions and missions and concerns, except for France who had recommended that all I needed was about 500 unarmed observers to be able to bring about the solution of the mission. And no one else asked to actually be debriefed by my reconnaissance concept of operations except the French, which I returned to do before leaving my -- Rwanda the first time.
During my work in New York I briefed a number of countries under the context of trying to convince, nearly begging countries, to provide troops for the mission. And it was during that time that Belgium had originally promised a full battalion of 800 but subsequently provided a half-battalion. The Americans took note of the concept, but very little other movement.
Q. You've just mentioned the United States of America. Did you have the impression that the United States, in their capacity as the world's policeman, or gendarme, did not follow closely enough the development of the situation in Rwanda?
A. To be quite honest, I had no opinion on the Americans -- certainly at the reconnaissance time, and in the initial phases Canada was not interested, other countries were not interested. They were up to their ears in Yugoslavia and Cambodia at the time.
Q. Thank you.
MR. SEGATWA:
Just for the purposes of informing the Chamber, I had some video to be viewed, but since we have some difficulties this evening, I believe that this could be addressed tomorrow and that the line of questioning relating to that video could be visited tomorrow.
BY MR. SEGATWA:
Q. General, yesterday you testified to the existence of a heavy weapons cache in the native region of President Habyarimana. Did I understand you correctly?
A. Yes, the information that I had was that those weapons were in fact in the tea plantation near his village of birth.
Q. Can you tell this Court the type of weapons that you saw in those plantations, be they tea or coffee plantations?
A. I'm afraid I don't have in memory the description of the weapons systems that were in that specific tea plantation headquarters, or building area. I was informed they were the heavy weapons systems. Heavy weapons systems in the Rwandan army were 105-calibre artillery howitzers, reconnaissance vehicles, 120-millimetre mortars, and potentially heavy anti-aircraft weapons.
MR. SEGATWA:
Can I ask the registry representative, Mr. Kouambo, to look into the Akayesu case file and bring out document 18467 and 18468 and give those documents to General Dallaire.
MR. BÂ:
Mr. Segatwa, did you disclose your documents to Prosecution?
THE ENGLISH INTERPRETER:
Counsel's microphone -- Defence counsel's microphone, please.
MR. SEGATWA:
I believe that if the Prosecution did not receive them by email -- because this was the means used by the registry -- then I could give you this file.
THE ENGLISH INTERPRETER:
Defence counsel hands a file to registry staff.
MR. BÂ:
Are those the Akayesu transcripts?
MR. SEGATWA:
No, they are not transcripts in the Akayesu case. I thought that the Akayesu transcripts are well known to the Prosecution.
THE ENGLISH INTERPRETER:
Prosecution microphone, please.
MR. BÂ:
The documents that you intend to use, did you disclose them to us as is the rule in this Court? Mr. Taku did so. Yesterday you made hell out of the issue of not disclosing documents. But if you decide not to disclose them, that's fine. I simply want to know whether you intend to disclose the documents you would rely on.
MR. SEGATWA:
I believe that the registrar -- registry staff, before leaving for Ottawa, required that all parties disclose all documents and the Akayesu documents were among the documents that were disclosed and taken by Mr. Kouambo. I did not know that you were going to need them here. But in any case, the documents that I'm going to use, of course I can give you copies thereof.
Now, the documents you are showing, Mr. Kouambo, from Canada --
MR. KOUAMBO:
Mr. President, for the purposes of the records, I would like to say that Defence counsel did not ask me to disclose those documents to anyone whatsoever. He asked me to bring them to Ottawa, perhaps for -- to be given to General Dallaire.
MR. SEGATWA:
But, Mr. Kouambo, I believe that there is the representative of the OTP and -- and once one of the Prosecution -- or Prosecutors has the documents, that means that I've complied with the rule of disclosure.
Whatever be the case, I believe that I gave you a document of about -- or, a file, rather, a file of about six or seven documents. Perhaps that file may not include the transcripts in the Akayesu trial, because those trial -- those transcripts are well known.
