Opening Statement in Milosevic Defense (31/8 & 1/9/2004)--by Slobodan Milosevic (with the whole ICe House gang.)
[I've always found it extraordinary how the small time players in the Business Culture (gangsters) manage to scurry around and pick through the detritus of the mega waste heaps left by the giant corporate players, all the while passing themselves off as small time socialists (guerillas). This is not the dignified struggle for survival that you see African or Brazilian or Palestinian or Iraqi children engaged in, trying to feed their families; these are the feral scroungings of the morally bereft in desperate pursuit of higher byline recognition.
Look at how the OTPOR kids that USAID, CIA and the NED paid $77 million to violently subvert the Yugoslav elections four years ago (they just reprised this hit in Georgia) are now being called by 'Marianne' (the slick French Leftish weekly) modern-day Che Guevaras--that is to say, these aimless, unemployed little fuckers are the paid flunkies of the same interests who assassinated Che? But then the New Left Review a while back called the Chechen terrorists, who just the other day murdered 300+ innocents at Beslan in Russia, the Che Guevaras of the Caucauses. But these are really the big fish compared to the small fry I'm concerned with here.
I remember walking back to my room at the Hotel Prag in Belgrade during the October 22-23, 2001, Freedom for Slobodan Milosevic Conference, and overhearing Jared Israel and Nico Varkevisser blowing smoke up each other's ass about how much money they were gouging out of the SPS (Serbian Socialist Party, as it was then) just for the honor of their presence: you know, air travel, hotel, even per diem. Reminded me of a couple a movie extras bragging about the bumps they'd chiseled a production company out of. But I was so naively delighted at just being a paying tourist, invited with my fresh little 911 riff (Belgrade/NY: aller-retour--somewhere on the blog here) to this major Yugoslav Conference, and being able to hang out with these ultra-fat players, that all I could think was how coooool they both seemed.
Then I started to notice their propensity for 'borrowing' the work of others: EmpsCl's 'Judgment' K7, a great item, was really the work of German reporter Thomas Deichmann; Chris Black had asked me to tape a meeting he was having with the wife and the lawyer of the former head of Belgrade TV, Mr Milanovic, who was at that time locked down, charged with responsibility in the deaths of the 16 RTV employees killed in the 1999 NATO missile strike, and Jared quickly commandeered the tape I'd made--though I don't think he ever did anything with the recording, he certainly woofed me outta writing about it; then there was the long, hard work on the Milosevic appeal to the Strasbourg Court on Human Rights, done for the President's current 'atyourknee', Nico van Holst en Steijnen--this pro bono work was received not with a grateful handshake, but with a lame-ass shake down, a demand to write a proposal to raise money in France and the US to further his lawyering for the Man; then there was the redaction of the David Owen book, 'Balkan Odyssey', gleaning of all relevant quotes from this turgid tome for the learning-challenged mitties @ EmpCls, which I was told would go directly to Milosevic for use in court--though not with my name whispered anywhere near it.
I could go on, but even I am bored by this. So let's jump-cut to the crux of the matter: Another expropriator of the works of others, Louis Dalmas at Balkans Infos, has asked people to support his association, Verité et Justice, an association (like the 44th with that name in France) formed a couple years ago on an impulse to spread support for the international defense of Slobodan Milosevic to France (0 associations with the President's name in my new home country). However, comrade Dalmas' Trotskyist longings made it impossible for him to actually associate his name or the name of his august association with that of the 'accused', the 'Butchest of the Balkans', the 'Stalinist dictator', the 'Balkan strongman' or whatever the Chetniks and Orthodox god-squadders were calling President Milosevic at the time. The Trots have always punched out at supporting Leftists who actually win state power.
So here goes BI/LD/VJ downloading the transcript of Milosevic's opening defense argument at The Hague (version française) and flogging it for 15 euros! There's precious little I can do to discourage this kind of graceless fiddle, now that I've broken with just about everyone in the Truth and Justice and Balkans movements, the Slobodan Milosevic Freedom Center where the Nicos are currently kenneled, and most of the Left, the academic Left, certainly, in the US, and, of course, Jared Israel has now been so well served by me that he no longer claims to know who I am. You girls know how that feels, huh.
Hey, Jared, I'm the one told you that the Tribunal's being a 'kangaroo court' didn't make Scheveningen, the NATO lock-up next door, a 'kangaroo prison'; and that Vivendi wasn't primarily a designer of video games but one of the world's largest privately held public utilities (Vivendi Environnementale=Société générale des eaux); that Raçak=Jenin was bullshit for innumerable reasons, not the least of which being that in this full-scale military 'incursion' into the undefended Jenin refugee camp, the majority of IDF casualties resulted from 'friendly fire'; and that the original 'joint criminal enterprise' at the heart of modern terrorism (i.e., the killing of innocent civilians to advance political interests) is not Hezbollah or Hamas or the KLA or al Qaida, but the inbred military/intelligence monstrosity that Israel and the US have spawned: Bush and Sharon, NATO and the IDF, DIA/CIA and Mossad have brought about the militarization of everyday life on this planet (and even into outer space) and rendered all into a giant bone yard where diseased dogs like those mentioned above will have a single place to shit and feed.
So here's CM/P's great money saving offer for you: Rather than send 15 euros to V&J&Rentabilité, read the transcripts of the President's opening statement on the CirqueMinime/Paris blog (ou les téléchargez en français à www.icty.org), and shoot even a small part of the chalk'n cheese off to SLOBODA (icdsm.org) instead. And while you're at it, tell them finally to shoot all those deadbeat Zionist punks to the shitty curb they fell off of and put '3 on a Genocide' back on their web site. Now's no time to break solidarity with the Rwandans, the Palestinians and the Iraqis--and White 'denial' ain't just a river in Sudan.--mc]
Page 32157
1 Tuesday, 31 August 2004
2 [Defence Opening Statement]
3 [Open session]
4 [The accused entered court]
5 --- Upon commencing at 9.02 a.m.
6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, you may proceed with your opening
7 statement.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, for my opening
9 statement, I would need tomorrow as well. I would like to note that the
10 other side had three days, so I expect you to be so kind as to make this
11 day and the following day available to me as well.
12 May I start now?
13 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, this is your third bite at the
14 proverbial cherry. In response to the Prosecution's opening on the Kosovo
15 part of the case, you were allowed eight hours, two days. And in response
16 to the Prosecution's opening on the Bosnia and Croatian part of the case,
17 you were allowed three and a half hours. This is your third bite.
18 Please proceed.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, you personally, you
20 yourself, said that I have the right to a statement and to opening
21 arguments. What I made were statements. This is an opening argument. I
22 think that you should bear that in mind. I think that you should look at
23 this request that I've just put forth and I think that you should give me
24 additional time.
25 JUDGE ROBINSON: Please proceed, Mr. Milosevic.
Page 32158
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Robinson.
2 In the international public, for a long time and with clear
3 political intentions an untruthful, distorted picture was being created in
4 terms of what happened in the territory of the former Yugoslavia.
5 Accusations levelled against me are an unscrupulous lie and also a
6 tireless distortion of history. Everything has been presented in a
7 lopsided manner so -- in order to protect from responsibility those who
8 are truly responsible and to draw the wrong conclusions about what
9 happened and also in terms of the background of the war against
10 Yugoslavia.
11 There is a fundamental historical fact that one should proceed
12 from when seeking to understand what happened and which led to everything
13 that happened in the territory of Yugoslavia from 1991 until the present
14 day, and that is the violent destruction of a European state, Yugoslavia,
15 which was derived from the statehood of Serbia, the only ally of the
16 democratic world in that part of the world over the past two centuries.
17 There is no doubt that this fundamental historic fact is going to leave an
18 imprint on European history in the times to come.
19 A multi-ethnic, multi-cultural, multi-confessional state was
20 destroyed, a state that had its historic and international legal
21 legitimacy. In its territory, according to the dictat of Germany and
22 Vatican, assisted by the United States and the European Community, pure
23 nation states, miniature nation states, were established. The state that
24 was destroyed was a member of all international organisations starting
25 with the first postal union from 1884 through the League of Nations, the
Page 32159
1 International Label Organisation, the United Nations, the World Bank, the
2 International Monetary Fund, and all other specialised agencies of the
3 United Nations all the way up to the Organisation for Security and
4 Cooperation in Europe.
5 Whose merit was this that this sovereign state was destroyed?
6 According to the Nuremberg principles, this constitutes the gravest
7 international crime, a crime against peace. Whose merit was it that a war
8 happened in which tens of thousands of civilians were killed, hundreds of
9 thousands of people wounded and maimed? Thousands of people lost their
10 homes and fled from their homes, mostly Serbs, and also there are millions
11 of damage in terms of property. The -- this is -- not speak of the
12 ecological disaster involved.
13 The international community will have to face up to all of this.
14 It is not only that a state was destroyed. The United Nations system was
15 destroyed. Also the corpus of principles upon which the world
16 civilisation was based has been destroyed. In addition to that, never in
17 history has a state disappeared by sheer coincidence. There was a great
18 deal of rhetoric involved in the destruction of Yugoslavia. When the
19 crisis first broke out, all the way up to the present day, everything that
20 has been said, including what this so-called Prosecution said, is wrong.
21 Yugoslavia did not simply disappear into thin air, as Mr. Robert Badinter
22 tried to explain, and in this way he resorted to some kind of legal
23 metaphysics. This country was destroyed through a plan, violently, and
24 through a war which continues to be waged, and a series of war crimes were
25 committed in this war.
Page 32160
1 An American theoretician, a prominent one, Stephen John Steedman,
2 noted, rightly so, in 1993 in the periodical Foreign Affairs that at the
3 beginning of the war, and I am quoting: "Slovenia or some other state did
4 not exist. There was only one state; Yugoslavia." So it is logical to
5 take that as a point of departure in any kind of legal analysis.
6 Yugoslavia, which was headed at this most critical time by a
7 member of the Presidency from Croatia, Stjepan Mesic, the Prime Minister
8 of the country at the time was also from Croatia; Ante Markovic. The
9 Foreign Minister was also from Croatia; Budimir Loncar.
10 As for the top echelons of the military, and we heard about that
11 here, among the 16 top generals, there were only two Serbs. The majority
12 were Croats, Slovenes, and people with other ethnic backgrounds.
13 This state had a strong armed force that was in a position to keep
14 the conflict under control and to prevent it from happening altogether.
15 However, this government let paramilitary formations, arms smugglers, have
16 their way, even the narco Mafia, when we look at the end of this process
17 in Kosovo. However, this government acted in concert with the European
18 Community, notably Germany and the Vatican.
19 As early as the end of June 1991, the European Community asked for
20 the legitimate army to remain within barracks and in this way to turn the
21 army voluntarily into detainees within their own country, which is only
22 logical -- and it is only logical that this led to secession and to the
23 creation of paramilitary formations. The secession of Slovenia happened
24 in 1991, and it was accompanied by armed action.
25 In June 1991, the Slovenian military formations without any cause
Page 32161
1 killed in cold blood JNA soldiers who were securing the border towards
2 Austria and Italy and took over border posts. From the point of view of
3 the UN charter, from the point of view of general legal principles
4 recognised by civilised nations, this is a classical example of an armed
5 rebellion against a state. Therefore the state is duty-bound to take all
6 necessary measures in order to restore law and order.
7 We know that when acting on orders given by the federal Prime
8 Minister, Ante Markovic, the commander of the 5th army, a Slovenian,
9 General Konrad Kolsek, informed the government of Slovenia that the
10 Yugoslav People's Army will regain control over the border and that this
11 task would be carried out.
12 The Slovenian leadership, instead of making it possible to carry
13 these decisions out peacefully, these decisions taken by the federal
14 authorities, said that they are taking this challenge and that they would
15 resort to force in order to oppose it, and that's what they did. Their
16 paramilitary forces, which then included 36.000 persons illegally armed,
17 were used by Slovenia to launch an armed offensive. All of them knew full
18 well that the Yugoslav army, educated in the spirit of brotherhood and
19 unity, would not shoot at Slovenians who they considered to be their own
20 citizens. So actually the killing of JNA soldiers was a mere premeditated
21 crime. It was no war.
22 Grave war crimes were committed. Not even military medical
23 institutions were spared. The troika of the European Community toured the
24 area and described the dramatic situation. There is a long list of crimes
25 and there is also film material documenting the crimes of the Slovenian
Page 32162
1 paramilitary forces, and this footage was shot by an Austrian TV company.
2 Due to the time constraints that you have imposed upon me, I do not have
3 the possibility of playing these tapes now, but I am going to call certain
4 witnesses and show them then.
5 On the 10th of July, 1991, the European parliament passed a
6 resolution condemning not the rebels, not the secessionists, but the legal
7 force, the Yugoslav People's Army. And inversion was carried out between
8 the victim and the executioner, and in this way the European Community and
9 the United States fuelled the war.
10 I am pointing this out because it has been said time and again
11 ever since that this is what happened in the former Yugoslavia, and this
12 is a formula that was resorted to all the time. In Croatia, crimes
13 against the Serbs started even earlier, even before secession was
14 declared. The same methods in the same areas where the genocide against
15 the Serb people started in 1941 by the Ustasha formations in the so-called
16 Independent State of Croatia.
17 World experts who studied genocide, the genocide that occurred in
18 different places and at different times, for example, Leo Cooper, Peter
19 Drost, Ted Gertz, Louis Horowitz, George Cram, and others came to the
20 conclusion that genocide over a people can occur only once. Any further
21 attempt would turn into civil war. And this thesis was confirmed in
22 Croatia.
23 The genocide over the Serbs in Croatia in 1941 started by making
24 lists and calling upon groups and giving -- in order to ostensibly give
25 them information. However, they were not given information. Serbs were
Page 32163
1 killed and sent off to concentration camps.
2 This time, when similar things were done, the Serbs resisted, and
3 they felt seriously manipulated by politicians who had defended ideals of
4 fraternity and unity and then called upon the people in a different way.
5 Old Ustasha formulas and old Ustasha symbols were resorted to. Laws were
6 passed along the fast track and the Serbs lost their status of a
7 constituent people. Without the army isolated in barracks, the Serbs in
8 Krajina were prepared to die, but they were not to submit themselves yet
9 to another genocide.
10 A long time before the secession of 1991 in Croatia, armed groups
11 functioned there. The so-called voluntary peoples protection forces;
12 Zebra, Black Wolves, the Wolves from Vukovar, et cetera. In Zagreb on the
13 28th of May, a military parade was organised a month before secession
14 where arms were shown, arms that particularly came from Germany. These
15 were only preparations for what would happen later. Groups of
16 paramilitaries were transferred from Croatia to Bosnia at that time
17 because President Tudjman had announced a change of borders and that the
18 borders of Croatia would be moved to the Drina.
19 In July 1991, the armed paramilitaries in Croatia started a
20 frontal war. From the 20th of July until the 4th of August, there were 75
21 attacks against the JNA.
22 THE INTERPRETER: Could the speaker please be asked to slow down.
23 It is impossible for the interpreters to follow any longer.
24 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, the interpreters are asking you to
25 speak slowly, more slowly.
Page 32164
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] They could have said that to me. I
2 didn't hear them.
3 JUDGE ROBINSON: They did.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.
5 Serb houses were set on fire and individual crimes against Serbs
6 were transformed into mass liquidations. In the cornfield near the
7 village of Jankovci, 65 Serbs were slaughtered. All of them have been
8 identified. In the village of Svinjarevo 25 were killed, and so on and so
9 forth. Entire villages in the area of Papuk and Slunj were razed to the
10 ground. The most widespread form of terror over the Serbian people were
11 forcible evictions, and this was the strongest link between the years 1941
12 and 1991.
13 These activities began in Western Slovenia immediately after the
14 HDZ won the elections. A psychosis was created so that people would be
15 encouraged to move out. Various methods were used. Serbian children were
16 mocked in school. The people were brought into police stations. Serbs
17 were dismissed from work on a large scale, their houses were bombed. The
18 Crisis Staff in Slavonska Pozega on the 28th of October, 1991, issued an
19 order on the eviction of Serbs from 24 villages; Oblakovac, Orijaca,
20 Slatina, and so on, within a 24-hour period. This order was broadcast on
21 the radio and published in the press. Those who refused to comply were
22 taken to concentration camps. A large scale exodus of Serbs in the areas
23 of Podravska Slatina, and Daruvar took place.
24 From July to August 1991 to the -- 1992, many Serbian villages
25 were ethnically cleansed. Documents on all this were submitted to the
Page 32165
1 European Community.
2 War activities were then taken to the territory of Bosnia and
3 Herzegovina. The ideological foundations were laid in 1970 with the
4 Islamic declaration of Alija Izetbegovic. This was a secret platform.
5 Later on, in 1984, a book by the same author was published on Islam and
6 the West, and then the Islamic declaration was published again in 1990.
7 It is well known that it states that there can be no peace and
8 co-existence between the Islamic faith and non-Islamic faiths. This is
9 repeated many times in all these books and publications.
10 At the Bosnian and Herzegovinian Assembly session on the 21st of
11 December 1991, Izetbegovic said he was willing to sacrifice peace for a
12 sovereign Bosnia and Herzegovina. There was mass mobilisation and civil
13 war started with abundant financial help arriving from Saudi Arabia, Iran,
14 and other Islamic countries. After this, many Mujahedin arrived.
15 On the 6th summit of the organisation of the Islamic Conference
16 held on the 9th of December, 1991, before the war was fully developed and
17 before Bosnia and Herzegovina was recognised, support was given to their
18 brothers in faith, support for the creation of the first Islamic state in
19 Europe. Even today Bosnia and Herzegovina does not have a majority Muslim
20 population. Not only was there substantial financial help, but Alija
21 Izetbegovic was feted and honoured at the Islamic Conference held in Djeda
22 on the -- from the 1st to the 2nd of December 1991. They also extended
23 their concern to two areas in Serbia; to Kosovo and the area of Raska, or
24 as they called it, Sandzak.
25 The first holy warriors, the Mujahedin, arrived from Afghanistan,
Page 32166
Page 32167
1 Lebanon, Morocco and Pakistan, armed with weapons sent by the CIA to the
2 rebels in Afghanistan. A group of 400 members of Hezbollah arrived in
3 Sarajevo as military instructors. Following the tradition from World War
4 II of a joint action under the auspices of Nazi Germany against the
5 democratic coalition to which the then Yugoslavia belonged, Tudjman and
6 Izetbegovic, the two leaders of the rebels, signed an agreement stating
7 that the armed forces of the Croatian Defence Council would be part of the
8 unified armed forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This was followed by the
9 expulsion of Serbs from areas under the control of Muslim forces. Tens of
10 thousands of people were expelled from Mostar, 2.000 from Gorazde, and so
11 on.
12 As happened in Croatia, in Bosnia and Herzegovina allegedly
13 retired American officers were sent to be instructors of the Muslim army.
14 Combat operations developed and moved from the north toward the south, and
15 they were finally transferred to the territory of Serbia, that is to
16 Kosovo. The pattern along which the destruction of Yugoslavia was
17 planned, Kosovo being the last phase, is very simple: Reliance was placed
18 on paramilitary rebel forces, criminals, and on Kosovo, the narco Mafia,
19 as well as terrorist forces.
20 During the time of Croatia and Serbia, the legitimate force was
21 the JNA, and later on the army of Yugoslavia. There was open aggression
22 on the remainder of Yugoslavia, Serbia and Montenegro. Tens of thousands
23 of bombs were dropped and various projectiles with depleted uranium and
24 five to six times more poison was dropped than was the case in Hiroshima.
25 All this happened in the aggression against Yugoslavia by the NATO pact.
Page 32168
1 The involvement of the West, primarily the Vatican and Germany,
2 was evident from the very beginning. Donald Horowitz, the well-known
3 American theoretician, presented arguments in his study on ethnic and
4 national conflicts, that they take on their worst form, war, when they
5 gain international support. And this is precisely what happened on the
6 territory of Yugoslavia.
7 The war on this territory was a synchronised activity by
8 secessionist forces and external forces who, in preparing the bloodshed
9 and fuelling the bloodshed, implanted into Yugoslavia Ustasha extremists
10 and Nazis, Islamic fundamentalists and Albanian terrorists whose role was
11 to be the detonator for the outbreak of the conflict. The external forces
12 in the initial phases acted behind the scenes, supplying the secessionists
13 with arms and money and infiltrating mercenaries into the country. The
14 final destruction of Yugoslavia was perpetrated through institutional
15 deceptions.
16 In the final act from -- the final document from Helsinki, the USA
17 and other countries promised to respect the integrity of all the countries
18 in the area, all the states, and said that they would refrain from any
19 activities against the territorial integrity and unity and independence of
20 every signatory country. This was signed in Paris in 1990. Only a year
21 after this, the international community acted openly on the political
22 scene as the main force for the destruction of Yugoslavia.
23 On Brioni on the 7th of July, 1991, a declaration was signed on
24 the peaceful resolution of the conflict in the SFRY. Relying on these
25 documents which I have mentioned, the European Community promised to seek
Page 32169
1 a peaceful solution and to respect the territorial integrity of
2 Yugoslavia, which was the only legally protected entity, which actually
3 gave it the mandate to mediate in this conflict. The whole process
4 started from several -- there were several possible solutions that were
5 proposed, and concessions were proposed that could be relied on.
6 Instead of all this, Lord Carrington, at a meeting on the 18th of
7 October 1991, set out an ultimatum, and there was no alternative to the
8 disappearance of Yugoslavia. This was the model applied by Hitler in
9 1941. Nazi values won the day. The right to the destruction of a state
10 to secession was given priority over preserving a state and the right to
11 preserve a state, a member of the UN.
12 The paradox is that the right that was given to the secessionists
13 of Yugoslavia is denied, for example, to the Irish by the British, and so
14 on. Let us remember that there was a time when Serbian fighters fought
15 together with the allies in World War II and that then the troops of the
16 so-called Independent State of Croatia, as well as some forces from
17 Bosnia, also then within the Independent State of Croatia, fought on the
18 side of the Nazi forces. At that time the well-known Handzar Division
19 from Bosnia was sent to France as part of the convicts unit, and there
20 they committed unprecedented crimes.
21 Let us go back to Carrington's document, which was the first blow
22 against the sovereignty of Yugoslavia. This is an evident deception.
23 This is something that transformed further negotiations into a farce.
24 After this, the secessionist republics were recognised under strong
25 pressure from Germany and the Vatican, against the elementary principles
Page 32170
1 of international law, the practice of the United Nations, and the practice
2 of a leading power, the USA.
3 Very well. On the basis of Smithson's declaration from the 7th of
4 January 1932, the United Nations -- United States promised not to
5 recognise countries arising from violent changes. This principle first
6 became the regional rule of the USA and then entered the universal rules
7 of international law. This time America trampled on its own law.
8 In July 1991, before the war started, the Minister of Foreign
9 Affairs of Germany, Genscher, advocated that Croatia and Slovenia be
10 recognised right away. A parallel action was waged by the Vatican. The
11 ambassador with the Holy See, Thomas Patrick Milady, in mid-1991, the
12 Vatican initiated an unprecedented action and led the forces lobbying for
13 the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia.
14 In August 1991, Pope John Paul II sent Archbishop Torano to
15 Yugoslavia. On his return, he submitted a report stating that Serbia was
16 indisputably the aggressor. This was another shameless lie. This was
17 hypocrisy on the part of a spiritual leader. Aggression on one's own
18 country is something that only be conceived of maliciously. However, this
19 was accepted by the press and there was perfect coordination between the
20 Vatican and Germany. In December 1991, Genscher visited the Vatican. On
21 his return on the 19th of December, he announced that Germany would
22 recognise Croatia and Slovenia regardless of the positions of other
23 countries. And this was carried out on the 23rd of December. The Vatican
24 did this on the 13th of January 1992.
25 Germany and the Vatican were led by their historical geostrategic
Page 32171
1 interests. For years they worked on the destruction of Yugoslavia. This
2 was stated by Helmut Kohl in the magazine Politics International, issue
3 66. He said that the creation -- that the decisive period started when
4 Kinkel became head of the security service of Germany, and he established
5 close links with the Ustasha emigres. These were forces which worked on
6 the break-up of Yugoslavia, according to the writings of the well-known
7 American analyst Eric Schmidt-Birnbaum. These were Josip Balovic [phoen],
8 Josip Boljkovac, Franjo Tudjman, and Stjepan Mesic, the present Croatian
9 president. Mesic confirmed his role on Slovenian television by stating
10 that the idea on the break-up of Yugoslavia was something he wanted to
11 transmit to those who had the strongest influence on its fate, Genscher
12 and the Pope.
13 "I met Genscher three times. He made it possible for me to contact
14 the Holy See. The Pope and Genscher agreed to the total break-up of
15 Yugoslavia." End of quotation.
16 After this, recognition followed by other members of the European
17 Community in January 1992. In the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, this
18 happened on the 6th of April of the same year. On the very date of
19 Hitler's attack on Yugoslavia in 1941; the 6th of April.
20 The federal entities were recognised, and in there, as it is
21 stated, "internationally recognised borders." However, never in any
22 international document were the administrative borders recognised. There
23 was not even an internal document about these borders. What is most
24 important in all this, recognition is a one-sided political act, whereas
25 the establishing of borders is a process, an internal process. The units
Page 32172
1 that were recognised did not meet the elementary prerequisites to be
2 recognised as states. For a state to be recognised, it needs to have a
3 legitimate state apparatus, stable political structures, there must be a
4 monopoly of power within the territory, full control over the use of
5 power, and, what is most important, a state has to express its strength
6 and its ability to provide security on the international and internal
7 levels. None of this was complied with. There was a bloody civil war
8 which will be recorded as something unique in modern history but in a very
9 negative way.
10 In legal circles throughout the world, the recognition of the
11 rebel forces caused great astonishment and was condemned. Cedric
12 Thornberry, the leader of the UNPROFOR, stated, I quote: "When Ambassador
13 Cutileiro notified us of the decision to recognise, General Morillon and I
14 were astonished." The French newspaper Figaro called this legal
15 hypocrisy. General MacKenzie, in his memoirs, states, "Although we were
16 not diplomats, all of us in uniform were sure that fighting would break
17 out all around us as soon as recognition is announced."
18 Special envoy of the UN, Cyrus Vance, stated that recognition of
19 Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina by the European Community and
20 the United States, I quote: "Led to the war that is being waged on the
21 territory of Yugoslavia." He said this in September 1992.
22 The recognition of fictitious states in a civil war represents an
23 indirect form of aggression against the Socialist Federative Republic of
24 Yugoslavia. Along with a powerful media campaign and a -- deluding the
25 international community by violation of international law and the laws of
Page 32173
1 the United Nations, the secessionist states were recognised as members of
2 the UN. The rest of the Yugoslavia, the core part of Yugoslavia, were
3 imposed with sanctions in May 1992, and the country was isolated, and in
4 July of the same year they were excluded or expelled from the United
5 Nations only because we did not accept, by a stroke of the pen, to have
6 the existing state deleted, the state in which we were living.
7 In this legal chaos and this moral decline of the leading powers
8 in the post-Cold War period and of the Vatican, the way was opened for
9 craziness and lawlessness from the borders in the south to Kosovo -- in
10 the north to Kosovo in the south. This ad hoc Tribunal was formed also
11 with the one and only objective of covering up the piled-up mistakes of a
12 Western policy and to justify the crimes, the destruction of a state, and
13 the highly technological barbarism committed by NATO countries in their
14 three-month bombing of Yugoslavia. Mass crimes were committed against its
15 citizens, medieval heritage of the Serbian people in Kosovo was destroyed,
16 and so on and so forth.
17 By instrumentalising extremely complex events in the territory of
18 Yugoslavia and by placing the responsibility on Yugoslavia and myself
19 personally as aggressors, a very obvious tactic was used to close the
20 circle and prevent logical thinking based on empirical principles.
21 Senseless, vulgar theories about bad guys and rough state cannot serve to
22 explain historical facts and provide the historical responsibility for the
23 destruction of a state. The joint criminal intent existed but it didn't
24 proceed from Belgrade, however, nor did it exist in Belgrade at all.
25 Quite the contrary. It existed through the joint forces of the
Page 32174
1 secessionists, Germany and the Vatican, and also the rest of the countries
2 of the European Community and the United States.
3 During my first appearance in this place and then on several
4 occasions after that, I questioned the legality of this so-called
5 Tribunal. During the trial, you have provided me with a lot of arguments
6 in support of my position. I will not dwell on the lack of the legal
7 basis for the establishment of this Tribunal. I would just like to recall
8 that the source of judicial power can only come from international
9 treaties and not resolutions, as stated by the UN Secretary-General
10 himself in a statement to the Security Council on May 3rd, 1993. However,
11 you owe a response to the international community of where does the right
12 of the Security Council come to suspend legal treaties? We have the legal
13 -- the Geneva Conventions from 1949 as well as Additional Protocols to
14 punish war crimes which place the responsibility for a trial of such cases
15 on national courts. An international court can have authority only if it
16 was created by a lege artis act and if it is of a general nature. This
17 Tribunal lacks both elements. The act of the establishment of this
18 Tribunal is of an individual nature. It's a political nature. The
19 elementary legal principle is equality. So then we have the question why
20 were not courts formed for all the wars that are being waged throughout
21 the world and that had been waged at least in the past decade of the 20th
22 century. Although there are no principled reasons for not doing something
23 like that and to apply to everybody if such a thing were legal.
24 In other words, this Tribunal represents the most serious form of
25 discrimination against one country, and it is a violation of the
Page 32175
1 protection against all forms of discrimination.
2 At the very beginning, I requested that this institution uses its
3 authority from Article 96 of the UN Charter and to ask the permission of
4 the General Assembly and to ask the International Court of Justice,
5 legally the highest judicial instance in the UN system which is authorised
6 to interpret the Charter and to provide its legal opinion on whether the
7 Resolutions of the Security Council establishing this Tribunal were in
8 accordance with the UN Charter or not. The fact that this Tribunal has
9 given it the right to decide for itself whether it was established in a
10 legally valid way and then concluded, as could be expected, that it was
11 done in a legal way does not mean that this conclusion is correct or that
12 it even had the right to reach such a conclusion. Namely, this so-called
13 Tribunal, just like any other Tribunal, is not authorised to bring
14 judgements on its own legality. That is why this decision is legally
15 invalid. Courts are authorised to decide on their own authority on
16 whether they are competent, on whether they are competent to decide on a
17 question or not. However, the question of the jurisdiction of a court and
18 the question of its legality are two separate issues. The question of
19 legality has precedence over the question of authority, because if a court
20 is not legal, then the question of its authority or jurisdiction is
21 pointless. As opposed to the question of its own authority, no court can
22 decide on its own legality, because by tradition it is not permissible to
23 judge in one's own matter.
24 Also, this illegal Tribunal does not have the right to deprive
25 persons before it from an answer of whether they are facing a legal or an
Page 32176
Page 32177
1 illegal organ, particularly if there is a legally valid way to resolve
2 this question, because the person in question then is denied justice, deni
3 de justice, if this is not allowed to be answered.
4 However, I'm afraid that the people in authority in this
5 institution are aware that the International Court of Justice would be in
6 accordance with the view of their previous president, Mohamed Dejoui
7 [phoen], stated in his book The New World Order, and control of the
8 legality of the acts of the Security Council where, amongst the acts or
9 the laws that he mentions as controversial, both Resolutions referring to
10 this Tribunal are cited.
11 This Tribunal is not an International Tribunal and it is not an
12 independent organ, as you wish to present it. Amongst the public, there
13 has been an ideological fiction. The international community, which is
14 allegedly behind this Tribunal, is actually a deception. The ideal to
15 establish the Tribunal came from Kinkel after he succeeded Genscher, the
16 main criminal in the destruction of Yugoslavia. The idea was taken over
17 by Madeleine Albright, and the costs of the preliminary activities as well
18 as later activities were funded by the Soros Foundation who also founded a
19 coalition for international justice as an NGO in order to provide
20 "assistance" to the Tribunal. "Assistance" please I would like to place
21 in quotes, to these who are writing the transcript. These members and
22 other NGOs, some of whom today are working in this Tribunal today, were
23 engaged in 1992 in Bosnia and Herzegovina to gather the evidence on
24 alleged crimes by Serbs.
25 Albright presented this before the US Congress, engaged different
Page 32178
1 lobbies and different media for the purpose of fabricating a certain image
2 which would influence the public. Sometimes they have called her the
3 mother of the Tribunal.
4 As for the authenticity of the evidence given by the NGOs, we can
5 use a scandal about the false documents presented by representatives of
6 those organisations in which I was allegedly accused for alleged crimes in
7 Kosovo. A journalist of the New York Times who wrote an article based on
8 this false information was forced to resign for professional and ethical
9 reasons.
10 I have that issue of the New York Times here but I don't have time
11 to present it.
12 The drafter of the Statute, Michael Scharf, of the Tribunal gave a
13 very precise assessment of the Tribunal in an interview to the Washington
14 Post on October 3rd, 1999. I quote: "The Tribunal is a useful political
15 channel which serves to diplomatically isolate rogue leaders and to
16 strength political will in the world, to apply sanctions and to enforce
17 power."
18 In other words, the Tribunal is an instrument of war and not of
19 justice. This was confirmed in Globe and Mail, a Canadian magazine, by
20 Marcus McGee, who stressed that the Tribunal, I quote: "Is a part of the
21 NATO war strategy."
22 So this is a private justice only known to them imposed by a war
23 coalition, and the intention is to return the judiciary to the medieval
24 era.
25 In the world this Tribunal is called a propaganda instrument of
Page 32179
1 NATO, so there can be no question of any independence at all. We also
2 need to add that since 1996 there has been a constant communication
3 between the NATO Secretary-General and your Chief Prosecutor. And on 9th
4 of May, 1996, a memorandum was signed by the Chief Prosecutor and the
5 Supreme Commander of NATO for Europe about the modalities of cooperation.
6 Therefore, NATO, and not the United Nations, have taken over the role of
7 the Tribunal policemen, and that is why this Tribunal cannot be considered
8 an international institution at all but an institution of NATO.
9 Another factor supporting this claim, your own Article 32 of the
10 Statutes provides that expenses for the Tribunal should be covered by the
11 regular budget of the United Nations, but in practice the money comes from
12 very morbid sources, dark sources like the Soros Foundation, different
13 other foundations, and also from Islamic countries. The bulk of the money
14 comes from NATO itself. According to NATO spokesman Shea, I quote: "NATO
15 is the biggest financial source for the Tribunal." He stated this on the
16 17th of May, 1999, in Brussels.
17 We also need to recall that Soros is also funding the liberation
18 army of Kosovo, the KLA, and their main propaganda newspaper, Koha Ditore.
19 During the signing on the 12th of September, 1990, in Moscow,
20 together with the foreign ministries of the Democratic Republic of Germany
21 at that time, also France, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, the United
22 States, of the treaty on the definite order of Germany, Genscher stated,
23 "We do not want for anything else other than to live with all other
24 nations in freedom and democracy. State unity represents for us a greater
25 responsibility."
Page 32180
1 Very well, I will read more slowly.
2 "State unity represents for us a greater responsibility but it
3 does not at the same time represent our aspirations for having greater
4 power."
5 Chancellor Kohl, on the 3rd of October, on the day of the
6 reunification of Germany, sent a message to all world governments,
7 including the Yugoslav government, in which, amongst other things, he
8 said, "In future only peace will emanate from German territory. We are
9 aware that the inviolability of borders, the respect of territorial
10 integrity and sovereignty of all states in Europe are the basic condition
11 for peace, and we also have moral and legal obligations which arise from
12 German history."
13 Big words and big promises given to the rest of humanity and in
14 particular Europe at the point when the German nation finally was allowed
15 to remove the burden of its division which was imposed on it precisely as
16 a result of the darkest period of German history. Yes, this was a big
17 promise, but at the same time an empty promise, because how did the German
18 top leadership view the moral and legal obligations arising from German
19 history, which they cited, and what is their relation to the inviolability
20 of borders and respect of territorial integrity and sovereignty of all
21 states in Europe, as they said themselves as the main condition of peace.
22 You could practically at the same time see very well in Yugoslavia
23 how this was. In the territory of that state which German history -- at
24 that point of the 20th century inflicted the cost of 3 million lives,
25 1.247.000 victims in First World War, and 1.700.000 in World War II.
Page 32181
1 Precisely in that month of German reunification, security services of the
2 Yugoslav People's Army uncovered and managed to tape secretly activities
3 pertaining to the illegal import of weapons by Croatia aimed at
4 facilitating the armed secession of Croatia. So actually, we're talking
5 about the break-up of the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia. This
6 import of weapons went through Hungary but also went through some units of
7 Germany, which made it ironical that Chancellor Kohl said in his message
8 that only peace would emanate from German territory.
9 The arming of the secessionists was not the only or the first kind
10 of involvement of Germany in the break-up of Yugoslavia and in the
11 creation of the Yugoslav crisis. The entire activities of Slovenia and
12 Croatia in their violent achievement of independence was not only aided by
13 Germany but to a considerable degree was encouraged by the top state
14 leaders.
15 Within the efforts to prevent the conflict or to stop the conflict
16 in the territory of Croatia as well as to stop attacks on the JNA, the
17 Presidency of Yugoslavia and the leaders of the Yugoslav republics
18 gathered in Belgrade at a meeting on the 20th and the 21st of August,
19 1991, and then adopted several decisions for the purpose of stabilising
20 the situation. A small programme of political and economic cooperation
21 was adopted. A commission was formed to develop agreements on the future
22 form of the multi-ethnic states, and there was an agreement also reached
23 between the leadership of Croatia and the officials of the JNA.
24 On the 20th of August, there was an extraordinary ministerial
25 session in which the foreign ministers of European Community member states
Page 32182
1 concluded that they welcomed the readiness of all parties to embark on
2 negotiations about the future of Yugoslavia and requested all the sides to
3 conduct the negotiations in goodwill amongst themselves.
4 On that very same day, Genscher held a consultative meeting with
5 the foreign ministers of Slovenia and Croatia. On the 24th of August,
6 1991, he called Boris Filic [phoen], the Yugoslav Ambassador to Bonn, who
7 happened to be a Slovene, which was a guarantee that the message directed
8 to the Yugoslav authorities would also be directed to Ljubljana and
9 Zagreb, and told him if the bloodshed continues and if the policy of
10 violence with the support of the JNA is not stopped immediately, the
11 federal government will seriously have to consider the recognition of
12 Slovenia and Croatia within the existing borders. It will also conduct
13 the review on these matters within the European Community.
14 The question is the following: Was more impetus needed, was a
15 greater impetus needed to those who had already proclaimed secession and
16 who had already resorted to weapons in order to carry this through? Was a
17 greater impetus needed in order to violate the cease-fire? Was any
18 greater impetus needed than this message that continued bloodshed will
19 lead to the recognition of those states? Unfortunately, that's what
20 happened. The message did yield the desired effect because the Croatian
21 paramilitary forces gave up on the cease-fire that had already been agreed
22 upon and the conflict escalated.
23 Finally, as Germany was ready to support Slovenia and Croatia in
24 this illegal secession, even at the cost of serious clashes with their
25 partners from the EC and the United States, Lord Owen speaks about this
Page 32183
1 too. You have admitted into evidence this -- his book here. He says: "I
2 remind you Genscher's letter to Perez de Cuellar, written in German,
3 invoked public statements that led to greater tensions in Yugoslavia and
4 invoked the Paris charter. But as Perez de Cuellar reminded him in his
5 reply, Genscher forgot to refer to the EC declaration adopted in Rome on
6 the 8th of November, 1991, which said that the prospects for recognising
7 the independence of those republics that so wished could only be looked
8 into within the overall environment."
9 I end the quote I referred to from Owen's book.
10 So, as I said, the European Community, on the 26th of March, 1991,
11 supported the unity of Yugoslavia but then the European Community, on the
12 8th of November, 1991, also called for a comprehensive solution in yet
13 another declaration that was adopted then.