MR. BÂ:
Well, these are the documents -- are these the documents you intend to use?
Thank you, dear colleague.
THE ENGLISH INTERPRETER:
Say Prosecution.
MR. SEGATWA:
Now, I will ask Mr. Kouambo to take out from the registry file registry document number 18467 and document number 18468 and please kindly give those documents to General Dallaire.
THE WITNESS:
I have a document that's dated (sic) 18467 and I've got another one that's the same date, but it doesn't have a number on it.
BY MR. SEGATWA:
Q. At any rate, what is of concern to me is in 18467. A question was put to you by the Presiding Judge of the Akayesu trial on the 25th of February 2006. In answer to that question you clarified what you understood by "arms caches". And that's what -- you said as follows --
MR. BÂ:
Clarification. Did you say 25th of February -- you said 2006?
MR. SEGATWA:
1998. 1998 in the Akayesu trial.
BY MR. SEGATWA:
Q. Well, you said as follows, General:
"I used the expression 'arms caches' as a reference to weapons that were not under the control of soldiers or of military structures."
Do you confirm that testimony of yours, General?
A. Yes, I've read the page and I've got no problem with the content.
(1910H)
BY MR. SEGATWA:
Q. If I'm not mistaken, General, based on the mandate of your mission, well, you split Rwanda into several secteurs. There were DMZs or demilitarised zones, there were weapons secure areas, and there were areas occupied by the belligerents. Are you in agreement with that apportionment, that division that I just listed now?
A. There was one weapons secure area, one DMZ, and yes, the RPF zone and yes, the RGF or government zone.
Q. Based on your definition, do I understand or believe that when reference is made to arms caches it is not at all in reference to weapons that are under either the army's or soldiers' control?
A. Yes, that would be a term normally used. Let me qualify that again. An arms cache is a place where weapons or ammunition or it could be even vehicles, for that matter, that are in a -- such a situation but they are hidden and unaccounted for. They could still belong to the government or the government forces or the RPF forces, but they simply had not been accounted for as well as they could belong to any subversive element that wanted to conduct whatever.
Q. Thank you again for that clarification. However, I would like to ask you if you did carry out an inventory of weapons in the possession of the RPF in those areas under its control.
A. As I indicated, we did not have a total definitive listing or citing of all weapons from all sides. Both sides, if we would maybe remember, at the time were to act according to a peace agreement, which means that both sides want peace, both sides have signed a peace agreement, both sides are compelled to provide all information they have in order to ensure that a transition towards peace be functioning. It is not in the process of conducting cordoned searches throughout the country to ensure that both sides are telling absolutely the truth. We conduct spot checks and also with the listings attempt to corroborate all that information with what we see on the ground.
MR. SEGATWA:
Can I again seek the services of registrar's representative Kouambo. We would need document bearing the number 18465. That is in the Akayesu case.
MR. BÂ:
It was just one day. When you say 18 something, could you give us the page represented therein in the transcript?
MR. SEGATWA:
Sorry. Sorry, Prosecutor. I am using documents disclosed by the registry, and he gave us copies with numbering of the pages, so I only have the numbers that have been put on it by the registrar. If you want me to engage in that exercise, I could do so but not now.
MR. BÂ:
Not bad.
MR. SEGATWA:
Thank you for your understanding. Has the registry given a copy of that document 18465 to the witness?
MR. KOUAMBO:
Done, Mr. Segatwa. The document has been given to General Dallaire.
BY MR. SEGATWA:
Q. General Dallaire, if you were to peruse that document, you would notice that the Presiding Judge of that Trial Chamber in the Akayesu trial again on the 25th of February 1998 asked you why you were only talking about the arms caches on one side, in other words, that of the Rwanda government forces and not enough about arms caches of the RPF, and your answer was that on the RPF side these were just troops in service and deployed depending on the ceasefire arrangements. Do you confirm your testimony in that regard?
A. I must say, you are taking -- I don't know the full context of what I'm reading here. However, if I interpret what you are saying, the RPF zone was devoid of any civilian population, so the only people that were there were military people deployed within military structures, and as such, we monitored those military structures that we were aware of. I had a different situation in the south where we had large populations; we had refugee camps where weapons were being distributed; we had a government that had distributed weapons to the civilian population, and these weapons had not been accounted for, nor could I get any information on them; we had weapons that were being snuck into the country, and having received that information, I deployed forces on the borders, pushing my mandate authority to actually search on borders certain vehicles that seemed suspect, which was not authorised by my superiors at the time, but then came into effect with the embargo later on.
MR. BÂ:
Are you sure that was the question from the Presiding Judge and not from Counsel Tiangaye.
MR. SEGATWA:
I'm sure it was a question asked by the Presiding Judge.
MR. BÂ:
Are you sure it was not Counsel Tiangaye?
MR. SEGATWA:
I believe it was the Presiding Judge. We can check. Sorry, it bears the number 18466. Is the previous number 18466?
BY MR. SEGATWA:
Q. Now, this is what is said. The Presiding Judge says, "General, you confirm that there was arms caches on just one side and not on the other side?"
MR. BÂ:
Yes, but that is not the same question as you put to him earlier on. You said the Presiding Judge allegedly said you are talking about the arms caches on one side and not on the other side. But here the Presiding Judge is only seeking a confirmation, so it is not the same thing as what you said earlier on.
MR. SEGATWA:
I believe I didn't read or quote that document. I merely made a suggestion. I picked up the idea of the Presiding Judge, but if that would satisfy you, I would ask the question quoting or using the words of the Presiding Judge.
MR. BÂ:
Then that was a poor summary of the words of the President.
BY MR. SEGATWA:
Q. Witness, it would appear the Prosecutor is saying that my summary is not properly done. I'm going to quote what the Presiding Judge of the Trial Chamber said, and I quote:
"General, you confirm that there were arms caches on one side and not on the other side?"
Your answer: "Yes, because on the other side, Mr. President, there were only troops in service deployed on the basis of the ceasefire."
Could you again confirm that that was your answer?
A. Yes. That makes sense, yes.
Q. That having been stated, I don't want to talk about the weapons that were distributed to members of the population. I wish to refer to weapons that were in military structures. General, can one not say that the residence of the president of the republic can be considered as an area under military control?
A. We can consider a whole bunch of practical scenarios. The question was, . . . is that I had received information that major weapons systems had left the KWSA before it was applied in December, and then I received a report that several of the heavy weapons were seen at the tea plantation in the president's village of origin. I mean, did the tactical situation all of a sudden change that required that redeployment contrary to the peace agreement? No, the situation had not changed at that time requiring that.
Q. General, in saying that the weapons which were in Ruhengeri préfecture or Gisinzi préfecture, that is, in the area of residence of the president, came out or came from the KWSA in view of the fact that there has been a weapons secure area agreement, on what do you base yourself in making that earlier allegation?
A. I don't have the reports, and I'm going by my memory, but the memory that I have is that when the negotiations of the KWSA were being done in the latter part of December, the weapons systems that were inventoried in the KWSA heavy weapons systems were not the weapons systems that had previously been seen in August, and I had had reports that the weapons had been moved along the roads. And then subsequent to that, I can't remember what month, it must have been sometime in January-ish or certainly no later than February, I don't think -- no, it wasn't later than February -- I had information that some heavy weapons were seen in the village of origin of the president. The deduction I had there was that the RGF did not want those weapons systems to be under the control of the KWSA and decided to move them out. If they moved other systems, I don't know, but at least we were aware of that. Why did they do that? Did they have concerns? We were still in the process, early process, of implementing the peace agreement, and they had not raised with me a concern that permitted them to actually start moving heavy systems around the country, contrary to the peace agreement where troops were to be where they were.