14 Finally, the German position did prevail, and once Pandora's box
15 was opened, once the illegal secession was recognised, even at the cost of
16 human lives, it was difficult to stop the bloodstained process. Things
17 did not end, in the case of Slovenia and Croatia, irrespective of the
18 bloody consequences. A further step was made.
19 At the end of his book, on page 384, Lord Owen says -- I've been
20 asked to read quotations slower so I'll try to do that. "The mistake made
21 by the European Union regarding the recognition of Croatia could have been
22 redressed had the situation not been complicated by the recognition of
23 Bosnia-Herzegovina irrespective of consequences. The United States of
24 America that opposed the recognition of Croatia in December 1991 became a
25 very active advocate of the independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1992.
Page 32184
1 However, it was not logical and it was not unavoidable to recognise
2 Bosnia-Herzegovina, a Yugoslav republic that consisted of three large
3 constituent peoples with very different positions regarding independence."
4 So one mistake followed the other. One impudence followed the
5 other, and the cost was paid in human lives. And if human lives are the
6 price that had to be paid, then this is turned into a crime, a crime
7 against peace. And it is probably no accident that this illegal
8 institution does not have jurisdiction over that, crimes against peace.
9 Warren Christopher, the US secretary of state, in his interview to
10 US Today, which was also carried by Die Welt on the 18th of June, 1993,
11 Christopher said in this interview: "During the overall process of
12 independence, and especially the premature recognition of independence,
13 grave mistakes were made and particular responsibility in this respect is
14 borne by the Germans. Many experts believe that the problems that we
15 confront today stem from the recognition of Croatia and later on Bosnia."
16 Roland de Mar [phoen], Christopher's French colleague, says in the
17 Deutsche Zeitung, on 21st of June, 1993, when he was criticising the
18 European Community for recognising Slovenia and Croatia, he says in a
19 hasty and precipitous manner, and this speeded up the break-up of
20 Yugoslavia. I quote: "The responsibility of Germany and the Vatican for
21 the escalation of the crisis is enormous, obviously."
22 Another participant in these events, the then Dutch Prime
23 Minister, Ruud Lubbers, said in 1997 that German Chancellor Kohl exerted
24 pressure on the European Community in order to have it change its position
25 that the independence of Croatia could not -- should not be recognised in
Page 32185
1 order not to fan a civil war. I quote: "Van den Broek and I could stand
2 on our heads. The other Europeans could only look around in astonishment.
3 The Germans did what they did, and that was a catastrophe." That is Au
4 Courant, the 21st of December, 1997.
5 When all this support to Slovenian and Croatian secessionists in
6 their efforts to carry out their plan is taken into consideration, then
7 those statements made by Stjepan Mesic should come as no surprise when he
8 spoke about the role of Genscher and Pope John Paul II. But Germany's
9 strong support to the break-up of Yugoslavia and the recognition of the
10 independence of its break-away republics is something that is general
11 knowledge now. However, the question remains in many people's minds what
12 are the motives of this kind of action and this kind of obstinacy and
13 persistence on the part of top leaders in the German state that had just
14 been reunified. This question is answered by one of the world's leading
15 geopolitical experts, General Pierre-Marie Gallois, a person who worked
16 closely with General de Gaulle. And he said in an interview on the 23rd
17 of July, 1993, the following: "The break-up of this country and the
18 linking of Croats and Slovenians to German industry led to the
19 emancipation of those peoples who used to be associated with the Empire in
20 the heart of Europe and then with the Third Reich. On the other hand,
21 that meant punishment of the Serbs, who, in both world wars, stood by the
22 allies. Thirdly, this led to the disappearance of the last remnants of
23 those treaties that punished Germany twice for their defeats."
24 Although many would not be willing to support these views of the
25 old French anti-fascist general, believing that the ambitions of Germany
Page 32186
Page 32187
1 are just a thing of the past and that the catharsis that the German state
2 went through would be a sufficient guarantee to believe the assurances
3 given by German politicians during these events that took place during the
4 reunification of Germany, it is sufficient to look at Klaus Kinkel's
5 article entitled German Foreign Policy in the World in the light of The
6 New World Order published on the 19th of March, 1993, in Frankfurter
7 Allgemeine Zeitung. In this article, the task of the German foreign
8 policy is expressed as follow: "Something has to be carried out now and
9 we failed in doing so twice in the past."
10 It is quite clear what this means. I believe there is no one in
11 the world who does not understand where it was that Germany failed twice
12 vis-a-vis the outside world.
13 So according to the foreign minister of Germany himself, the
14 foreign policy of this country was to use its potentials to achieve what
15 it did not achieve through two world wars, and the question remains
16 whether this will be resolved through new means or old means.
17 On the day of the recognition of Croatia's secession, Kohl himself
18 said in a TV programme, "There is a particularly intensive relationship
19 between Croats and Germans which has a great deal to do with history."
20 This historical vertical line that Kohl pointed to in Germany's foreign
21 policy, the one that was pointed out by Kinkel as well, and finally also
22 what their Croatian cronies did through their own policy is shown by many
23 things that were said during the two world wars and during the war against
24 Yugoslavia, the third war. So there were anti-Yugoslav pressures
25 constantly in all three wars. First there was bloodshed in order to
Page 32188
1 prevent the creation of the Yugoslav state, and later on every effort was
2 made to wipe it out altogether.
3 The red thread through all the rhetoric of the German bloc, that
4 is to say Austria, or rather Austro-Hungary, and Germany in the Balkans is
5 the thesis of a danger of creating some kind of Greater Serbia. This
6 danger, this key thesis took a central place in this false indictment
7 against me; a Greater Serbia. This thesis, this myth, was created by
8 Austro-Hungarian propaganda as far back as the second half of the 19th
9 century. It is an integral part of efforts made by a rotting empire to
10 keep its occupied Southern Slav territories.
11 As for this fear that the Southern Slav people still occupied by
12 the Austro-Hungarian empire and this was this broad wave of emancipation
13 in many European nations who wished to free themselves and also they
14 wished to integrate into one state, as was the case in Germany itself, the
15 fear that this might be carried out although there was a historical
16 legitimacy involved and a natural legitimacy involved as far as the
17 unification of the Southern Slavs was concerned.
18 Yet another German, Ambassador Ralf Hartman, in his book The
19 Honourable Mediators, on page 31 says as follows, and this illustrates the
20 depth of this fear and how far back it goes into the past. I quote:
21 "Already in 1876 when the Serb Prince Milos supported the rebellion of the
22 Christian population of Herzegovina and Bosnia against the Turkish rule
23 and declared war on Istanbul, the Russian Prince Gorchakov, German
24 Chancellor Bismarck, and the Austro-Hungarian Prime Minister Andraszy
25 exerted Habsburg pressure on the so-called memorandum that in case the
Page 32189
1 Serbs won" - this is his quotation - "the powers will not tolerate the
2 creation of a large Slav state. For Germans, Italians, Spaniards,
3 Russians and everybody else this was an understandable right, the right to
4 live in a single state. The Southern Slavs should be deprived of this
5 right forever. It was a heresy, that is what they declared it, and they
6 were not allowed to unite. The name of the heresy was a Greater Serbia.
7 So although the Serbian Kingdom, in spite of all its aspirations, was
8 small and weak compared to the European powers, and also the Serb
9 population never exceeded 10 million, for decades this remained in Vienna
10 and Berlin and this spectre continues to live until the present day."
11 This indictment is the best proof of how correct all of this is,
12 because it is spectres that are referred to here.
13 What is particularly striking is that as far as back as in the
14 Austro-Hungarian propaganda, the freeing of the people from the
15 Austro-Hungarian yoke and the unification of the Southern Slavs, not only
16 the Serbs, was called the expansion of the Serbian state, or a Greater
17 Serbia. And this formulation means that there should be some kind of
18 expansionist tendencies, tendencies of conquest among the Serbs. It is a
19 fact that this would then mean that part of the Southern Slav peoples were
20 under foreign rule. However, that is not true. It is among the Croatian
21 people that the idea of a single state for a Southern Slavs was born. In
22 spite of that, when the Serbs espoused this in order to help their
23 enslaved brothers, their brothers who were enslaved under Austro-Hungary,
24 each remained as an idea of a Greater Serbia.
25 And there are two ideas that were always considered to be
Page 32190
1 identical and they are absolutely not identical, that is to say Yugoslavia
2 on the one hand, the joint state of the Southern Slav peoples, and on the
3 other hand some kind of Greater Serbia which is actually the product of
4 anti-Serb and anti-Yugoslav propaganda. So then and now, somebody's
5 tendency to dominate the territories populated by Southern Slavic peoples
6 and keeping them enslaved had to be kept under the guise of a propaganda
7 smokescreen that it was primarily the Serbs who had such intentions and
8 that they wanted to spread into territories that belonged to others. And
9 this is a sheer lie.
10 I have another quotation. This comes from German archives. The
11 German ambassador conveyed to his government what he talked about with the
12 Count, the foreign minister of Austro-Hungary. I'm quoting from the
13 archives. "The minister said that he considered it his obligation to
14 familiarise the German government with the position of the monarchy, the
15 Southern Slavic issue, and that is to say the unhindered keeping of
16 Southern Slav populated provinces is a vital issue for the monarchy, and
17 Serbian supremacy in the Balkans could not be allowed. If Serbia defeats
18 Bulgaria and extends its boundaries beyond the old Serbia, they would have
19 to intervene." When I asked how this would happen, the minister said that
20 a good psychological moment could be found. A pretext came soon, the
21 well-known assassination in Sarajevo, when Gavralo Princip, a member of
22 the organisation Young Bosnia, assassinated Franz Ferdinand, the
23 Austro-Hungarian archduke and heir. No one says what the truth was and
24 that is that about 20 young men were part of this conspiracy. That was
25 this Young Bosna. Ethnic Serbs and Croats and others alike. Although it
Page 32191
1 was never established that the government of Serbia was involved in the
2 assassination in any way, accusations were immediately levelled against
3 Serbia, the Serb people, the Serb government, and war happened.
4 In this mentioned book, Ambassador Hartman says: "In
5 Austro-Hungary and Germany, a fierce anti-Serb campaign was initiated and
6 the German ambassador in London, Lichnovsky, was charged with notifying
7 Gottlieb von Jagow that the entire Serbian nation as a people of
8 evil-doers and criminals has to be branded." And this is obviously
9 something that challenges the authorship of these accusations.
10 The meaning of this evil above all evils, Greater Serbia, is
11 something that nobody wanted to consider or go into. It has been used
12 here in a very facile manner, very arrogantly. Nobody has investigated
13 its origins. Had they done so, this entire propaganda exercise would have
14 burst like a soap bubble.
15 It is well known that on the 23rd of July, 1914, the Serbian
16 government was given an ultimatum by Austria Hungary after false
17 accusations of Serbia's involvement in this assassination and a number of
18 demands were made on Serbia which no sovereign country in the world could
19 have accepted. The failure to meet this ultimatum was expected, and the
20 only role of this ultimatum was to cause war, to be a pretext for war,
21 just as happened in Rambouillet. The British foreign minister, Sir Edward
22 Grey, described this text, and I quote Grey: "The most astonishing
23 document ever engendered by diplomacy." "The most astonishing document
24 ever engendered by diplomacy." Grey probably never even dreamt that in
25 that same century the Serbian people and the Serbian state would be
Page 32192
1 exposed to a number of similar and even more arrogant and amazing
2 ultimatums and that, together with Germany, Austria, and some other
3 Western countries, and even some Serbian allies from that time such as
4 France and a little later the USA, his own country, Great Britain, would
5 share the authorship of such new ultimatums just as it would share the
6 authorship and participation in the implementation of murderous assaults
7 on the Serbian people in the late 20th century carried out by means of
8 unscrupulous lies, and this will be shown very clearly here before the
9 public. There were merciless economic sanctions as well as bestial
10 attacks against people whose chief sin was that they tried to protect
11 their country and their people and preserve what they had acquired with
12 great difficulty with the help of allies in two world wars.
13 It is hard to imagine the shame Sir Edward Grey would have felt
14 had he known of the role his country would play in completing this crime
15 against the Serbian people at the end of the 20th century, and this is
16 taking place here before this institution with the flagrant violation of
17 international law because the resolution establishing this illegal
18 Tribunal is part of what Sir Edward Grey defined as the most astonishing
19 document ever engendered by diplomacy.
20 It is general knowledge how the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and
21 Slovenes was established, later renamed Yugoslavia, as the common state of
22 the Southern Slav peoples. The German bloc wanted to prevent this and
23 this state was to vanish from the face of the earth. However, the old
24 myth of Greater Serbia remained as a smokescreen to conceal their own
25 crimes and their own evil deeds. It is in this institution that the lie
Page 32193
1 of Greater Serbia found its natural foundation and grew into a monstrous
2 construction of unprecedented magnitude.
3 To make the irony and absurdity even greater and to make the lies
4 and injustice against the Serbian people even worse in contrast to their
5 Balkan neighbours, it is only the Serbian people who, although they had
6 ample opportunity and much greater opportunity than others, tried to
7 create their own extended state, because it is well known that in 1915,
8 the allies of Serbia, in the so-called London Treaty, offered Serbia,
9 after winning the war, an extension of its territory to Bosnia and
10 Herzegovina, parts of Dalmatia, parts of Slavonia, and so on and so forth.
11 There are documents to show all this. But Serbia did not do this. Serbia
12 instead embraced and espoused Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes alike from the
13 former territories of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and this is how the
14 Kingdom of Croats, Serbs and Slovenes was created, later on to be called
15 Yugoslavia.
16 This option taken by the Serbian state to create a common state of
17 Yugoslavia rather than their own state provided protection to our Croatian
18 and Slovenian brothers. We protected them from territorial fragmentation.
19 And also, after they had been part of a defeated state, they became part
20 of the winning camp.
21 However, in the last throes of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the
22 Serbs have been branded with this lie of Greater Serbia, and this is still
23 being maintained. In order to understand the whole matter it is useful to
24 look on the other side of the front, World War I. In 1915, the German
25 theoretician Friederich Naumann published his book Middle Europe, Mittel
Page 32194
1 Europa, in which he set out a project for the reorganisation of Europe.
2 It was then expected that the Germans would win the war, of course. And
3 the reorganisation of Europe would imply the creation of a greater Germany
4 encompassing all of Central Europe surrounded by small and weak states
5 which Naumann in this book calls Trabant states. And --
6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, we are going to take a break at
7 half past.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, I understand it's
9 9.30. I hope you are aware of the fact that the interpreters often tell
10 me to slow down so that I think it would be a good idea for you to
11 consider extending my time and to give me some time tomorrow in addition
12 to today.
13 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, to the extent that you have a
14 written presentation, you might consider making it available to the
15 interpreters.
16 We will adjourn for half an hour.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, I do not have anything
18 in writing. I just have my notes. So I cannot give them my notes. They
19 would not be able to read my handwriting anyway. The documents I have
20 that are printed out would be completely useless to them. That's why I
21 asked you to consider --
22 JUDGE ROBINSON: Very well, Mr. Milosevic. Very well.
23 We will adjourn for half an hour.
24 --- Recess taken at 10.31 a.m.
25 --- On resuming at 11.05 a.m.
Page 32195
1 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, you may continue.
2 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Satellite states --
4 JUDGE ROBINSON: Microphone, please. No translation.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Microphone is not working? Is it
6 working now? Yes.
7 It's all right now. All right. Thank you.
8 I mentioned Friederich Naumann, the German theoretician who, in
9 his book on Central Europe or Middle Europe, explained a greater Germany
10 surrounded by satellite states which would be completely dependent on the
11 great and powerful German state. Naumann never mentioned Serbia, not even
12 as a satellite state because, according to him, "Serbia as a fortress that
13 is in the way in this area has to be wiped off the map."
14 Let me mention that this creator of the greater German project
15 which implies the wiping out of Serbia from the map of Europe, in
16 accordance with the anti-Serbian propaganda waged at that time and the
17 well-known slogan of the time "Serbia must die," "Serbia must termia," for
18 the sake of rhyming, this theorist is considered the ideologue of the
19 Liberal party in Germany, a party which has long served to balance the
20 German political scene and which was in charge of German foreign policy
21 during the time of Genscher and Kinkel. The same Kinkel who in 1993 felt
22 the need to publish the idea of German revision of historical processes
23 and who said that "something has to be done externally that we have twice
24 failed to do."
25 The importance attached by German Liberals, especially the two
Page 32196
Page 32197
1 above-mentioned leaders of German diplomacy, that they attach to the ideas
2 of Naumann is best seen in the fact that the foundation for the Liberal
3 Party is called the Friederich Naumann Stichtung or the Friederich Naumann
4 Foundation, and the same name is borne by the headquarters of this party
5 while its followers are best seen in the crazily destructive efforts of
6 these two towards Yugoslavia who wanted to fragment the Central European
7 and Eastern European territories, and this in fact happened. You have the
8 example of Czechoslovakia, not to mention the USSR, one of the winning
9 powers, the leading powers that won World War II.
10 When Serbia was sentenced to death in this deformed view of the
11 exponents of greater German aspirations, when it was drowned in the
12 Southern Slav state, the propaganda on Greater Serbian aspirations was
13 continued in relation to the newly established state of Yugoslavia. It is
14 well known that in Serbia there were protests against the government
15 decision to forge links with Hitler's alliance, and Churchill then said,
16 "Yugoslavia has found its soul again." This was stated on one of the
17 opposed sides. On the other side, Hitler, on the day Yugoslavia was
18 attacked, stated that "This military coup was directed against the same
19 criminal clique, the same creatures who, through the assassination in
20 Sarajevo, pushed the world into an unprecedented misfortune." This
21 reminds us of what a new theorist stated on the eve of a new bombing of
22 Yugoslavia. Clinton, the then president of the USA, on the night of the
23 24th of March, when explaining to the American public via television the
24 beginning of the air campaign, as he called it, against Yugoslavia, he
25 said, "The Serbs did not cause only World War I. Without them, there
Page 32198
1 would have been no Holocaust." So much for the knowledge of history of
2 these two criminals.
3 The rest is contained in the German archives. The Fuhrer, Hitler,
4 was determined to destroy Yugoslavia through military means and destroy it
5 as a state. To destroy Yugoslavia as a state, this can easily be linked
6 up to the message given in the notorious report by the president of the
7 Presidency until that time of Yugoslavia, Stjepan Mesic, to the Croatian
8 parliament on the 5th of December, 1991. He said, "Thank you for
9 entrusting me with fighting for the interests of Croatia in the segment
10 entrusted to me. I think I have performed my task. Yugoslavia is no
11 more."
12 When speaking of these efforts and this crime which was
13 perpetrated against Yugoslavia and other countries, before the attack on
14 Yugoslavia, in Germany there were directives given as to propaganda.
15 Ambassador Ralf Hartman speaks of well-known traditional lines of German
16 Balkan propaganda as follows: A, it is only the Serbian government that
17 is the opponent of Germany which fanned the flames of struggle against
18 Germany. B -- all right, I'll slow down. I'll read more slowly. I quote
19 further: "As the Serbs implemented a ruthless dictatorship against the
20 other peoples of Yugoslavia, primarily the Croats and the Macedonians, and
21 this is an absurdity, we can clearly tell them that the German Wehrmacht
22 is not entering Yugoslavia as enemies of the Croats and Macedonians. They
23 will in this way be protected against slaughter by the Serbian
24 chauvinists." In the German puppet state of the Independent State of
25 Croatia, this resulted in genocide against the Serbs, Jews and Gypsies.
Page 32199
1 On the territories of this monstrous state a million Serbs were wiped out,
2 over half of them being expelled and then driven to their death amid the
3 most grievous sufferings. This monstrous activity was certainly
4 contributed to by the directive of Joseph Goebbels, which remained alive
5 and topical in German practice, political practice, to toady up to the
6 Croats in order to work against the Serbs, and this is evident in the
7 German relationship to the Balkans in the 20th century, the late 20th
8 century.
9 But this is best illustrated by the next quotation, a statement by
10 the Croatian leader Ante Pavlic, "The independence of Croatia is due to
11 the Fuhrer and to the German Reich. And we can compare this to the song
12 Danke Deutschland, "Thank You, Germany," sung in Croatia in 1991 and 1992
13 and the role of Stjepan Mesic and what he said about the role played by
14 Genscher and Pope John Paul II, in the break-up of Yugoslavia.
15 When we're talking about the second key international participant,
16 according to what Mesic said, the key international participant in the
17 break-up of Yugoslavia, the Holy See, it is also characterised by its
18 historical continuity and its anti-Yugoslav activity as well as the
19 stability of its alliance with those who fought against the establishment
20 of Yugoslavia before and during World War I and who fought throughout its
21 existence against it, in particular during World War II. The deep roots
22 of this policy by the Vatican and the war inciting anti-Serb propaganda of
23 the Vatican are attested to by a quotation from a report by the Austrian
24 envoy to the Holy See sent to Vienna on the 27th of July, 1914, before war
25 was declared against Serbia, report on his conversation with the
Page 32200
1 Cardinal's state secretary Marie Del Vallo [phoen]: "During the last
2 year, His Holiness several times expressed his regret that Austro-Hungary
3 failed to punish its dangerous Danube neighbours. The Pope and the curate
4 see in Serbia a sickness that is eating away at the essence of the
5 monarchy and which will cause it to disappear. The destruction of this
6 bastion for the church -- the destruction of this bastion for the church
7 would constitute a loss of the firmest stronghold in its struggle against
8 orthodoxy and the loss of its major fighters. The cardinal's first
9 secretary expressed the hope that the monarchy will follow this through to
10 the end."
11 So according to the official position of the Vatican, Serbia was
12 to be destroyed in order to strengthen the Austro-Hungarian monarchy as
13 the stronghold of Catholicism in that area and in particular to serve as
14 its basis to expand to the east. This of course has nothing to do with
15 the teachings of Christ and it's more than evident but it is also more
16 than evident how much this has to do with the teachings which two decades
17 later were propagated by Adolf Hitler in his crazed idea that he had a
18 divine mission to achieve -- in his pull towards the east, the Dynastie
19 [phoen]. And this is something that will be embodied later in the axis
20 powers headed by Hitler. In Croatia this was achieved through the close
21 ties of the Catholic church with the Pavlic's Independent State of Croatia
22 whose minister of education, Mile Budak, stated in Gospic, "A part of the
23 Serbs we will destroy, another part we will expel, the others will be
24 converted to Catholicism and turned into Croats. In this way, we will
25 eradicate their traces and what will be left will be just a bad memory of
Page 32201
1 them."
2 Professor Edmund Paris, in his book Genocide in Satellite Croatia
3 1941-1945, Chicago 1961, says that "The biggest genocide during World War
4 II against a majority of a population did not take place in Nazi Germany
5 but in the satellite State of Croatia" which was created by the Nazis.
6 Also Professor Helen Feyne [phoen] in her book Accounting for
7 Genocide, New York, The Free Press, 1979, says that Croatia -- I am
8 quoting: "The Croatian state planned and executed a massacre against the
9 Orthodox Serb minority and that the Catholic clergy approved of this
10 massacre," according to McMillan's Encyclopedia of the Holocaust, pages
11 323 to 328, "In the NDH, Independent State of Croatia, more than half a
12 million Serbs were killed" -- I'm quoting -- "a quarter million were
13 expelled, and another number were forced to convert to Catholicism. The
14 genocide in the Independent State of Croatia against the Serbs is one of
15 the most concealed secrets of the 20th century, just as the rescue of
16 Ustasha criminals has not -- has also been kept a secret by the US and its
17 allies."
18 The United States, Great Britain and some of its allies played an
19 extremely sinister role in the rescue and fleeing abroad of a large number
20 of Ustashas primarily to South America, including the highly ranking ones,
21 amongst them Ante Pavlic who was their leader.
22 The reasons to rescue Ustashas and other Nazis and to transfer
23 them secretly through the Vatican secret channels was in the interest of
24 the Vatican in its struggle against the USSR and against the communist
25 threat in which no methods were discriminated against. The objective was
Page 32202
1 to save criminals, practising Catholics, whose crimes they approved of.
2 This concealment of crimes, making it possible for the criminals to
3 escape, was done because if the role of the Vatican and the Pope Pius were
4 announced publicly in some dominantly Catholic countries in Europe, there
5 could be negative repercussions. Primarily he's thinking about France and
6 Italy. These criminals were later used in order to weaken the communist
7 countries of Europe and to carry out terrorist activities.
8 The attempts of the Vatican to have as close as possible ties with
9 the main victors in World War II, the United States in particular, was a
10 success at the beginning of the '80s when at a meeting between the Pope
11 and Regan it was leaked that they discussed the solutions that were
12 adopted at Dialta [phoen] in 1945. There was also a series of meetings
13 held in the presence of their associates in the course of which firm ties
14 were established which Richard Allen, the White House advisor for
15 security, described as one of the greatest secret alliances of all times.
16 There is a book by Carl Bernstein --
17 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, the Chamber has allowed you some
18 latitude in making your statement. That is consistent with the practice
19 in this Tribunal, but you have to be careful. It is questionable whether
20 a lot of what you are saying is relevant to the case, and certainly it
21 would not be admissible in evidence. But a broad historical sweep is, to
22 a certain extent, permissible in an opening statement, but you must
23 discipline yourself, particularly if you want us to consider favourably
24 your request for additional time. Proceed.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The nature of this secret alliance
Page 32203
1 is written about by Professor Smilja Avramov in her book, although the
2 three theory Catholics, Brzezinski, Casey, and Walters, prepared the
3 ground for alliance, and although President Regan at the most prominent
4 places in the administration appointed Roman Catholics, for example,
5 Aleksandar Hague whose brother was a bishop, it would be wrong to claim
6 that the Roman Catholic faith was a decisive factor in the policy of
7 United States in that period. The administration of the United States did
8 not see an expression of religion in the alliance but the power of the
9 church as an institution which has been placed in the context of real
10 politics. Washington used the Vatican or the Roman Catholic Church in the
11 same way that it will try to do a bit later with Islam.
12 "Through this alliance, the reshaped geopolitical shape of the
13 map, a new aggressive politically -- political planetary bloc was created
14 which will have the most fatal consequences in relation to Yugoslavia."
15 The words of prominent intellectuals about the role of the Holy
16 See were confirmed by Mikhail Gorbachev who said in La Stampa in 1992,
17 "Everything that happened in Eastern Europe over the past few years would
18 not have been possible without the participation of Pope John Paul II."
19 In Eastern Europe over these past few years Yugoslavia was broken up in
20 blood, a state whose creation the Vatican wanted to prevent during World
21 War I and in whose break-up and bloodshed, the vast bloodshed which
22 accompanied this break-up it took part once before supporting Hitler, the
23 Ustasha state and the Ustasha crimes in the course of World War II.
24 The Vatican's policy towards Serbia was shaped as is evident from
25 the quoted letter from 1914 and also dating back to the time before the
Page 32204
1 creation of Yugoslavia. After the Kingdom of Croats, Serbs, and Slovenes
2 was created, this multi-cultural state was considered to be the main
3 barrier in the spread of Vatican -- of Catholicism to the East. That is
4 why the policy of Pope John Paul II and the Catholic church in general at
5 the time of this poke towards Yugoslavia constitute just the final phase
6 in the activities of the Catholic church in the break-up of Yugoslavia.
7 I will skip a series of examples of meetings held from 1991,
8 during 1991 and during 1992 which confirmed this, but I will include this
9 in the text that I'm going to submit because time does not permit me to
10 quote all that I have prepared.
11 Following the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia, followed by the
12 recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Vatican suddenly adopted a
13 peace-making policy. It was proposed in 1994 that the Pope visit Zagreb
14 and Sarajevo. The Vatican diplomacy viewed the expulsion of Serbs from
15 the territory that they lived on for centuries in Croatia in the Storm and
16 Flash operations, and I will remind you that Lord Owen called the Storm
17 Operation "the greatest ethnic cleansing in the territory of the former
18 Yugoslavia." The Vatican dubbed those actions as the recapturing of the
19 terrain, this territory where Serbs lived for centuries.
20 On the 19th of October, 1995, the Pope said about that that in
21 certain situations use of force is not ruled out if this is necessary for
22 the defence of the justified rights of a certain people. In such
23 situations we're talking about a humanitarian intervention in order to
24 protect human lives.
25 No human lives were threatened at that time, nor were there any
Page 32205
1 attacks from the UN protected zones or from Krajina to the areas
2 surrounding them, contrary to the Srebrenica protected zone from where
3 attacks were conducted throughout that whole year and when hundreds of
4 villages were attacked and a lot of Serb population was slaughtered. A
5 retired chaplain - and I'm saying "chaplain" for the interpreters and not
6 "captain" - he stated in Pittsburgh in January in 1999 that the Vatican
7 is to blame for all the troubles that occurred in Yugoslav territory and
8 that he personally saw bank accounts of the Vatican confirming that the
9 Catholic church, together with the German government, destabilised
10 Yugoslavia and caused a decade of bloody events. He claims that the
11 Vatican pumped in millions to separatists in Yugoslavia and that the
12 Catholic church was very active in the events in Croatia and Slovenia.
13 It is well known that the Vatican and the press supported the
14 demonstrations of Albanians in Kosovo and Metohija in 1989, and they did
15 the same -- and this was also done by the Ljubljana and Croatia
16 archbishops. The Pope supported the demands of secessionist Albanians in
17 Kosovo and Metohija in 1994. He was the first one to call for energetic
18 action against Serbia in 1998, and then he turned into a peacekeeper on
19 the 30th of May when he called the ambassador of the NATO member countries
20 and started an initiative to stop the war against Yugoslavia, and he also
21 wrote a letter to Clinton to stop the bombing over the Easter holidays.
22 When we have all these activities of the Vatican in mind which
23 relate to the break-up of Yugoslavia, the message of the 12th of May, 2000
24 sounds frightful when the Pope said, "We cannot and not recognise the
25 betrayal of the gospels committed by our members and the voice of
Page 32206
Page 32207
1 consciousness, and we ask for forgiveness of the sins of the Catholic
2 church." Professor Smilja Avramov, in her book Opus Dei recalls the
3 critical reactions to this statement, underlining the following words of
4 Leo Lyndaker [phoen], a Dutch religious scholar. She quotes him: "The
5 Pope expressed regret for what was done in the past but there are no
6 indications that he is thinking about changing his behaviour at present,
7 in the present."
8 As far as the United States is concerned, it has its own interests
9 in the area of Eastern Europe and the former Yugoslavia. The mutual
10 antagonisms and conflicts, the impoverishment and the inability to
11 function independently in the political, economical or any other plane of
12 the little countries created in the former Yugoslavia are a favourable
13 ground in order to implement the United States' economic, political and in
14 particular military presence in Europe. Especially this last one is very
15 important, because after the fall of the Warsaw Pact, the US military
16 presence in Western Europe has lost any kind of pretext or justification.
17 So it is not surprising that the United States has been active in
18 establishing this sorry situation that is currently in effect in the
19 majority of the Balkan countries.
20 After the break-up of the Eastern Bloc, some kind of Cold War has
21 continued in this context in order to prevent in any way the survival of a
22 society which could serve as an example of a successful alternative to
23 this current simple introduction of the -- or imposition of the capitalist
24 model. Two different problems. In any case, Yugoslavia was not to
25 outlive the Warsaw Treaty, because the Eastern European countries would
Page 32208
1 have an uncomfortable example of independent development and alternative
2 -- and an alternative to unquestioning acceptance of the values of the
3 West, thus posing an obstacle to the new world order as introduced or
4 imposed by the United States as the only remaining superpower in the
5 world, namely the transformation of the world to a corporation society
6 under the leadership of the World Bank and the United States where robbery
7 would be the main motive.
8 It is a well-known thing that the US Congress in March adopted a
9 foreign operation law stopping all assistance to Yugoslavia except for
10 democratic parties, and then neo-Nazis and fundamentalists were included
11 among these democratic parties that were supposed to be assisted. Later
12 on, Albanian terrorists, too, and Albanian separatists all the way along.
13 It is a well-known thing that this privatised MPRI, Military
14 Resources -- Resourcing Incorporated, played with the Croatian army and in
15 the final stages of the Croatian offensive against the Krajina. This also
16 confirms that American action in relation to the Yugoslav crisis had as
17 its aim the maintaining of US presence in Europe, including Kosovo and
18 Macedonia, as well as the influence of the US and NATO throughout Europe.
19 Economic interest as an interest that stands above all others is one that
20 I believe I need not refer to here and now.
21 Such aspirations for domination in this area are the only
22 explanation for some irrational actions at first glance taken by the
23 United States. For example, influencing Alija Izetbegovic to withdraw his
24 signature on the Cutileiro plan. And also what is less known is that the
25 Vance-Owen and Owen-Stoltenberg plans were thwarted in some stages. It is
Page 32209
1 obvious that it was not in the interest of the US to have peace in the
2 Balkans until the military presence of the US and NATO were not ensured
3 and conditions were not created to have a solution found under US
4 patronage. The US insisted in Rambouillet for -- on NATO military
5 presence throughout Yugoslavia, and also this aggression which had as its
6 aim the occupation of Kosovo, the occupation of all of Yugoslavia, and
7 ensuring the lasting presence of NATO throughout the area.
8 The administration of William Clinton got involved in dangerous
9 liaisons with Islamist fundamentalists, and they include the Hezbollah, al
10 Qaeda, the KLA terrorists in Kosovo, et cetera. So it is precisely those
11 individuals and organisations that, after the 11th of September, have
12 considered -- have been considered the greatest threat to the United
13 States and to the world in general. The price that has to be paid for
14 this policy of the Clinton administration is an enormous one and has to be
15 paid, unfortunately, by innocent citizens throughout the world, including
16 American citizens, but others, too, like Spaniards, et cetera.
17 However, if the aspirations and objectives of Germany and the
18 Vatican and the USA in the Yugoslav crisis were more or less evident, what
19 is shocking is the behaviour of the members of the other members of the
20 European Community, later on the European Union, especially under German
21 influence. In spite of the declaration of the European Community about
22 Yugoslavia, and I quote: "A democratic Yugoslavia has the best prospect
23 of fitting into a new Europe appropriately." And this was a quotation.
24 After Slovenia and Croatia were recognised and after an armed
25 conflict broke out, the European parliament, in Strasbourg in 1991,
Page 32210
1 adopted a resolution which did not support unilateral secession of these
2 two Yugoslav republics. Other organs of the European Community also
3 supported the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia. A Euro-American forum
4 at the OSCE Council of Ministers at their meeting in Berlin on the 19th of
5 January, 1991, adopted a declaration and it, inter alia, expressed its
6 support to the territorial integrity and unity of Yugoslavia in line with
7 Helsinki. What was particularly underlined was maintaining the
8 territorial integrity of the country.
9 Had a similar stand prevailed at that point in time in the other
10 -- or actually, it became obvious that this kind of stand was espoused on
11 the other side of the Atlantic too. And Baker, after his visit to
12 Yugoslavia, said that America supports a democratic and united Yugoslavia
13 and that its future should be ensured and he particularly pointed out that
14 the USA would not recognise any one-sided acts of secession.
15 Nevertheless, the European Community, an organisation that came
16 into being as the result of a progressive process in Europe and in the
17 world, opted finally towards the end of 1991 to support a retrograde
18 movement, that is to say secession in Croatia and Slovenia and other
19 secessionist republics, and on the 17th of December, 1991 it adopted a
20 declaration on the criteria for recognising the newly-established states
21 in the Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe and a declaration about
22 Yugoslavia, calling upon all Yugoslav republics to submit requests by the
23 23rd of December including proof that they have met criteria for
24 independence. In this way, the European Community not only trampled on
25 what it said itself on the 26th of March, 1991, in its own declarations
Page 32211
1 but also in another document, an EC declaration in Rome, the 8th of
2 November, 1991, that requests for independence put forth by those
3 republics who so wish can only be looked at in a particular context.
4 The role of Germany is clear in the change of this position of the
5 12. Nevertheless, it comes as a surprise and it is self-defeating that 12
6 states permitted themselves to be coerced into doing something that they
7 in principle did not agree with. And all of this was done under the
8 pressure of one of these 12 states only.
9 This regarding the strength of that state, I have to point out
10 once again Friederich Naumann and what he said at the beginning of the
11 20th century and the creation small obedient statelets, and he called them
12 satellites. Of course, when creating satellites, he did not think of the
13 West. However, the dictat that had to do with the secession of the
14 Yugoslav republics that was imposed upon the European Community members
15 and the fact that they accepted that even though there were separatist
16 tendencies in some of these countries themselves, and this was in contrast
17 to their very own interest, this just shows the fact that many countries,
18 including some former great powers, became German satellites. They
19 stooped that low because of the opportunism of their leaders, and this
20 lead to the NATO aggression against Yugoslavia and they all became
21 satellites of the United States of America.
22 So one cannot bring into question at all the right of Yugoslavia
23 to survive, or can one bring into question the illegal character of its
24 break-up as the basis and reason for the conflict. It is cynical, to say
25 the least, that those who brought the peoples of the former Yugoslavia to
Page 32212
1 mutual wars and a cycle violence and hatred, that they now, pretending to
2 be naive, allow themselves to administer justice, as they call it. Our
3 peoples should never forget who the guiltiest party of all is for the
4 tragedy in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, and that will be shown
5 and proven clearly.
6 In Nuremberg, the first and basic crime was the crime against
7 peace, which in this illegal Tribunal of yours is not the case only
8 because those who had established this unlawful institution would have to
9 take themselves to trial first and foremost.
10 When looking at historical developments, and there are documents
11 and writings about all of this, and the side opposite has the -- all of
12 these documents, the war in Yugoslavia did not -- was not started by Serbs
13 nor did it come from Serbia. It was started by the ultra-rightist
14 separatist movement in Croatia, in Kosovo and Metohija, in
15 Bosnia-Herzegovina, by the Ustashas and neo-Nazis, to put it briefly,
16 Islamic fundamentalists, and Albanian terrorists. It is not hard to
17 prove, and you will see how this will take place that the fratricidal war
18 in the territory of the former Yugoslavia was instigated and supported
19 precisely by those who established this court of yours; Germany, the
20 Vatican, and the United States. The destruction and the break-up of a
21 sovereign state was something they carried out in spite of international
22 and national law. Also, it is not difficult to prove that they resorted
23 to highly undemocratic methods in the break-up of Yugoslavia although they
24 kept claiming that they were very humane. They called themselves the
25 international community, but in the territory of Yugoslavia, Croatia,
Page 32213
1 Bosnia, Kosovo, they supported a totalitarian chauvinist elite terrorist,
2 Islamic fundamentalists, neo-Nazis whose objective was an ethnically pure
3 state, that is to say a state without any Serbs. The methods of cleansing
4 the Serb people that the Croatian ultra-nationalist movement carried out
5 through their paramilitary units in the beginning of 1991 are quite
6 identical to what happened to the same people in the same area 50 years
7 before that.
8 In the early 1990s, it was the Serbs who were killed and expelled
9 from Croatia, and this happened just before Tudjman came into power. It
10 was Serbs who were being killed and expelled from Kosovo and Metohija.
11 This international community, headed by the USA, favoured in
12 Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo Islamic fundamentalism, and Islamic
13 fundamentalists carried out many crimes in the territory of
14 Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo. In addition to everything else, crimes
15 against Serbs are being committed in Kosovo with the full assistance of
16 the NATO-led coalition, fully trampling upon Resolution 1244 of the
17 Security Council which codified the terms of the cease-fire that were
18 offered to Yugoslavia.