Q. General, what I wanted to say is the following: The arms in the areas under government control and which were there before the signing of the KWSA, that these only applied in the case of Kigali and whether those arms can be considered as hidden ones. I'm saying so because there is some difficulty with the -- with the interpretation of the arms caches concept. As a general, what do you say to that?
MR. BLACK:
I'm sorry, I have a strong objection to this line of questions because the question is based on a false premise. There is no -- the general stated he had no information, no confirmation such weapons caches existed in the president's zone of residence, and this entire line of questioning is designed to elicit from the general things which are not true. I do not want not only to face the Prosecutor but face on my left flank attacks from counsel that is supposed to be defending the case but assisting the Prosecution. This entire line of questioning, in my view, is designed to do exactly that as it was with the Des Forges testimony. This question is improper because it is based on a false premise. The general actually said, “I have no confirmation there were weapons systems at the president's zone of origin," and therefore this question cannot be asked. And I have grave concerns about the lines of questioning by my comrade here, by my confrère, as I did with the Des Forges testimony and the line of questions they had there because it was also designed to rehabilitate Madam Des Forges. And if this continues, I am going to ask for my case to be split off from these -- this co-Accused Mr. Sagahutu because I'm not going to have General Ndindiliyimana prejudiced by a line of questioning which is designed to prejudice his case.
MR. PRESIDENT:
Counsel, that is why I said at the beginning, sometimes silence is golden. You must defend your client and ask the appropriate questions rather than try to show the expertise you have in this field.
MR. BLACK:
I'm not required to defend my client --
MR. PRESIDENT:
No, not you, Counsel. I am referring to Mr. Segatwa.
MR. BLACK:
Oh, okay. But I'm telling you, Mr. President, that if this continues, I'm going to ask for my case to be split off and have a separate trial.
MR. PRESIDENT:
Mr. Segatwa, you now find that your line of questioning, you said you have so many questions (inaudible) 11 questions, that is what the other counsel says, not me, so you had better start again and try to confine your case to the charges levelled against your Accused.
MR. SEGATWA:
Mr. President, I don't know whether my colleagues do have such concerns. I don't know. Well, my client is being accused of the fact there were some arms caches, so I want to find out whether these did exist. Now, if indeed it appears to the Court that General Dallaire had no information, no report, well, then, I will be with you, namely, to set aside this line of questioning, if that is your opinion of the Court, Mr. President. But then, Mr. President, I would like, all the same, to suggest that -- well, my co-counsel has advised me to leave that line.
I will move on to something else, Mr. President.
MR. SEGATWA:
I think I should deal with the Turatzine enigma. Obviously, I would have wanted to show some film, a documentary, which was shot on the Turatzine matter, but I suppose with your leave I could get back to it at the appropriate time.
BY MR. SEGATWA:
Q. General, are you aware of the informant by the name Jean Turatzine?
A. No, I don't -- I don't -- I don't remember the name.
MR. PRESIDENT:
Do you have the correct name, Counsel? You said Jean Turatzine.
MR. SEGATWA:
Jean Abubacarr Turatzine, T-U-R-A-T-Z-I-N-E.
BY MR. SEGATWA:
Q. General, you are saying you don't know him?
A. I don't know the name, but if you give me a description of who is or what he did and so on, that might bring back in my memory.
Q. General, I'm referring to the informant Jean Abubacarr Turatzine in regard to whom you sent a cable to UN headquarters. Does that ring a bell in your mind?
A. The only cable I remember sending was the one on the informant called Jean Pierre, that we dubbed Jean Pierre. I don't know his real name.
Q. Indeed, the name is Jean Pierre Abubacarr Turatzine. Did you meet him personally?
A. No, I did not.
Q. Did you carry out any investigation regarding him in order to confirm information about him before sending a cable to New York, even as it appears that that cable was never found in New York?
A. Well, my decision to send a cable, to take action, was based on the information that we received -- was based on the general information that we had already at the time from a variety of sources which were far too often, and I would agree, not validated. I decided to implement that plan with the caveat that, yes, it could be possible that we were going to be set up for an action that ultimately would look bad on the mission and possibly even cause casualties, but knowing the (French spoken) and depth of information that was required, I felt that taking 36 hours to plan it, prepare it and check out what might be a validation would be sufficient, which was done in the next 24 hours when my staff were able to confirm one of the caches as described earlier on.