19 When Yugoslavia could not be taken and when the war had to be
20 stopped, terms were offered guaranteeing the sovereignty and territorial
21 integrity of Yugoslavia, that the protection force of the United Nations
22 would come to Kosovo to protect the entire population. That was their
23 obligation. And to a certain extent the army and the police of the
24 Yugoslav state and Serbia would have to go back to Kosovo.
25 None of this was actually accomplished. Everything else was
Page 32214
1 accomplished. NATO soldiers came, together with criminals, expelled a
2 large number of people, torched many churches, but I will move on to that
3 later. What I wish to say now is that as far as crimes against the Serb
4 people are concerned over the past ten years, there is an enormous amount
5 of documents, and they were offered to this institution and to many
6 institutions throughout the world. The side opposite did not even glance
7 at these documents. The reason is that the international community, when
8 causing a conflict in our territories decided in advance that the Serbs
9 were to be blamed for everything, and that is why everybody else had to be
10 portrayed as a victim.
11 As to how the war started in the territory of the former
12 Yugoslavia, the authors of the so-called Kosovo indictment against me, in
13 paragraph 79 and 80 presented one of their rare true assertions contained
14 in this otherwise totally false and shameful document. I am quoting their
15 text: "Slovenia on the 25th of June, 1991, proclaimed independence from
16 the SFRY which led to the outbreak of war." That is what it says in their
17 document. "Croatia proclaimed its independence on the 25th of June, 1991,
18 which led to fighting between Croatian military forces on the one hand and
19 the JNA and paramilitary units and the army of the Serb Krajina on the
20 other hand." "Bosnia and Herzegovina proclaimed its independence on the
21 6th of March, 1992, which, after the 6th of April, 1992, led to a war of
22 wide proportions."
23 So even the authors of this false indictment probably did not
24 envisage that they would issue an indictment against me for Croatia and
25 Bosnia later on, said themselves who caused this war. This is indeed a
Page 32215
1 criminal enterprise, and there are protagonists both at home and abroad
2 and they acted in contravention of Yugoslav law and international law.
3 This is a trampling of law. And then there was a forceful secession of
4 Yugoslavia and Slovenia, and they carried out the gravest of all crimes
5 that was dealt with in Nuremberg and Tokyo and that is the crime against
6 peace.
7 As opposed to the authorities of Croatia and Slovenia and the
8 Muslim authorities of Bosnia-Herzegovina that carried out an armed
9 secession and as opposed to their instigators, aiders and abettors from
10 Germany, Austria, the Vatican, the European Community, and later on the
11 USA and NATO, the Serb people and the Serb leadership and I personally
12 made every effort to preserve the Yugoslav community. In this way, we
13 were on the side of the law, whereas the destroyers of Yugoslavia were
14 flagrantly violating national and international law. They were invoking
15 the right to self-determination but this was only a smokescreen, and they
16 were trying to hide their efforts involved in unlawful secession because
17 the Yugoslav peoples and Yugoslav republics did not have the right to
18 one-sided secession according to the constitution of Yugoslavia and
19 according to the constitutions of those republics and in accordance with
20 international law. In particular, they did not have the right to achieve
21 this objective by killing other people and breaking up the state.
22 Article 5 of the constitution of Yugoslavia, which was in force
23 then, was a constitution that was adopted in 1974, and it states: "The
24 territory of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is a unified
25 territory and is composed of the territories of the socialist republics.
Page 32216
Page 32217
1 The borders of the SFRY cannot be changed without the agreement of all the
2 republic and autonomous provinces."
3 It follows from this unambiguously that no single republic or
4 nation within the SFRY, as explicitly stated in the constitution, had the
5 right to secede from the SFRY one-sidedly. This was possible only on the
6 basis of agreement, the agreement of all.
7 Bearing this in mind and bearing in mind the desire expressed in
8 Slovenia and Croatia, and later on in Bosnia and Croatia and Macedonia, to
9 leave the Yugoslav Federation and in an attempt to avoid any kind of
10 conflict, the Serbian side, as confirmed by witness Borislav Jovic, the
11 president of the Presidency of Yugoslavia and later on the member of the
12 Presidency, the Serbian side, beginning in August 1991, tried to convince
13 the representatives of the other republics in the federal bodies to adopt
14 a law which would regulate this appropriately.
15 As Jovic said in his book which was quoted here, they were
16 determined to follow this through even though at the cost of incidents and
17 conflicts.
18 Let me remind you from Tudjman's great speech, which was quoted
19 here when he said there would have been no war had Croatia not wanted it,
20 without such a war, no one would have been able to expel half a million
21 Serbs from territories which they had inhabited for centuries, and who at
22 the time of Croatian secession were not asking for a state but only for
23 autonomy and who, up to that point according to the Croatian constitution,
24 were a constituent people in Croatia because Croatia had been defined as a
25 state of the Croatian people, the Serbian people, and others, and this was
Page 32218
1 later deleted.
2 When bearing in mind the provisions quoted from the constitution,
3 the Yugoslav republics of Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Slovenia
4 declared their independence and their secession in violation of the
5 constitution. In view of the fact that the secession was conducted by
6 armed force, this was illegal, violent, armed secession, and illegal,
7 armed, violent secession leading to tens of thousands of people killed,
8 leading to crimes is a crime under international law, just as aiding and
9 abetting this is a crime, and this was done by others. These were the
10 same ones who are behind this illegal court, and they are trying to gain
11 amnesty for themselves and to shift the blame onto the actual victims.
12 The secession of the former Yugoslav republics and the way it was
13 carried out is not permissible. This situation as regards secession, the
14 secession of the former Yugoslav republics, is confirmed explicitly by
15 Antonio Cassese, the former president of this institution, in a monograph
16 that he wrote dedicated to The Right of Peoples to Self-determination,
17 Cambridge University Press 1995. On pages 269 and 270 he points out that
18 the Yugoslav republics did not have the right to self-determination either
19 under international law or under Yugoslav internal law. Cassese says on
20 the pages I mentioned the following: "As in the case of the 12 Soviet
21 republics, under international law, the six Yugoslav republics did not
22 have the right to external self-determination. This right was not
23 provided for in the Yugoslav constitution. However, unlike the Soviet
24 constitution, the Yugoslav constitution did not provide for the secession
25 of the six republics making up Yugoslavia," and he quotes the constitution
Page 32219
1 of Yugoslavia.
2 Therefore, as this illegal prosecution in a moment of inattention
3 quoted in some paragraphs of the so-called Kosovo indictment, paragraphs
4 79 and 80, as to who caused the war in the former Yugoslavia, the former
5 president of this court, in the same book on page 273, after establishing
6 the illegality of the secession, draws an identical conclusion, identical
7 to the one that the Prosecution inadvertently slipped into these
8 paragraphs. He says: "It is well known that Croatia, Bosnia and
9 Herzegovina, as well as several former Soviet republics, that in these
10 republics it was secession that revived the ancient hatreds and led to
11 bloodshed. That it is generally known, this is correct." Anyone who
12 wishes to and who has a minimum of honesty has to accept this as true.
13 Those who do not have a minimum of honesty can permit themselves to
14 distort generally known facts and transform them into their opposite. But
15 inadvertently from time to time the truth slips out, even from them. It
16 must not be forgotten that to have the truth as one's ally is a guarantee
17 sooner or later of victory. Having the truth opposing you is a certain
18 path to a humiliating defeat. Everything I'm saying is true about the
19 bloody break-up of Yugoslavia, an internationally recognised state, which
20 both under law and according to morality and historical facts, and what is
21 most important, the real interests and well-being of its citizens, had the
22 right to survive.
23 Time does not permit me to set out some indispensable facts and
24 conclusions. I hope you will not oppose, in the case of Kosovo, accepting
25 the seven white books of Yugoslavia which are in evidence, and all the
Page 32220
1 documentation which has been submitted to the regular and legal
2 International Court of Justice in The Hague pertaining to the aggression
3 against Yugoslavia. Later on, I will tender other documents as well.
4 In relation to Kosovo, I wish to say only a few things which, with
5 hindsight, show how correct Yugoslavia's approach was. What happened?
6 What are the consequences?
7 In the first year of the foreign presence in Kosovo and Metohija,
8 from the moment the JNA and the Serbian police withdrew from this Serbian
9 province in June 1999, 5.000 acts of terrorism were perpetrated in Kosovo
10 and Metohija, in one year alone. Several thousand people were killed or
11 abducted. One hundred and fifty churches were destroyed. Had 150 mosques
12 or Catholic churches or synagogues been demolished anywhere in the world,
13 the whole world would be buzzing about it.
14 Under the auspices and protection of the United Nations, all these
15 crimes were committed, trampling on the UN resolution, transforming the
16 security forces of the United Nations into forces of occupation in
17 collaboration with the Albanian terrorists. Over 300.000 inhabitants were
18 expelled under the auspices of the United Nations and in collaboration
19 with them.
20 On the other side, more than 200.000 Albanians, foreign citizens,
21 moved into Kosovo, mostly from Albania and other countries. Persecution
22 of all non-Albanians continued with undiminished fervor and continues to
23 this day.
24 As a result of this criminal hysteria, almost everything that is
25 Serbia and non-Albanian has already been cleansed from Kosovo, and that is
Page 32221
1 the reason for the fall in volume and in scale, because there is less and
2 less that this violence can be directed towards. Even what little is left
3 that is not Albanian in Kosovo and Metohija has been too much for these
4 terrorists, so that the combination of the anti-Serb violence in Kosovo
5 and Metohija occurred on the 17th of March this year, after the most
6 recent efforts by witness Halid Barani, who testified here. He, of
7 course, is not the only criminal who has testified here. Numerous
8 criminals has testified here, but this has been proved.
9 Halid Barani with his new invented story of the alleged Serbian
10 crime against three Albanian boys who drowned in the river allegedly
11 fleeing from their Serbian persecutors gave the signal, the green light
12 for a hysterical mass assault on everything Serbian, for which reason KFOR
13 arrested him as well. And another witness here, Shukri Buja, another
14 criminal and terrorist who confirmed here that he was in command of a UCK
15 unit, a KLA unit in Racak and that he was the first to open fire from a
16 machine-gun on a policeman there, and of course together with his fellow
17 -- fellows.
18 This pogrom of the Serbian people in Kosovo and Metohija is the
19 result of a joint criminal enterprise between this institution and its
20 witnesses whose interest the defence here -- and with whom it collaborates
21 and those who are behind it with the most retrograde movement engendered
22 in Europe in history. Bearing in mind what happened in Croatia and Bosnia
23 and Herzegovina, especially the evident continuity between the separatist
24 and nationalist tendencies and movements and their pro-Nazi and extremist
25 predecessors from World War II, and bearing in mind the irrational fervor
Page 32222
1 and zeal with which this so-called Prosecution tries to justify the acts
2 of those who persist in revising the results of two world wars and to
3 achieve what they did not manage to achieve because they were defeated in
4 those wars, then a very worrying conclusion emerges that the joint
5 criminal enterprise, of which this institution is a participant, is far
6 broader, both by the number of participants and the criminal plan and the
7 time span and the territory involved.
8 Today many in the West are trying to justify the violence
9 perpetrated by the terrorists in Kosovo by saying it is revenge for the
10 long-term terror and repression over the Albanian population in Kosovo and
11 Metohija. This is a lie. Where are these people who were persecuted and
12 imprisoned all those years?
13 These arguments are not only based on false facts but they cannot
14 hold water in the face of historical continuity. The historical
15 continuity of the persecution of the Serbian and Christian population of
16 the territory of Kosovo and Metohija from the times of the Turkish
17 occupation with short breaks until today, although there were really no
18 interruptions to speak of.
19 The ethnic cleansing of the Serbs from Kosovo and Metohija has a
20 long history, and it became especially intensive after the founding of the
21 so-called Albanian League in Prizren in 1878 which drew up the idea of
22 creating a Greater Albania. Konstantin Jiricek, the eminent historian,
23 says of the old Serbia that is Kosovo from 1878 to 1912, 150.000 Serbs
24 were expelled, amounting to a quarter of the Serbian population. In
25 addition to many Russian, French, and other sources, this process is also
Page 32223
1 dealt with in British documents, diplomatic documents, for example, by Sir
2 George Banham to the Marquess of Lansdowne in 1901, where he speaks of the
3 expulsions of Serbs and then about the expulsion of large numbers of
4 Serbian families, but I have no time to quote this right now.
5 The development of the situation in Kosovo and Metohija has shown
6 that nothing has changed in the methods of de-Serbianising the area. On
7 the contrary, the policy of pressure and terror over Serbs and
8 Montenegrins by Albanians has become even worse, and this became
9 especially evident during World War I, especially during the withdrawal of
10 the Serbian troops through Albania in 1915. And there are numerous
11 documents about this. When at the beginning of World War II Italy created
12 the puppet Greater Albania, including the largest part of Kosovo and
13 Metohija, this was an opportunity for new terror over the non-Albanian
14 primarily Serbian population, as evidenced by the statement of Mustafa
15 Kroja, the Prime Minister of June 1941 of the puppet Albanian state, who
16 said: "Maximum efforts have to be invested to expel all the Serbs from
17 Kosovo, to take them to concentration camps in Albania. The immigrants
18 who are Serbs have to be killed." Reminding you of the statement made by
19 the Albanian Prime Minister, a famous historian says that from the
20 beginning of the war, April 1941 to August 1942, killed 10.000 Serbs and
21 expelled hundreds of thousands of people. A similar number of Albanians
22 moved from Albania to Kosovo.
23 Herman Neuebacher, special envoy of the Third Reich to
24 south-eastern Europe wrote in 1943 in the autumn: "The Albanians have
25 hurried to expel as many Serbs as possible from the country. When General
Page 32224
1 Nedic bitterly complained to me, I urgently recommended to the Albanian
2 government to stop the persecution. When I saw that my intervention did
3 not produce any results, I asked to resign from my mission in Albania."
4 And this was written by the -- by a man authorised by the Third Reich, a
5 Nazi, and he was horrified by this.
6 Priest Makarije, on the 3rd of April, 1968 wrote to Serbian
7 Patriarch German because the Yugoslav authorities after World War II
8 concealed the persecution of the Serbs from the public, especially the
9 public outside of Kosovo, he says: "The Albanians are again showing their
10 historic hatred towards the Serbs. We are in a difficult situation, more
11 difficult than during Austria and Turkey. Violence is an everyday
12 occurrence. Thefts in the middle of the day, insults. You probably hear
13 from others what is going on with Serbs from Kosmet."
14 The department for internal affairs in the province in 1966 says:
15 "In high schools, gymnasiums, and teacher training colleges, nationalism
16 is legally being taught to the youth. Enemy activity is growing and there
17 are more and more activities like this. Physical attacks against Serbs
18 and Montenegrins in order to expel them are also happening, and there are
19 publicly hostile speeches being made in public places."
20 Russian Balkans expert Professor Elena Guskova, in her book The
21 History of the Yugoslav Crisis From 1990 to 2000, on page 444, says:
22 "Demonstrations in the province are followed by diversion or acts of
23 sabotage in factories, dispersion of flyers in order to turn the province
24 into an ethnically clear territory. The chauvinists are using all sorts
25 of methods, including the threat of physical exterminations of Serbians
Page 32225
1 and Montenegrins. They have been burning Orthodox monuments, houses,
2 taking others' land by force, and limiting freedom of movement. The
3 consequence of that is the mass departure of Serbian families from this
4 area. From out of 1.451 settled places in 1981, there were no Serbs
5 except in six of them. There are only 216 Serbs left there. During the
6 ten years in this place, there was Albanian terrorism in play which was
7 very hard to suppress. During these ten years less than 10 per cent of
8 Serbs remained in the territory."
9 So the term "ethnic cleansing," "ethnically clean," began to be
10 used for the first time and appeared in relation to these events. And
11 your witness here Slovenian professor of law, of constitutional law, Ivan
12 Kristan, in an article entitled The Constitutional Position of Autonomous
13 Provinces in the SFRY, which was published in 1981, and I note in 1981
14 says, and I'm quoting from this article of his: "The Albanian nationalist
15 concept of an ethnically clean or pure state of Kosovo and the unification
16 of all Albanians into one territory violates all of the objectives
17 achieved after World War II. Instead of equality of peoples and
18 ethnicities, they are encouraging them to check their numbers all the time
19 and they are engendering chauvinism."
20 This is cited by the Slovenian professor here, who testified here,
21 and he said this in 1981. I continue to quote him: "Against other peoples
22 and nationalities, pressures are being exerted and there are chauvinist
23 excesses which go as far as to make the members of certain ethnic groups
24 move out. This has been going on for a while in Kosovo from where a
25 considerable number of Serbs and Montenegrins have moved out, so that
Page 32226
Page 32227
1 according to the census of 1981 in comparison to the one from 1970, there
2 are much fewer members of these two ethnicities than before."
3 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, before you continue, we're going
4 to take a break now for 20 minutes, and we will sit, with the cooperation
5 of the interpreters, until 2.00 p.m. So we are adjourned for 20 minutes.
6 --- Recess taken at 12.20 p.m.
7 --- On resuming at 12.43 p.m.
8 JUDGE ROBINSON: Please continue, Mr. Milosevic.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Judge Robinson, I insist that you
10 allocate some time for me for tomorrow.
11 JUDGE ROBINSON: We will consider that near to the end of today's
12 session.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well. Kristan, and I'm
14 repeating, this is an article by a witness of yours from 1981, who points
15 to a crucial link between the greater Albanian fascist movement from World
16 War II, the so-called Balists, with the separatist Albanian movement of
17 the 1980s, the same movement, the same participant which at the end of the
18 20th century, and especially intensely from 1988 grew into overt terrorism
19 with secessionist motives and by terrorist means and in cooperation with
20 the aggressor troops from 90 NATO countries, finally ethnically cleansed
21 of Serbs and other nationalities this birthplace of Serbian culture. This
22 link and the continuity of greater Albanian fascists from World War II,
23 Kristan says in the cited article the following: "The irridentist
24 aspirations of Albanian nationalists in Kosovo are not recent. They
25 actually appear as an extension of various quisling and fascist
Page 32228
1 organisations. Greater Albanian aspirations and territorial pretensions
2 of Albania are not dead and gone and they date back from World War II,
3 together with their German and Italian Nazis and fascists. We see by the
4 conduct coming from Albania and Kosovo and Metohija the General-Secretary
5 of the Albania Communist Party, Enver Hodza, thus, in a letter to the
6 Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party in 1949 relying on the
7 conflict of Yugoslavia with Stalin at the time wrote, I quote: "The
8 Berlin Congress and the Versailles Peace Treaty unjustly damaged the
9 interests of Albania and the Albanian national minority in Kosovo. They
10 did not agree with this resolution of that question and they do not wish
11 to remain within the borders of Yugoslavia independent of its political
12 order. Their only solution would be to politically join Albania." The
13 mentioned Russian historian Elena Guskova, in her quite voluminous work,
14 says: "The separatist activity of the radically minded section of
15 Albanians in Kosovo and Metohija started immediately after World War II
16 and did not stop for a second."
17 Already in 1956 the security service discovered in the province
18 several groups which a few years earlier were infiltrated to Kosmet from
19 Albania in order to create illegal nationalist organisations. At the end
20 of the '50s and in the early '60s the organisation of the revolutionary
21 movement for the reunification of Albanians was active in Kosmet and it
22 was headed by Adem Demaci."
23 Citing that in the course of the '60s, Albanian terror became much
24 more active, meaning that the Albanian separatists in that period
25 organised "provocations, sabotages, and that they attacked religious
Page 32229
1 facilities," the same author explains that the situation did not calm down
2 even in the '70s despite the fact that in 1974, Kosmet practically was
3 ripped away from the legal system of Serbia, and citing an interview that
4 the number one person of the police, the minister of internal affairs, a
5 Croat, by the way, Franjo Herljevic gave, says that he cited the following
6 fact, and I quote: "From 1974 until 1981, the security organs discovered
7 over 1.000 people who were involved in undermining the system from the
8 positions of Albanian nationalism. Many of them, according to him, are
9 linked to one of the most active organisations of the so-called red front.
10 It's a pro-Albanian organisation active in the territory of the Western
11 countries aimed at -- which is aimed -- directed and channeled by the
12 Albanian Party of Labour. Following the unrests of the Albanian
13 separatists from March 1981, the Albanian separatist movement openly
14 advocates the idea of a Kosovo republic or the secession of Kosovo from
15 Serbia and then from Yugoslavia, and finally this territory joining the
16 territory of Albania."
17 If you look at the demographic structure of Kosovo and Metohija at
18 the end of the 19th century and then at the end of the 20th century, you
19 can see that it had drastically changed, to the detriment of the Serbs.
20 The biggest changes took place specifically during the crimes which
21 occurred during World War II from 1941 to 1945.
22 After the adoption of the constitution in 1974, each political,
23 judicial or executive power in Kosovo was in the hands of the Albanian
24 minority there. In particular from 1966 and then of course following the
25 adoption of the constitution in 1974, the Albanians in this part of Serbia
Page 32230
1 used this power to harass the Serbian majority and to flame inter-ethnic
2 intolerance, which resulted in daily expulsions of Serbs instead of the
3 essential spirit of tolerance and understanding and civilised cultivation
4 of relations with other people. The paradox of this whole situation lies
5 in the fact that the Albanians in Kosovo and Metohija whose leadership
6 claimed that for centuries they were discriminated against actually -- and
7 oppressed, actually achieved such a level of economic prosperity that
8 already in the 1980s you could see a vast difference between the situation
9 in Kosovo and the situation in Albania where they had their own national
10 states, of course in favour of their position in Kosovo and Metohija. The
11 Albanian minority in Serbia, namely in Kosovo and Metohija, went through a
12 rebirth in the scientific, cultural and educational sense, primarily
13 thanks to the educational authorities of Serbia precisely during the
14 period when the Serbian population in the province drastically reduced.
15 Of course there was also the moving out of Serbian intellectuals
16 under pressure from Kosovo. Only in the course of 1981, scores of doctors
17 left the medical centre in Pristina. Scores of professors of university
18 were leaving the faculties in Pristina. On the other hand, the Greater
19 Albanian chauvinist propaganda achieved its peak from 1975 to 1980
20 following the adoption of the 1974 constitution giving a province
21 attributes of statehood.
22 Between Yugoslavia and Serbia, actually between Kosovo and
23 Metohija and the neighbouring Albania, there was practically no border.
24 And this was during the golden era of the rule of Enver Hodza in Tirana.
25 To the extent that the Kosovo Albanians during the time of Tito were given
Page 32231
1 ever growing autonomous rights, their appetites for even greater
2 independence grew as the first step towards secession.
3 The first mass destructive demonstration date from November 1968.
4 It became evident that later, following the period of 1980, they were no
5 longer satisfied with broad autonomy and guaranteed political and human
6 rights as provided for under the constitution of 1980, and this was
7 expressed in the mass rebellion of Albanian separatists in the spring of
8 1981 under the slogan of the creation of Kosovo Republika, Kosovo
9 Republic. And this is also something that was mentioned by your witness
10 Ivan Kristan.
11 The influence of foreign factors who supported and aided the
12 break-up of Yugoslavia was quite considerable. Precisely, these factors
13 of influence came out with quite a malicious claim, and that is that the
14 crisis in Kosovo and Metohija actually occurred in 1989 with the adoption
15 of the amendments to the constitution of Serbia, stating that they
16 abolished the autonomy in Kosovo and limited the human rights of
17 Albanians.
18 This is quite without foundations. The Serbian constitutional
19 amendments in 1989 established a constitutional or unity of the Republic
20 of Serbia which up until then was under the tutelage of its two provinces
21 because Kosovo and Vojvodina, up until the adoption of those amendments,
22 participated in the rule of that republic but the republic did not have
23 any influence over what was going on in the provinces. So the republic,
24 in parts of its own territory, could not implement its constitutional
25 authority, primarily -- one primarily being to care for the benefits of
Page 32232
1 its own people. By the amendments in the Republic of Serbia in 1990, the
2 anomalies were corrected in the position of the Republic of Serbia in
3 relation to its autonomous provinces, and these amendments of 1989 and the
4 constitution of 1990 did in no way infringe on or abolish the human rights
5 of Albanians. They still continued to enjoy free education, press,
6 publishing in their own language. And in everything else, proceedings
7 before judicial organs, they could do that in their own language. And
8 they were more protected than any national minority in any other country.
9 With the secession of Slovenia and Croatia, the Kosovo crisis
10 entered into a new phase. From the forming of the terrorist KLA, the
11 Albanian secessionists began with overt terrorist attacks. That
12 organisation, and this will be shown by documents that will be presented
13 here, armed and trained its members with the assistance of some foreign
14 countries, first of all Germany, the United States, Switzerland, and some
15 other -- some Islamic countries.
16 At the time, lists of names of banks and the numbers of bank
17 accounts where contributions were sent for the KLA were published in
18 Germany and Switzerland. I'm not going to go into this because I don't
19 have enough time.
20 According to reports in the European and the Concrete magazine
21 from March 1999, the latest weapons were delivered to Kosovo via Albania
22 worth several million German marks. According to OSCE members from a
23 checkpoint which was on the border of Albania and Yugoslavia, observers
24 noted there with surprise that members of the KLA actually were wearing
25 German uniforms. In any case, the German intelligence service admitted
Page 32233
1 that it had organised the training of Albanian terrorists in Berlin and
2 other places as well as the transport of Albanian terrorists. There was
3 also help and assistance from Turkey and also from the Albanian drug
4 Mafia. This is something that is known, and we have quite reliable
5 sources about these issues.
6 The main tasks with the arming of these forces were given to the
7 US intelligence service in assistance with the British service, and the
8 Scotsman says that the US intelligence service got in contact with MI5 in
9 order to train the KLA, and then MI5 or MI6 actually passed these tasks on
10 to certain British security companies which then in turn implemented these
11 tasks. Then they also published the lists of weapons and so on, and I
12 have no time to speak about that today.
13 The most frequent targets of the KLA were police stations and
14 military institutions as well as the civilian population initially. Their
15 victims were very often members of their own people just because they were
16 loyal citizens of Serbia. The terrorist activity was increasing from year
17 to year.
18 A vast number of attacks occurred. I will mention only some. In
19 the report for 1998 from January 1st until December 31st, there were 1.129
20 terrorist acts in which 115 members of the Ministry of Internal Affairs
21 were killed, out of which -- well, I don't want to go into division. No,
22 actually 215 were -- 216 were killed, 115 were wounded, and 187 were
23 likely wounded, while a number of them were also hijacked. There were
24 also 755 terrorist attacks and provocations directed at citizens. The
25 figures before referred to police officers. 173 citizens were killed out
Page 32234
1 of whom 46 Serbs and Montenegrins, 77 Albanians, three Gypsies, two
2 Muslims, and 42 unidentified persons. As you can see, in 1998, the KLA
3 killed more Albanians than Serbs.
4 In that year the terrorists abducted 292 citizens, out of which
5 173 Serbs and Montenegrins, 100 Albanians, 14 Roma, one Bulgarian, one
6 Greek, and one Macedonian. They killed 31, 142 are missing, and nine
7 escaped.
8 Then further explanations are given in terms of everything that
9 was used: Mortars, hand-held rocket launchers, explosive devices,
10 anti-tank mines, and so on and so forth. All of this happened at the time
11 when Ibrahim Rugova claimed that the KLA is just a figment of the
12 imagination of the Serb propaganda, that it doesn't really exist.
13 This information is sufficiently clear, and I wonder if any
14 government in the world would remain passive vis-a-vis such terrorist
15 activity. It is only understandable that the police not only had to react
16 to terrorist attacks but it was indispensable for it to take action in
17 order to neutralise and combat terrorist groups in order to re-establish
18 control.
19 Attacks against the army is something that you know of very well,
20 and the entire public does. In a broad spectrum of views of different
21 international political structures, particularly in part of the
22 international public opinion, especially since 1998 there was this
23 misconception that was launched on purpose of the KLA as some kind of
24 liberation movement, which is quite unfounded. So for example, the FAS,
25 which is considered to be a think-tank, published a report in which it
Page 32235
1 says that the terrorist KLA was included among the best-known terrorist
2 countries -- terrorist organisations in the world. In addition to the
3 FAS, the State Department is the only institution in the US that deals
4 with the question of terrorist organisations seriously.
5 John Pike, security head of the FAS, stated that his organisation
6 carried out a detailed analysis studying the entire structure of the KLA,
7 as opposed to the State Department which bases its opinions on opinions
8 only rather than such careful analysis. The tactics of the KLA consist of
9 ambushes, then KLA members are organised in members of three to five --
10 cells of three to five members, which is characteristic of terrorist
11 organisations. The members of the group are visibly obsessed with their
12 idea of secession from Yugoslavia and annexation to Albania, and they
13 carry out orders without any protest. There are a thousand mercenaries in
14 the KLA from Saudi Arabia, Albania, Bosnia and Croatia, and some Western
15 countries that I cannot go into now, and they work there as experts.
16 Also, the camps are listed, the camps on the territory of Albania.
17 The FAS report also states that the open, long-term objective of the KLA
18 is to unite the Albanian populations of Kosovo, Albania, and Macedonia
19 into a Greater Albania. The KLA represented a typical terrorist
20 organisation, with all the accompanying characteristics, and that was the
21 position of all the police forces of the Western countries because they
22 were aware of the links of this organisation to drug dealers and white
23 slave traders.
24 Gelbard, in 1998, on the 23rd of February, stated at a press
25 conference in Belgrade, and I quote: "We are deeply disturbed and we
Page 32236
Page 32237
1 condemn the impermissible activity of terrorist groups in Kosovo
2 especially the KLA. There is no doubt that this is a terrorist group. I
3 do not accept any kind of justification. Having worked on the subject
4 of terrorist activity for years, I know very well how to define a
5 terrorist group, and I base this on facts, not any kind of -- any kind of
6 rhetoric. Their activities speak for themselves."
7 He called upon Albanian leaders to condemn terrorism and to show
8 on which side they were, and nothing came out of this as we all know.
9 Outside the establishment, outside the Clinton administration, the
10 second half of 1998 there was an unequivocal belief that the KLA was a
11 typical terrorist organisation. This is also confirmed by a carefully
12 compiled document prepared by the Senate Committee of the Republican Party
13 in 1999, which says and I quote: "At the time when the NATO bombing
14 started, the partnership between the Clinton administration and the KLA
15 was unequivocal. Such demonstrative acceptance on the part of leading
16 persons from the Clinton administration of an organisation which was
17 branded a terrorist organisation by one of its officials only a year
18 beforehand is shocking, to put it mildly. It is even more important that
19 the new partnership between Clinton and the KLA can conceal the worrisome
20 characteristics of the KLA that Clinton did not take into account."
21 This is an official document of the Senate of the United States of
22 America.
23 The nature and role of the KLA as a terrorist organisation is the
24 subject of documents. And in the transcript of the US Congress from the
25 year 2000 Frank Ciluffo from the programme called Globalised Organised
Page 32238
1 Crime Programme, when testifying before Congress with the representative
2 juridical committee, stated: "What was concealed from the eyes of the
3 public was the fact that the KLA got part of its funds from the sale of
4 narcotics. Albania and Kosovo are in the middle of the Balkan route which
5 links up the crescent of Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Western Europe. The
6 value is about 400 million US dollars per year and about 80 per cent of
7 the heroin intended for Europe goes along that route."
8 All of this was said in a hearing in the US Congress. (redacted)
9 (redacted)
10 (redacted)
11 (redacted)
12 (redacted)
13 (redacted)
14 An analysis of Security Council Resolutions in Kosovo and
15 Metohija --
16 JUDGE ROBINSON: I think the witness is protected.
17 MR. NICE: I'm finding it a little hard to follow exactly what the
18 accused is saying but I think the passage that deals with protected
19 evidence ought probably to be given protection now.
20 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. It will be redacted, and be more careful in
21 the future, Mr. Milosevic.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This is not evidence that has to be
23 protected, it is the witness who has to be protected. I did not mention
24 who the witness was or his name, I'm just reminding you of what the
25 witness testified about over here.
Page 32239
1 Resolutions of the Security Council about Kosovo and Metohija
2 adopted before the NATO aggression against Kosovo show that the Security
3 Council believed that in Kosovo and Metohija there were terrorist attacks
4 that had taken place, and the KLA in these resolutions was clearly defined
5 as a terrorist organisation.
6 Resolution 1160: "Condemnation of all acts of terrorism by the
7 KLA or any other group or individual or any kind of external support to
8 the terrorist activity in Kosovo, including the financing, arming and
9 training thereof..." And we can see who was involved in this training, et
10 cetera.
11 In paragraph 2, the leadership of the Kosovo Albanians is called
12 upon to "condemn all terrorist actions," and it underlines that all
13 elements of the Albanian community in Kosovo should achieve their means
14 and objectives -- their objectives only by peaceful means.
15 In paragraph 8 reference is made to similar matters.
16 This remained a mere promise never fulfilled. Terrorist
17 activities were reinforced, more and more weapons brought in, and the
18 terrorists acted even more intensively with the engagement of the West.
19 Resolution 1199, I quote: "Condemns terrorism as a means of
20 obtaining political objectives of any group or individual and condemns any
21 kind of external support to such activity in Kosovo, including the
22 provision of weapons for terrorist activities in Kosovo."
23 What the Clinton administration did and which led to what happened
24 on the 11th of September is a major thing and nobody can deny that. You
25 can see how many of the suspects who were arrested took part in activities
Page 32240
1 conducted by the KLA in Kosovo. There is ample proof of that in Kosovo
2 and Bosnia-Herzegovina, practically as members of al Qaeda.
3 The Security Council expresses its concern over reports of
4 constant violations of the bans of providing weapons to terrorists, as
5 stated in Resolution 1160, and again in paragraph 6 it insists on the
6 condemnation of all terrorist activities and that all members of the
7 Albanian community should achieve their goals through peaceful means only.
8 In paragraph 11, it is stated that financial resources should not
9 be gathered in the territory of any country.
10 In Resolution 1203, there is a condemnation of terrorism of any
11 group or individual in order to achieve political objectives, including
12 the provision of weapons in Kosovo and the carrying out of terrorist
13 activities in Kosovo and also concern is expressed over continued
14 violations of previous resolutions passed by the Security Council.
15 In paragraph 10, I quote -- all of this has been a
16 quotation: "The Security Council insists that the leadership of the
17 Kosovo Albanians should condemn terrorist activities. However, they had
18 never done so." Terrorist activities of the KLA, that is.
19 So in contrast to these evident facts which pointed to the
20 terrorist character of the KLA and according to Security Council
21 Resolutions, every country had the duty to do their best to suppress such
22 activities. The Clinton administration, under the influence of a strong
23 Albanian lobby and their drug-related money, from 1999 onwards publicly
24 and directly sided with this terrorist organisation and became its
25 protector. Therefore, it is not surprising that after that period it took
Page 32241
1 measures to prevent the break-up of the KLA and to ensure them the status
2 of a party involved in the entire process, and it is in this capacity that
3 they brought them to Rambouillet even.
4 In this public rehabilitation Holbrooke, together with Gelbard,
5 the other US representative, met with a group of terrorists of the KLA and
6 conducted a dialogue with them before TV cameras. Soon afterwards he
7 admitted that Gelbard had previously established contact with them
8 already.
9 During August and September 1998, the police forces practically
10 broke up and neutralised the terrorists of the KLA and their strongholds.
11 Then again representatives of the Clinton administration came to the --
12 came onto the scene and then the Verification Mission came. Later on, it
13 was established that their only objective was to revitalise and re-animate
14 and protect the KLA.
15 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Milosevic, would you hold a minute.
16 [Trial Chamber confers]
17 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Continue, Mr. Milosevic.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The appointment of William Walker as
19 the leader of the Verification Mission was no accident. This was done at
20 the insistence of the CIA whose agent he was. It should be remembered
21 that he was the US Ambassador in Salvador and that he was in charge of
22 special operations in Nicaragua, such as the supplying of arms and the
23 forming of the death squads.
24 The developments of the late 20th century showed that the Clinton
25 administration used the nationalist and separatist movement and similar
Page 32242
1 movements in the world in order to achieve their interests. Therefore,
2 they whole-heartedly supported such movements, usually by way of sponsored
3 terrorism. This was shown on Kosovo and Metohija, and it is also
4 confirmed by the conclusion of the Committee for Foreign Affairs of the US
5 Congress in 1992 which said activate Kosovo and wherever possible get
6 concessions from Belgrade.
7 In an analysis of a commission of the republican Senate, it says
8 that the NATO intervention was planned beforehand by the American
9 administration but it lacked a media event which would, in the eyes of the
10 international community, serve as a political pretext for intervention.
11 There were lies upon lies waiting for a trigger to set events in motion.
12 Official NATO structures were recruited on time and during Clark's mandate
13 they established initial contacts with the KLA. This follows from the
14 background briefing in the American Ministry of Defence on the 15th of
15 July, 1998. These initial contacts were recognised by NATO in mid-1998.
16 They were given covert support from the mid-1990s onward by the CIA and
17 the BND. These secret operations were supported by NATO and were known to
18 NATO, as can be seen by -- in the book Kosovo, The Freedom Fighters, under
19 quotation marks. All of this confirms that the KLA, which was initially
20 treated as a terrorist organisation from mid-1998 due to a decision by the
21 Clinton administration entered into close links with NATO. Preparations
22 for the NATO aggression were conducted in this partnership together and in
23 parallel with the farcical negotiations in Rambouillet.
24 The turning point was the above-mentioned media event which was
25 created pursuant to what happened in Racak, according to the tried and
Page 32243
1 tested scenario from Bosnia in the case of the Markale market. There was
2 allegedly a massacre in the village of Racak, and the experienced chief of
3 the OSCE mission, Walker, called it an unprecedented crime by the Serbian
4 security forces. This was the peak of the preparations carried out in
5 order to create a pretext for the NATO aggression according to a plan
6 developed previously by the Clinton administration. There was an attempt
7 to describe this event in these terms here as well, and I showed you a
8 video where you can see the orange uniforms of the Verification Mission on
9 the hill overlooking Racak when Walker's deputy testified where you can
10 see what really happened there, and you could see the testimony of their
11 commander over there.
12 I have no time to go into it now on this occasion, but I wish to
13 quote what the military commentator Milovan Drecun said in the book The
14 Second Kosovo Battle about the Racak case. He said: "The Racak case will
15 enter many textbooks as a brilliantly executed and pure anti-terrorist
16 action carried out by members of the police but also as one of the most
17 monstrous media deceptions ever seen by the world. We are witnesses to
18 the fact that the events in Racak are daily being manipulated, especially
19 in The Hague where persistently serious falsification is being
20 perpetrated."
21 It is well known that the sponsors of these events did not want it
22 to be published that there was no massacre in Racak but attempts were made
23 throughout to blame the Serbian side.
24 JUDGE ROBINSON: That is the commentator, Mr. Milosevic, the
25 commentator that you just referred to.
Page 32244
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Milovan Drecun, in his book The
2 Second Battle of Kosovo.
3 JUDGE ROBINSON: And he's from where?
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Belgrade.
5 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thanks.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] There are facts that show that after
7 the agreement on the presence of the Verification Mission in October 1998
8 on Kosovo until the end of January 1999, over 500 KLA attacks were
9 perpetrated. And in the same period, using the Verification Mission as a
10 screen, 35 villages inhabited by Serbs and Montenegrins were ethnically
11 cleansed. And on -- in November 1999, 80 terrorist attacks were
12 perpetrated by the KLA on the police and on civilians.
13 As a reward for these and all other crimes they perpetrated,
14 primarily against the Serbs but also against other non-Albanians and also
15 against Albanians, and for their collaboration during the NATO aggression,
16 the KLA was renamed the Kosovo Protection Corps, and the UN gave it
17 legitimacy, making it possible for them to access funds in Western
18 countries through bilateral channels, including direct military aid. It
19 was understood, however, that they had to disarm immediately. This is
20 only one of many details in a sea of abuses that occurred. And Agim Ceku,
21 a notorious terrorist, was put at the head of this protection force.
22 There were many crimes against Serbs in Kosovo and Metohija committed
23 under his orders. Serbs and Albanians were killed because of their
24 loyalty to the state they lived in, Serbia. This same person fought
25 against the Serbs as an officer in the Croatian army in Croatia, and he
Page 32245
1 was especially prominent because of the crimes he committed against the
2 Serbs during Operations Flash and Storm and in the Medak pocket where
3 women, after being raped, were doused with gasoline and set on fire.
4 There is certainly data about this. But he is protected. He is an ally
5 in spite of the fact that he is a notorious murderer and terrorist.
6 You're able to see, for example, in 2003 in November in the
7 Belgrade press, photographs. I have no time to use photographs in my
8 opening statement because my time is too short, but you can see KLA
9 members in uniform holding heads of Serbs in both hands and where you can
10 see a bag full of heads of Serbs who had been beheaded. Everybody can see
11 that the person being photographed holding Serbian heads in his hands is
12 Sadik Cuflaj, and they carried out, they perpetrated crimes in Pec and
13 other places, Zvelan [phoen] and Pec. And this is just a part of
14 everything. Names, dates, information was published, but this was all
15 neglected and ignored. And now this same Cuflaj, with thousands of other
16 terrorists of the former KLA is a member of the Kosovo Protection Corps
17 and he holds a rank in it and he's a corporal. And they have been
18 entrusted by the international community to maintain order in Kosovo where
19 the Serbs are in constant fear of extinction.
20 In Kosovo and Metohija, for example, the USA and the West have
21 shown that they have a double standard when it comes to terrorists. I
22 know I have no time, but please look at this. On the 26th of August,
23 2004, the Washington Post writes about an Australian being tried for war
24 crimes. He was captured in Afghanistan, and in the article published by
25 the Washington Post it says how Hicks went from kangaroo skinner to
Page 32246
Page 32247
1 alleged al Qaeda fighter. How he did that is not clear but the prosecutor
2 says he converted to Islam "[previous translation continues] [in English]
3 ... Kosovo Liberation Army, received training in al Qaeda camp, and took
4 up arms with a terrorist organisation against US forces in Afghanistan."
5 The question arises to illustrate this double standard whether he
6 is a Taliban and al Qaeda war criminal when he's fighting against
7 Americans in Afghanistan or was he also a criminal when he was fighting
8 against Serbs as a member of the KLA.
9 Every day an information such as this one comes to light. This
10 one is only a few days old.
11 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, in view of the extended break that
12 we had to take for technical reasons and the fact that you have had to
13 slow down, and I notice now that you are speeding up, I should tell you
14 that the Chamber has considered your request for an extension and has
15 decided that if you need it, you may have the first session tomorrow
16 morning. Only if you need it.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I certainly need it. I need much
18 more than that, but I will certainly make use. There is no doubt about
19 it, I will make use of it.
20 While American planes were transporting al Qaeda terrorists from
21 Afghanistan to Guantanamo in chains, at the same time the then puppet
22 regime in Belgrade received a demand that they should release from prison
23 all Albanian terrorists without any condition because they were allegedly
24 political criminals, and these were -- political prisoners, and these were
25 in fact murderers, and they were released.
Page 32248
1 I think that the consequences of what the Clinton administration
2 did in support of terrorism are evident, both in the USA and elsewhere.
3 And now they have become the greatest threat to modern humanity.
4 Clinton -- Clinton's administration, throughout its time in
5 office, applied this policy of double standards which has now turned very
6 brutally against the Americans themselves, as can be seen from what
7 happened on September the 11th.
8 From the aggression of the NATO pact on Yugoslavia, five years
9 have elapsed. This is not a great distance in time, but it is enough to
10 draw some conclusions about the consequences of this disgusting act and
11 the consequences on the population and the cultural and other values of
12 the country that came under attack. It is known for a fact, and it shall
13 be established here through documents and witnesses, reliable witnesses,
14 that the aggression was planned for a long time. It was inspired and
15 organised by those who concealed its true causes through a propaganda
16 trick about the alleged humanitarian catastrophe on Kosovo. The powers
17 that be in the NATO pact proclaimed the KLA terrorists to be peaceful
18 civilians, and they accused the military and political forces of the
19 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of alleged crimes against the civilian
20 population while in fact they were legally fighting against terrorists.
21 The question should be put to them if this was the case, what did
22 a thousand soldiers and policemen die of? Were they killed by these
23 peaceful unarmed civilians? How come so many citizens died? Was this
24 caused by these peaceful and unarmed civilians? What are the facts that
25 can be taken as valid?
Page 32249
1 Clark himself, the then Commander-in-Chief of the NATO pact for
2 Europe whom you did not allow me to cross-examine here either about the
3 war or about his book in which he himself denied these charges in a very
4 obvious manner, he says in his book that NATO brought forces to Macedonia,
5 apparently for the pull-out, and everybody knew the extraction forces, and
6 everybody knew that there was no threat to the Macedonians, and they
7 escorted them to the border when they expressed a wish to go. And as
8 General Naumann testified here, they went when the aggression on
9 Yugoslavia became imminent and then they told the Verification Mission to
10 withdraw so as to make the bombing possible.
11 On page 168 of his book, he says the following: "When the army of
12 Yugoslavia, in spite of all the threats of bombings seized the troops" --
13 I will slow down. "The army of Yugoslavia when it seized troops at the
14 border, reacts by strengthening its forces toward that border." Then
15 Clark calls General Ojdanic, that's on page 168 of his book, and asks him
16 why he was bringing in new troops. Ojdanic replied that this was a
17 response to the new NATO troops in Macedonia, and then Clark said, "From
18 the Serbs' position the strengthening of his forces makes sense but it is
19 also a pretext for strengthening the forces again the Albanians.
20 Therefore, when a direct threat causes the strengthening of forces as a
21 consequence, this consequence is transformed into a cause for new
22 escalation."
23 And Madeleine Albright - this is on page 172 of his book - I
24 quote, says that: There is continuous deployment and strengthening of
25 Serbian troops. That's what he reported to Madeleine Albright, but before
Page 32250
1 that he said that it made sense from the Serbs' point of view. Then he
2 transforms a consequence into a cause, and this is what he says in his
3 report on the 6th of March, 1999, 18 days before the bombing, before there
4 were any refugees, he explains the scenario, what would happen after the
5 airstrikes and what the airstrikes would lead to. That's what he says in
6 page 173 of his book.
7 "Albright: If we start with the airstrikes, will the Serbs
8 attack the population? Clark: Almost certainly they will attack the
9 population. This is what they are promising to do. If we begin the
10 airstrikes, will they attack?" And he is talking about the attack not in
11 the past tense but as something that is to be expected as a consequence of
12 the airstrikes. Will the Serbs attack if the airstrikes begin? And he
13 says almost certainly they will. "Albright: What should we do? How can
14 we prevent their attacks on civilians? Clark: We can't. In spite of our
15 best efforts, the Serbs will attack civilians. This will be a race of our
16 airstrikes and the damage we do to them and what they can do on the
17 ground. In the short-term they will win the race. Albright: So what
18 should we do? Clark: We will have to strengthen our powers, our forces.
19 We will have to do more. We can be superior to anything they have, but it
20 will not be pleasant.
21 That's what it says in his book. Of course he doesn't mention the
22 KLA. As it can be seen clearly, the fight with the KLA he calls the
23 fighting with the civilians, but undoubtedly one or the other would be
24 caused by bombing consciously in a planned way. It's expected, and it
25 will be resolved by the bombing of the whole of Yugoslavia over a longer
Page 32251
1 term. Therefore, he himself, the Supreme Commander of NATO for Europe at
2 the time, discards the main thesis that the Serbs are responsible for the
3 persecution of Albanians because, he says, when we attack, then the
4 attacks will continue. He says that Rambouillet is not any kind of
5 unsuccessful negotiating situation but a process planned to produce an
6 ultimatum to be able to move from peace to war. This indicates that the
7 unscrupulous bombing of the towns, villages, the infrastructure and the
8 enormous human casualties are not a mistake but a calculated race, pouring
9 fuel onto the fire from a safe distance in order to burn down whatever can
10 be burned down as soon as possible, and then the fire-fighter would be
11 responsible whose duty it is in all fire conditions to spare human
12 casualties and to give them help.
13 He says that he planned the air operation against Yugoslavia, and
14 he wanted to be able to introduce NATO to Kosovo. I expect when he's
15 issued the summons to come and testify here we will see whether you think
16 that it is worth charging Wesley Clark for the crimes committed in the
17 former Yugoslavia for which you claim that you are responsible for, it's
18 under your jurisdiction. Then we will see.
19 Then we will see evidence that will show that the NATO pact -- or
20 I shouldn't say NATO pact, I should say the Clinton administration rather,
21 because Clark was one of his closest associates, and the rest, of course.
22 The Clinton administration falsified the reasons for their aggression
23 against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
24 The Canadian General Lewis MacKenzie, one of the former commanders
25 of UNPROFOR in Bosnia, in his text of the 6th of April, 2004 in the
Page 32252
1 Canadian daily National Post, says: "NATO decided on the action although
2 no member of the NATO alliance was in danger. It was decided to bomb not
3 only Kosovo but also the infrastructure and the people of Serbia, and this
4 without a resolution of the United Nations." I continue to quote: "We
5 mentioned that the West is placing itself on the side of the extremists,
6 of a militant separatist movement of Albanians from Kosovo, but we were
7 pushed aside as unobjective, and it is without doubt that the Kosovo
8 Liberation Army, which is fighting for the secession of Kosovo, was
9 characterised as a terrorist organisation which was receiving assistance
10 from Osama bin Laden," and we will present documents about this.
11 MacKenzie continues, contrary to what this illegal Prosecution insists on
12 in their unfounded indictment, he says: "All the information served to
13 cover or justify the bombing of Serbia turned out to be serious
14 forgeries."
15 General Lewis MacKenzie is no pro-Serb Canadian, he's only a
16 professional soldier speaking about the campaign to expel from Kosovo all
17 those who are not Albanian so that Kosovo would link up with mother
18 Albania and fulfil the objective of a Greater Albania, MacKenzie says:
19 "The campaign began with an attack on Serb security forces in the early
20 1990s. Milosevic's strong response to these attacks were managed to be
21 used by Albanians to get sympathies from the world for their objectives.
22 Quite contrary to Western claims, the genocide did not happen. Out of an
23 alleged 100.000 buried in mass graves, about 2.000 were found, and these
24 were members of all ethnic groups, including those who were obviously
25 killed in war, while taking part in combat."
Page 32253
1 Let us not even speak about how many of those were killed by the
2 KLA. You have here in prison this Limaj who is charged with the murder of
3 nine Serbs and 13 Albanians. So for the murder of more Albanians than
4 Serbs. Well, he only had nine Serbs in the prison and he had many more
5 Albanians, so he killed all of those nine Serbs and out of the rest of the
6 Albanians, he picked those 13 to kill. We have witnesses who will tell
7 you here, tell you and the international public how many Albanians were
8 killed and in what way by the KLA, and all this of was ascribed to the
9 Serbs.
10 And finally, playing with these numbers with your alleged experts
11 who are doing statistical calculations about the possible number of Serbs
12 is senseless in any kind of procedure which pretends to be a criminal
13 procedure.
14 MacKenzie goes on: "The Albanians from Kosovo played with us just
15 like a maestro plays with a violin. We helped and indirectly supported
16 their forceful campaign for an ethnically cleansed and independent Kosovo.
17 We never blamed them for the violence from the 1990s. We still present
18 them as victims although facts speak to the contrary. Think what kind of
19 a message of encouragement this would be to other terrorist movements in
20 the world who are seeking independence. If the Albanians achieve the
21 independence of Kosovo with the assistance of our taxpayer dollars as well
22 as those coming from bin Laden's al Qaeda."
23 He does not mention many other dollars received by them but we
24 will have the opportunity to discuss those as well.
25 He goes on: "Following the NATO intervention in 1999, Kosovo
Page 32254
1 became the biggest centre for crime in Europe, a white slave trade and
2 also a smuggling route on its way to Europe and North America. There is
3 proof that the largest quantities are coming from -- through Kosovo from
4 another country liberated by the West, Afghanistan. Members of the KLA
5 are personally implicated in these in this organised crime."
6 Admiral Gregory Johnson, the commander of the NATO forces in
7 Kosovo, or the commander of the NATO Southern Force, stated on the
8 occasion of the crimes in March 2004 that the conflicts which followed
9 constituted an action organised in advance, an action of ethnic cleansing
10 organised in advance by Albanians.
11 Damjan Krnjevic, he's an editor of the US magazine National
12 Interest and an associate of the Centre for South-Eastern Studies, in an
13 article published in the Wall Street Journal, under the title
14 Kristallnacht in Kosovo, underlines that Serbs for years warned about the
15 true nature of the Siptar movement and that the West claimed that they
16 were making this up and exaggerating. Krnjevic characterises this
17 anti-Serb activity and the position of the Serb people in Kosmet in the
18 following way: "Murder followed by murder, kidnapping followed by
19 kidnapping, and arson followed by arson, and finally the pogrom, which
20 confirmed the fears of the Serbs that they had been left to the mercy of
21 barbarians," and this under the auspices of the United Nations. This is
22 something that I added that is not his quotation. His quote ends at
23 "barbarians."
24 In this article Kristallnacht in Kosovo, he presents the fact that
25 from June 1999, 3.000 were kidnapped or killed. This is what I already
Page 32255
1 told you, and that "the mission of the United Nations in Kosovo constantly
2 deceived the entire world during the past five years with their alleged
3 successes while they were actually concealing the militarisation taking
4 place there."
5 Just like General MacKenzie, he quotes Derek Chapel, the spokesman
6 of the NATO police, who stated, "Everything is planned in advance." And
7 then he concludes based on that: "The only thing that is lacking or that
8 was lacking was the trigger. Now it is clear that certain Kosovo
9 politicians believe that by expelling Serbs, which they have already
10 achieved from 1999 with two-thirds of the Serbs, they can present the
11 international community with a fait accompli, and they can then take this
12 cleansing to be a sort of foundation for a sort of independence."
13 The Florida Times Union daily, shortly before the March escalation
14 of Albanian terrorism in Kosovo, March of this year, so prior to the
15 escalation in 2004, expressed the demand that Kosovo be returned to Serbia
16 because, I quote: "It is final time that Kosmet be returned to its true
17 owners."
18 Reporters of the Russian agency Novosti informed their readership
19 about the scale of the activities of the Albanian extremists in an article
20 entitled Vandals of the 21st Century. The aggressively minded section of
21 the Albanian population is destroying Christian monuments probably because
22 these monuments are direct evidence of the life and existence of Serbs in
23 that territory from ancient times and because they present authenticate
24 history which cannot be negated or eradicated from the collective memory.
25 The conduct of the protectorate power and the outrages of the Kosmet
Page 32256
25
Page 32257
1 rulers are characterised in the following ways: Every time with new
2 crimes against Serbs the protectorates have expressed condolences to those
3 who have collaborated in these crimes. So is it those who are in power
4 there who have command responsibility there and everything else that is
5 used here in the -- to the most possible degree? And they have four times
6 as much power than we had at the time when it was possible to maintain
7 public law and order to protect the citizens in the entire territory of
8 Kosovo.
9 Russian historian Naro Chichkaya, who is also the deputy president
10 of the Commission for International Relations of the Duma of Russia, in a
11 text entitled Kosovo, The Monstrous Boil on the Body of Europe, which was
12 published in the Belgrade newspaper Srpska Oblada on the 14th of April,
13 2004, says: "The bitter fruit --" that "They are the bitter fruits of the
14 anti-Serbian phobia of the West. The author says that it is still not
15 talked about the fact that not a single crime ascribed to the Serb police
16 and army has not been proven and that The Hague Tribunal has been
17 projected in order to justify the aggression against the sovereign Federal
18 Republic of Yugoslavia and that it has been a complete fiasco."
19 The well known and respectable London Financial Times expresses
20 the dilemma whether Kosovo will ever be safe, answers that first of all
21 depends on, I quote, "whether the West will think and review its policy
22 towards Kosovo from the very beginning."
23 The news from Kosmet indicate that the members of the KFOR are not
24 only allowing the rages of the Albanian terrorists but look on it
25 favourably. So they prevented a Serb from putting out the fire on his own
Page 32258
1 house with the words "Tonight everything Serbs must burn." Members of the
2 German KFOR peacefully looked on as terrorists burned down four churches,
3 demolished the monastery of St. Archangel and also the monument to Emperor
4 Dusan. This is not the first time that they did that. They set fire on a
5 Serbian religious building with people still inside, and they also burned
6 the fresco of philosopher Plato that was inside. A German officer coldly
7 and cynically commented the burning and the destruction of medieval
8 churches of vast cultural and historical importance in Prizren and its
9 environs by saying, "Well, those churches were old anyway."
10 I will skip over the propaganda activities and the statements of
11 various people or figures from the West. I will mention Kinkel who, on
12 the 27th of May, 1992, said that "Serbs should be brought to their knees."
13 Helmut Kohl in 1993, "Let the Serbs drown in their own stench." Blair in
14 1999, "War against Serbia is no longer a military conflict. It's a battle
15 between good and evil, between civilisation and barbarism." Clinton, who
16 said on 23rd, 25th of April in 1999 that "The Serbs were inflicting terror
17 and raping Albanian children."
18 This political psychological and psychopathological, I will say it
19 that way, situation is the conditions under which the NATO aggression
20 against Yugoslavia was conducted.
21 It has already been documented here, already I have shown a large
22 number of photographs about the bombing, but this is also in the
23 voluminous documentation which I will tender as an exhibit along with my
24 opening statement. Apparently it was not enough that so many Serbian
25 facilities were destroyed and so many citizens of Yugoslavia were killed
Page 32259
1 and wounded. That was not enough. So they even fired at the Chinese
2 Embassy and killed some Chinese and destroyed their embassy. Along with
3 using ammunitions with depleted uranium, this has polluted the ground, and
4 this will go on for many thousands of years. It can be said with
5 certainty that the pollution of the environment is not something that
6 occurred not only on the territory of Yugoslavia, but this pollution has
7 occurred on a broader area in Eastern Europe. Depleted uranium ammunition
8 was mostly -- mostly used in Kosovo. That is where there are many sources
9 of rivers which flow throughout Europe, so it was obvious that this was
10 the intent, to poison the rivers which flow into Serbia. Velika Morava,
11 Sava, and the Danube. So this led to an ecological catastrophe by
12 polluting major rivers as well as many spas in an area which is one of the
13 richest of medicinal waters. In the production of food, first of all,
14 which is something that is very expensive in Western Europe and the United
15 States, we're talking about organically grown food, and it's something
16 that Yugoslavia thought it had a future in. So this was jeopardised.
17 There was also a long-term strategic plan for agriculture which was made
18 by Yugoslavia until the year 2020 and where biologically or organically
19 grown food had a specific special place, health food. And with bombing,
20 many impermissible chemicals were introduced, thus jeopardising the
21 long-term production of this health food.
22 According to the findings of experts of the District Court in
23 Belgrade in the indictment against NATO leaders, the cluster bombs which
24 were dropped by NATO dissipated over a large area, and that is why it is
25 not possible to direct their activity only at military targets even though
Page 32260
1 -- even their use against military targets was a crime but they dispersed
2 to a much greater territory.
3 JUDGE ROBINSON: I'm sorry to interrupt you but I think we have to
4 leave it there for the day.
5 We will adjourn now and resume tomorrow morning at 9.00.
6 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.00 p.m.,
7 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 1st day of
8 September, 2004, at 9.00 a.m.
Page 32261
1 Wednesday, 1 September 2004
2 [Defence Opening Statement]
3 [Open session]
4 [The accused entered court]
5 --- Upon commencing at 9.05 a.m.
6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, the concluding part of your
7 opening statement.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, I hope you will bear
9 in mind that we started with a delay.
10 During the NATO aggression, poisons were not used directly, but
11 consequences similar to those of a chemical war were caused all the same
12 in other ways. For example, by bombing plants and warehouses containing
13 chemicals, oil refineries, chemical factories in Pancevo, Novi Sad,
14 Lucani, Baric. So that a chemical war was also waged against Serbia.
15 The powers that be do not like the sovereignty of Serbia and
16 Kosovo, although it is guaranteed by the conditions of the cease-fire and
17 contained in Resolution 1244, which is not being respected at all. Their
18 interest is to use the territory of Kosovo and Metohija for their
19 geostrategic and political goals; to use the mineral wealth, water
20 resources and other resources of Kosovo. We bear in mind that Kosovo
21 contains the biggest lignite mines in Europe. Close to 14 billion tonnes.
22 And there are also mines at Sink [phoen] and lead mines of enormous value
23 there. On Kosovo and Metohija there are also reserves of cobalt, nickel,
24 which are also very valuable. And the electricity plants in Kosovo are
25 very significant for the energy balance of Serbia.
Page 32262
1 All this demonstrates the basest motivation of the so-called
2 fighters for human rights of the Kosovo Albanians from the West. It is
3 evident that the source of the overall crisis in Kosovo and Metohija,
4 which has been going on ever since the Turkish occupation of that area
5 until today, is the wish of Albanian nationalists to create a Greater
6 Albania. They do not conceal this aspiration, and they do not refrain
7 from any means. They don't hesitate to use any means to achieve that
8 goal.
9 This so-called Prosecution is impudent enough to include in their
10 indictment against me and the Serbs that in the middle of the state of
11 Serbia, on the territory which is the very heart of the medieval Serbian
12 state, that there we wanted to create a so-called Greater Serbia. How can
13 Serbia, great or small, be created in Serbia itself is something that they
14 themselves are unable to explain or prove. And this is best demonstrated
15 by the first part of this operation which you call a trial, which like the
16 remainder of that operation, thanks to the nature and contents of this
17 false indictment, has turned into a simple and pure farce. However, the
18 amount of money set aside is not insignificant. It is not a cheap farce.
19 The money set aside by Saudi Arabia, George Soros, and other ostensibly
20 impartial donors, the US and so on.
21 Let me add that in 1998 when Holbrooke visited us in Belgrade, we
22 told him the information we had at our disposal, that in Northern Albania
23 the KLA is being aided by Osama bin Laden, that he was arming, training,
24 and preparing the members of this terrorist organisation in Albania.
25 However, they decided to cooperate with the KLA and indirectly, therefore,
Page 32263
1 with bin Laden, although before that he had bombed the embassies in Kenya
2 and Tanzania although he had already declared war.
3 I am convinced that one day all this will have to come to light,
4 these links, and that soon there will be a time when Clinton, Albright,
5 and others will have to be held responsible if not for what happened to
6 the Serbs then at least for what happened to their own people.
7 I will read a quotation and then I will have to move on to other
8 topics. The airstrikes and the unprecedented strikes, terror, sabotage,
9 murders of leading statesmen, the overwhelming attacks on all enemy lines
10 that will take place at a single point in time, this is the war of the
11 future on an unprecedented scale. I assume this reminds you of what the
12 NATO forces did to Yugoslavia in 1999. The aggression that this side
13 whose duty it would be to pay attention to that refuses to do so, but it
14 is not Clinton or Clark who said this, it is Hitler, although it fully
15 describes what they did. This was published in New York in 1940 by Herman
16 Rausching, My Confidential Conversations with Hitler. And this book goes
17 on to say, "No so-called international law or treaties will prevent me
18 from seizing the opportunity that is presenting itself." And then he goes
19 on to speak about how he will enslave France, how he will enter France as
20 their liberator, and how he will convince the middle class that he has
21 come in order to establish social law and order and a just social order.
22 As regards the war in Slovenia and Croatia, to begin with I will
23 only mention briefly that in Warren Zimmerman's book - he was the last US
24 ambassador to the SFRY - on page 173 he makes the following comment on the
25 position of the JNA and the so-called heroic struggle in Slovenia and
Page 32264
1 Croatia against the still common and legal Yugoslav army. I quote: "The
2 JNA was in its own country. Its troops were legitimately deployed in all
3 the Yugoslav republics. Even so, after the declaration of independence by
4 Slovenia and Croatia, the troops were treated as occupying troops even
5 when they did not leave their barracks. The Slovenian tactics and later
6 on --" Very well, I will slow down. "The Slovenian and then the Croatian
7 tactics, which cannot boast of any particular heroism, was based on
8 avoiding open conflict and attempting to bring the soldiers in the
9 barracks to a state of hunger and forcing them to leave. The JNA, which
10 until yesterday was a protector of the country and today has been treated
11 as the occupier, had a strong effect on the soldiers who were torn between
12 the two sides."
13 Further, Zimmerman, bearing in mind all the circumstances,
14 concludes in his book that it is wrong to speak of an attack by the JNA on
15 Slovenia and later on on Croatia. One of the most active anti-Serb
16 activists, Warren Zimmerman, who was then on the spot, is pointing to a
17 well-known fact that it is wrong to speak of an attack by the JNA on
18 Slovenia and Croatia while you here have been given the task of saying
19 that aggression was perpetrated there by the JNA on its own country.
20 Within Yugoslavia the Croatian separatist tendencies did not fully
21 disappear with the defeat and disappearance of the quisling independent
22 state of Croatia in World War II. These tendencies began to be displayed
23 quite openly in the early '70s with the so-called mass movement in Croatia
24 by a part of the republican leadership when demands were put forward for
25 the independence of Croatia and very strong pressure and threats were
Page 32265
1 directed towards the Serbian people. Although in post-war Yugoslavia,
2 among the most prominent state leaders, the Croats were given especially
3 significant posts, and they dominated in absolute numbers. Even so, in
4 Croatia and in some other places, the thesis was constantly fabricated
5 that there was so-called Serb hegemony there. What the Serb domination or
6 hegemony looked like we shall see.
7 From World War II throughout the existence of Yugoslavia, it is
8 very well known that from the end of World War II until his death in 1980,
9 the undisputable leader was Tito, who was a Croat. During the existence
10 of socialist Yugoslavia from 1945 to 1992, over a period of 47 years at
11 the head of the Yugoslav government, 30 years, were Croats. And during
12 the remaining 17 years, it was all the others. Only one of them was a
13 Serb, from 1963 to 1967, and that was Petar Stambolic.
14 When all this is borne in mind, how can we say that it was the
15 Serbs who dominated in the political leadership of the country? As for
16 the army, your own witness described the composition of the top leadership
17 at the time of the break-up of Yugoslavia. There was one Yugoslav and
18 that was the minister of defence, Veljko Kadijevic, from Croatia, from a
19 mixed marriage between a Serb and a Croat woman; two Serbs, one from
20 Serbia, one from Bosnia; eight Croats; two Slovenians; two Macedonians;
21 and one Muslim.
22 We should add to this that Tito's closest collaborator and the
23 creator of the constitutional system in all its stages was a Slovene,
24 Edvard Kardelja. All this shows quite clearly that the story of some kind
25 of Serbian domination in Yugoslavia is a pure and simple lie as well as
Page 32266
1 the statement that the Croats and Slovenians had cause to complain of
2 inequality and insufficient representation. The story of Serb hegemony
3 was only a propaganda tool which went against the truth and which was used
4 to justify secessionist aspirations.
5 In post-war Yugoslavia, the Ustasha genocide over the Serbs was a
6 topic that was not much talked about. The remaining Serbs on the
7 territory of the former Independent State of Croatia, especially those in
8 the Krajina which the well-known Serbian poet Matija Beckovic described as
9 the remnants of a slaughtered people, tacitly agreed not to talk about the
10 sufferings of their relatives, even not to bury them in a proper way. The
11 mass graves, Jadovnov [phoen], Pribilovci, Golubnjaca were simply covered
12 over with concrete and left to be forgotten, whereas here the thesis has
13 been put forward that the Serbs reburied their dead later on, although
14 these people had never been given a proper burial.
15 Bearing in mind this terrible mass crime from the not so distant
16 past, what could the Serbs in Croatia feel when at in February 1990, at
17 the rally of the HDZ in Zagreb, the president of that party, Tudjman,
18 said, among other things, the Independent State of Croatia was not only a
19 quisling creation and a fascist crime, it was also an expression of the
20 historical aspirations of the Croatian people. What was more natural than
21 for them to respond and to raise their voices before "the Croatian
22 people," in quotation marks, because this was not referring to all Croats
23 but to extremists aided from abroad, before they set out anew to realise
24 their so-called historical aspirations.
25 All this is information that you have and that you are
Page 32267
1 overlooking. This illegal Prosecution was not hindered from speaking in
2 paragraph 94 of its illegal indictment about the HDZ without any
3 qualification, although this was a party which revived the practices and
4 symbols from Ustasha times. While in paragraph 95 of this same false
5 indictment, the pro-Yugoslav Serb Democratic Party is called a nationalist
6 party. This is a manipulation which they permitted themselves in this
7 kind of presentation because they know everything about the chauvinist
8 activities of the HDZ, but they are not allowing a word to be said about
9 it. Everything about the HDZ had to be suppressed, and the SDS had to be
10 blackened.
11 This shows quite clearly that these activities of the Serbian
12 people -- what they fail to say is that the activities of the Serbian
13 people were activities aimed at defence.
14 Warren Zimmerman, in his book The Source of a Catastrophe speaks
15 about how in Tudjman's Croatia, in quotes, "The rights of Serbs were
16 seriously violated. They were dismissed from work, asked to sign
17 statements of loyalty." The irony is greater because here they tried to
18 impute that I requested some type of statement of loyalty. Well, they
19 couldn't find then a single person who had to sign this statement of
20 loyalty to me. This is absurd. Their homes and property were attacked,
21 Zimmerman continues, says that Tudjman's ministers called the Serbs by
22 derogatory names.
23 On page 215 of that book he says that Tudjman played a major role
24 in the violent death of Yugoslavia and the violence in Bosnia and
25 Herzegovina and Croatia. He said that he was said to have a Nazi attitude
Page 32268
1 towards the Serbs due to which Croatia turned into an undemocratic and
2 explosive republic, and these are his words.
3 The anti-Serb path of the new Croatian government is linked to the
4 Nerval Group. Nerval is a place in Canada where the Franciscan monks and
5 Ustashas were situated. These neo-Ustasha groups were assessed by the
6 Canadian government as more extreme than the actual pro-Nazi-Ustasha
7 organisation during Hitler's Independent State of Croatia.
8 In spite of that, the Croatian press is writing about these things
9 but due to a shortage of time I cannot present this to you now. But the
10 gist is in the following: At the time already in 1987, in 1987, as early
11 as that, an approach was made to the future Independent State of Croatia
12 containing this programme containing four main points taken over from
13 information coming from Croatia, from the Croatian magazine Globus.
14 Number one: At any cost Croatia must be an independent state. We must
15 work on having Croatia become ethnically clear and homogenous. In other
16 words, the Serb national community should be reduced to a minimal minority
17 so that they would not be a disruptive factor. The struggling Croatia
18 should be led on one front, and the main opponent are the Serbs. In order
19 to defeat the Serbs, we need to join together with the Communists and the
20 Partisans and in union with them we will win our finer victory. And
21 four: As far as Bosnia and Herzegovina is concerned, such a policy should
22 be conducted which would sooner or later lead to the joining of Western
23 Bosnia to Croatia to have a pure Croatian territory.
24 Martin Spegelj, his defence minister during the time of these
25 events in the Dnevnik on the 28th of October, 2001, said publicly, "If a
Page 32269
1 house of a Serb is burned down, he will not have anywhere to return." He
2 said that Gojko Susak said this. Again in Novi List, Spegelj said on the
3 29th of October 2001 that Tudjman and Susak essentially made a concept of
4 a pure nationalist state after the model of Croatia from World War II.
5 In December, on 8th of December, 1993, the New York Times speaks
6 about 10.000 homes which were blown up with dynamite. I'm not going to
7 quote from that in order not to waste time.
8 In spite of the pressures, harassment, physical attacks and an
9 overall degradation on the individual and collective level, the Serbian
10 people in Croatia were also discriminated against in a legal way. The
11 Christmas Constitution is well known, which deprived the Serbs of all the
12 rights that they enjoyed prior to that. In The Balkan Odyssey, Lord Owen
13 says on page 61 that they resisted joining the settlements populated by
14 Serbs which generally together formed the military border between the
15 Habsburg and the Ottoman Empires, which was defended from Vienna and not
16 from Zagreb. The sense grew after 1945 because this population was
17 exposed to genocide during World War II by the Croatian Ustashas. A very
18 small number of commentators in 1995 realised or recognised that the
19 Croatian government in attacking Krajina did not liberate this land since
20 the Serbs had inhabited it for over three centuries. This is something
21 that is written by Lord Owen.
22 Already in mid-1990, there was a series of actions, attacks, and
23 killings, and because of the Serb reaction by placing barricades to the
24 entrances to their settlements, this revolt was called the log revolution.
25 The Croatian authorities interpreted these reactions of Serbs who were
Page 32270
1 afraid to remain without any means of collective defence in relation to
2 the recurring Ustasha terror and ideology, considered that to be an
3 attack, an aggression against the Croatian state. Well, I don't know how
4 one can make an attack by placing logs in front of the approaches to their
5 houses.
6 Spegelj, who said what I quoted before, said the following:
7 "Knin, we will resolve in such a way that we will massacre them. We will
8 massacre them." This is what we have international recognition for.
9 There are numerous proofs of this, that these are not just empty words but
10 that we are talking about dead people here.
11 In his book The Invasion of Serbian Krajina, Gregory Elich speaks
12 of the following: "In 1990 Tudjman said, 'I'm glad my wife is neither a
13 Serb or a Jew.' [In English] and wrote that accounts of the Holocaust were
14 exaggerated and one-sided."
15 [Interpretation] I will skip over many of his quotes but mention
16 just some of them. "[In English] During its violent secession from
17 Yugoslavia in 1991, Croatia expelled more than 300.000 Serbs, and Serbs
18 were eliminated from ten towns and 183 villages." [Interpretation] There
19 was a mistake. Yes, that's correct; and 183 villages.
20 And then: "[In English] Tomislav Mercep, until recently the
21 advisor to the Interior Minister and a member of parliament, is a
22 death-squad leader. Mercep's death squad murdered 2.500 Serbs in Western
23 Slavonia in 1991 and 1992, actions Mercep defends as 'heroic deeds.'"
24 [Interpretation] You have here the testimony of Miro Bajramovic, a
25 member of that death squad. I have it on tape, but I don't have time to
Page 32271
1 show it to you.
2 Gregory Elich goes on to say: "[In English] Sadly, the Clinton
3 administration's embrace of Croatia follows a history of support for
4 fascists when it suits American geopolitical interests."
5 [Interpretation] Susan Woodward of the Brookings Institution, in
6 the book The Balkan Tragedy 1995, says: "[In English] The Croatian
7 government did little to protect its citizens from vicious outbursts of
8 anti-Serb terrorism saw mixed communities of Dalmatia and interior during
9 the summer months of 1989 when Croat zealots smashed store fronts,
10 fire-bombed homes, and harassed and arrested potential Serbs leader. In
11 many parts of Croatia, Serbs were expelled from jobs because of their
12 nationality. Discrimination was not limited to this early flare-up but
13 increased over the following years."
14 [Interpretation] How long before this log revolution when this was
15 going on in 1989 and that criminal activity that you are ascribing to the
16 Serbs when they were actually just defending themselves?
17 Chris Hedges, in The New York Times on the 16th of June, 1997,
18 says: "[In English] [Previous translation continues]... 500.000 of
19 600.000 ethnic Serbs from the country and carried out de facto annexation
20 of largely Catholic region of Herzegovina," et cetera.
21 [Interpretation] I don't have time. They are talking about the
22 Kristallnacht in Zadar, talking about expulsion of tens of thousands of
23 people from their apartments. They're talking about in the Croat papers
24 in Feral, in the Tjednik, new proof about the -- of the crimes in Vukovar,
25 and I'm quoting them, "when the corpses of dead bodies floated down the
Page 32272
1 Danube, then in Gospic in the Croatian coastal area," and so on.
2 The magazine Identitet, a Croatian magazine, says that the least
3 work was done to shed light on the crimes in Osijek in 1991 and 1992 when
4 several Serb civilians were killed, and they explain how they were taken
5 away and how they were killed.
6 When we're talking about Gospic, three officers of the Croatian
7 army applied to testify here about the crimes. They were not given any
8 protection, so the witness Milan Levar, who was supposed to testify
9 against those who committed the Gospic massacre was liquidated.
10 Erdemovic, who admitted that he had killed 100 people in Srebrenica, whom
11 we arrested, who came here because he asked to be brought here, he asked
12 to be extradited to The Hague, and he was not our citizen so he was
13 extradited at his own request, you provided protection for him although he
14 admitted killing 100 people. He admitted that to our investigative
15 organs, and you released him after four years to -- to live unpunished.
16 But you did not protect these other witnesses, but you did extend
17 protection to him so that he can go back to -- I see that I will have to
18 skip some things. The time flies, unfortunately.
19 On one page 182 of his book, David Owen touches upon the following
20 topic and he says: "Mostly the Serbs who remained there didn't have any
21 freedom at all. Many JNA barracks were surrounded by the Croatian army,
22 which was the reason why the JNA reacted so strongly in places like
23 Vukovar." He says "places like Vukovar," but that is actually the only
24 place where the JNA reacted forcefully. But he does explain why this
25 happened.
Page 32273
1 The explanation is also what is being written in the Croatian
2 press now about how many corpses were floating down the river much
3 earlier, before the events in Vukovar.
4 Vukovar was the only exception and the only place where the JNA
5 responded to being surrounded, to its members being attacked, to civilians
6 being attacked, responded forcefully. So it is without doubt that the war
7 in Croatia was caused and initiated by the Croatian authorities in order
8 to effect a violent and illegal secession, and, as the years that will
9 come would show, to achieve an ethnically clean Croatian state.
10 And arising without doubt from everything is that the Serbs were
11 forced to defend themselves. They had to fight for their survival. So
12 nobody is doubting the existence of individual crimes which were the
13 result of the chaos that had occurred and which this so-called indictment
14 is trying to present as the result of some kind of joint criminal
15 endeavour, although all the facts, the historical, military, and legal
16 facts, speak to the contrary. And they base this on testimonies such as
17 the testimony of Milan Babic, who was in conflict with his very own
18 leadership precisely because of his own extremism and similar witnesses.
19 It is well known that primarily thanks to the efforts of Cyrus
20 Vance but also thanks to the efforts of the Republic of Serbia and my own
21 efforts, the Vance Plan was adopted. The protected zones were created
22 which the Croat army never respected, because it is well known how many
23 attacks there were: Miljevacka, Klatno [phoen], Peruca, Medak pocket,
24 Zemunik, Western Slavonia, Flash, Storm, and so on. How many hundreds of
25 Serbs were killed in each one of those attacks and all that happened.
Page 32274
1 Weapons were under a double lock. The Serbs had handed it over, but they
2 took it back when they were attacked in order to defend their very lives
3 and to prevent a massacre.
4 In view of all the above, Lord Owen in his book says:
5 "The Croatian army equipped itself quickly with planes, heavy
6 artillery. All this came from neighbouring European countries and was
7 bought in the former eastern Germany. When this happened, it was not
8 difficult, as far as the Serbs were concerned, why they resisted
9 demilitarisation and demobilisation. The Serb factor was a consolidating
10 factor, and the Croatian side was a destabilising factor."
11 I am finishing my quote from the Owen book. And he said that the
12 biggest ethnic cleansing in the Yugoslav crisis was the ethnic cleansing
13 in front of which this institution remains unmoved, and that is the
14 expulsion of thousands of Serbs and hundreds killed. When something like
15 this happens to the Serbs, it does not appear to be a crime.
16 I will just say a few words about Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is
17 well known that peace lasted as long as the former Yugoslavia lasted, with
18 a small delay. We had this peace. It was there because the absence of
19 tutors and occupiers finally turned the citizens of this multi-cultural
20 state towards one another.
21 In the changes of the constitution on the 31st of July, 1991, in
22 Article 1, the drafters wrote that Bosnia and Herzegovina is a democratic,
23 sovereign state, an equal community of all of its citizens - Muslims,
24 Serbs, and Croats of members of other nationalities that live there; and
25 that the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina is within the
Page 32275
Page 32276
1 composition of Yugoslavia. This was written in the new constitution.