MR. BÂ:
A point of clarification, in the French translation, I heard that six hours were necessary. Was that indeed what was said in English, six hours? Is that what you said in English? In French, I heard six hours. I do not know whether I misheard or that was actually what was said.
BY MR. SEGATWA:
Q. General, were you aware that the said Jean Pierre Turatzine was an RPF agent?
A. I was informed that he was a senior person within the Interahamwe, and that information was provided to me by Faustin Twagiramungu. That is why we initiated this exercise.
Q. Counsel for the Prosecution asked you before he closed his direct examination whether you still maintain the fact that information from Turatzine was still reliable. What answer did you give him, General?
A. I said that essentially everything he told us actually did play out ultimately.
MR. SEGATWA:
Can I ask the registrar to show you document number 66 from my file, document number 66 from my file.
THE WITNESS:
I have the document.
BY MR. SEGATWA:
Q. Well, if you speak French, rather, that is even better for me.
As a matter of fact, this is the statement from the wife of Jean Pierre Abubacarr Turatzine. The document is numbered KO 272529, AKO 272533. His wife says that her husband, namely Jean Pierre Abubacarr Turatzine, worked as a driver at Kibuye préfecture office, and he drove the préfet of Kibuye who was called Donat Hakizimana. Donat Hakizimana had just been transferred to the president's office in Kigali as an intelligence staff.
Do you have any comments to make on that assertion?
A. No, I've got nothing to say.
Q. His wife continues and says as follows: That in January 1994 --
MR. BÂ:
Perhaps read the passages as they are instead of summarising in your manner as you deem fit.
MR. SEGATWA:
Well, if the General has no objection to my manner of proceeding, I don't see why I should read the entire document.
MR. BÂ:
Instead of summarising in your own manner, please read the passage as it is.
MR. PRESIDENT:
Yes, Mr. Segatwa, read it so we also can understand.
BY MR. SEGATWA:
Q. So, his wife continued and said as follows:
"In early 1994, my husband went to Tanzania to prepare the place where we were going to stay and he started some business. We were nevertheless in contact -- we nevertheless maintained contact. In February 1994, he sent a message requesting me to join him, that is, I and the children, to join him."
I'm not going to read the entire paragraph because I'm not interested in that. The wife continues:
"My husband had family in Tanzania and some of those family members belonged to the RPF. They are the ones who convinced my husband to join the RPF."
What do you say to that, General?
A. Well, the first question I have in attempting to respond to yours is how do I know this guy is actually the one who was the informant? Do you have anything to help me comprehend that this is actually the same guy?
Q. As a matter of general principle as a witness, you answer the questions. I am here to ask you questions on behalf of the Tribunal. And if you have questions, you could address them to the Bench. But --
MR. PRESIDENT:
Well, Counsel, I think he said he doesn't know whether this is the same person so, therefore, he can't comment.
MR. SEGATWA:
Mr. President, I think that if the witness carried out investigations on Jean Pierre Abubacarr Turatzine, he would know that he was born in 1986 (sic) in Shyorongi or, rather, in 1990 (sic) in Shyorongi.
MR. PRESIDENT:
Well, Counsel, you say that he was carrying out investigations. He said he had not even seen the man. Mr. Segatwa, the witness has not even seen this person. That is what he said: "I have not seen him."
MR. SEGATWA:
That is even more serious, Mr. President. If someone believes as a gospel truth information coming from a person whose identity is not known, then that is even more serious. In any case, I believe that I have given the witness the opportunity to know who the said Jean Pierre Abubacarr Turatzine, whom he considered to be a very important informant, given the opportunity to talk about him.