2 However, even during this peaceful life among the population in this
3 republic, you can still see -- see on the site of the Bosnian organisation
4 Mladi Muslimani, Young Muslims, organised in 1939, find the oath which
5 they created in the second half of 1947 in which they talk about an
6 uncompromising struggle against everything that is not Islamic, that they
7 will sacrifice everything on the path, including their own lives, if this
8 is in the interests of Islam.
9 How can you fight in a multi-ethnic community like Bosnia and
10 Herzegovina and Yugoslavia against everything that is not Islamic? And if
11 we keep in mind that the vast majority of the population there is not
12 Islamic. And it happened that precisely these young Muslims had the way
13 open to them and the means placed in their hands in order to conduct a
14 holy war.
15 The first national political party that was created was the Party
16 of Democratic Action of Izetbegovic. It is characteristic that the
17 founder of the station and Izetbegovic's sponsor, Izet Adil Zulfikarpasic,
18 speaks in his book about Novi Pazar the following:
19 "When we came to Novi Pazar, we were welcomed by a large mass of
20 people. The authorities were quite fair, the police also. Patrol cars
21 made sure that everything passed without any conflict. In the town
22 itself, when we arrived, the police officers withdrew from the streets and
23 we could see only SDA guards everywhere."
24 But then something happened at this rally that surprised me
25 considerably. There was a rally and this rally was conducted in a sort of
Page 32277
1 pro-fascist way. There were hundreds of religious flags on the stadium.
2 And then he continues to speak in his book:
3 "Whenever we went in a large number, then the imams would
4 appear. They were our hosts. They organised everything. Religious
5 officials joined the party. At some point I requested that the flags be
6 removed, but then people appeared in caftans and dzelabija, which nobody
7 actually ever wore in Bosnia before then."
8 I'm going to admit some things. Anyway, Zulfikarpasic left the
9 party because he didn't want any part of that.
10 It is a well-known thing that Izetbegovic, as far back as the
11 spring of 1943, led the Muslim youth of Sarajevo, and in that capacity he
12 was the host of Amin al Huseini, the great mufti from Jerusalem, Hitler's
13 friend who had fled to Germany. And in his book he advocates jihad, a
14 holy war against Christians and Jews. All of this within the Independent
15 State of Croatia of Pavelic. And at Himmler's initiative, and through the
16 mediation of this same Huseini, a Muslim Wafe SS division was established.
17 Not one, as a matter of fact; a Handzar Division, a Kama division, and
18 also a Skenderbeg division consisting of Muslims from Kosovo and Metohija.
19 Unfortunately I have to be very quick and move through this very
20 quickly.
21 Izetbegovic in 1990 again published his Islamic declaration, and I
22 quote from it:
23 "The creation of a single Islamic Community from Morocco to
24 Indonesia. Also the fact that non-Islamic institutions cannot co-exist
25 with Islamic institutions. We do not herald an era of piece. We herald
Page 32278
1 an era of unrest. People who are asleep can be awakened only by blows.
2 First of all, we have to be preachers and only then soldiers. The Islamic
3 movement can and shall take over power as soon as its numbers rise to the
4 extent that it cannot only topple the existing non-Islamic government but
5 build an Islamic government. Members of the Islamic faith should learn,
6 using the example of Pakistan, what should be done and what should not be
7 done. Nowadays, the aspiration for all the Islamic communities and all
8 Islam believers in the world should be brought together. This is all
9 aimed at an Islamic Community from Morocco to Indonesia, from Europe to
10 Africa."
11 So you can imagine how people who were not the Islamic faith felt
12 in Bosnia and Herzegovina in view of these promises that they were
13 supposed to live in some kind of European Pakistan. You can imagine what
14 their reaction could have been.
15 However, as for the allegiance of the -- of Alija Izetbegovic to
16 the Islamic fundamentalist cause, nobody can testify better to that than
17 Islamic fundamentalists themselves. On the 11th of April, 1993, Reuters
18 reports from Dubai that Alija Izetbegovic received an Islamic award in
19 Riyadh in great festivities, and I quote, "for his contribution to jihad,
20 the holy war against non-believers."
21 So this reward confirmed that Alija Izetbegovic persevered along
22 the road that he had opted for when he was a young man, and in accordance
23 with the oath of allegiance he took in 1947, it meant an uncompromising
24 struggle against everything, especially everything non-Islamic. But it
25 was not only the Islamic fundamentalist circles that knew of this kind of
Page 32279
1 nature of the Bosnian-Herzegovnian regime; it is also clearly stated in
2 the republican report in the Senate of the United States of America. This
3 is a document dated the 16th of January, 1997.
4 I'm going to go through it very, very quickly. It refers to three
5 questions.
6 First of all, I am going to omit the rest, how it all went.
7 The last sentence in one is:
8 [In English] "And the departments of state and defence were kept
9 in the dark until after the decision was made."
10 The second point speaks of:
11 [In English] "The military Islamic network, along with the weapons
12 Iranian Revolutionary Guard and Vivac Intelligence Operatives, entered
13 Bosnia in large numbers along with thousands of Mujahedin, holy warriors,
14 from across the Muslim world. Also engaged in the effort were several
15 other Muslim countries, including Brunei, Malaysia, Pakistan, Saudi
16 Arabia, Sudan, and Turkey, and a number of radical Muslim organisations.
17 For example, the role of one Sudan-based humanitarian organisation..."
18 [Interpretation] This is under quotation:
19 [In English] "... one relief agency has been well documented."
20 [Interpretation] Point number 3:
21 [In English] "Islamic character of the Sarajevo regime. This
22 Islamist orientation is illustrated by profiles of important officials,
23 including President Izetbegovic himself. The progressive Islamisation of
24 the Bosnian army, including the creation of native Bosnian Mujahedin
25 units, credible claim that major atrocities against civilians in Sarajevo
Page 32280
1 were staged for propaganda purposes by operatives of the Izetbegovic
2 government in suppression of enemies, both non-Muslim and Muslim."
3 [Interpretation] In this document, it is corroborated that they
4 themselves staged attacks against their own citizens.
5 I'm going to skip over some other things.
6 [In English] The report concluded, page 2:
7 "The Administration's Iranian green light policy gave Iran an
8 unprecedented foothold in Europe and has recklessly endangered American
9 lives and US strategic interests."
10 [Interpretation] Then there is reference to the presence of Divak,
11 also sleeping agents; then the AID, Izetbegovic's intelligence service
12 that you brought here, rather, you brought their members here to testify
13 against me. "[In English] [Previous translation continues]... point of
14 jointly planning terrorist activities."
15 [Interpretation] And then it says: "[In English] Clinton gave a
16 green light that would lead to this degree of Iranian influence."
17 [Interpretation] Then they give explanations as to what this is all about
18 and you will have an opportunity to see this document. "[In English]
19 [Previous translation continues]... Islamic revolution in Europe."
20 [Interpretation] And then there is reference to this phoney
21 humanitarian agency. "[In English] [Previous translation continues]... is
22 believed to be connected with such fixtures of the Islamic terror network
23 of Sheikh Omar Abdel-Rahman, the convicted mastermind behind the 1993
24 World Trade Centre bombing, and Osama bin Laden, a wealthy Saudi immigrant
25 believed to bankroll numerous militant groups."
Page 32281
1 [Interpretation] And then it says: "[In English] [Previous
2 translation continues] "'... into Bosnia was of great assistance in
3 allowing the Iranian to dig in and create good relations with Bosnian
4 government,' a senior CIA officer told Congress in a classified
5 deposition. And it is a thing we will live to regret because when they
6 blow up some Americans, as they no doubt will before this thing is over,
7 it will be in part because Iranians were able to have the time and
8 contacts to establish themselves well in Bosnia."
9 [Interpretation] Later on they blew them up, the Kenyans, the
10 Tanzanians, and also these crimes that were committed in the Balkans, but
11 I don't have time to speak of that now. I really have to move on very
12 quickly because you've been so stingy with time.
13 I just wish to note that the 31st of March, 1991, in
14 Bosnia-Herzegovina today, or rather in this federation, is an official
15 holiday. It is the Day of the Patriotic League, the military formation
16 that was established by the SDA. The 31st of March, 1991.
17 They organised their party along military lines as well a year
18 before the conflict broke out. And in this year, 1991, when conflicts
19 broke out, half of the Serbs were killed then out of the total number of
20 Serb victims. Analyses show, experts have proven, that Serbs were not
21 prepared for the war at all, whereas these people were preparing for
22 themselves for an entire year.
23 Owen says in his book the picture of the Bosnian Muslims of being
24 unarmed is not a true one. Even Alija Izetbegovic himself admitted on
25 television that they were armed through secret channels. And he speaks of
Page 32282
1 millions of bullets and tens of thousands of bombs, grenades, shells,
2 hundreds of thousands of uniforms, and so on and so forth. And according
3 to the statement made by Sefer Halilovic, the Chief of the Main Staff of
4 the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, in an interview he gave to Nasi Dani on
5 the 25th of September, 1992 - 1992, gentlemen - the Patriotic League, when
6 the war started, had 103 municipal staffs and 98.000 fighters. 103
7 municipal staffs. And Bosnia-Herzegovina had a total of 109
8 municipalities altogether. Everything is clear as far as war preparations
9 are concerned. It is clear to all but you.
10 The Serb side had three objectives. That can be seen when the
11 entire political situation is analysed. The first one was to preserve the
12 Yugoslav federation. And then, if it is impossible to obtain that
13 objective, to attain their own right to self-determination like the right
14 enjoyed by other peoples in Yugoslavia. So in case that objective is
15 impossible too, then finding ways and means through negotiations to ensure
16 an equitable position for Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
17 The Serb side advocated the preservation of Yugoslavia, and it was
18 not only the fact that this was in line with domestic and international
19 law but everything else worked in favour of that. Unfortunately, there is
20 no time to discuss all of this now.
21 How justified the requests of the Serb people were, their calls
22 for an equality of rights, that is deeply rooted because the Serb people
23 have lived in the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina for over a millennium.
24 So there are deep roots in history.
25 I have to speed things up.
Page 32283
1 If one looks at the chronology of all events, and we will have the
2 opportunity to deal with this through witnesses, indicates the following:
3 First that what the Serbs did were reactions to what the Muslim side did,
4 that is to say violations of the constitutional rights of the Serbs. And
5 this, what the Serbs did, was only making up for what the other two, the
6 Muslims and the Croats, took away from them. It can be seen that the
7 other side gradually moved away, and finally the Serbs were cornered and
8 agreed to a minimum of their demands. Finally the Dayton Agreement
9 sanctioned their minimal rights, but unfortunately, later on in a fully --
10 this happened only after a great deal of blood was shed unnecessarily.
11 The last chance of preserving peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina before
12 the war was the Cutileiro plan. Everybody signed the plan, and when
13 Zimmerman talked him into it, Izetbegovic withdrew his signature from the
14 plan. I believe that we are going to have ample documents about this that
15 we will present later.
16 All of this shows very clearly that the Serb side was not the one
17 that wanted war. It did its best to prevent a war.
18 After the international recognition and after the break-out of the
19 war, and it is no accident that the two coincided, the JNA started
20 withdrawing from Bosnia-Herzegovina in accordance with the previously
21 signed agreement. That is stated in the report of the Secretary-General
22 of the United Nations, Boutros-Ghali, dated the 30th of May, 1992,
23 addressed to the Security Council, in which it is also stated that the
24 army of Republika Srpska, established on the 15th of May, was not under
25 the control of Belgrade. And it also states that a considerable part of
Page 32284
1 the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina was under the occupation of the
2 official forces of the Republic of Croatia. However, the then president
3 of the Security Council, the Austrian Petar van Felner [phoen], concealed
4 or, rather, withheld part of that report of Boutros-Ghali until sanctions
5 were voted for by the Security Council against Yugoslavia. And it is only
6 Croatia that should have had sanctions imposed on it on the basis of the
7 report, by no means the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
8 These are all the facts that I managed to present over this short
9 period of time. This is only the tip of the iceberg. And now what have
10 you come up with against these undisputable material facts and historical
11 facts?
12 In this false indictment, you mechanically compiled in an
13 unnatural way a series of events - and crimes, no doubt - and you branded
14 it a joint criminal enterprise without a shred of evidence. And you only
15 talk about some kind of plan and intention of the Serbs. However, this
16 so-called Prosecution relies on a unique concept called joint criminal
17 enterprise, and that in itself proves that they cannot establish guilt.
18 There is absence of evidence and of any intent, and that is the only thing
19 that could compel one to resort to such a nebulous construction, joint
20 criminal enterprise. In other words, when there is proof and evidence of
21 something someone did and of intent, then an illegal Prosecution does not
22 have to think up some joint criminal enterprise. Then it uses evidence
23 concerning the actual deeds committed and the intent.
24 When a prosecutor does not have evidence and cannot establish
25 guilt, then they resort to that, and then in this way they dodge the
Page 32285
1 obligation which is called burden of proof, and that is part of any legal
2 judicial system.
3 This was conceived so that without proving guilt innocent people
4 can be charged. And of course that is sheer mutilation of justice,
5 nothing else. What it says there are empty words.
6 You explain in these indictments, in these charges, in these
7 alleged indictments, you speak of crimes that we did not commit. And you
8 explain it by intent that we never had. That is your concept.
9 I don't want to go into the question of Bosnia and Croatia again
10 where Serbia did not have any jurisdiction, but we did assist the Serbs.
11 Of course we did. And we would have been the scum of the earth had we not
12 helped them when their lives were in peril. And our greatest wish was to
13 establish peace and the greatest assistance was that in Serbia over all of
14 those ten years there was no discrimination on ethnic grounds against
15 anyone in any way.
16 When speaking of Kosovo, there is not a single shred of evidence
17 that any crime was committed. Not only on anyone's orders but also with
18 any kind of previous knowledge of the generals in command. And you have
19 indicted four generals. Not a single one of them issued any orders to
20 that effect. Not a single one of them had any knowledge about anything
21 that could have constituted a crime before these crimes actually happened.
22 You have accused the political leadership and the military leadership of
23 Serbia and Yugoslavia, and you have all the evidence showing that whatever
24 happened in Kosovo and Metohija was during the bombing, the day and night
25 bombing, and that the legal authorities brought to justice those who
Page 32286
1 committed crimes.
2 Even your witness here, General Vasiljevic, confirmed the details
3 about a meeting that I had with the top echelons of the military, of the
4 General Staff, and that I personally insisted that all perpetrators should
5 be arrested. And he even quoted me as saying that no one should have it
6 easy and that everyone, including General Ojdanic, who is sitting in this
7 prison, totally innocent, and then further on these four generals who you
8 have indicted, Lazarevic, Pavkovic, Djordjevic, and Lukic, everybody had
9 the same position. And even the leadership, the Supreme Command along the
10 vertical line acted by way of prevention, that is to say forbidding the
11 existence of paramilitary formations.
12 There are written reports and I have tendered them into evidence
13 -- or, rather, I shall tender them into evidence through the testimony of
14 witnesses. There are hundreds of reports of military courts, of military
15 prosecutors' offices regarding the perpetrators of various crimes. The
16 first reports start already at the end of March 1999 and then they move
17 on.
18 What else could the executive government have done and the
19 judiciary in any country as well as the chain of command but to
20 categorically insist on the Prosecution of all perpetrators of crimes and
21 to make sure through the reports it gets that this is being done? This is
22 what we did under the most difficult of circumstances, under conditions of
23 daily bombing. Some trials were completed and the perpetrators convicted
24 even before the bombing ended.
25 In these two years of presentation of evidence, you have not
Page 32287
1 presented a shred of evidence to the contrary. Throughout these two years
2 you have not presented a shred of evidence or a single testimony that
3 might indicate a link between a crime that was committed or a criminal
4 with the troop commanders, the generals you have indicted, or the
5 political leadership of Serbia, or me personally. On the contrary, you
6 have evidence that we did our utmost to prevent crimes, and if crimes were
7 committed - and this is possible even in peacetime let alone during
8 wartime and especially during ethnic conflicts - that they should be
9 prosecuted under the law. In Serbia in the Sabac District Court in 1993,
10 the first of these trials was held, and you have information to that
11 effect.
12 On the other side, you have all the evidence that we were the ones
13 who were the most persistent in achieving peace and who can claim the most
14 credit for achieving peace, that we saved millions of refugees on the
15 principle of non-discrimination, because tens of thousands of Muslim
16 refugees found refuge in Serbia. We freed French pilots and other
17 hostages. You can see what was done to achieve this through materials you
18 yourselves have. And all we could do was insist and beg and exert
19 pressure because we had no other powers. But we succeeded in this.
20 Please look at these interviews, because this is enough for you to
21 understand that all these charges make no sense.
22 On the other side, you can see what evidence you have on the role
23 of the Croatian political leadership in ethnic cleansing and the plan and
24 the achievement of the plan both before and after 1990. You even have
25 stenograms. We received some of these from you, and we were able to see
Page 32288
1 them here, from which you can see the fabrication of excuses for the
2 perpetration of crimes during Operations Flash and Storm. You have
3 evidence of the role of the Clinton administration in all this, and you
4 will receive more evidence. You have written evidence about those who
5 made all these decisions, because in each of the stenograms of the
6 so-called VONS, the Council of Defence and National Security, you can see
7 who was present there.
8 You also have evidence of crimes against the Serbs based on
9 decisions by the Muslim leadership. Kljuc testified here, a former member
10 of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and on the basis of the
11 stenogram I asked him about this because you can see that Izetbegovic knew
12 about the camps where people were illegally detained for years on end, and
13 you will be able to hear more testimony about this. You have everything
14 you need about the Croatian and the Muslim leaderships but not about the
15 leadership of Republika Srpska, the Republika Srpska Krajina, and Serbia.
16 You have evidence from the testimony of your own protected witness
17 who was an important political leader that what Milan Martic said to me
18 was correct, that is that in the Krajina, including in Knin itself, the
19 Croats who remained were being treated as equal citizens and that there is
20 absolutely no discrimination whatsoever.
21 I think that what I'm going to say now deserves more time, but I
22 will be very brief and simply just touch upon it. And this is the matter
23 of witnesses who reached a plea agreement with this so-called Prosecution,
24 and this is, I dare say, an example of the fabrication of false witnesses.
25 I think that this is an unprecedented event. When one of these
Page 32289
1 witnesses, when I asked him how he could have signed that in Srebrenica
2 7.000 Muslims were shot, he explained that his defence sent a letter in
3 which it promised not to challenge numbers. So you could have written
4 down 70.000. You could have written down whatever you wanted.
5 Before the Bosnia case, I put forward information my collaborators
6 succeeded in collecting which throws serious doubt on your constructions
7 about Srebrenica. In the meantime, we have heard the testimony of General
8 Morillon who testified here that Srebrenica was a trap for Mladic who
9 confirmed that in his opinion, and he knew Mladic well, Mladic could never
10 have issued such an order. And this is in accordance with what I believe.
11 I do not believe Mladic could have issued such an order. His honour would
12 never have allowed him to do such a dishonourable thing. But there will
13 be witnesses called to testify about all this.
14 And what I want to say is that I think it's in the interests of
15 both Serbs and Muslims that the truth about Srebrenica should come to
16 light rather than a false myth be created. Your fabrication of false
17 witnesses and the pressures of Paddy Ashdown on the leadership of
18 Republika Srpska, which is synchronised with what you are doing, this will
19 not be sufficient to perpetrate this double crime, this double crime which
20 insults both the dead and the living.
21 Everyone should be interested in establishing the truth about
22 Srebrenica so that those who perpetrated crimes might be punished and
23 those who are innocent might be released and set free of any charges or
24 doubts that they committed such a dishonourable thing.
25 You did not make use of Erdemovic to get information from him.
Page 32290
Page 32291
1 You did not make use of any of the things you could have made use of to
2 establish the truth. I hope, I can only hope that some of the witnesses -
3 I am trying, through my collaborators, because I myself cannot do it, of
4 course - I hope they will throw more light on what happened there.
5 But to go back to this witness or two other witnesses whom you
6 have here who made plea agreements. You then had such protected
7 witnesses, because you had the public testimony of Miroslav Deronjic, and
8 his own mother should not speak to him in view of what he said he did,
9 that he killed a whole village after guaranteeing its security. First, he
10 guaranteed its security and then slaughtered the whole village. You
11 forgave him all of that only so that he would lie against Karadzic. And
12 you have Karadzic's order to the troops in Srebrenica in your hands to the
13 effect that they should look after the civilians and adhere to the Geneva
14 Conventions. This was sent in writing to the troops. And then someone
15 like Deronjic comes along to testify that Karadzic allegedly whispered in
16 his ear that they should all be killed. This does not make sense, and
17 it's not even worth discussing. No normal man could comprehend it,
18 especially when someone signs a document about the shooting of 7.000 men
19 because he's obliged not -- obliged not to challenge any figures.
20 Not to mention other matters that you made use of here. You made
21 use of my speech, you built it into the very foundation of your indictment
22 when you first opened your mouths in 2002, my speech in Gazimestan where I
23 allegedly fanned the flames of Serb nationalism. I am proud of that
24 speech to this day, because it is everything else, but it is certainly not
25 the awakening of some sort of negative atmosphere. On the contrary. But
Page 32292
1 you are not the only ones to participate in this. This has been repeated
2 by many Western politicians. There is almost no newspaper that has not
3 written about it. The lie has been repeated innumerable times, but not in
4 '89. To put it correctly, then, it's only ten years later that this
5 happened. I have no time to dwell on this, but I will take it as an
6 example of the way manipulations and lies are perpetrated.
7 Robin Cook, on the 28th of June, 1999, ten years later, says:
8 [In English] ... not to give a message of hope and reform.
9 Instead, he threatened force to deal with Yugoslavia's internal political
10 difficulties, doing so thereby launched his personal agenda of power and
11 ethnic hatred under the cloak of nationalism."
12 [Interpretation] I have here any number of quotations dating from
13 1999, 2000, 2001. Look at The Independent, the 1st of July, 2001:
14 "[In English] ... without his agenda, more than a million Serbs;
15 at the battle of Kosovo, 600, anniversary celebration, as he openly
16 threatens force to hold the six-republic federation together."
17 [Interpretation] You have quotations here from Time magazine, even
18 from The Economist. They are all quoting lies. I have now quoted from
19 The Independent, the 1st of July, 2001. Now I will quote The
20 Independent from the 29th of June, 1989. The same newspaper, it says:
21 "[In English] The President made not one aggressive reference to
22 Albanian counter-revolutionaries ..."
23 [Interpretation] Counter-revolution is a definition put forward by
24 the party leadership in 1981.
25 "[In English] ... of mutual tolerance, building a rich and
Page 32293
1 democratic society and ending the discord which he said led to Serbia's
2 defeat here by the Turks six centuries ago."
3 [Interpretation] And then The Independent quotes my words when
4 they report it:
5 "'[In English] There is no more appropriate place than this field
6 of Kosovo to say that accord and harmony in Serbia are vital to the
7 prosperity of the Serbs and of all other citizens living in Serbia
8 regardless of their nationality or religion,' he said. 'Mutual tolerance
9 and cooperation were also sine qua non for Yugoslavia.'"
10 [Interpretation] And then they quote me:
11 "[In English] Relations on the basis of equality among Yugoslav
12 peoples are a precondition for its existence for overcoming the crisis."
13 [Interpretation] Therefore, when they received orders that they
14 should lie, they did not even read their own newspapers from the time they
15 first reported. But I have no time to dwell on this now.
16 And the quotations you can find not all that easily, but you have
17 the Lexis Nexis programme on the BBC. You can find my original speech
18 which the BBC translated, and you can find it there even today, where it
19 says, for example, this is taken from the BBC:
20 "[In English] [Previous translation continues] ... only Serbs
21 living in it. Today, more than in the past, members of other peoples and
22 nationalities also live in it. This is not a disadvantage for Serbia. I
23 am truly convinced that this is an advantage. Citizens of different
24 nationalities, religions and race have been living together more and more
25 frequently and more and more successfully. Therefore, all people in
Page 32294
1 Serbia who live from their own work, honestly, respecting other people and
2 other nations, are in their own republic."
3 [Interpretation] There is no point in taking up my time, using up
4 my time on this. I just wanted to illustrate the scale to which the
5 abuses go, in particular the abuses in a procedure which pretends or
6 aspires to be a legal procedure, because intellectuals, authors, literary
7 critics, publicists, scientists believe it is immoral to take out of
8 context a few sentences. But you did not only take out of context pieces
9 -- sentences, but you took out of context parts of sentences in order to
10 create your constructs. But we will have time later. In any case, this
11 is -- it seems to me it is not something that is difficult to establish.
12 I am not citing that here for any other reason but to show in
13 which way lies are being put forward unscrupulously. You can look at this
14 policy, and I'm talking about national equality as the only principle on
15 which one can proceed further, and it has continuity over ten years. We
16 have the transcript of a party conference in 1998 here, and it's a
17 transcript where we have all the members sitting together from the ruling
18 party, which, amongst other things, the meeting discussed Kosovo. This
19 was not discussed for the newspaper, this was a discussion with the
20 political leadership, including all the ministers, members of government,
21 members of the parliament from the ruling party.
22 I would just like to read only a brief part, my conclusion. And I
23 say, as far as Kosovo is concerned, I'm saying who submitted the
24 introductory remarks, what the majority was, and then I say:
25 "Our policy to resolve the problem of Kosovo is to do it by
Page 32295
1 political means," so we're talking about 1998 now, the 10th of June, 1998.
2 "Our policy is to resolve the problem of Kosovo by political
3 means. We are approaching that settlement in view of our conviction and
4 our programme which implies the principle of national equality. We do not
5 want to damage or inflict damage on the Albanians, and we do not want
6 Albanians in Kosovo to be citizens of second class."
7 And then I speak about how many think that perhaps the majority of
8 Albanians are in favour, and I say:
9 "It is not true that all of them are for it. Perhaps the majority
10 is depending on the pressure exerted on them, what was explained to them,
11 how this explanation was given about their future perspectives and
12 everything else. We must discuss this and we must take this approach. We
13 must have a political resolution on the principles of national equality.
14 We must keep in mind that those who were manipulated in this way, these
15 are unhappy people who are manipulated with just like any poor people in
16 the world are, by the powerful, by the manipulators throughout the world
17 whose objective is to destabilise South-Eastern Europe where they
18 constantly need to have an alibi in order to keep the military forces of
19 the great powers there."
20 And then at the end I say Dialogue: "The dialogue which was
21 started is not reserved for the state committee and representatives of
22 Albanian political parties," and then I mention them, all those from the
23 state commission, I mention them individually. "The dialogue is not
24 reserved only for them and it is not only the Serb-Albanian dialogue but
25 it is the Serb-Albanian-Roma-Muslim-Bulgarian dialogue. This dialogue
Page 32296
1 should be present at all levels; in the municipality, in the local
2 commune, in the formal and informal sense, a formal and informal dialogue,
3 because people need to be mobilised to live."
4 So ten years of continuity in my commitment for a policy of
5 national equality which preserved half of the former Yugoslavia from
6 entering into any conflict or war throughout those ten years.
7 I'm speaking about how much this -- this whole thing has been
8 turned upside down. And that is why I said that this indictment
9 represents a sum of unscrupulous manipulations, lies, crippling of the law
10 and an unjust presentation of the history.
11 The individual acts of generals, officials, my own, by way of
12 command responsibility through which you could convict any innocent person
13 because they held a certain post, and now you're trying to bring these
14 generals here. These individual acts I cannot discuss because of a lack
15 of time, and first of all, they've already been challenged in the
16 testimony of your own witnesses and much more, in the biographies and
17 memoirs of participants, and also in scientific studies which were written
18 based on Western sources, documents, and so on. We will leave it up to
19 the witnesses to have the final word when they appear before you here.
20 I would just like to point out a paradoxical situation in which
21 you have brought yourself into by bowing down to the daily merciless
22 policy of the Clinton administration. Reality was falsified in the name
23 of a pragmatic political programme. All three indictments were issued
24 after 19 NATO countries carried out an open aggression against the
25 remaining part of Yugoslavia, Serbia and Montenegro, with banned weapons
Page 32297
1 implementing new forms of tyranny through high technology. Is there any
2 greater cynicism? The indictment for Croatia cites ethnic cleansing of
3 Croats, and this was conceived before the 1st of August, 1991, and lasted
4 until 1992. I must say that one has to be extremely arrogant to place
5 such a lie on paper. As is well known, this was a period of mass crimes
6 against Serbs, and the first major exodus of Serbs from Croatia. A
7 hundred and fifty thousand of them, precisely in this time period.
8 The Kosovo indictment was issued, and I am quoting, "because of
9 the expulsion of a substantial number of Albanian citizens from Kosovo."
10 Well, you saw what it says in Clark's book, but you will see many other
11 also more interesting things. You cannot cite one single village from
12 which someone was expelled while Kosovo was under the control of the Serb
13 state organs. And it's a fact that I'm not following --
14 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, bring your statement to an end in
15 three minutes.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes. I will do my best. If not in
17 three then four, but it will not be longer than that. I've had to skip
18 over a lot.
19 You're not even monitoring official statements by US and NATO
20 representatives who openly state today they needed these games around
21 Kosovo so that NATO could extend its activities beyond its borders. The
22 indictment against Bosnia and Herzegovina was issued for genocide.
23 Please, genocide against Croats and Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which
24 is also highly insolent when we know that the Belgrade precisely --
25 Belgrade was the political centre in these evil times. The only centre in
Page 32298
1 Yugoslavia during the Yugoslav crisis from which the policy of peace was
2 consistently conducted, the policy of national equality, thanks to which
3 there were no occurrences of discrimination and no occurrences of crimes,
4 and thanks to which throughout the entire decade an unchanged national
5 ethnic structure in Serbia was preserved.
6 I am aware, gentlemen, that it is illusory to look for logic in a
7 staged process. There were such cases before, the Dreyfuss case or the
8 Dimitrov case regarding the burning of the Reichstag. This process
9 exceeds those because of the depth of the tragic consequences that it
10 entails. I do not even wish to say anything on a personal note in this,
11 but I would like to mention the depth of the tragic consequences where the
12 universal legal order was thoroughly destroyed. Thanks to our past, there
13 were honourable authors who have carved the truth into history so that
14 mistakes would not be repeated and that the generations that come would
15 know what happened. In the true history of this era, this ad hoc justice
16 of yours will be placed or used as an illustration of monstrous events at
17 the changing from one century to another.
18 Gentlemen, you cannot imagine what a privilege it is, even in
19 these conditions that you have imposed on me, to have truth and justice as
20 my allies. I am sure you cannot even conceive this.
21 Thank you, Mr. Robinson. Unfortunately, I did not have the
22 opportunity to present everything that I wished to, but I believe that I
23 will be given this opportunity perhaps by other means. Thank you very
24 much.
25 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you, Mr. Milosevic. You are right, of
Page 32299
1 course, that you will be able to bring your evidence.
2 We're going to adjourn now for 20 minutes, and when we resume we
3 will have the discussion on procedural matters as indicated in the
4 Chamber's order of the 25th of August. We'll begin with the Prosecutor,
5 then the accused, then the amicus, and the subject matter will be the
6 content of the medical reports and the assignment of Defence counsel.
7 I urge parties to confine their submissions to those issues,
8 although the Chamber will hear other matters if it finds it appropriate.
9 We are adjourned.
10 --- Recess taken at 10.37 a.m.
11 --- On resuming at 11.00 a.m.
12 JUDGE ROBINSON: As indicated, we will have submissions now on the
13 two questions set out in our order of the 25th. Beginning first with the
14 Prosecutor. Madam Prosecutor.
15 MS. DEL PONTE: Mr. President, Your Honours, detailed argument
16 regarding the imposition of counsel have been made in a number of previous
17 Prosecution filings. The arguments made in these filings will be dealt
18 with in full by Mr. Nice. I do, however, wish to make a few general
19 introductory remarks.
20 This is not the first time that a Trial Chamber of this Tribunal
21 has had to consider the question of imposition of counsel. The Trial
22 Chambers in the cases of both Seselj and Blagojevic have previously ruled
23 that in certain circumstances, counsel may be imposed. The issue has also
24 arisen in the Rwanda Tribunal case of Barayagiza and in both the cases of
25 the accused Norman and Gbao before the Special Court of Sierra Leone. In
Page 32300
1 these International Tribunals counsel has been imposed for varying
2 reasons, including the obstructionism of the accused and the Tribunal's
3 right to protect the integrity of the proceedings.
4 National jurisdictions have also recognised the need in some
5 instances to impose counsel. In Israel with the defendant claiming to be
6 a political prisoner but also in the United Kingdom where in sexual
7 offence cases the accused is not entitled to run the totality of his own
8 defence in person. And the United States Supreme Court has observed in
9 the Martinez case, I quote: "[e]ven at the trial level, therefore, the
10 government's interest in ensuring the integrity and efficiency of the
11 trial at times outweighs the defendant's interest in acting as his own
12 lawyer."
13 And the imposition of counsel is entirely familiar to those
14 accustomed to the law and practice of the criminal courts in modern Serbia
15 and Montenegro, and indeed previously in the SFRY and FRY.
16 It is the duty of the Prosecutor and of the Chamber at this
17 Tribunal to ensure that the type of problem being faced can be dealt with
18 in the cases concerned, but as it will also no doubt be a question of
19 concern at other International Tribunals, including the International
20 Criminal Court, we owe a wider duty to developing international
21 jurisprudence it show how such problems can be dealt with. The parties,
22 including the accused, have a right to a fair and expeditious trial, and
23 the responsibility for ensuring a fair trial falls to the Trial Chamber.
24 We submit that the accused should be invited to allow his
25 associates to extend their present behind-the-scenes role of legal
Page 32301
1 advisors and to assist him with the presentation of his case simply in the
2 courtroom. Should the accused refuse to allow his associates to appear in
3 court, the accused will not have been denied the right to appoint counsel
4 of his own choosing. Rather, having been provided that right, he has
5 failed to exercise it.
6 This trial has required from the beginning the imposition of
7 counsel, and I have urged this position at every opportunity from the
8 start of the trial. The evolution of the trial in the past year has made
9 this need even more evident.
10 As mentioned before, the imposition of counsel is something which
11 is now becoming more familiar to the common law tradition. It has, on the
12 other hand, for a long time been familiar to the civil law tradition. The
13 civil law tradition takes the view that an accused lacks the requisite
14 distance and objectivity. The appointment of professional counsel allows
15 for the greater protection of both the accused's right and the wider
16 interests of justice.
17 This Tribunal draws on both the civil and common law traditions.
18 When faced with problems such as the present one before this Trial
19 Chamber, the Chamber has the privilege and duty of looking to both
20 traditions for solutions. When the solution is found, the Tribunal must
21 have or find the confidence to apply it irrespective of argument, even
22 public argument, however loud, extensive, and apparently well-informed.
23 It is we here who now know the problem. We here who face the
24 problem, and we here who have the duty to resolve the problem in the
25 greater interest of justice.
Page 32302
1 I recognise that in the earlier stages of this trial there was
2 little practical experience of this type of problem. The Chamber acted
3 with generosity towards the accused out of the best of intentions and in
4 so many ways to the best effect, but now the need for a more robust
5 approach has been revealed by the accused himself. The trial needs the
6 safeguard of imposed counsel.
7 Thank you very much for your attention.
8 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you, Madam Prosecutor.
9 Mr. Nice.
10 MR. NICE: Your Honour, this matter has been extensively argued in
11 written filings, of which there are public versions. I desire today to
12 make a general point and then to summarise our position with some
13 particulars on imposed counsel, to deal with the health issue, and then
14 with one or two other matters, with your leave.
15 The general point is this: Where a rational and reasonable person
16 finds himself pitted in discussion, argument, or even conflict against
17 someone who is irrational or unreasonable, there is sometimes an almost
18 irresistible temptation on the part of the reasonable one to think that
19 the other is going to behave reasonably, is going to respond to sense or
20 generosity. And that almost irresistible temptation derives from the
21 reasonable person's belief that there will be no chance of progress in the
22 matter at hand without movement by one party or the other and the
23 reasonable person's belief that the other party will never budge. Now,
24 this may be a process that this accused well understands, as it happens,
25 in the very matters into which we are inquiring, but also in this court.
Page 32303
1 And to pick up the last point made by the Prosecutor, this Bench,
2 rational, reasonable in the extreme, has, it may judge, faced some
3 obduracy and obstinacy by this accused over and over again, for example,
4 in time being allowed and, it may be thought, used in an ill-advised way
5 by him leading to his repeated demands or indeed, yesterday, insistence of
6 the Chamber for more time, and the Court always hoping for the best.
7 I would ask you to have that general proposition in mind as we
8 look at the problem we now face, and it is a real problem, given the
9 history of intervention -- not intervention, interruption of the timetable
10 by matters arguably without but arguably within the accused's own control,
11 namely, his health condition.
12 I turn, then, to some supplementary points about imposing counsel.
13 In domestic court systems, in the vast majority of all criminal
14 cases, those charged comply with the reasonable requirements of the court
15 system in which they find themselves. Do they do it because they respect
16 the law or the judges? If they are, in fact, serious offenders, criminals
17 of one kind or another, it's highly unlikely that they respect the law.
18 That's why they are, in fact, offenders. Nor is it likely that they
19 respect the judges, in truth. But they comply because they recognise that
20 once in the system, their own best interests, acquittal or reduced
21 sentence, will be served by compliance.
22 In that very, very small minority of cases in domestic courts and
23 in the rather larger portion of cases in this type of court where
24 non-compliance is a feature of a defendant's or accused's conduct, it is
25 because he does not see his own best interests as served at all by
Page 32304
1 compliance. His best interests, he judges, are elsewhere. And it is, of
2 course, our argument to this Court, as it has been on earlier occasions
3 and indeed in written submissions, that this accused's interests are
4 arguably, if not unarguably, his ability to address a different audience
5 with his account of events and his understanding of history.
6 For a court facing this problem, compliance will only, it may be
7 thought, be secured if even the accused recognises that his perception of
8 his best interests will be favoured by compliance. And so in this case,
9 without beating about the bush, unless the accused recognises that he will
10 lose his platform for whatever purpose he puts it unless he so conducts
11 his defence as to fit in with the requirements of this Court which has to
12 deliver justice and not to serve the non-forensic purposes of this
13 accused, then we will be in the same unfortunate position we have been in
14 for the last year and more.
15 For those who haven't read the public filings, in a sentence, our
16 arguments are that there is the power to impose counsel who would be able,
17 if necessary, to conduct the defence case without contact with or without
18 discussion with the accused, and that imposed counsel should be imposed
19 now and be ever-ready to take over the conduct of the defence immediately
20 or at a later stage, that that imposition is required now for all the
21 reasons with which we are familiar; and that once that has been done, then
22 the accused can be invited to make the reasonable decision, given the
23 health history and other matters, to conduct the preparation and
24 presentation of his case through lawyers. If he declines that invitation,
25 imposed counsel will be in a position to do the job for him.
Page 32305
Page 32306
1 Even if he declines the invitation so that imposed counsel takes
2 over the running of the Defence case, as we have proposed in a schedule to
3 our first filing, there are many ways and many stages in which and at
4 which the accused can be invited positively to contribute to the
5 preparation of witnesses -- not so much preparation, identification of
6 witnesses and their presentation in court by being allowed or invited to
7 contribute to the questioning that might otherwise be taken by imposed
8 counsel.
9 That's our proposal in a nutshell, and we say that the most
10 obvious candidate for imposed counsel should be one of or two of the amici
11 because of their familiarity with the case. We say that their proposal,
12 which would take them far more closely to the accused, is perilous in the
13 extreme for this reason: At the moment they retain, according to one of
14 their recent filings, the detachment of never having been instructed by
15 the accused. They may speak to him but they've never been instructed by
16 him, so that they do not have any relationship of intimacy with the
17 accused as a professional client that would enable him to put them in the
18 position of their being embarrassed and having to withdraw. They would
19 thus always be available to the Court to conduct the defence if things
20 started, yet again, to go wrong. Thus, in our submission, is their
21 proposal a dangerous one, one that should not be followed.
22 In our arguments, and as the Prosecutor has already foreshadowed,
23 we refer to recent developments in common law jurisdictions in relation to
24 sexual offenders, or alleged sexual offenders. I say straight away that
25 in our first filing, which, for reasons of timetable of the Court, was
Page 32307
1 prepared in somewhat short order, I missed that material. I was later
2 gratefully later reminded of it by Mr. Ruxton. I missed it. And we
3 worked out from first principles how imposed counsel could and should
4 operate in a case like this.
5 With a little more time at our disposal after complying with the
6 deadline for the first filing, we reviewed the present state of the law in
7 Scotland, in England and New South Wales and New Zealand, where the
8 practice is developing of imposing counsel in cases of the kind I've
9 described. And it was interesting and indeed heartening to discover that
10 the regimes that are being imposed by statute in those common law
11 countries match extremely closely the model we identified as suitable for
12 this case, working simply from first principles.
13 It may be worth going back to an earlier point in relation to the
14 sex offenders exception in common law countries for this reason: I
15 believe that one of the early stimuli for the change of the law in England
16 was that a sex offender, or alleged sex offender, cross-examined a victim
17 extensively and, as it was judged, not for the proper forensic purpose of
18 establishing his innocence if he could but to gratify himself by further
19 subjecting -- or by subjecting the victim to further punishment. He had
20 an interest outside the interest of the court, and it was because he
21 needed to be deprived of the ability to serve that interest through a
22 court hearing that the change in the law was ultimately made.
23 And so the case, although very different on its facts, of course,
24 than the case at hand, has -- the exception for sex cases is very
25 different for the case at hand, has in common with it the need to ensure
Page 32308
1 that accused persons cannot, through court proceedings, serve their own
2 improper and irrelevant purposes.
3 JUDGE ROBINSON: Did that arise frequently, Mr. Nice?
4 MR. NICE: No, I think --
5 JUDGE ROBINSON: Because normally sex offenders would be
6 represented by counsel who would carry out the cross-examination.
7 MR. NICE: Absolutely so. But on this particular case, if my
8 recollection is correct, it was the case of a sex offender appearing for
9 himself and subjecting the victim to a quite extravagant cross-examination
10 that lead to the inquiry being made by parliament and the change in the
11 law, because they realised that otherwise they didn't have the power to
12 deal with this problem.
13 There is much in the consultative documents for the Scottish
14 reform of the law that I think matches the arguments that we've made as
15 well as matching in the final practices that have been introduced and
16 those which we recommended.
17 Can I return again to a point that the Prosecutor has made. We
18 suggest in our filings that this problem is unknown or very rarely known
19 to the common law and that in this area the genius of the common law has
20 to some extent been wanting, and it is to the genius of the civil law that
21 we must turn. And with my remarks so far in mind, would the Court bear in
22 mind what it is that, as the Prosecutor reminded us, is the underlying
23 purpose of the civil law's requirement that counsel be imposed, for it's
24 twofold. It's both to achieve the objective of the court to have justice
25 done, and it is to bring distance and objectivity to the presentation of a
Page 32309
1 Defence.
2 And of course here, if we are right in our characterisation of the
3 accused's defence as being aimed at a different audience, there is the
4 real possibility that he will be missing points that he should be making
5 if looking at the problem in the proper way, and nobody in this court
6 wants any accused to be convicted when he should be acquitted, to be, in
7 the vernacular, over-convicted or over-sentenced. And so the imposition,
8 on the basis of the civil law approach, of counsel would in this case
9 serve those twin objectives that the Prosecutor has identified from her
10 experience and knowledge of the civil law.
11 Finally on this point, the accused -- or the trial of this
12 accused, facing the problem it does, must not be subject to any special
13 treatment simply because of the gravity of the charges against the accused
14 nor must there be any special leniency in the approach of the Chamber to
15 the problem simply because of the once elevated status of this accused.
16 A problem has been created and we'll turn to it more perhaps in
17 closed session when we look at one or two other issues, that demands
18 immediate resolution if we're not to run the risk of the timetable being
19 out of control, and I use the word "again." In our respectful submission,
20 the detailed proposals we make will work and are likely, if not very
21 likely, to ensure that the accused's future conduct will serve the best
22 interests of justice as well as of himself.
23 Before I turn to health and as a subsidiary point of what I've
24 said already and before the first witnesses are called, can I make one
25 observation about etiquette, court etiquette, because I have referred to
Page 32310
1 it on several occasions in our filings.
2 The Court, for the best of possible reasons, has tolerated what in
3 any other court would be quite unacceptable; that is to be told day after
4 day that it is an illegal court and that the Judges of it and the
5 Prosecutors are acting unlawfully. Were it to be the case that the
6 accused were to be allowed to call his own witnesses without correction as
7 to his manner of conduct in this court, we would be left, would we, with
8 the position where the accused would be using the incorrect form of
9 address to the Court, referring when it suited him to this illegal court
10 and yet expecting his witnesses, who would of course have to take the
11 solemn declaration, to treat the Court with the appropriate respect? It's
12 hard to conceive of a more unsatisfactory way of progressing. It's hard
13 to know how his witnesses would understand what was truly expected of
14 them. Can you really have a litigant being allowed to say to his witness,
15 "Witness, tell this illegal court what you know"?
16 When we see that the accused would wish people with either present
17 or past high office to come here to help you, can we really expect that
18 they would if they know that that is how they're going to be dealt with?
19 And so etiquette is not a trivial matter, in our respectful
20 submission, and it's something that needs to be dealt with.
21 The next issue is health, and although there's been some opening
22 of the health issues, it may be at the moment that the Chamber would
23 prefer us to go into private session to deal with that.
24 JUDGE KWON: Before going on, Mr. Nice, if you could elaborate on
25 the feasibility that an imposed counsel can start his conduct of
Page 32311
1 examination immediately, without any adjournment.
2 MR. NICE: Yes. I've -- I've dealt with that in the filings and
3 I'm grateful for the opportunity of repeating our position.
4 It may be urged that if counsel is imposed, he or she, whether an
5 existing amicus or a newly imposed counsel, could not run the Defence case
6 if the accused declines to cooperate because he or she could not be
7 prepared. The answer to that comes in two parts.
8 First, imposed counsel in the circumstances of this case would not
9 be expected and should not be instructed on the basis of and should not be
10 allowed to contemplate conducting a full investigation or any extensive
11 further investigation into the defence case in order to run it, because,
12 A, the position we find ourselves in is largely, if not wholly, of the
13 accused's own creation; and B, because there is an enormous amount of
14 material already and easily available to any counsel, however newly
15 imposed, that would enable him or her to identify and to call the
16 witnesses very quickly but, of course, not immediately.
17 My proposal, and this is the second part of the answer to Your
18 Honour's question, is this: Were the accused absolutely to refuse to
19 cooperate in any way and were the Chamber to have decided to impose
20 counsel, we already have a list of some 70 witnesses that the accused
21 wishes to call, he having, although the order has changed on a regular
22 basis, ordered the first -- I think the latest list is 12 but in fact it's
23 been up from time to time to figures rather more than that. And those,
24 the pro se legal officer assisting him, will know of the logistical
25 arrangements to bring those witnesses here. We know from the 65 ter
Page 32312
1 summaries in short order what the witnesses are supposed to deal with and
2 it would always be possible, possibly subject to privilege but that will
3 be for detailed consideration, to obtain what notes exist of what the
4 witness is going to be talking about. So the Chamber itself could find, I
5 have no doubt, the power to call witnesses from that list while imposed
6 counsel was being identified and instructed, could get them to give their
7 evidence in the way that witnesses in this court used to give evidence in
8 the earlier days of these proceedings, in the narrative form with
9 questions coming later, and the Chamber could, as I've suggested in our
10 filing, at the end of its examination of the witness, invite the accused
11 to identify topics that haven't been covered that should have been covered
12 to make sure that the evidence he would want from that witness would be
13 before you.
14 Those first witnesses, the witnesses on his present list, at three
15 days a week would probably take us nearly to Christmas. And in that
16 period of time, identified, retained, appointed counsel, imposed counsel,
17 could be becoming familiar with the case. We know from recent experience
18 that with the records available, reading into this case to become familiar
19 with it is, of course, a heavy task but not a limitless one.
20 So that's our proposal. And to reach that conclusion - and I'm
21 very grateful for being able to think about this and address it - to reach
22 that conclusion, as the Chamber might have to do, which would be a strong
23 and bold decision, would be simply to reflect that the court's authority
24 has been flouted, as we will explore, and the accused has shown himself
25 willing to decline to do what the Court wants, and it's in the face of
Page 32313
1 that that the Court would have to be saying to itself, "Yes, getting this
2 case concluded in the reasonable time we have allowed, by next October, is
3 something that we can accomplish, and we can accomplish it with these
4 early witnesses by dealing with them in this way, calling them ourselves,
5 giving the accused the opportunity to fill in the questions we may have
6 missed."
7 JUDGE KWON: One more query. If counsel is to be imposed in one
8 way or another, during the interim period until he or she can take over
9 the case in full, what kind of danger would there be if the Chamber allows
10 the accused to go on without being represented until that -- until -- as
11 far as he can?
12 MR. NICE: The real danger would appear to be -- there are several
13 dangers but the principal danger would be that he would still be preparing
14 the witnesses himself and -- we are venturing into something that is
15 probably best dealt with in private session, but taking it shortly, the
16 risk is that we would find ourselves back in the position we were in where
17 the health condition or apparent health condition of the accused simply
18 leads to weeks and months of downtime of the court.
19 There are other risks associated with his preparation and
20 presentation of witnesses. I've touched on the matter of etiquette, but
21 the major risk of doing that, and it's not a risk, it's almost a certainty
22 on the material we have, is that the timetable will not work at all.
23 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
24 [Trial Chamber confers]
25 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, the Chamber was consulting on your
Page 32314
1 request for a private session to discuss certain matters. Would you like
2 to explain why you think there should be a private session?
3 MR. NICE: Only out of respect for the privacy that is associated
4 with medical reports. If the Chamber is happy for me to discuss all those
5 medical reports fully in public, I will do so.
6 JUDGE ROBINSON: I'm going to inquire from the other parties, of
7 course, but as I indicated to the accused when we met in July, the
8 jurisprudence of the Tribunal is that such material is confidential except
9 when it is required for trial purposes in the public interest. The health
10 of the accused is intimately tied up with the pace of the trial which
11 itself is linked to the issue of expeditiousness, and expeditiousness is a
12 requirement of a fair trial. I see it as an issue that is essentially
13 tied to the fairness of the trial ultimately, but I'd like to hear first
14 from the amicus.
15 Mr. Kay.
16 MR. KAY: Your Honour, would you like us to deal with the issue of
17 privacy at this stage rather than the full argument?
18 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, just the issue of privacy, yes.
19 MR. KAY: It very much depends upon what the accused would submit
20 on the matter. Sometimes an accused is happy enough for such issues to be
21 public so that there is a full understanding of what the argument is
22 about, particularly if he has his own view on the matter.
23 Personal details should be avoided being put into the public
24 domain, and by that I mean specifics of medical analyses, and I think we
25 can all understand what I mean about that. But general issues relating to
Page 32315
1 health when they arise in this manner would be able to be discussed so
2 that the public or -- we're not doing this really for the benefit of the
3 public, we're doing this for the benefit of legal argument in the ordinary
4 course of the -- of the trial and so that there is an understanding what
5 is going on in this trial at this stage.
6 So if argument was able to be without specific references to
7 personal medical details, which I'm sure that the Court would understand,
8 then that -- that can take place in public, in our submission, but it must
9 be dealt with in general terms rather than anything that might cause
10 embarrassment or anything that might be too revealing. In many respects,
11 it's how far the Trial Chamber wants to go, or any of the parties wants to
12 go on the issue.
13 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you. Mr. Milosevic, on this issue. Do you
14 wish to say anything?
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] In connection with my personal
16 health issues to be discussed in a public or private session, is that what
17 you're asking me?
18 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I told you last time when you asked
20 this that I feel that issues of health should be discussed in private
21 session. These are my own personal private matters. They do not concern
22 the public. I think that these are elementary rules.
23 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you. The Chamber will consult.
24 [Trial Chamber confers]
25 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, yes. On this issue?
Page 32316
1 MR. NICE: We would, of course, favour the presentation of this
2 material in public to the extent necessary to explain part of the
3 reasoning of our arguments on imposed counsel. We have no desire to go
4 into matters in detail, and indeed the conclusion of the doctors is all we
5 need.
6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you. Yes. The Chamber believes that
7 Mr. Kay struck the right balance in his presentation on this matter.
8 We will have the discussion in public in general terms, and if a
9 matter comes up that is particularly sensitive, then that can be brought
10 to the Chamber's attention and we will move into private session.
11 MR. NICE: Your Honour, thank you.
12 Before I move on to the health issue, and going back to Your
13 Honour's earlier question about the introduction of imposed counsel for
14 sexual offence cases, I am very grateful to Ms. Graham for finding the
15 reference that will most help you. It's actually in the New South Wales
16 Law Reform Commission papers in the book of authorities at pages 20 and
17 21, where they are looking at the then-British experience, or the English
18 experience, and at paragraph 2.26 the commission's report sets out how the
19 England -- or the English -- the United Kingdom Home Office report on the
20 same topic followed two prominent sexual assault cases in which defendants
21 used the opportunity of cross-examination in person to humiliate and
22 intimidate their victims, and it sets out the details of what happened at
23 that paragraph.
24 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you, Mr. Nice.
25 MR. NICE: On the health issue, I need, I think, only remind the
Page 32317
1 Court of one fact and take you to short passages in summary from the four
2 latest reports.
3 The Chamber will recall that in discussions of the time required
4 for preparation of his defence, the accused was always unhappy with the
5 time allowed, reasonable though it undoubtedly was, and required to be
6 allowed until September. In the event, the manifestation of his health
7 problem has brought us to September.
8 The latest reports with which we need be concerned start with the
9 report of Dr. Tavernier, dated the 24th of July of 2004. On the third
10 page of that report, following a detailed examination and analysis to
11 which I need not refer, he picked up on an earlier suggestion that the
12 accused was not following the drug regime prescribed in his best interests
13 and in order to enable him to be fit for trial with this observation at
14 the end of the paragraph:
15 "All these observations suggest that the accused is not taking his
16 medication in a strict manner."
17 Further down that page, the doctor expressed the opinion that
18 based upon the presented clinical condition, the then-lifestyle and poor
19 adherence to proposed therapeutic plan, the accused was not fit, in the
20 opinion of Dr. Tavernier, to represent himself. And he went on to say
21 that he shared the opinion of his colleague, Dr. Dijkman, that the
22 resumption of the trial under the then-conditions would result in a very
23 early -- an early occurrence of very high blood pressure with the
24 inability of the accused to continue to work, which would have a major
25 impact on the trial schedule.
Page 32318
1 The next report in time comes from the said Dr. Dijkman, is dated
2 the 18th of August, and again on the second page, following careful
3 examination of -- a record of examination of the accused, it says this:
4 "We may conclude that there must be serious doubt over the
5 patient's adherence to this therapy. From the clinical point of view, we
6 have suspected this for some time given the repeated occurrences of sinus
7 tachycardia, which is odd with the continuous and correct taking of a
8 particular drug that he identifies."
9 But he then goes on, and I think this is the first time this is
10 clear from the reports, to identify something else. He says:
11 "In addition," and he then identifies another drug, "another drug
12 was repeatedly found in the blood, which is odd given the patient's
13 refusals to take benzodiazepines from the United Nations unit's staff."
14 It goes on to suggest that the accused must have obtained and be taking
15 drugs other than those prescribed in some other way.
16 Dr. Dijkman ended this paragraph by saying that, in his opinion,
17 the patient is not fit to defend himself.
18 "Should the trial be continued in the old way, there will be
19 constant interruptions which will delay the progress of the trial
20 considerably."
21 Dr. Tavernier's report of the 27th of August, commenting on Dr.
22 Dijkman's report, said at page 2, paragraph 1, subconclusion 2, there is
23 significant doubt about the therapy compliance of the accused, and at the
24 end of that paragraph, dealing with the drug taken that was not being
25 prescribed, said:
Page 32319
1 "Since this drug is not on his medication list in his medical
2 file, this means that Mr. Milosevic must obtain this drug in another way.
3 This illustrates the unwillingness of Mr. Milosevic to adhere to a
4 therapeutic plan because administration of this kind of drug in a
5 controlled was already suggested but refused."
6 The doctor then deals with one of the possible complications of
7 detail that we needn't go into.
8 The last report comes from Dr. Dijkman on the 26th of August, I
9 think, specifically in response to an order of the Trial Chamber, and he
10 sets out in detail - it's a longer report - why it is and the basis upon
11 which he's able to say that there has been a refusal of the accused to
12 comply with the prescribed medical regime and, indeed, why it is clear - I
13 needn't go into the detail of this - that he is taking some other drug.
14 And on page 3, at the end of the large paragraph on page 3 dealing
15 with the other drug that has been taken without prescription and without
16 supervision by the Detention Unit staff, he says this -- well, perhaps one
17 can pick it up two-thirds of the way down the paragraph:
18 "The measurements taken by a colleague," he names the colleague,"
19 proves the opposite thus indicating that Mr. Milosevic is providing us
20 with incorrect information about his medication intake, which leads me to
21 doubt also his statements that he is taking the anti-hypertensive
22 medication correctly."
23 At the end of that paragraph, he says:
24 "The medication is not at all expected to cause a rise in blood
25 pressure. On the contrary. It would be expected indirectly to lower it
Page 32320
Page 32321
1 when this medication has achieved a reduction in stress. This was the
2 reason why I offered it to him in the past. I am at a loss to explain why
3 he has refused it in the past but has now taken it."
4 The drug that was being taken without supervision and prescription
5 would have been of benefit if taken in a controlled way, but apparently
6 was not being so taken. At times -- well, it was not taken in that way.
7 And the overall and unanimous opinion of the experts is that the accused
8 is not fit to conduct the trial himself, that he has not been taking the
9 drugs in the manner prescribed and apparently supervised for no reason
10 that is advanced by the doctors but for reasons that can be all too
11 readily understood by those of us who have seen months of court time
12 wasted; and that in combination with that conduct, he has been obtaining
13 for his own purposes other drugs, no doubt to help himself.
14 This material makes it overwhelmingly clear that the accused will
15 do whatever is necessary to serve his own purposes, in our respectful
16 submission, and that the Court can be quite satisfied that this material,
17 for two reasons, shows that counsel must be imposed; the first being the
18 underlying health condition itself, which will be aggravated to the point
19 of intolerability if he is allowed to continue seeing, preparing
20 witnesses, which is clear on the evidence to be the hard work, but also
21 because the Court might be quite satisfied he has been manipulating this
22 Tribunal.
23 Your Honour, the only other points I would make, I've been some
24 time --
25 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Nice, I think I need some clarification on the
Page 32322
1 issue of non-adherence of the accused to the therapeutic plans. It seems
2 to me that both doctors based their conclusion -- their conclusion that
3 he's not fit to represent himself on the very fact that he is not been
4 adhering to the therapeutic plans. Well, then, suppose from now, if he
5 adheres to the therapeutic plan in full, then he will be fit to represent
6 himself. I don't think so. So his non-adherence can be a basis for us to
7 continue while he is sick, which he brought himself, but I don't think
8 it's a sufficient -- can be a sufficient reason to impose a counsel while
9 he's healthy to represent himself.
10 Can I hear your observation on this?
11 MR. NICE: Well, several points. The first point is the doctors
12 appear to be of the view that it's his underlying medical condition that
13 makes him unfit, and that, of course, we rely on and that's in itself is
14 sufficient.
15 To that, the non-adherence is a feature of obstructionism by this
16 accused, to use the words I think used in the Seselj case, that taken
17 together with other aspects of his behaviour and other ways in which it's
18 clear that he's using this Court for purposes that are not properly
19 forensic, show that the civil law's approach to the imposition of counsel
20 is right. You have a man who in one, two, or more ways is acting
21 unwisely, improperly, and for personal reasons outside those of the
22 furtherance of justice, and, says the civil law, you need to protect that
23 man and to stop him doing what he's doing. You need to ensure that his
24 proper defence is advanced. You need to ensure that the administration of
25 justice is not impeded.
Page 32323
1 And so Your Honour's proposition that merely not to take his
2 prescribed medicines correctly, even to do so with bad intent, is not in
3 itself enough to impose counsel is, if I may respectfully say so, slightly
4 off the point, because imposition of counsel comes in this case and at
5 this stage for a range of reasons of which this is one component part, but
6 it's one component part of a mix of reasons that relate to his conduct and
7 is separate from his underlying ill health which freestanding on its own
8 would justify the imposition of counsel because he's simply not actually
9 physically strong enough and fit enough to prepare and present the case
10 himself.
11 JUDGE ROBINSON: What are the other reasons? What are the other
12 reasons? You say it's just one component part of a mix of reasons.
13 MR. NICE: Yes. This accused has shown himself, and we've seen it
14 in the recent speech that he's presented, concerned to take - and we would
15 say to waste - time, valuable, precious time on matters that are not at
16 the heart of this case, indeed completely away from what this case is
17 about. He will continue to do that because he has another objective to
18 serve, both in his -- to some degree in his identification witnesses but
19 certainly in the use he seeks to make of witnesses. And we've seen in the
20 cross-examination exercises how difficult it was for the Court to bring
21 him to matters of relevance. Time after time he would be allowed two
22 hours and he would waste one hour and three-quarters, in our respectful
23 submission, on what was irrelevant, and try hard as His Honour Judge May
24 did to bring him to matters of relevance, it didn't work.
25 Now, the same accused represented by counsel, whether imposed or
Page 32324
1 his own, can be sure to have the correct matters identified and laid
2 before you and the irrelevant omitted. So that's a second way in which it
3 is appropriate to impose counsel.
4 And a third way, which I have already touched on, is, frankly,
5 etiquette. The time has come when this Court is entitled to be approached
6 on behalf of this accused's defence appropriately, and it should not, in
7 our respectful submission, any longer be tolerating the manner in which
8 this case is being presented.
9 And can I come back, however, in light of Your Honour's -- His
10 Honour Judge Kwon's question, to what I suspect may be an underlying
11 thought, and I hope Your Honour won't mind if I say temptation, because
12 Your Honour will remember that my first point, which was a general point,
13 was how the reasonable person reacts to the unreasonable and the rational
14 to the irrational by being tempted time and again to expect the best of
15 the other when all the experience is actually to the contrary. And I
16 venture to suggest that Your Honour's question may have allowed within it
17 this thought: Maybe the accused will now buckle down and behave. That
18 would be a perilous approach to take for, in our submission, he has shown
19 himself quite uninterested in bringing this case to a just conclusion, and
20 there is no reason to believe that he will not take whatever course is
21 open to him when it is necessary to have his way.
22 And so in answer to His Honour Judge Robinson's question, there
23 are at least three separate reasons of which non-adherence to the drug
24 regime is a component part which would justify the imposition of counsel.
25 The health condition on its own also justifies it.
Page 32325
1 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you.
2 MR. NICE: Your Honour, I know that time is valuable but this is a
3 very important topic. I have identified in the pleadings, and I don't
4 desire to go through it in detail now, one way in which this accused has
5 shown absolute defiance of this Court. He produced a list of whatever it
6 was, 1.300 witnesses and was required to name all but whatever might be
7 the very small minority to both the Court -- the small minority that will
8 require special protection, to the Court and to the Prosecution. He told
9 you at the last hearing he would give us as many names, basically, as he
10 thought we deserved.
11 We have drawn to your attention in a couple of pleadings that he
12 has refused to comply with the order although the names were there because
13 they were provided to the Chamber, and it was two days ago, I think, that
14 we got not the majority of the names but -- 600? About. About 900 of
15 them.
16 JUDGE ROBINSON: 900.
17 MR. NICE: About 900 in total.
18 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.
19 MR. NICE: Without apology, without explanation. He was
20 instructed to provide all exhibits. Now, there may be practical problems
21 with exhibits. The first -- that was months ago. The first day we
22 received exhibits, all in B/C/S, was a couple days ago.
23 These -- one can readily understand an instinct to say, oh, let
24 bygones be bygones, let's not look at that; but we have to press the
25 Chamber in making this decision now, realising that if a decision isn't
Page 32326
1 made now it will always be more difficult later, to recognise what is
2 quite apparent from this accused's conduct of this case, namely that he
3 will to the limited -- or to the degree allowed, have it his way, act in
4 defiance of the Court and diminish the standing of this court which has
5 and merits the very substantial of a court, of a lawful court doing its
6 best to deliver justice in a difficult case to this particular accused.
7 Your Honour, I won't say anything more about other matters save
8 just to identify things which I think are on your agenda generally. One
9 is whether the accused should give evidence himself, which of course he
10 will have to do with the solemn declaration, and when. And to draw to
11 your attention that, as I understand it, certainly one of the quotations
12 attributed to a Western leader in the speech of the accused was, as it
13 sounded when I heard it, a complete misquotation, and I will provide you
14 with chapter and verse for correction. And unless I'm in error, unless
15 those informing me are in error, I will be asking the accused personally
16 or through counsel, in due course, to correct an error. There may be
17 other examples of straight misquotations that we've heard in the last day,
18 and they should not be allowed to stand.
19 JUDGE ROBINSON: If you have that, bring it to the Court's
20 attention, we will bring it to the attention of the accused, and we expect
21 him to take the appropriate action.
22 Mr. Milosevic, do you have submissions on this matter?
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] First of all, there is no need for
24 anyone to make me correct quotations. If it's given wrongly, it's
25 sufficient just to draw my attention to it, and of course I will do that
Page 32327
1 myself. So I am convinced that I did not provide any wrong or
2 misquotations, but if that is the case, I will very easily correct that.
3 That is not a problem.
4 But as far as the topic is concerned that we're discussing,
5 Mr. Nice has talked here about motives because of which I'm speaking here.
6 There is no mystery there. I have emphasised this on several occasions.
7 I will always speak here any time you make it possible for me because I'm
8 using the opportunity to tell the truth. That is my only motive.
9 I assume that the truth should be also a motive and objective or
10 purpose of any procedure or any debate or any academic discussion, even.
11 Therefore, I don't see why my motive to speak the truth would be in
12 collision with any honourable motive of any side, whatever it is, if it
13 should turn out that that other side wishes to learn the truth and wishes
14 to find out the truth in an as thorough way as possible in the interest
15 of justice.
16 Mr. Nice speaks about rules. Well, your rules are not such that I
17 have no right to a defence. All international regulations, all treaties
18 and pacts on human rights give me the right to defend myself. In any
19 case, the late Judge May himself, when this was discussed the last time,
20 stressed in particular, and I remember that very well, that my right to
21 defence must not be questioned.
22 We have an absurd situation here. I'm now talking about the
23 explanations that we have heard from Mr. Nice. I was capable of
24 questioning witnesses of the other side, the hostile side, which it, in
25 the best desire to bring in as many as possible strong witnesses against
Page 32328
1 me, did so. So I was able to question witnesses of the other side. And
2 now suddenly I'm not able to question my own witnesses. And there is this
3 absurd thing here that is cited by Mr. Nice --
4 JUDGE ROBINSON: Please continue. We adjourn at a quarter past,
5 15 minutes after.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well. Speaks about the danger
7 - and I don't know how this can have any logic at all - of the danger of
8 mistreating or abusing witnesses if I question them. I did not mistreat
9 any witnesses of theirs. I did not mistreat any witness from the other
10 side. And how can then it be conceivable at all that there be a danger
11 now that I will mistreat witnesses that I have called myself? For
12 goodness sake, is there any logic in that even for any one to consider
13 of any age? It's absurd that I would be in the situation of mistreating
14 my own witnesses.
15 Mr. Nice said - I even wrote it down - about the danger of
16 preparing my own witnesses. I understand if this were a danger in order
17 to knock down this construct that they have built, but that is precisely
18 what I want to do. It is my right to do so. How can anyone who is in
19 favour of law and justice against me preparing my own witnesses?
20 I -- as far as my witnesses are concerned, in view of the short
21 time that you have given me and in view of the fact that I will be working
22 three days a week, will be able to spend one day at the most with an
23 individual witness. And you know very well that the other side prepared
24 their witnesses for a week or two or more than that with their entire
25 machinery, and this was even in the case of witnesses that they chose not
Page 32329
1 to call to testify. I will have to perhaps even prepare two witnesses in
2 one day. Therefore, the rational use of time is a relative question,
3 whether this is the most rational thing or not. This is something that
4 can be put as a question. But I will be using my time much more
5 rationally than the other side which used much more time in the
6 preparation of their witnesses. This is something that is obvious.
7 Therefore, I think that the whole idea presented by Mr. Nice is to
8 actually shut me up in the process of stating the truth. That's what it's
9 about. He says that I inflicted my health problem on myself. I have
10 suffered from hypertension for ten years now.
11 Second, it must be clear to everyone that I have been given
12 hundreds of thousands of pages of documents here, different papers, as
13 part of what the other side was doing and not given an adequate amount of
14 time to read them all. Of course this calls for additional efforts. Of
15 course this creates fatigue, and of course this then reflects on higher
16 blood pressure as a result of the fatigue, and this applies in any kind of
17 work; less sleep, a large number of hours spent reading, reviewing,
18 preparing. So it is just not true. Quite to the contrary. Their
19 dynamics and the lack of time is something that is responsible for that.
20 The other claim is that I am not responsible in taking my
21 medication. I will not go into the methods, how this is measured and
22 calculated, but you probably don't know the practice in your own Detention
23 Unit. I take my medication in the presence of guards. I'm given them. I
24 take them in the presence of the guard, and the guard writes down in the
25 book the exact time when I ingested those medicines. Therefore, this
Page 32330
1 assumption can be an assumption. Anyone can assume whatever they want,
2 but this assumption is groundless.
3 It is true that I had a discussion - this was over a year ago -
4 with the doctors about certain medicines which had some bi-effects which
5 actually caused fatigue, drowsiness, and which prevented me from working.
6 But this medication that I'm talking, I didn't take this medicine because
7 it didn't agree with me and put it to the side. I told the doctor, "I
8 cannot take this medicine because it interferes with my normal
9 functioning." I spoke with my own doctor by telephone, and we coordinated
10 the -- a different regime of medication, and this was approved by this
11 doctor here, and it was suggested by the doctor who has been treating me
12 for more than ten years now. And I have told you about the way that I
13 take these medicines, about the procedure under which I take the
14 medication.
15 I believe that other factors are at issue here. We're talking
16 about fatigue, that factor, because if I am taking the same medicines the
17 whole time and then over the past month or so my blood pressure has
18 normalised, that is because I have had a rest. I gave precedence to a
19 rest -- a rest for a period when I saw fit to do that in order to
20 stabilise my blood pressure so that I could be physically able to
21 function. I did that at the expense of what I needed to do at that time,
22 but I assume that it was within human bounds and that it's a minimal rest
23 that I needed to give myself. And this was a crucial factor in
24 contributing to me normalising my blood pressure.
25 So if we are taking care to have a regular, normal pace of
Page 32331
1 affairs, something that can be maintained, then absolutely there can be no
2 question of it not being possible for me to do what I need to do. It
3 would be very unfair, in the same health conditions, for you to assess
4 that I could go through these past two years of cross-examination of
5 witnesses of the other side and now that it's my time to examine my own
6 witnesses, the other side suddenly panics that I'm not preparing
7 witnesses, that I should not be working with them, that I should not be
8 questioning them. Actually, this seems a panic caused by the lack of
9 desire for the truth to be heard, and this is something that is evident to
10 anybody who is watching.
11 There are no other reasons for that other than those which were in
12 force at the time when the late Judge May was the Presiding Judge, who
13 said at the time that my right to defend myself cannot be infringed upon.
14 Therefore, I really cannot accept at all that you do not give me the right
15 and the opportunity to voice the truth, and I find it unacceptable to be
16 prevented from having witnesses come, witnesses that I have called, and to
17 have them testify about what they are supposed to testify about, to
18 testify for reasons that they are called to testify for.
19 As far as I know, this number of 900 witnesses that Mr. Nice
20 talked about, as far as I know, this list was given over a month ago
21 containing over 1.100 names. So this is the first time that I'm hearing
22 about it. As far as what was said when this was given, I will accept
23 that. But as far as I know, to my best recollection, you were provided
24 with this list certainly over a month ago.
25 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, we are going to take a break now
Page 32332
1 for 20 minutes.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would just like to clarify one
3 thing before we take this break. Each person can fall ill, especially
4 someone who suffers from chronic cardiovascular problems. I'm hearing for
5 the first time that someone, because they can possibly fall ill, should be
6 denied their right to defence, which is guaranteed by all conventions on
7 human rights, rather than if that person is ill not holding a sitting on
8 that day, one day, two days, or something like that for as long as it's
9 needed. But I've never heard that someone, because they are ill and they
10 are in that situation because of the other side that is asking that, that
11 they are then denied the right to their defence for these reasons.
12 This has nothing to do with any sense of logic or morale or law,
13 and it is simply out of the question.
14 JUDGE ROBINSON: We will take the adjournment now for 20 minutes.
15 --- Recess taken at 12.19 p.m.
16 --- On resuming at 12.45 p.m.
17 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would just like to add I also
19 think that the explanation of Mr. Nice is quite inappropriate regarding
20 the recognition of the Tribunal. I consider the Tribunal to be illegal.
21 This is not in dispute as far as I'm concerned. But I did state political
22 and legal reasons for my views. I even quoted the book of the former
23 president of the International Court of Justice who believes the two
24 resolutions under which this court was founded are controversial from the
25 point of view of the United Nations. I do have the right to state
Page 32333
1 political and legal reasons in my assessment of whether this Tribunal is
2 legal or not, especially when I pointed out to the way in which we can get
3 the question of -- on its legality, through the institutions which are
4 authorised within the UN system to decide on that. So it's not logical
5 that I'm insulting anyone in this way, and I don't believe that I even, as
6 far as one witness is concerned, whether there were false witnesses and
7 murderers, I don't believe that I insulted any one of those witnesses
8 during my questioning. But I am stating political and legal arguments
9 which I believe are valid in relation to the illegality of this Tribunal,
10 and this is my right and I do not have any intention of being deprived of
11 that right just because Mr. Nice or anyone else does not like that.
12 Therefore, I request to be allowed that witnesses come regularly,
13 that I am allowed to question them, and that I have the rights in relation
14 to that, the same rights that the other side had when they questioned
15 their witnesses. I ask for no more or no less than that. I actually have
16 less because my conditions for preparation are not as extensive, but that
17 is my problem.
18 In any event, I request to be allowed that witnesses be permitted
19 to come. They are coming here at my invitation and not at the invitation
20 of somebody that they do not know at all.
21 And I must say that I do not believe that there is any lawyer who
22 holds to the legal codes, who sticks to essential moral norms who would
23 agree to be imposed as an attorney to somebody who does not accept that.
24 I don't believe that there is anyone like that, but probably everything is
25 possible.
Page 32334
1 So I request to be permitted to be able to question my witnesses.
2 And Mr. Nice, who obviously wished that he himself questions my witnesses
3 personally or through an intermediary, has the same right to
4 cross-examination that I had when he was bringing his witnesses. I did
5 not interfere in his choice of witnesses.
6 JUDGE KWON: If I can say this to Mr. Milosevic once again, I
7 remember I once mentioned this earlier: Mr. Milosevic, you are saying
8 that you cannot appoint a counsel because you don't recognise this
9 Tribunal. However, in my opinion, recognition of the Tribunal and having
10 the assistance of counsel are two different matters. In fact, your
11 actions have reflected this already. You nominated, by a document signed
12 by yourself, the three legal associates from Belgrade, and during the
13 presentation of the Prosecution's case they have been assisting you, inter
14 alia, by gathering the information and the evidence and preparing the
15 questions you have put to the witness. In essence, I think they have been
16 your de facto Defence counsels without being physically present in the
17 courtroom.
18 It is with this in mind and given that the presentation of the
19 Defence case requires a higher level of physical exertion than what may be
20 required during the Prosecution's case the Trial Chamber discusses this
21 current issue of imposing or assigning a counsel to assist you.
22 We are discussing this issue to alleviate the burden of yours, not
23 to silence you. If you truly wish to remain loyal to your assertion that
24 you endeavour to present your case for the sake of the truth, I think then
25 it's only rational and in the best interest that you choose to have the
Page 32335
Page 32336
1 assistance of counsel.
2 I urge you to bear these facts in mind. And if I add to this, we
3 have a clear doctor's message which says that you are not fit to represent
4 yourself. We have to do something in one way or another. But we leave
5 it, as was suggested, we leave it to you to avoid such imposition of
6 counsel at any time by inviting your associates to come into the courtroom
7 to assist you. And if you so wish, there is also room for you for further
8 flexibility by allowing you the opportunity to supplement the examination
9 and re-examination of witnesses by the counsel whom you appoint.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Kwon, that is the difference.
11 That is the point. I do not wish to be in a situation to cross-examine my
12 own witnesses. I want to be able to conduct the examination-in-chief of
13 my own witnesses, and that is my right established by you according to
14 your rules, that I do have the right to defend myself. This is a major
15 difference.
16 Therefore, I request that you permit me to call and examine my own
17 witnesses. This is an elementary right of mine.
18 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, in your earlier presentation
19 before the break, you made reference to Judge May's support of your right
20 to defend yourself. I also supported it, as did Judge Kwon, but there is
21 a decision of the Trial Chamber on that issue, and it clearly states that
22 the Trial Chamber supported that right but that the right was not without
23 qualification. So I ask you to bear that in mind in your repeated
24 references to the earlier ruling of the Trial Chamber on this issue.
25 If you are finished, then Mr. Kay.
Page 32337
1 MR. KAY: Thank you, Your Honours. In our submission, this issue
2 entirely arises as a result of the condition of the health of the accused.
3 We do point out to the Court that rather contrary to some of the
4 submissions from the Prosecution today, that in their submissions of the
5 26th of July, 2004, at paragraph 29, they conceded that the conduct of the
6 accused was stopping just short of obstructionism. That was not in fact
7 an allegation that was in their mind at that time rather to the extent
8 that it has been presented today.
9 We all know the issue of the accused concerning the legitimacy of
10 the Tribunal, and the proceedings over the last three years has been
11 conducted with that in mind, and in our submission the Trial Chamber has
12 respected his arguments on the matter whilst ruling against it. There's
13 been no attempt by the Trial Chamber to silence the accused on such an
14 issue. They, in fact, have respected his opinions whilst going about
15 their own business in dealing with the conduct of this case. And it's not
16 meant to be insulting to the Court in any way. There is a freedom of
17 expression available to him. He is not counsel. He has chosen to defend
18 his case himself whilst at all times taking pains to ensure that why he is
19 doing what he is doing is understood within a general context. At the end
20 of the day, the powers and decision-making, we all recognise, lie with
21 this Court and the Judges, and in our submission, the accused isn't being
22 disrespectful in relation to that.
23 Judge Bonomy.
24 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Kay, I think there are certain limits to how
25 far certain references can be tolerated, and as you must have observed
Page 32338
1 yesterday, I think on two occasions Mr. Milosevic referred to this Trial
2 Chamber as part of a joint criminal enterprise and acting against him.
3 Now that is offensive. And my only reason for not intervening on either
4 occasion was the circumstances that he was making an opening statement,
5 which in my opinion he's entitled to make without interruption, but that
6 was the only reason, I assure you, for not interrupting what I thought was
7 a flagrant insult to the Court.