BY MR. SEGATWA:
Q. What I will say to conclude on this point, General, is that the woman returned to Rwanda, the wife returned to Rwanda in 1994, and a certain minister called Abdul Kareem told her that her husband had been killed in the course of the war. I believe that was the war between the RPF and the government.
Now, General, I would like to put some propositions to you or ask you some questions. According to this document that was presented to us by the Prosecutor, the document that was disclosed to us by the Prosecutor, do you maintain that he was a member of the Presidential Guard?
A. Who are we talking about?
Q. We are still talking about the informant called Jean Pierre Abubacarr Turatzine. You --
MR. PRESIDENT:
Well, Counsel Segatwa, you are giving the full name. He knows the informant only as Jean Pierre. If you question him on the informant Jean Pierre, he will answer.
MR. BÂ:
Mr. Segatwa, if you want to refer him to what he said, then I think it is better to also show him the code cable of 11 January. Ask Roger Kouambo to show him the code cable of 11 January.
MR. SEGATWA:
You are right. Roger Kouambo, please, can you show him the code cable of 11 January.
MR. BÂ:
That is assuming that you also have that cable before you.
MR. SEGATWA:
You disclosed it, Mr. Prosecutor; it was rather late.
MR. BLACK:
Again, I have to object to the question. It's based on a false premise. No information ever came out that this man was ever a member of the Presidential Guard. It is not in the code cable at all that he was a member of the Presidential Guard. And I can't understand why my friend is trying to link the army here with this man. Perhaps the Prosecutor can explain why. I don't understand this line of questioning. There is nothing in the code cable stating that he was a member of the Presidential Guard.
THE ENGLISH INTERPRETER:
Mr. President, it is impossible to interpret two people speaking at the same time. We are not able to interpret that. Two people were speaking at the same time. We couldn't interpret because he was speaking at the same time as Defence counsel, Mr. President. We are sorry.
MR. PRESIDENT:
No, don't have cross-talk because then nothing will come out. Nothing but the interpreter.
MR. BLACK:
I will repeat my objection. The question is based on a false premise because in the code cable that General Dallaire says he sent there is no mention this man was connected to the Presidential Guard.
MR. PRESIDENT:
Yeah, Counsel, this witness understands the question so he will give an appropriate answer.
MR. BLACK:
Well, my fear is that these questions are a setup in order to draw certain answers from General Dallaire, and that my friend here is not working in the interests of the Defence. And I do not want to sit here with my client being attacked by someone who is supposedly working for the Defence because that is not, . . . because that is quite clearly what is happening.
MR. PRESIDENT:
Your client is not a Presidential Guard.
MR. BLACK:
His client is and by implication he is a military. It is not right, it is not what the code cable says. And I became concerned about my friend's line of questioning with Des Forges, which was nothing but a rehabilitation of our attack on her. And now this is a rehabilitation to try to get General Dallaire to say certain things to destroy our attack in advance of our questioning. It is quite clear to me what is happening here. And I'm going to tell you, if it continues I'm going to ask to file a motion to split my case off because I can't get a fair trial when I'm not only being attacked from that side of the table but from this side too.
MR. MACDONALD:
Your Honour, I'm still listening to the cross-examination of my friend Mr. Segatwa, and somewhat I have to agree with Mr. Black. I'm deeply concerned with a few lines of questions from Mr. Segatwa. I will wait and see what my definite position will be, but I have to express also my concern on Mr. Black's objection.
MR. PRESIDENT:
Yes, Counsel, that is why I told you from the beginning if you confine -- if all the counsels confine their cases to the charges levelled against their client, nothing will happen, no problem. But when you try to be the lead counsel, all are trying to be the lead counsel, all the problems come. If you will work within your confines, nothing will happen as like with Mr. Taku.
MR. BLACK:
My objection is more serious, sir. It goes to what the whole purpose of these lines of questions is. It is not helping his client whatsoever; it has nothing to do with his client. It is only meant to damage the interests of the army and the gendarmerie and the military in general. These lines of questions are nothing more than setups in order to draw questions in favour of the Prosecution. It is quite clear to me, if not to anybody else. And if it continues, I'm going to ask for General Ndindiliyimana's case to be split off and have a separate trial, because I can't get a fair trial in this way when I'm being attacked not only by the Prosecution but by people who, if not working for the Prosecution, have the effect of doing so.