8 MR. KAY: It was an opening statement. When he gets down to the
9 matter of dealing with business in terms of witnesses, one will have seen
10 from the record that in fact that's not his approach to the evidence.
11 And he's also been the subject of many barbs and criticisms from
12 the other side. We have heard it today as well. We have at times as
13 well. And this is perhaps when the parties on both sides perhaps get too
14 over-enthused by the legitimacy of their provisions and positions.
15 In our submission, there is no disrespect here intended by the
16 accused. In fact, within the proceedings he has not been obstructive.
17 He's been respectful to the Court subject to certain occasions that Your
18 Honour has pointed out, and his clear intent has been on that line.
19 To start saying whatever faults there may be, that that's a ground
20 for taking away his right to represent himself, in our submission is
21 Draconian and doesn't really cause us to be here today discussing this
22 issue. It's probably a feature of the Prosecution's argument that we can
23 put on one side.
24 JUDGE BONOMY: I think I also ought to make it clear to you,
25 Mr. Kay, that of course that sort of thing is something that in my opinion
Page 32339
1 the Court ought to deal with as it arises, and I understand what you're
2 saying, that it may well not be an issue in relation to the assignment of
3 counsel. It may in fact be a quite separate matter, and indeed that may
4 be said of the other references that Mr. Nice made to features of the
5 conduct of the accused himself.
6 The point, however, needs to be made that these things do not go
7 unnoticed. What action is taken is quite another matter.
8 MR. KAY: Yes, and I'm grateful for Your Honour's comments on
9 that, and we of course are all aware of that, that that's the position of
10 the Trial Chamber.
11 In relation to issues such as the naming of the witnesses, that
12 appears to have been, which the Trial Chamber I believe know from
13 documents filed, a misunderstanding in communication by those acting on
14 his behalf. The amici curiae on the 9th of August filed a list of numbers
15 of witnesses ex parte and confidential. We've been endeavouring to help
16 as much as possible to try to get a smooth introduction to the Defence
17 evidence in this case, and I believe it was misunderstood by another party
18 about the need for the issuing of the names. When that mistake was
19 recognised, the legal officer for the Tribunal, Ms. Anoya, filed on the
20 25th of August, I believe, a document that had been constructed with
21 numbers and names together which came from the associates. The
22 Prosecution have known this as well, actually, and to make it as a point
23 now, in our submission that doesn't really give merit to their arguments.
24 They've known what the difficulty was behind that particular matter.
25 Let's get to the real issue, which concerns the health of the
Page 32340
1 accused. The amici curiae filed on the 13th of August our submissions in
2 relation to this matter, and we have always argued in support of the right
3 of the accused to represent himself. However, there has been a change in
4 the information before the Trial Chamber and that arises from the medical
5 reports.
6 In many respects, this is an issue that perhaps can be dealt with
7 in two stages. First of all, do the -- do the Trial Chamber accept from
8 the evidence before it that the accused is unfit fully to represent
9 himself? And there needs to be a second stage, once that finding has been
10 made, that receives the arguments of the parties as to where to go next.
11 The amici curiae have always sought to fulfil their role which requires
12 them to make points in the interest of the accused on matters of law,
13 objections to evidence, and matters of procedure, and that's been our
14 position to date, and we've endeavoured to provide full arguments for his
15 side on the matter, there being no written filings by the accused himself,
16 just the oral argument that the Tribunal has heard today and on other
17 occasions.
18 In many respects, I've then got to go to the next stage on the
19 basis of what if there is a finding in relation to his representation?
20 There's no point me just standing here and saying, well, that's as far as
21 the matter goes, because it may be that the Trial Chamber makes that
22 finding and then deals with the secondary stage: What happens next.
23 In our submission, there's nothing in the Rules that would prevent
24 the accused from still taking part in the presentation of his defence, and
25 on those occasions where there may be failings in the trial that require
Page 32341
1 an alternative course of conduct or indeed if the accused to preserve his
2 energy and health and in the delegation of tasks brought about by
3 representing himself, that in those circumstances he should be entitled to
4 use the services of his associates if they wish to take up that position
5 on his behalf or another counsel appointed by Mr. Milosevic or his
6 associates to deal with such matters when they arise.
7 Within the funding of this Tribunal, there are grounds, and indeed
8 within the Rules, that no obstruction to funding being made available for
9 counsel appointed by him or his associates to represent him in this
10 courtroom if the Court went down that route of what we could call a hybrid
11 position of representation. Maybe the phrase in that circumstance of
12 "imposing counsel" is inappropriate. It's assisting Mr. Milosevic in his
13 presentation of the Defence case.
14 JUDGE ROBINSON: You will have noticed, Mr. Kay, that we haven't
15 used the term "imposing." We have been speaking of assigning in our
16 orders.
17 MR. KAY: Yes, the amici have noticed that throughout and felt
18 that that was an indication here that the Tribunal were not, in the
19 circumstances, taking away the right of his representation, but as Judge
20 Kwon's questioning earlier this morning posited that there could be a dual
21 function within Mr. Milosevic's team or group for the presentation of his
22 case. And that's a course that we urge be adopted by him as well as by
23 the Trial Chamber. And all lawyers involved in big litigation - and this
24 litigation is as big as it gets - have to delegate roles and tasks, and
25 the leaders of teams involved in this kind of litigation, as we've seen in
Page 32342
1 the Prosecution presentation, may I say in a very limited form in terms of
2 the amici curiae, but in all other cases, a delegation of tasks for
3 interviewing witnesses, thinking of case strategies, as well as the
4 presentation of evidence.
5 We urge that that not be taken away from Mr. Milosevic despite the
6 medical reports, but that it gives him a free hand, if you like, to make
7 his own personal decisions as to what is in his best interest. And it may
8 be, if we're in this stage, too, of his right of unfettered
9 self-representation being curtailed because of the position of the trial
10 at this date, it may be that having passed the one hurdle, that he, aware
11 of the fact that if there is a breakdown in the course of the conduct of
12 the case caused because he has worked himself too hard, then someone else
13 on his behalf within his team, or appointed by him if it's outside his
14 team, would be able to present evidence on his behalf. And then he has to
15 judge how much he does and either delegate more, regulate the amount of
16 work that he does; but to ensure that those aspects of the case that he
17 needs to deal with he can fulfil that role effectively.
18 So if the Trial Chamber does move from the position of unfettered
19 self-representation, we urge him and the Trial Chamber to view that as
20 really the first stop on the issue. The highest priority is that it's
21 someone within his team who is able to share some of the burden within
22 him. And if his other two associates, or three associates now who have
23 been dealing with the preparation of the case are unable to take that on
24 themselves because they're involved in other aspects, that they appoint
25 someone that they want to deal with the supplemental advocacy on those
Page 32343
1 occasions when Mr. Milosevic can't do it or has felt able to relieve some
2 of the burden on himself.
3 Within the Rules of this Tribunal, that can be funded. There is
4 no reason why there should be an obstruction in the provision of resources
5 that way. And every indication would be so far in the presentation of
6 this trial that the Registry in this building would be supportive of that.
7 But we do urge that that is very much the first stop, to give him
8 the choice once a decision is made, when it's known how this matter is to
9 be dealt with, before the Trial Chamber moves into any other position.
10 Unless I can deal with other issues specifically on behalf of the
11 amici, those are our submissions at this stage.
12 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you very much, Mr. Kay.
13 Mr. Nice.
14 MR. NICE: Can I reply briefly?
15 On the accused's points, he speaks of our speaking of danger in
16 preparing the witnesses. The danger to which I initially referred was the
17 danger to his health. But there is, in fact, an additional danger. It's
18 the danger of a personal party to litigation being too close to the
19 litigation to prepare witnesses dispassionately, and in this case, of
20 course, some witnesses might actually prefer the practice that exists in
21 many jurisdictions whereby witnesses are not prepared by the litigant
22 himself and have to be prepared by the independent solicitor or other
23 lawyer.
24 In speaking of his fatigue, the accused did not suggest that he
25 has the physical capacity to both prepare and present witnesses at the
Page 32344
1 rate that would be required to guarantee a three-day sitting week, which
2 is the minimum, of course, that the Chamber might regard as acceptable.
3 And indeed, he didn't challenge the medical finding that he is not fit to
4 prepare and present his case wholly himself.
5 I observe from an interview we've received notice of recently,
6 when the accused speaks of, as it were, his disinclination to have a
7 lawyer act for him, that one of his advisors, in a public interview in a
8 newspaper - I'm afraid it's in German; we'll make it available - Mr.
9 Ognjanovic, has described his role as being only marginally distinct from
10 that of Defence counsel. The next stage is one that, at a minimum, should
11 now be required of him via this accused.
12 It's said that our initial submissions spoke of behaviour being
13 just short of obstructionist. True. We also referred to the etiquette
14 matter. We have referred regularly and extensively to the wasting of
15 time, and that filing came before we had the recent and very much stronger
16 evidence going to show that what was happening with the medical regime was
17 obstructionist.
18 JUDGE ROBINSON: You mean before the second report from Dr.
19 Dijkman?
20 MR. NICE: Yes. That's the earliest filing that came right in
21 July. So insofar as there's been a strengthening of our position, it
22 reflects that.
23 As for the suggestion that the observations, the recurring
24 observations of this accused are not present to be insulting, that's not a
25 proposition we can accept. Apart from the matters to which His Honour
Page 32345
1 Judge Bonomy referred, it is the needless repetition of the points, both
2 as against the Judges and as against the Prosecutor and those prosecuting,
3 that we rely on to reveal the true intention of this accused, which, in
4 our respectful submission, is claimly aimed at showing public respect and
5 being allowed to show public respect to the audience at which his
6 performance is principally directed.
7 On the topic of the production of statements -- sorry, names of
8 witnesses and exhibits, the Chamber will have the history before it. It
9 was on the 18th of June that the order was made -- or the 17th of June,
10 set in writing on the 18th of June. The Prosecution sought relief on the
11 29th of June in relation to this and raised the question of non-compliance
12 on the 5th of July, and it was at that hearing that the accused said that
13 he was only going give us so much and he was acting in the identical
14 manner as the other party.
15 Compliance with that order was made on the 6th of July, and on the
16 16th of July, the amici requested, as for the accused, 14 days for further
17 compliance, so that would have only taken them until the end of July.
18 The order of the Trial Chamber came on the 28th of July, and
19 whatever misunderstanding there may have been, and I accept that Ms. Anoya
20 spoke of a misunderstanding to the case manager, Ms. Dicklich, on the 25th
21 of August, the fact of the matter is, that despite that history, we got
22 the names on the 20 -- well, two days ago, three days ago, and we don't
23 adjust our position in respect to that at all.
24 Funding is a separate issue and it's not a matter, I think, upon
25 which we should dwell, save to say this: If the Chamber decided that its
Page 32346
1 future conduct of the case were to be conditional on the accused appearing
2 through counsel of his own nomination as part of its overall plan for the
3 future conduct of the case, that decision should come first and the
4 question of funding should come second, it needing to be established, I
5 think, by the Registry, what his financial position is, and that's not a
6 matter for us to trouble you with at this stage.
7 The distinction between imposition and assignment is one we've
8 recognised from the beginning and throughout our submissions, and
9 Mr. Kay's -- my learned friend Mr. Kay's proposal, as we ventured to
10 suggest at the start of our argument this morning, allows for control of
11 the proceedings to be in the hands of the accused, and one has only to
12 look at what happened in Seselj where counsel was made available to him on
13 the basis that counsel would not be removable by him, and the first
14 counsel was. It's all too possible, if you have that kind of
15 relationship, for something to go wrong, which is why we repeat our
16 request to the Chamber to impose counsel and then to allow the accused to
17 make the sensible decision. Imposed counsel might have no function more
18 pleasing than to be on stand-by throughout the rest of the case. He might
19 serve as an alternate Judge serves in courts that appoint such Judges.
20 But his presence or her presence would guarantee two things, first that
21 the progress of the Chamber of the trial would not be further thwarted;
22 and second, in fact, that the accused through his nominated counsel would
23 comply with what was required of him, for imposed counsel would remind
24 him, standing ever so still and ever so silently in the Court -- or
25 sitting ever so still and ever so silently in the Court, would remind him
Page 32347
1 that if he returned to conduct that was obstructive in any way by
2 preparation or otherwise, the conduct of the case would be handed over to
3 an independent and objective different counsel.
4 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson.
6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This is improper. I would use an
8 even graver word, but there is no need for that. It is highly improper.
9 This proposal made by Mr. Nice is that you should threaten me that
10 I should not fall ill, because in case I fall ill, you will not act as you
11 would act in any other court of law on this planet. You will not say on
12 such and such a day we will not work, but then there will be this threat
13 hanging over me that then some other person would take over my rights to
14 defend myself. That is senseless.
15 Please, let's be clear on this. Mr. Nice says that I did not
16 challenge the fact that I was ill. Of course I did not challenge it. But
17 I was ill during that case of theirs too. They had 300 days. Three
18 hundred active days and I don't know how many witnesses. Please.
19 And indeed if anybody is watching this, then it's quite clear. At
20 that time, the question of my capabilities was not raised in terms of
21 exercising my rights, the ones that you gave me and that belong to me
22 according to all international conventions. But now when my time has
23 come, all of a sudden the question of my ability to defend myself has been
24 raised. You do not take away somebody's right to self-defence if he gets
25 sick. Then you don't work and that's it.
Page 32348
1 Let's get another thing clear too. The right to defend myself is
2 a question of principle. I do not accept any decrease of that right or
3 any renouncing of that right altogether. So I insist that you make it
4 possible for me to question my own witnesses, and I am categorical on that
5 point.
6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. We have heard your submissions.
7 [Trial Chamber confers]
8 JUDGE ROBINSON: We'll take a ten-minute adjournment to consider
9 this matter.
10 --- Break taken at 1.26 p.m.
11 --- On resuming at 1.45 p.m.
12 JUDGE ROBINSON: In the result, the Chamber was not able to arrive
13 at a decision on this matter in the time that we had set ourselves for the
14 adjournment, but in the event that the Chamber should decide to assign
15 counsel, the Chamber would wish the parties to be prepared tomorrow
16 morning at 9.00 to advance submissions on the question of how such
17 assignment should be made, the manner in which such assignment should be
18 made, that is the modalities that would govern such an assignment.
19 Is that sufficiently clear?
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson.
21 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, yes.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Please bear in mind the following:
23 For three years, the same doctors have considered me fit from the point of
24 view of health to function, and you yourselves have been able to see that.
25 Even Mr. Nice, in support of his motion that I be given as little time as
Page 32349
1 possible, put forward the argument that I have been functioning very
2 efficiently. So for three years the same doctors have considered me fit
3 to function. Then an independent doctor turns up from Belgium, the
4 country which is the seat of the NATO pact, and he says I'm unfit and then
5 the doctors here agree with him.
6 Allow me to bring into question this kind of deduction of medical
7 evidence. Please consider my motion and let the experts evaluate the
8 situation, but I ask for an expert from Russia, from Serbia, from Greece,
9 and then you can add two of your own, if you like, whom you will appoint,
10 to see what this is about. Things are being mystified here when in fact
11 they are very simple.
12 I see this as a manipulation aimed at depriving me of my right to
13 speak here and to speak the truth. That is the essence of it all.
14 Mr. Nice says in support of his argument that a lawyer should be
15 imposed on me, counsel should be imposed on me, that I am too involved and
16 am unable to be dispassionate. However, I feel that the other side is too
17 dispassionate when it comes to the truth. I cannot, of course, interfere
18 in how the other side do their job, but they cannot interfere in the way I
19 exercise my rights. That too is a question of principle.
20 Therefore I wish to reiterate: My right to defend myself is
21 something that I will neither accept having diminished nor will I ever
22 waive it. Please bear that in mind. And you can reach your own
23 decisions, but I receive the medicaments given to me by your people, your
24 employees. What is happening here, I don't know, but I can bring the
25 whole floor of the Detention Unit here to testify to what happened when
Page 32350
Page 32351
1 the food I had was exchanged with the food of the person across the
2 passageway, and there was a big to-do about setting things right, although
3 the food apparently was the same. It appeared to be the same. And I did
4 not raise the issue. I don't know what was going on.
5 But please be kind enough to bear in mind that when, for three
6 years, they have been saying one thing and now suddenly they turn around
7 and say something else, I am right in having suspicions. My suspicions
8 may or may not be justified, but they are well grounded.
9 [Trial Chamber confers]
10 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, on the submission from the accused that
11 he be allowed to bring an expert on the question of his health, do you
12 have any --
13 MR. NICE: First of all -- first of all, just investigating
14 whether this whole and very late submission by him was the subject of an
15 earlier order of yours that has not been reflected or respected by him,
16 and I'm grateful to Ms. Graham again for having this point in mind because
17 it had eluded me.
18 Would Your Honour just give me one minute.
19 [Prosecution counsel confer]
20 MR. NICE: Your Honour, what I'm concerned about is whether, in
21 fact, there's an order that quite expressly raises these issues for the
22 accused to deal with, and he, it may be thought, declined to deal with
23 them until right at the last minute, maybe when he sees, in the
24 vernacular, which way the wind is blowing. But even if there is no
25 express order in respect of which he is in non-compliance, his approach to
Page 32352
1 raising this issue, really, at this stage when he's seen the reports and
2 he had the earlier opportunity to raise the point is not insignificant.
3 Let me see if I can find the order. Apparently not. The amici
4 might be able to assist with the relevant order that we have in mind, and
5 I'm sorry, I've gone through them all recently, chronologically, but I
6 can't find it.
7 As to the substance of the matter that he raises, no, it's far too
8 late. This issue of his health and of his possible, probable, or certain
9 manipulation of his medical regime has been before him and his associates,
10 who are marginally different from lawyers appearing for him, as one of
11 them has said, for months. They know. The accused is a highly
12 intelligent man who, it may be thought, knows how to play the Court when
13 he has to. They know that that's an issue that is going to come up for
14 consideration and that you need to prepare to deal with it. This
15 allegation about the Belgian NATO-country doctor is absurd and the Chamber
16 should be content with the evidence that it has, the Chamber having been
17 always extremely careful to check medical information against second
18 opinion when it's judged it necessary.
19 The order that we had in mind is the order dated the 6th of August
20 where the accused and the amici were ordered to file submissions within
21 two weeks on the role that counsel assigned -- I'll check. It's a public
22 order. On the role that counsel --
23 JUDGE ROBINSON: We only have four more minutes before we have to
24 vacate the court.
25 MR. NICE: Okay. Ensuring fair representation of the Defence case
Page 32353
1 in the absence of instructions or cooperation with the counsel, and the
2 role which the amici curiae might play. And Your Honour, that order, even
3 if it didn't specifically seek any contrary evidence on medical issues, to
4 any intelligent person let alone to a lawyer appearing for this accused
5 would have raised the need to prepare himself against the eventuality he
6 now concerns himself with.
7 JUDGE ROBINSON: All right. Mr. Kay.
8 MR. KAY: Very briefly. There was no order requiring him to posit
9 any alternative medical report the Trial Chamber in our researches into
10 the matter. It has been raised by the accused at a late stage but it is
11 an important matter and the Trial Chamber might like to consider that when
12 dealing with this issue and give the accused, say, seven days in which to
13 respond to the matter.
14 JUDGE ROBINSON: We're going to adjourn and resume at 9.00.
15 Mr. Milosevic, can you say very quickly, why is this matter being
16 raised so late by you?
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Because it seems to me,
18 Mr. Robinson, that there is a manipulation going on here, because if for
19 three years --
20 JUDGE ROBINSON: I'm stopping you because the medical reports have
21 been transmitted to you. So you would have had time to consider the
22 matter, and instead you're raising it at the very last minute.
23 It's important that you offer an explanation for the lateness if
24 the request is to be considered.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Because, Mr. Robinson, until today
Page 32354
1 when I heard all these arguments which I feel to be highly illogical and
2 tendentious, it never crossed my mind. I'm probably not as intelligent as
3 Mr. Nice thinks I am. It never crossed my mind that it might be at all
4 possible for counsel to be imposed on me. It didn't even cross my mind.
5 I had in mind a clear-cut position that this was my right which would not
6 be denied me. However, now that I have heard all this, examples of how
7 people are treated who are accused of sexual crimes, which have nothing to
8 do with which we are speaking about here, when I see the arguments
9 constructed by the other side in order to have this right denied to me at
10 any cost, then of course I am beginning to think that there might be some
11 sort of manipulation involved here. I think it's quite logical and
12 normal. It never even crossed my mind that this kind of situation might
13 arise, that you might impose counsel on me. That is out of the question,
14 and I will not accept it.
15 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Kay, your submission, as I understand it, is
16 that the accused might be allowed a week in which to get this medical
17 evidence.
18 MR. KAY: Yes. I don't think he's been advised on this issue by
19 his associates, from the information I have, the argument just put by the
20 accused to the Tribunal concerning it never crossing his mind that his
21 right of self-representation may be taken away is probably right. And it
22 may be well be that this issue has not been given the attention that it
23 ought to have been by those advising him.
24 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you. We will adjourn, and we will address
25 these matters tomorrow morning at 9.00.
Page 32355
1 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.00 p.m.,
2 to be reconvened on Thursday, the 2nd day of
3 September, 2004, at 9.00 a.m.
Look at how the OTPOR kids that USAID, CIA and the NED paid $77 million to violently subvert the Yugoslav elections four years ago (they just reprised this hit in Georgia) are now being called by 'Marianne' (the slick French Leftish weekly) modern-day Che Guevaras--that is to say, these aimless, unemployed little fuckers are the paid flunkies of the same interests who assassinated Che? But then the New Left Review a while back called the Chechen terrorists, who just the other day murdered 300+ innocents at Beslan in Russia, the Che Guevaras of the Caucauses. But these are really the big fish compared to the small fry I'm concerned with here.
I remember walking back to my room at the Hotel Prag in Belgrade during the October 22-23, 2001, Freedom for Slobodan Milosevic Conference, and overhearing Jared Israel and Nico Varkevisser blowing smoke up each other's ass about how much money they were gouging out of the SPS (Serbian Socialist Party, as it was then) just for the honor of their presence: you know, air travel, hotel, even per diem. Reminded me of a couple a movie extras bragging about the bumps they'd chiseled a production company out of. But I was so naively delighted at just being a paying tourist, invited with my fresh little 911 riff (Belgrade/NY: aller-retour--somewhere on the blog here) to this major Yugoslav Conference, and being able to hang out with these ultra-fat players, that all I could think was how coooool they both seemed.
Then I started to notice their propensity for 'borrowing' the work of others: EmpsCl's 'Judgment' K7, a great item, was really the work of German reporter Thomas Deichmann; Chris Black had asked me to tape a meeting he was having with the wife and the lawyer of the former head of Belgrade TV, Mr Milanovic, who was at that time locked down, charged with responsibility in the deaths of the 16 RTV employees killed in the 1999 NATO missile strike, and Jared quickly commandeered the tape I'd made--though I don't think he ever did anything with the recording, he certainly woofed me outta writing about it; then there was the long, hard work on the Milosevic appeal to the Strasbourg Court on Human Rights, done for the President's current 'atyourknee', Nico van Holst en Steijnen--this pro bono work was received not with a grateful handshake, but with a lame-ass shake down, a demand to write a proposal to raise money in France and the US to further his lawyering for the Man; then there was the redaction of the David Owen book, 'Balkan Odyssey', gleaning of all relevant quotes from this turgid tome for the learning-challenged mitties @ EmpCls, which I was told would go directly to Milosevic for use in court--though not with my name whispered anywhere near it.
I could go on, but even I am bored by this. So let's jump-cut to the crux of the matter: Another expropriator of the works of others, Louis Dalmas at Balkans Infos, has asked people to support his association, Verité et Justice, an association (like the 44th with that name in France) formed a couple years ago on an impulse to spread support for the international defense of Slobodan Milosevic to France (0 associations with the President's name in my new home country). However, comrade Dalmas' Trotskyist longings made it impossible for him to actually associate his name or the name of his august association with that of the 'accused', the 'Butchest of the Balkans', the 'Stalinist dictator', the 'Balkan strongman' or whatever the Chetniks and Orthodox god-squadders were calling President Milosevic at the time. The Trots have always punched out at supporting Leftists who actually win state power.
So here goes BI/LD/VJ downloading the transcript of Milosevic's opening defense argument at The Hague (version française) and flogging it for 15 euros! There's precious little I can do to discourage this kind of graceless fiddle, now that I've broken with just about everyone in the Truth and Justice and Balkans movements, the Slobodan Milosevic Freedom Center where the Nicos are currently kenneled, and most of the Left, the academic Left, certainly, in the US, and, of course, Jared Israel has now been so well served by me that he no longer claims to know who I am. You girls know how that feels, huh.
Hey, Jared, I'm the one told you that the Tribunal's being a 'kangaroo court' didn't make Scheveningen, the NATO lock-up next door, a 'kangaroo prison'; and that Vivendi wasn't primarily a designer of video games but one of the world's largest privately held public utilities (Vivendi Environnementale=Société générale des eaux); that Raçak=Jenin was bullshit for innumerable reasons, not the least of which being that in this full-scale military 'incursion' into the undefended Jenin refugee camp, the majority of IDF casualties resulted from 'friendly fire'; and that the original 'joint criminal enterprise' at the heart of modern terrorism (i.e., the killing of innocent civilians to advance political interests) is not Hezbollah or Hamas or the KLA or al Qaida, but the inbred military/intelligence monstrosity that Israel and the US have spawned: Bush and Sharon, NATO and the IDF, DIA/CIA and Mossad have brought about the militarization of everyday life on this planet (and even into outer space) and rendered all into a giant bone yard where diseased dogs like those mentioned above will have a single place to shit and feed.
So here's CM/P's great money saving offer for you: Rather than send 15 euros to V&J&Rentabilité, read the transcripts of the President's opening statement on the CirqueMinime/Paris blog (ou les téléchargez en français à www.icty.org), and shoot even a small part of the chalk'n cheese off to SLOBODA (icdsm.org) instead. And while you're at it, tell them finally to shoot all those deadbeat Zionist punks to the shitty curb they fell off of and put '3 on a Genocide' back on their web site. Now's no time to break solidarity with the Rwandans, the Palestinians and the Iraqis--and White 'denial' ain't just a river in Sudan.--mc]
Page 32157
1 Tuesday, 31 August 2004
2 [Defence Opening Statement]
3 [Open session]
4 [The accused entered court]
5 --- Upon commencing at 9.02 a.m.
6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, you may proceed with your opening
7 statement.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, for my opening
9 statement, I would need tomorrow as well. I would like to note that the
10 other side had three days, so I expect you to be so kind as to make this
11 day and the following day available to me as well.
12 May I start now?
13 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, this is your third bite at the
14 proverbial cherry. In response to the Prosecution's opening on the Kosovo
15 part of the case, you were allowed eight hours, two days. And in response
16 to the Prosecution's opening on the Bosnia and Croatian part of the case,
17 you were allowed three and a half hours. This is your third bite.
18 Please proceed.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, you personally, you
20 yourself, said that I have the right to a statement and to opening
21 arguments. What I made were statements. This is an opening argument. I
22 think that you should bear that in mind. I think that you should look at
23 this request that I've just put forth and I think that you should give me
24 additional time.
25 JUDGE ROBINSON: Please proceed, Mr. Milosevic.
Page 32158
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Robinson.
2 In the international public, for a long time and with clear
3 political intentions an untruthful, distorted picture was being created in
4 terms of what happened in the territory of the former Yugoslavia.
5 Accusations levelled against me are an unscrupulous lie and also a
6 tireless distortion of history. Everything has been presented in a
7 lopsided manner so -- in order to protect from responsibility those who
8 are truly responsible and to draw the wrong conclusions about what
9 happened and also in terms of the background of the war against
10 Yugoslavia.
11 There is a fundamental historical fact that one should proceed
12 from when seeking to understand what happened and which led to everything
13 that happened in the territory of Yugoslavia from 1991 until the present
14 day, and that is the violent destruction of a European state, Yugoslavia,
15 which was derived from the statehood of Serbia, the only ally of the
16 democratic world in that part of the world over the past two centuries.
17 There is no doubt that this fundamental historic fact is going to leave an
18 imprint on European history in the times to come.
19 A multi-ethnic, multi-cultural, multi-confessional state was
20 destroyed, a state that had its historic and international legal
21 legitimacy. In its territory, according to the dictat of Germany and
22 Vatican, assisted by the United States and the European Community, pure
23 nation states, miniature nation states, were established. The state that
24 was destroyed was a member of all international organisations starting
25 with the first postal union from 1884 through the League of Nations, the
Page 32159
1 International Label Organisation, the United Nations, the World Bank, the
2 International Monetary Fund, and all other specialised agencies of the
3 United Nations all the way up to the Organisation for Security and
4 Cooperation in Europe.
5 Whose merit was this that this sovereign state was destroyed?
6 According to the Nuremberg principles, this constitutes the gravest
7 international crime, a crime against peace. Whose merit was it that a war
8 happened in which tens of thousands of civilians were killed, hundreds of
9 thousands of people wounded and maimed? Thousands of people lost their
10 homes and fled from their homes, mostly Serbs, and also there are millions
11 of damage in terms of property. The -- this is -- not speak of the
12 ecological disaster involved.
13 The international community will have to face up to all of this.
14 It is not only that a state was destroyed. The United Nations system was
15 destroyed. Also the corpus of principles upon which the world
16 civilisation was based has been destroyed. In addition to that, never in
17 history has a state disappeared by sheer coincidence. There was a great
18 deal of rhetoric involved in the destruction of Yugoslavia. When the
19 crisis first broke out, all the way up to the present day, everything that
20 has been said, including what this so-called Prosecution said, is wrong.
21 Yugoslavia did not simply disappear into thin air, as Mr. Robert Badinter
22 tried to explain, and in this way he resorted to some kind of legal
23 metaphysics. This country was destroyed through a plan, violently, and
24 through a war which continues to be waged, and a series of war crimes were
25 committed in this war.
Page 32160
1 An American theoretician, a prominent one, Stephen John Steedman,
2 noted, rightly so, in 1993 in the periodical Foreign Affairs that at the
3 beginning of the war, and I am quoting: "Slovenia or some other state did
4 not exist. There was only one state; Yugoslavia." So it is logical to
5 take that as a point of departure in any kind of legal analysis.
6 Yugoslavia, which was headed at this most critical time by a
7 member of the Presidency from Croatia, Stjepan Mesic, the Prime Minister
8 of the country at the time was also from Croatia; Ante Markovic. The
9 Foreign Minister was also from Croatia; Budimir Loncar.
10 As for the top echelons of the military, and we heard about that
11 here, among the 16 top generals, there were only two Serbs. The majority
12 were Croats, Slovenes, and people with other ethnic backgrounds.
13 This state had a strong armed force that was in a position to keep
14 the conflict under control and to prevent it from happening altogether.
15 However, this government let paramilitary formations, arms smugglers, have
16 their way, even the narco Mafia, when we look at the end of this process
17 in Kosovo. However, this government acted in concert with the European
18 Community, notably Germany and the Vatican.
19 As early as the end of June 1991, the European Community asked for
20 the legitimate army to remain within barracks and in this way to turn the
21 army voluntarily into detainees within their own country, which is only
22 logical -- and it is only logical that this led to secession and to the
23 creation of paramilitary formations. The secession of Slovenia happened
24 in 1991, and it was accompanied by armed action.
25 In June 1991, the Slovenian military formations without any cause
Page 32161
1 killed in cold blood JNA soldiers who were securing the border towards
2 Austria and Italy and took over border posts. From the point of view of
3 the UN charter, from the point of view of general legal principles
4 recognised by civilised nations, this is a classical example of an armed
5 rebellion against a state. Therefore the state is duty-bound to take all
6 necessary measures in order to restore law and order.
7 We know that when acting on orders given by the federal Prime
8 Minister, Ante Markovic, the commander of the 5th army, a Slovenian,
9 General Konrad Kolsek, informed the government of Slovenia that the
10 Yugoslav People's Army will regain control over the border and that this
11 task would be carried out.
12 The Slovenian leadership, instead of making it possible to carry
13 these decisions out peacefully, these decisions taken by the federal
14 authorities, said that they are taking this challenge and that they would
15 resort to force in order to oppose it, and that's what they did. Their
16 paramilitary forces, which then included 36.000 persons illegally armed,
17 were used by Slovenia to launch an armed offensive. All of them knew full
18 well that the Yugoslav army, educated in the spirit of brotherhood and
19 unity, would not shoot at Slovenians who they considered to be their own
20 citizens. So actually the killing of JNA soldiers was a mere premeditated
21 crime. It was no war.
22 Grave war crimes were committed. Not even military medical
23 institutions were spared. The troika of the European Community toured the
24 area and described the dramatic situation. There is a long list of crimes
25 and there is also film material documenting the crimes of the Slovenian
Page 32162
1 paramilitary forces, and this footage was shot by an Austrian TV company.
2 Due to the time constraints that you have imposed upon me, I do not have
3 the possibility of playing these tapes now, but I am going to call certain
4 witnesses and show them then.
5 On the 10th of July, 1991, the European parliament passed a
6 resolution condemning not the rebels, not the secessionists, but the legal
7 force, the Yugoslav People's Army. And inversion was carried out between
8 the victim and the executioner, and in this way the European Community and
9 the United States fuelled the war.
10 I am pointing this out because it has been said time and again
11 ever since that this is what happened in the former Yugoslavia, and this
12 is a formula that was resorted to all the time. In Croatia, crimes
13 against the Serbs started even earlier, even before secession was
14 declared. The same methods in the same areas where the genocide against
15 the Serb people started in 1941 by the Ustasha formations in the so-called
16 Independent State of Croatia.
17 World experts who studied genocide, the genocide that occurred in
18 different places and at different times, for example, Leo Cooper, Peter
19 Drost, Ted Gertz, Louis Horowitz, George Cram, and others came to the
20 conclusion that genocide over a people can occur only once. Any further
21 attempt would turn into civil war. And this thesis was confirmed in
22 Croatia.
23 The genocide over the Serbs in Croatia in 1941 started by making
24 lists and calling upon groups and giving -- in order to ostensibly give
25 them information. However, they were not given information. Serbs were
Page 32163
1 killed and sent off to concentration camps.
2 This time, when similar things were done, the Serbs resisted, and
3 they felt seriously manipulated by politicians who had defended ideals of
4 fraternity and unity and then called upon the people in a different way.
5 Old Ustasha formulas and old Ustasha symbols were resorted to. Laws were
6 passed along the fast track and the Serbs lost their status of a
7 constituent people. Without the army isolated in barracks, the Serbs in
8 Krajina were prepared to die, but they were not to submit themselves yet
9 to another genocide.
10 A long time before the secession of 1991 in Croatia, armed groups
11 functioned there. The so-called voluntary peoples protection forces;
12 Zebra, Black Wolves, the Wolves from Vukovar, et cetera. In Zagreb on the
13 28th of May, a military parade was organised a month before secession
14 where arms were shown, arms that particularly came from Germany. These
15 were only preparations for what would happen later. Groups of
16 paramilitaries were transferred from Croatia to Bosnia at that time
17 because President Tudjman had announced a change of borders and that the
18 borders of Croatia would be moved to the Drina.
19 In July 1991, the armed paramilitaries in Croatia started a
20 frontal war. From the 20th of July until the 4th of August, there were 75
21 attacks against the JNA.
22 THE INTERPRETER: Could the speaker please be asked to slow down.
23 It is impossible for the interpreters to follow any longer.
24 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, the interpreters are asking you to
25 speak slowly, more slowly.
Page 32164
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] They could have said that to me. I
2 didn't hear them.
3 JUDGE ROBINSON: They did.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.
5 Serb houses were set on fire and individual crimes against Serbs
6 were transformed into mass liquidations. In the cornfield near the
7 village of Jankovci, 65 Serbs were slaughtered. All of them have been
8 identified. In the village of Svinjarevo 25 were killed, and so on and so
9 forth. Entire villages in the area of Papuk and Slunj were razed to the
10 ground. The most widespread form of terror over the Serbian people were
11 forcible evictions, and this was the strongest link between the years 1941
12 and 1991.
13 These activities began in Western Slovenia immediately after the
14 HDZ won the elections. A psychosis was created so that people would be
15 encouraged to move out. Various methods were used. Serbian children were
16 mocked in school. The people were brought into police stations. Serbs
17 were dismissed from work on a large scale, their houses were bombed. The
18 Crisis Staff in Slavonska Pozega on the 28th of October, 1991, issued an
19 order on the eviction of Serbs from 24 villages; Oblakovac, Orijaca,
20 Slatina, and so on, within a 24-hour period. This order was broadcast on
21 the radio and published in the press. Those who refused to comply were
22 taken to concentration camps. A large scale exodus of Serbs in the areas
23 of Podravska Slatina, and Daruvar took place.
24 From July to August 1991 to the -- 1992, many Serbian villages
25 were ethnically cleansed. Documents on all this were submitted to the
Page 32165
1 European Community.
2 War activities were then taken to the territory of Bosnia and
3 Herzegovina. The ideological foundations were laid in 1970 with the
4 Islamic declaration of Alija Izetbegovic. This was a secret platform.
5 Later on, in 1984, a book by the same author was published on Islam and
6 the West, and then the Islamic declaration was published again in 1990.
7 It is well known that it states that there can be no peace and
8 co-existence between the Islamic faith and non-Islamic faiths. This is
9 repeated many times in all these books and publications.
10 At the Bosnian and Herzegovinian Assembly session on the 21st of
11 December 1991, Izetbegovic said he was willing to sacrifice peace for a
12 sovereign Bosnia and Herzegovina. There was mass mobilisation and civil
13 war started with abundant financial help arriving from Saudi Arabia, Iran,
14 and other Islamic countries. After this, many Mujahedin arrived.
15 On the 6th summit of the organisation of the Islamic Conference
16 held on the 9th of December, 1991, before the war was fully developed and
17 before Bosnia and Herzegovina was recognised, support was given to their
18 brothers in faith, support for the creation of the first Islamic state in
19 Europe. Even today Bosnia and Herzegovina does not have a majority Muslim
20 population. Not only was there substantial financial help, but Alija
21 Izetbegovic was feted and honoured at the Islamic Conference held in Djeda
22 on the -- from the 1st to the 2nd of December 1991. They also extended
23 their concern to two areas in Serbia; to Kosovo and the area of Raska, or
24 as they called it, Sandzak.
25 The first holy warriors, the Mujahedin, arrived from Afghanistan,
Page 32166
Page 32167
1 Lebanon, Morocco and Pakistan, armed with weapons sent by the CIA to the
2 rebels in Afghanistan. A group of 400 members of Hezbollah arrived in
3 Sarajevo as military instructors. Following the tradition from World War
4 II of a joint action under the auspices of Nazi Germany against the
5 democratic coalition to which the then Yugoslavia belonged, Tudjman and
6 Izetbegovic, the two leaders of the rebels, signed an agreement stating
7 that the armed forces of the Croatian Defence Council would be part of the
8 unified armed forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This was followed by the
9 expulsion of Serbs from areas under the control of Muslim forces. Tens of
10 thousands of people were expelled from Mostar, 2.000 from Gorazde, and so
11 on.
12 As happened in Croatia, in Bosnia and Herzegovina allegedly
13 retired American officers were sent to be instructors of the Muslim army.
14 Combat operations developed and moved from the north toward the south, and
15 they were finally transferred to the territory of Serbia, that is to
16 Kosovo. The pattern along which the destruction of Yugoslavia was
17 planned, Kosovo being the last phase, is very simple: Reliance was placed
18 on paramilitary rebel forces, criminals, and on Kosovo, the narco Mafia,
19 as well as terrorist forces.
20 During the time of Croatia and Serbia, the legitimate force was
21 the JNA, and later on the army of Yugoslavia. There was open aggression
22 on the remainder of Yugoslavia, Serbia and Montenegro. Tens of thousands
23 of bombs were dropped and various projectiles with depleted uranium and
24 five to six times more poison was dropped than was the case in Hiroshima.