MR. MACDONALD:
Your Honour, you have to agree when -- and the illustration given by Mr. Black was the Des Forges case. I mean, it seemed pretty obvious that Segatwa's team were entitled to cross-examine last, and it seemed that the -- it seemed that Madam Des Forges was anticipating the questions and everything was flowing so perfectly and with the result that it destroyed a great deal of Mr. St-Laurent's work and perhaps Mr. Black's work also. So we have to raise this at this point -- you cannot not agree, Mr. President.
MR. PRESIDENT:
Yes, Counsel, I -- Mr. Segatwa, I think the Court also has an interest with regard to -- the Court also has an interest with regard to the Accused, so please confine your questions to the charges. Why do you want to go outside the realm of your charges? Your duty is defend your client. And why don't you think over it and come tomorrow. You can reorganise yourselves and come tomorrow. We will be starting at 1:00 tomorrow.
MR. SEGATWA:
Mr. President, I think that before we conclude, we should clarify the situation. If -- we are always ready to take the last position, especially as the indictment is very clear, they always start first. If the other counsel want us to be the first, they should bear with us and allow us to ask the questions we want to ask. But if they want a severance, we would be the first to support that. They cannot request that the order of presentation of evidence be reversed and now complain that we are cross-examining against their interests.
MR. BÂ:
I'm going to jump in here and support the Defence. I believe that Mr. Black is preparing a motion for severance, but the criticisms against Mr. Segatwa are unjust. I think he should allow Mr. Segatwa to carry out his cross-examination as he sees fit.
MR. PRESIDENT:
Mr. Segatwa, you had better think about the objections and come back tomorrow. We will be starting at 1:00 tomorrow Arusha time.
Yes, General, you can take a rest today and then come tomorrow.
MR. MACDONALD:
Are we sitting until 8:00?
MR. PRESIDENT:
Yes, we will give you enough time.
MR. MACDONALD:
Perfect.
MR. PRESIDENT:
With short breaks.
Yes? Yes, Mr. Taku.
MR. TAKU:
Absolutely nothing, Your Honour. Absolutely nothing.
MR. BÂ:
Did they hear the beginning time for tomorrow? I think it is important to have an abundance of caution. Have they heard the starting time?
MR. PRESIDENT:
Mr. Dallaire --
MR. KOUAMBO:
Yes, we heard that it will be 1 p.m. Arusha time.
MR. PRESIDENT:
Thank you. Court is adjourned until 1:00 tomorrow.
THE WITNESS:
Mr. President, if I may.
MR. PRESIDENT:
Yes.
THE WITNESS:
Sorry, if I may. There had been a comment stated earlier on about the availability of time and that we were describing the days of work of being half days. I think that if we are moving to a possibility of up to seven hours with some breaks that we are actually doing full days of testimony.
MR. PRESIDENT:
Yes.
THE WITNESS:
Is that not correct, sir?
MR. PRESIDENT:
That is correct, yes.
MR. MACDONALD:
What is the point?
MR. PRESIDENT:
Thank you very much.
(Court adjourned at 1955H)
C E R T I F I C A T E
We, Sithembiso Moyo, Eleanor Bastian, Kirstin McLean and Leslie Todd, Official Court Reporters for the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, do hereby certify that the foregoing proceedings in the above-entitled cause were taken at the time and place as stated; that it was taken in shorthand (stenotype) and thereafter transcribed by computer; that the foregoing pages contain a true and correct transcription of said proceedings to the best of our ability and understanding.
We further certify that we are not of counsel nor related to any of the parties to this cause and that
we are in nowise interested in the result of said cause.
___________________________ Sithembiso Moyo
___________________________ Eleanor Bastian
___________________________ Kirstin McLean
___________________________ Leslie Todd
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