25 All this happened in the aggression against Yugoslavia by the NATO pact.
Page 32168
1 The involvement of the West, primarily the Vatican and Germany,
2 was evident from the very beginning. Donald Horowitz, the well-known
3 American theoretician, presented arguments in his study on ethnic and
4 national conflicts, that they take on their worst form, war, when they
5 gain international support. And this is precisely what happened on the
6 territory of Yugoslavia.
7 The war on this territory was a synchronised activity by
8 secessionist forces and external forces who, in preparing the bloodshed
9 and fuelling the bloodshed, implanted into Yugoslavia Ustasha extremists
10 and Nazis, Islamic fundamentalists and Albanian terrorists whose role was
11 to be the detonator for the outbreak of the conflict. The external forces
12 in the initial phases acted behind the scenes, supplying the secessionists
13 with arms and money and infiltrating mercenaries into the country. The
14 final destruction of Yugoslavia was perpetrated through institutional
15 deceptions.
16 In the final act from -- the final document from Helsinki, the USA
17 and other countries promised to respect the integrity of all the countries
18 in the area, all the states, and said that they would refrain from any
19 activities against the territorial integrity and unity and independence of
20 every signatory country. This was signed in Paris in 1990. Only a year
21 after this, the international community acted openly on the political
22 scene as the main force for the destruction of Yugoslavia.
23 On Brioni on the 7th of July, 1991, a declaration was signed on
24 the peaceful resolution of the conflict in the SFRY. Relying on these
25 documents which I have mentioned, the European Community promised to seek
Page 32169
1 a peaceful solution and to respect the territorial integrity of
2 Yugoslavia, which was the only legally protected entity, which actually
3 gave it the mandate to mediate in this conflict. The whole process
4 started from several -- there were several possible solutions that were
5 proposed, and concessions were proposed that could be relied on.
6 Instead of all this, Lord Carrington, at a meeting on the 18th of
7 October 1991, set out an ultimatum, and there was no alternative to the
8 disappearance of Yugoslavia. This was the model applied by Hitler in
9 1941. Nazi values won the day. The right to the destruction of a state
10 to secession was given priority over preserving a state and the right to
11 preserve a state, a member of the UN.
12 The paradox is that the right that was given to the secessionists
13 of Yugoslavia is denied, for example, to the Irish by the British, and so
14 on. Let us remember that there was a time when Serbian fighters fought
15 together with the allies in World War II and that then the troops of the
16 so-called Independent State of Croatia, as well as some forces from
17 Bosnia, also then within the Independent State of Croatia, fought on the
18 side of the Nazi forces. At that time the well-known Handzar Division
19 from Bosnia was sent to France as part of the convicts unit, and there
20 they committed unprecedented crimes.
21 Let us go back to Carrington's document, which was the first blow
22 against the sovereignty of Yugoslavia. This is an evident deception.
23 This is something that transformed further negotiations into a farce.
24 After this, the secessionist republics were recognised under strong
25 pressure from Germany and the Vatican, against the elementary principles
Page 32170
1 of international law, the practice of the United Nations, and the practice
2 of a leading power, the USA.
3 Very well. On the basis of Smithson's declaration from the 7th of
4 January 1932, the United Nations -- United States promised not to
5 recognise countries arising from violent changes. This principle first
6 became the regional rule of the USA and then entered the universal rules
7 of international law. This time America trampled on its own law.
8 In July 1991, before the war started, the Minister of Foreign
9 Affairs of Germany, Genscher, advocated that Croatia and Slovenia be
10 recognised right away. A parallel action was waged by the Vatican. The
11 ambassador with the Holy See, Thomas Patrick Milady, in mid-1991, the
12 Vatican initiated an unprecedented action and led the forces lobbying for
13 the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia.
14 In August 1991, Pope John Paul II sent Archbishop Torano to
15 Yugoslavia. On his return, he submitted a report stating that Serbia was
16 indisputably the aggressor. This was another shameless lie. This was
17 hypocrisy on the part of a spiritual leader. Aggression on one's own
18 country is something that only be conceived of maliciously. However, this
19 was accepted by the press and there was perfect coordination between the
20 Vatican and Germany. In December 1991, Genscher visited the Vatican. On
21 his return on the 19th of December, he announced that Germany would
22 recognise Croatia and Slovenia regardless of the positions of other
23 countries. And this was carried out on the 23rd of December. The Vatican
24 did this on the 13th of January 1992.
25 Germany and the Vatican were led by their historical geostrategic
Page 32171
1 interests. For years they worked on the destruction of Yugoslavia. This
2 was stated by Helmut Kohl in the magazine Politics International, issue
3 66. He said that the creation -- that the decisive period started when
4 Kinkel became head of the security service of Germany, and he established
5 close links with the Ustasha emigres. These were forces which worked on
6 the break-up of Yugoslavia, according to the writings of the well-known
7 American analyst Eric Schmidt-Birnbaum. These were Josip Balovic [phoen],
8 Josip Boljkovac, Franjo Tudjman, and Stjepan Mesic, the present Croatian
9 president. Mesic confirmed his role on Slovenian television by stating
10 that the idea on the break-up of Yugoslavia was something he wanted to
11 transmit to those who had the strongest influence on its fate, Genscher
12 and the Pope.
13 "I met Genscher three times. He made it possible for me to contact
14 the Holy See. The Pope and Genscher agreed to the total break-up of
15 Yugoslavia." End of quotation.
16 After this, recognition followed by other members of the European
17 Community in January 1992. In the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, this
18 happened on the 6th of April of the same year. On the very date of
19 Hitler's attack on Yugoslavia in 1941; the 6th of April.
20 The federal entities were recognised, and in there, as it is
21 stated, "internationally recognised borders." However, never in any
22 international document were the administrative borders recognised. There
23 was not even an internal document about these borders. What is most
24 important in all this, recognition is a one-sided political act, whereas
25 the establishing of borders is a process, an internal process. The units
Page 32172
1 that were recognised did not meet the elementary prerequisites to be
2 recognised as states. For a state to be recognised, it needs to have a
3 legitimate state apparatus, stable political structures, there must be a
4 monopoly of power within the territory, full control over the use of
5 power, and, what is most important, a state has to express its strength
6 and its ability to provide security on the international and internal
7 levels. None of this was complied with. There was a bloody civil war
8 which will be recorded as something unique in modern history but in a very
9 negative way.
10 In legal circles throughout the world, the recognition of the
11 rebel forces caused great astonishment and was condemned. Cedric
12 Thornberry, the leader of the UNPROFOR, stated, I quote: "When Ambassador
13 Cutileiro notified us of the decision to recognise, General Morillon and I
14 were astonished." The French newspaper Figaro called this legal
15 hypocrisy. General MacKenzie, in his memoirs, states, "Although we were
16 not diplomats, all of us in uniform were sure that fighting would break
17 out all around us as soon as recognition is announced."
18 Special envoy of the UN, Cyrus Vance, stated that recognition of
19 Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina by the European Community and
20 the United States, I quote: "Led to the war that is being waged on the
21 territory of Yugoslavia." He said this in September 1992.
22 The recognition of fictitious states in a civil war represents an
23 indirect form of aggression against the Socialist Federative Republic of
24 Yugoslavia. Along with a powerful media campaign and a -- deluding the
25 international community by violation of international law and the laws of
Page 32173
1 the United Nations, the secessionist states were recognised as members of
2 the UN. The rest of the Yugoslavia, the core part of Yugoslavia, were
3 imposed with sanctions in May 1992, and the country was isolated, and in
4 July of the same year they were excluded or expelled from the United
5 Nations only because we did not accept, by a stroke of the pen, to have
6 the existing state deleted, the state in which we were living.
7 In this legal chaos and this moral decline of the leading powers
8 in the post-Cold War period and of the Vatican, the way was opened for
9 craziness and lawlessness from the borders in the south to Kosovo -- in
10 the north to Kosovo in the south. This ad hoc Tribunal was formed also
11 with the one and only objective of covering up the piled-up mistakes of a
12 Western policy and to justify the crimes, the destruction of a state, and
13 the highly technological barbarism committed by NATO countries in their
14 three-month bombing of Yugoslavia. Mass crimes were committed against its
15 citizens, medieval heritage of the Serbian people in Kosovo was destroyed,
16 and so on and so forth.
17 By instrumentalising extremely complex events in the territory of
18 Yugoslavia and by placing the responsibility on Yugoslavia and myself
19 personally as aggressors, a very obvious tactic was used to close the
20 circle and prevent logical thinking based on empirical principles.
21 Senseless, vulgar theories about bad guys and rough state cannot serve to
22 explain historical facts and provide the historical responsibility for the
23 destruction of a state. The joint criminal intent existed but it didn't
24 proceed from Belgrade, however, nor did it exist in Belgrade at all.
25 Quite the contrary. It existed through the joint forces of the
Page 32174
1 secessionists, Germany and the Vatican, and also the rest of the countries
2 of the European Community and the United States.
3 During my first appearance in this place and then on several
4 occasions after that, I questioned the legality of this so-called
5 Tribunal. During the trial, you have provided me with a lot of arguments
6 in support of my position. I will not dwell on the lack of the legal
7 basis for the establishment of this Tribunal. I would just like to recall
8 that the source of judicial power can only come from international
9 treaties and not resolutions, as stated by the UN Secretary-General
10 himself in a statement to the Security Council on May 3rd, 1993. However,
11 you owe a response to the international community of where does the right
12 of the Security Council come to suspend legal treaties? We have the legal
13 -- the Geneva Conventions from 1949 as well as Additional Protocols to
14 punish war crimes which place the responsibility for a trial of such cases
15 on national courts. An international court can have authority only if it
16 was created by a lege artis act and if it is of a general nature. This
17 Tribunal lacks both elements. The act of the establishment of this
18 Tribunal is of an individual nature. It's a political nature. The
19 elementary legal principle is equality. So then we have the question why
20 were not courts formed for all the wars that are being waged throughout
21 the world and that had been waged at least in the past decade of the 20th
22 century. Although there are no principled reasons for not doing something
23 like that and to apply to everybody if such a thing were legal.
24 In other words, this Tribunal represents the most serious form of
25 discrimination against one country, and it is a violation of the
Page 32175
1 protection against all forms of discrimination.
2 At the very beginning, I requested that this institution uses its
3 authority from Article 96 of the UN Charter and to ask the permission of
4 the General Assembly and to ask the International Court of Justice,
5 legally the highest judicial instance in the UN system which is authorised
6 to interpret the Charter and to provide its legal opinion on whether the
7 Resolutions of the Security Council establishing this Tribunal were in
8 accordance with the UN Charter or not. The fact that this Tribunal has
9 given it the right to decide for itself whether it was established in a
10 legally valid way and then concluded, as could be expected, that it was
11 done in a legal way does not mean that this conclusion is correct or that
12 it even had the right to reach such a conclusion. Namely, this so-called
13 Tribunal, just like any other Tribunal, is not authorised to bring
14 judgements on its own legality. That is why this decision is legally
15 invalid. Courts are authorised to decide on their own authority on
16 whether they are competent, on whether they are competent to decide on a
17 question or not. However, the question of the jurisdiction of a court and
18 the question of its legality are two separate issues. The question of
19 legality has precedence over the question of authority, because if a court
20 is not legal, then the question of its authority or jurisdiction is
21 pointless. As opposed to the question of its own authority, no court can
22 decide on its own legality, because by tradition it is not permissible to
23 judge in one's own matter.
24 Also, this illegal Tribunal does not have the right to deprive
25 persons before it from an answer of whether they are facing a legal or an
Page 32176
Page 32177
1 illegal organ, particularly if there is a legally valid way to resolve
2 this question, because the person in question then is denied justice, deni
3 de justice, if this is not allowed to be answered.
4 However, I'm afraid that the people in authority in this
5 institution are aware that the International Court of Justice would be in
6 accordance with the view of their previous president, Mohamed Dejoui
7 [phoen], stated in his book The New World Order, and control of the
8 legality of the acts of the Security Council where, amongst the acts or
9 the laws that he mentions as controversial, both Resolutions referring to
10 this Tribunal are cited.
11 This Tribunal is not an International Tribunal and it is not an
12 independent organ, as you wish to present it. Amongst the public, there
13 has been an ideological fiction. The international community, which is
14 allegedly behind this Tribunal, is actually a deception. The ideal to
15 establish the Tribunal came from Kinkel after he succeeded Genscher, the
16 main criminal in the destruction of Yugoslavia. The idea was taken over
17 by Madeleine Albright, and the costs of the preliminary activities as well
18 as later activities were funded by the Soros Foundation who also founded a
19 coalition for international justice as an NGO in order to provide
20 "assistance" to the Tribunal. "Assistance" please I would like to place
21 in quotes, to these who are writing the transcript. These members and
22 other NGOs, some of whom today are working in this Tribunal today, were
23 engaged in 1992 in Bosnia and Herzegovina to gather the evidence on
24 alleged crimes by Serbs.
25 Albright presented this before the US Congress, engaged different
Page 32178
1 lobbies and different media for the purpose of fabricating a certain image
2 which would influence the public. Sometimes they have called her the
3 mother of the Tribunal.
4 As for the authenticity of the evidence given by the NGOs, we can
5 use a scandal about the false documents presented by representatives of
6 those organisations in which I was allegedly accused for alleged crimes in
7 Kosovo. A journalist of the New York Times who wrote an article based on
8 this false information was forced to resign for professional and ethical
9 reasons.
10 I have that issue of the New York Times here but I don't have time
11 to present it.
12 The drafter of the Statute, Michael Scharf, of the Tribunal gave a
13 very precise assessment of the Tribunal in an interview to the Washington
14 Post on October 3rd, 1999. I quote: "The Tribunal is a useful political
15 channel which serves to diplomatically isolate rogue leaders and to
16 strength political will in the world, to apply sanctions and to enforce
17 power."
18 In other words, the Tribunal is an instrument of war and not of
19 justice. This was confirmed in Globe and Mail, a Canadian magazine, by
20 Marcus McGee, who stressed that the Tribunal, I quote: "Is a part of the
21 NATO war strategy."
22 So this is a private justice only known to them imposed by a war
23 coalition, and the intention is to return the judiciary to the medieval
24 era.
25 In the world this Tribunal is called a propaganda instrument of
Page 32179
1 NATO, so there can be no question of any independence at all. We also
2 need to add that since 1996 there has been a constant communication
3 between the NATO Secretary-General and your Chief Prosecutor. And on 9th
4 of May, 1996, a memorandum was signed by the Chief Prosecutor and the
5 Supreme Commander of NATO for Europe about the modalities of cooperation.
6 Therefore, NATO, and not the United Nations, have taken over the role of
7 the Tribunal policemen, and that is why this Tribunal cannot be considered
8 an international institution at all but an institution of NATO.
9 Another factor supporting this claim, your own Article 32 of the
10 Statutes provides that expenses for the Tribunal should be covered by the
11 regular budget of the United Nations, but in practice the money comes from
12 very morbid sources, dark sources like the Soros Foundation, different
13 other foundations, and also from Islamic countries. The bulk of the money
14 comes from NATO itself. According to NATO spokesman Shea, I quote: "NATO
15 is the biggest financial source for the Tribunal." He stated this on the
16 17th of May, 1999, in Brussels.
17 We also need to recall that Soros is also funding the liberation
18 army of Kosovo, the KLA, and their main propaganda newspaper, Koha Ditore.
19 During the signing on the 12th of September, 1990, in Moscow,
20 together with the foreign ministries of the Democratic Republic of Germany
21 at that time, also France, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, the United
22 States, of the treaty on the definite order of Germany, Genscher stated,
23 "We do not want for anything else other than to live with all other
24 nations in freedom and democracy. State unity represents for us a greater
25 responsibility."
Page 32180
1 Very well, I will read more slowly.
2 "State unity represents for us a greater responsibility but it
3 does not at the same time represent our aspirations for having greater
4 power."
5 Chancellor Kohl, on the 3rd of October, on the day of the
6 reunification of Germany, sent a message to all world governments,
7 including the Yugoslav government, in which, amongst other things, he
8 said, "In future only peace will emanate from German territory. We are
9 aware that the inviolability of borders, the respect of territorial
10 integrity and sovereignty of all states in Europe are the basic condition
11 for peace, and we also have moral and legal obligations which arise from
12 German history."
13 Big words and big promises given to the rest of humanity and in
14 particular Europe at the point when the German nation finally was allowed
15 to remove the burden of its division which was imposed on it precisely as
16 a result of the darkest period of German history. Yes, this was a big
17 promise, but at the same time an empty promise, because how did the German
18 top leadership view the moral and legal obligations arising from German
19 history, which they cited, and what is their relation to the inviolability
20 of borders and respect of territorial integrity and sovereignty of all
21 states in Europe, as they said themselves as the main condition of peace.
22 You could practically at the same time see very well in Yugoslavia
23 how this was. In the territory of that state which German history -- at
24 that point of the 20th century inflicted the cost of 3 million lives,
25 1.247.000 victims in First World War, and 1.700.000 in World War II.
Page 32181
1 Precisely in that month of German reunification, security services of the
2 Yugoslav People's Army uncovered and managed to tape secretly activities
3 pertaining to the illegal import of weapons by Croatia aimed at
4 facilitating the armed secession of Croatia. So actually, we're talking
5 about the break-up of the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia. This
6 import of weapons went through Hungary but also went through some units of
7 Germany, which made it ironical that Chancellor Kohl said in his message
8 that only peace would emanate from German territory.
9 The arming of the secessionists was not the only or the first kind
10 of involvement of Germany in the break-up of Yugoslavia and in the
11 creation of the Yugoslav crisis. The entire activities of Slovenia and
12 Croatia in their violent achievement of independence was not only aided by
13 Germany but to a considerable degree was encouraged by the top state
14 leaders.
15 Within the efforts to prevent the conflict or to stop the conflict
16 in the territory of Croatia as well as to stop attacks on the JNA, the
17 Presidency of Yugoslavia and the leaders of the Yugoslav republics
18 gathered in Belgrade at a meeting on the 20th and the 21st of August,
19 1991, and then adopted several decisions for the purpose of stabilising
20 the situation. A small programme of political and economic cooperation
21 was adopted. A commission was formed to develop agreements on the future
22 form of the multi-ethnic states, and there was an agreement also reached
23 between the leadership of Croatia and the officials of the JNA.
24 On the 20th of August, there was an extraordinary ministerial
25 session in which the foreign ministers of European Community member states
Page 32182
1 concluded that they welcomed the readiness of all parties to embark on
2 negotiations about the future of Yugoslavia and requested all the sides to
3 conduct the negotiations in goodwill amongst themselves.
4 On that very same day, Genscher held a consultative meeting with
5 the foreign ministers of Slovenia and Croatia. On the 24th of August,
6 1991, he called Boris Filic [phoen], the Yugoslav Ambassador to Bonn, who
7 happened to be a Slovene, which was a guarantee that the message directed
8 to the Yugoslav authorities would also be directed to Ljubljana and
9 Zagreb, and told him if the bloodshed continues and if the policy of
10 violence with the support of the JNA is not stopped immediately, the
11 federal government will seriously have to consider the recognition of
12 Slovenia and Croatia within the existing borders. It will also conduct
13 the review on these matters within the European Community.
14 The question is the following: Was more impetus needed, was a
15 greater impetus needed to those who had already proclaimed secession and
16 who had already resorted to weapons in order to carry this through? Was a
17 greater impetus needed in order to violate the cease-fire? Was any
18 greater impetus needed than this message that continued bloodshed will
19 lead to the recognition of those states? Unfortunately, that's what
20 happened. The message did yield the desired effect because the Croatian
21 paramilitary forces gave up on the cease-fire that had already been agreed
22 upon and the conflict escalated.
23 Finally, as Germany was ready to support Slovenia and Croatia in
24 this illegal secession, even at the cost of serious clashes with their
25 partners from the EC and the United States, Lord Owen speaks about this
Page 32183
1 too. You have admitted into evidence this -- his book here. He says: "I
2 remind you Genscher's letter to Perez de Cuellar, written in German,
3 invoked public statements that led to greater tensions in Yugoslavia and
4 invoked the Paris charter. But as Perez de Cuellar reminded him in his
5 reply, Genscher forgot to refer to the EC declaration adopted in Rome on
6 the 8th of November, 1991, which said that the prospects for recognising
7 the independence of those republics that so wished could only be looked
8 into within the overall environment."
9 I end the quote I referred to from Owen's book.
10 So, as I said, the European Community, on the 26th of March, 1991,
11 supported the unity of Yugoslavia but then the European Community, on the
12 8th of November, 1991, also called for a comprehensive solution in yet
13 another declaration that was adopted then.
14 Finally, the German position did prevail, and once Pandora's box
15 was opened, once the illegal secession was recognised, even at the cost of
16 human lives, it was difficult to stop the bloodstained process. Things
17 did not end, in the case of Slovenia and Croatia, irrespective of the
18 bloody consequences. A further step was made.
19 At the end of his book, on page 384, Lord Owen says -- I've been
20 asked to read quotations slower so I'll try to do that. "The mistake made
21 by the European Union regarding the recognition of Croatia could have been
22 redressed had the situation not been complicated by the recognition of
23 Bosnia-Herzegovina irrespective of consequences. The United States of
24 America that opposed the recognition of Croatia in December 1991 became a
25 very active advocate of the independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1992.
Page 32184
1 However, it was not logical and it was not unavoidable to recognise
2 Bosnia-Herzegovina, a Yugoslav republic that consisted of three large
3 constituent peoples with very different positions regarding independence."
4 So one mistake followed the other. One impudence followed the
5 other, and the cost was paid in human lives. And if human lives are the
6 price that had to be paid, then this is turned into a crime, a crime
7 against peace. And it is probably no accident that this illegal
8 institution does not have jurisdiction over that, crimes against peace.
9 Warren Christopher, the US secretary of state, in his interview to
10 US Today, which was also carried by Die Welt on the 18th of June, 1993,
11 Christopher said in this interview: "During the overall process of
12 independence, and especially the premature recognition of independence,
13 grave mistakes were made and particular responsibility in this respect is
14 borne by the Germans. Many experts believe that the problems that we
15 confront today stem from the recognition of Croatia and later on Bosnia."
16 Roland de Mar [phoen], Christopher's French colleague, says in the
17 Deutsche Zeitung, on 21st of June, 1993, when he was criticising the
18 European Community for recognising Slovenia and Croatia, he says in a
19 hasty and precipitous manner, and this speeded up the break-up of
20 Yugoslavia. I quote: "The responsibility of Germany and the Vatican for
21 the escalation of the crisis is enormous, obviously."
22 Another participant in these events, the then Dutch Prime
23 Minister, Ruud Lubbers, said in 1997 that German Chancellor Kohl exerted
24 pressure on the European Community in order to have it change its position
25 that the independence of Croatia could not -- should not be recognised in
Page 32185
1 order not to fan a civil war. I quote: "Van den Broek and I could stand
2 on our heads. The other Europeans could only look around in astonishment.
3 The Germans did what they did, and that was a catastrophe." That is Au
4 Courant, the 21st of December, 1997.
5 When all this support to Slovenian and Croatian secessionists in
6 their efforts to carry out their plan is taken into consideration, then
7 those statements made by Stjepan Mesic should come as no surprise when he
8 spoke about the role of Genscher and Pope John Paul II. But Germany's
9 strong support to the break-up of Yugoslavia and the recognition of the
10 independence of its break-away republics is something that is general
11 knowledge now. However, the question remains in many people's minds what
12 are the motives of this kind of action and this kind of obstinacy and
13 persistence on the part of top leaders in the German state that had just
14 been reunified. This question is answered by one of the world's leading
15 geopolitical experts, General Pierre-Marie Gallois, a person who worked
16 closely with General de Gaulle. And he said in an interview on the 23rd
17 of July, 1993, the following: "The break-up of this country and the
18 linking of Croats and Slovenians to German industry led to the
19 emancipation of those peoples who used to be associated with the Empire in
20 the heart of Europe and then with the Third Reich. On the other hand,
21 that meant punishment of the Serbs, who, in both world wars, stood by the
22 allies. Thirdly, this led to the disappearance of the last remnants of
23 those treaties that punished Germany twice for their defeats."
24 Although many would not be willing to support these views of the
25 old French anti-fascist general, believing that the ambitions of Germany
Page 32186
Page 32187
1 are just a thing of the past and that the catharsis that the German state
2 went through would be a sufficient guarantee to believe the assurances
3 given by German politicians during these events that took place during the
4 reunification of Germany, it is sufficient to look at Klaus Kinkel's
5 article entitled German Foreign Policy in the World in the light of The
6 New World Order published on the 19th of March, 1993, in Frankfurter
7 Allgemeine Zeitung. In this article, the task of the German foreign
8 policy is expressed as follow: "Something has to be carried out now and
9 we failed in doing so twice in the past."
10 It is quite clear what this means. I believe there is no one in
11 the world who does not understand where it was that Germany failed twice
12 vis-a-vis the outside world.
13 So according to the foreign minister of Germany himself, the
14 foreign policy of this country was to use its potentials to achieve what
15 it did not achieve through two world wars, and the question remains
16 whether this will be resolved through new means or old means.
17 On the day of the recognition of Croatia's secession, Kohl himself
18 said in a TV programme, "There is a particularly intensive relationship
19 between Croats and Germans which has a great deal to do with history."
20 This historical vertical line that Kohl pointed to in Germany's foreign
21 policy, the one that was pointed out by Kinkel as well, and finally also
22 what their Croatian cronies did through their own policy is shown by many
23 things that were said during the two world wars and during the war against
24 Yugoslavia, the third war. So there were anti-Yugoslav pressures
25 constantly in all three wars. First there was bloodshed in order to
Page 32188
1 prevent the creation of the Yugoslav state, and later on every effort was
2 made to wipe it out altogether.
3 The red thread through all the rhetoric of the German bloc, that
4 is to say Austria, or rather Austro-Hungary, and Germany in the Balkans is
5 the thesis of a danger of creating some kind of Greater Serbia. This
6 danger, this key thesis took a central place in this false indictment
7 against me; a Greater Serbia. This thesis, this myth, was created by
8 Austro-Hungarian propaganda as far back as the second half of the 19th
9 century. It is an integral part of efforts made by a rotting empire to
10 keep its occupied Southern Slav territories.
11 As for this fear that the Southern Slav people still occupied by
12 the Austro-Hungarian empire and this was this broad wave of emancipation
13 in many European nations who wished to free themselves and also they
14 wished to integrate into one state, as was the case in Germany itself, the
15 fear that this might be carried out although there was a historical
16 legitimacy involved and a natural legitimacy involved as far as the
17 unification of the Southern Slavs was concerned.
18 Yet another German, Ambassador Ralf Hartman, in his book The
19 Honourable Mediators, on page 31 says as follows, and this illustrates the
20 depth of this fear and how far back it goes into the past. I quote:
21 "Already in 1876 when the Serb Prince Milos supported the rebellion of the
22 Christian population of Herzegovina and Bosnia against the Turkish rule
23 and declared war on Istanbul, the Russian Prince Gorchakov, German
24 Chancellor Bismarck, and the Austro-Hungarian Prime Minister Andraszy
25 exerted Habsburg pressure on the so-called memorandum that in case the
Page 32189
1 Serbs won" - this is his quotation - "the powers will not tolerate the
2 creation of a large Slav state. For Germans, Italians, Spaniards,
3 Russians and everybody else this was an understandable right, the right to
4 live in a single state. The Southern Slavs should be deprived of this
5 right forever. It was a heresy, that is what they declared it, and they
6 were not allowed to unite. The name of the heresy was a Greater Serbia.
7 So although the Serbian Kingdom, in spite of all its aspirations, was
8 small and weak compared to the European powers, and also the Serb
9 population never exceeded 10 million, for decades this remained in Vienna
10 and Berlin and this spectre continues to live until the present day."
11 This indictment is the best proof of how correct all of this is,
12 because it is spectres that are referred to here.
13 What is particularly striking is that as far as back as in the
14 Austro-Hungarian propaganda, the freeing of the people from the
15 Austro-Hungarian yoke and the unification of the Southern Slavs, not only
16 the Serbs, was called the expansion of the Serbian state, or a Greater
17 Serbia. And this formulation means that there should be some kind of
18 expansionist tendencies, tendencies of conquest among the Serbs. It is a
19 fact that this would then mean that part of the Southern Slav peoples were
20 under foreign rule. However, that is not true. It is among the Croatian
21 people that the idea of a single state for a Southern Slavs was born. In
22 spite of that, when the Serbs espoused this in order to help their
23 enslaved brothers, their brothers who were enslaved under Austro-Hungary,
24 each remained as an idea of a Greater Serbia.
25 And there are two ideas that were always considered to be
Page 32190
1 identical and they are absolutely not identical, that is to say Yugoslavia
2 on the one hand, the joint state of the Southern Slav peoples, and on the
3 other hand some kind of Greater Serbia which is actually the product of
4 anti-Serb and anti-Yugoslav propaganda. So then and now, somebody's
5 tendency to dominate the territories populated by Southern Slavic peoples
6 and keeping them enslaved had to be kept under the guise of a propaganda
7 smokescreen that it was primarily the Serbs who had such intentions and
8 that they wanted to spread into territories that belonged to others. And
9 this is a sheer lie.
10 I have another quotation. This comes from German archives. The
11 German ambassador conveyed to his government what he talked about with the
12 Count, the foreign minister of Austro-Hungary. I'm quoting from the
13 archives. "The minister said that he considered it his obligation to
14 familiarise the German government with the position of the monarchy, the
15 Southern Slavic issue, and that is to say the unhindered keeping of
16 Southern Slav populated provinces is a vital issue for the monarchy, and
17 Serbian supremacy in the Balkans could not be allowed. If Serbia defeats
18 Bulgaria and extends its boundaries beyond the old Serbia, they would have
19 to intervene." When I asked how this would happen, the minister said that
20 a good psychological moment could be found. A pretext came soon, the
21 well-known assassination in Sarajevo, when Gavralo Princip, a member of
22 the organisation Young Bosnia, assassinated Franz Ferdinand, the
23 Austro-Hungarian archduke and heir. No one says what the truth was and
24 that is that about 20 young men were part of this conspiracy. That was
25 this Young Bosna. Ethnic Serbs and Croats and others alike. Although it
Page 32191
1 was never established that the government of Serbia was involved in the
2 assassination in any way, accusations were immediately levelled against
3 Serbia, the Serb people, the Serb government, and war happened.
4 In this mentioned book, Ambassador Hartman says: "In
5 Austro-Hungary and Germany, a fierce anti-Serb campaign was initiated and
6 the German ambassador in London, Lichnovsky, was charged with notifying
7 Gottlieb von Jagow that the entire Serbian nation as a people of
8 evil-doers and criminals has to be branded." And this is obviously
9 something that challenges the authorship of these accusations.
10 The meaning of this evil above all evils, Greater Serbia, is
11 something that nobody wanted to consider or go into. It has been used
12 here in a very facile manner, very arrogantly. Nobody has investigated
13 its origins. Had they done so, this entire propaganda exercise would have
14 burst like a soap bubble.
15 It is well known that on the 23rd of July, 1914, the Serbian
16 government was given an ultimatum by Austria Hungary after false
17 accusations of Serbia's involvement in this assassination and a number of
18 demands were made on Serbia which no sovereign country in the world could
19 have accepted. The failure to meet this ultimatum was expected, and the
20 only role of this ultimatum was to cause war, to be a pretext for war,
21 just as happened in Rambouillet. The British foreign minister, Sir Edward
22 Grey, described this text, and I quote Grey: "The most astonishing
23 document ever engendered by diplomacy." "The most astonishing document
24 ever engendered by diplomacy." Grey probably never even dreamt that in
25 that same century the Serbian people and the Serbian state would be
Page 32192
1 exposed to a number of similar and even more arrogant and amazing
2 ultimatums and that, together with Germany, Austria, and some other
3 Western countries, and even some Serbian allies from that time such as
4 France and a little later the USA, his own country, Great Britain, would
5 share the authorship of such new ultimatums just as it would share the
6 authorship and participation in the implementation of murderous assaults
7 on the Serbian people in the late 20th century carried out by means of
8 unscrupulous lies, and this will be shown very clearly here before the
9 public. There were merciless economic sanctions as well as bestial
10 attacks against people whose chief sin was that they tried to protect
11 their country and their people and preserve what they had acquired with
12 great difficulty with the help of allies in two world wars.
13 It is hard to imagine the shame Sir Edward Grey would have felt
14 had he known of the role his country would play in completing this crime
15 against the Serbian people at the end of the 20th century, and this is
16 taking place here before this institution with the flagrant violation of
17 international law because the resolution establishing this illegal
18 Tribunal is part of what Sir Edward Grey defined as the most astonishing
19 document ever engendered by diplomacy.
20 It is general knowledge how the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and
21 Slovenes was established, later renamed Yugoslavia, as the common state of
22 the Southern Slav peoples. The German bloc wanted to prevent this and
23 this state was to vanish from the face of the earth. However, the old
24 myth of Greater Serbia remained as a smokescreen to conceal their own
25 crimes and their own evil deeds. It is in this institution that the lie
Page 32193
1 of Greater Serbia found its natural foundation and grew into a monstrous
2 construction of unprecedented magnitude.
3 To make the irony and absurdity even greater and to make the lies
4 and injustice against the Serbian people even worse in contrast to their
5 Balkan neighbours, it is only the Serbian people who, although they had
6 ample opportunity and much greater opportunity than others, tried to
7 create their own extended state, because it is well known that in 1915,
8 the allies of Serbia, in the so-called London Treaty, offered Serbia,
9 after winning the war, an extension of its territory to Bosnia and
10 Herzegovina, parts of Dalmatia, parts of Slavonia, and so on and so forth.
11 There are documents to show all this. But Serbia did not do this. Serbia
12 instead embraced and espoused Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes alike from the
13 former territories of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and this is how the
14 Kingdom of Croats, Serbs and Slovenes was created, later on to be called
15 Yugoslavia.
16 This option taken by the Serbian state to create a common state of
17 Yugoslavia rather than their own state provided protection to our Croatian
18 and Slovenian brothers. We protected them from territorial fragmentation.
19 And also, after they had been part of a defeated state, they became part
20 of the winning camp.
21 However, in the last throes of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the
22 Serbs have been branded with this lie of Greater Serbia, and this is still
23 being maintained. In order to understand the whole matter it is useful to
24 look on the other side of the front, World War I. In 1915, the German
25 theoretician Friederich Naumann published his book Middle Europe, Mittel
Page 32194
1 Europa, in which he set out a project for the reorganisation of Europe.
2 It was then expected that the Germans would win the war, of course. And
3 the reorganisation of Europe would imply the creation of a greater Germany
4 encompassing all of Central Europe surrounded by small and weak states
5 which Naumann in this book calls Trabant states. And --
6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, we are going to take a break at
7 half past.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, I understand it's
9 9.30. I hope you are aware of the fact that the interpreters often tell
10 me to slow down so that I think it would be a good idea for you to
11 consider extending my time and to give me some time tomorrow in addition
12 to today.
13 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, to the extent that you have a
14 written presentation, you might consider making it available to the
15 interpreters.
16 We will adjourn for half an hour.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, I do not have anything
18 in writing. I just have my notes. So I cannot give them my notes. They
19 would not be able to read my handwriting anyway. The documents I have
20 that are printed out would be completely useless to them. That's why I
21 asked you to consider --
22 JUDGE ROBINSON: Very well, Mr. Milosevic. Very well.
23 We will adjourn for half an hour.
24 --- Recess taken at 10.31 a.m.
25 --- On resuming at 11.05 a.m.
Page 32195
1 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, you may continue.
2 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Satellite states --
4 JUDGE ROBINSON: Microphone, please. No translation.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Microphone is not working? Is it
6 working now? Yes.
7 It's all right now. All right. Thank you.
8 I mentioned Friederich Naumann, the German theoretician who, in
9 his book on Central Europe or Middle Europe, explained a greater Germany
10 surrounded by satellite states which would be completely dependent on the
11 great and powerful German state. Naumann never mentioned Serbia, not even
12 as a satellite state because, according to him, "Serbia as a fortress that
13 is in the way in this area has to be wiped off the map."
14 Let me mention that this creator of the greater German project
15 which implies the wiping out of Serbia from the map of Europe, in
16 accordance with the anti-Serbian propaganda waged at that time and the
17 well-known slogan of the time "Serbia must die," "Serbia must termia," for
18 the sake of rhyming, this theorist is considered the ideologue of the
19 Liberal party in Germany, a party which has long served to balance the
20 German political scene and which was in charge of German foreign policy
21 during the time of Genscher and Kinkel. The same Kinkel who in 1993 felt
22 the need to publish the idea of German revision of historical processes
23 and who said that "something has to be done externally that we have twice
24 failed to do."
25 The importance attached by German Liberals, especially the two
Page 32196
Page 32197
1 above-mentioned leaders of German diplomacy, that they attach to the ideas
2 of Naumann is best seen in the fact that the foundation for the Liberal
3 Party is called the Friederich Naumann Stichtung or the Friederich Naumann
4 Foundation, and the same name is borne by the headquarters of this party
5 while its followers are best seen in the crazily destructive efforts of
6 these two towards Yugoslavia who wanted to fragment the Central European
7 and Eastern European territories, and this in fact happened. You have the
8 example of Czechoslovakia, not to mention the USSR, one of the winning
9 powers, the leading powers that won World War II.
10 When Serbia was sentenced to death in this deformed view of the
11 exponents of greater German aspirations, when it was drowned in the
12 Southern Slav state, the propaganda on Greater Serbian aspirations was
13 continued in relation to the newly established state of Yugoslavia. It is
14 well known that in Serbia there were protests against the government
15 decision to forge links with Hitler's alliance, and Churchill then said,
16 "Yugoslavia has found its soul again." This was stated on one of the
17 opposed sides. On the other side, Hitler, on the day Yugoslavia was
18 attacked, stated that "This military coup was directed against the same
19 criminal clique, the same creatures who, through the assassination in
20 Sarajevo, pushed the world into an unprecedented misfortune." This
21 reminds us of what a new theorist stated on the eve of a new bombing of
22 Yugoslavia. Clinton, the then president of the USA, on the night of the
23 24th of March, when explaining to the American public via television the
24 beginning of the air campaign, as he called it, against Yugoslavia, he
25 said, "The Serbs did not cause only World War I. Without them, there
Page 32198
1 would have been no Holocaust." So much for the knowledge of history of
2 these two criminals.
3 The rest is contained in the German archives. The Fuhrer, Hitler,
4 was determined to destroy Yugoslavia through military means and destroy it
5 as a state. To destroy Yugoslavia as a state, this can easily be linked
6 up to the message given in the notorious report by the president of the
7 Presidency until that time of Yugoslavia, Stjepan Mesic, to the Croatian
8 parliament on the 5th of December, 1991. He said, "Thank you for
9 entrusting me with fighting for the interests of Croatia in the segment
10 entrusted to me. I think I have performed my task. Yugoslavia is no
11 more."
12 When speaking of these efforts and this crime which was
13 perpetrated against Yugoslavia and other countries, before the attack on
14 Yugoslavia, in Germany there were directives given as to propaganda.
15 Ambassador Ralf Hartman speaks of well-known traditional lines of German
16 Balkan propaganda as follows: A, it is only the Serbian government that
17 is the opponent of Germany which fanned the flames of struggle against
18 Germany. B -- all right, I'll slow down. I'll read more slowly. I quote
19 further: "As the Serbs implemented a ruthless dictatorship against the
20 other peoples of Yugoslavia, primarily the Croats and the Macedonians, and
21 this is an absurdity, we can clearly tell them that the German Wehrmacht
22 is not entering Yugoslavia as enemies of the Croats and Macedonians. They
23 will in this way be protected against slaughter by the Serbian
24 chauvinists." In the German puppet state of the Independent State of
25 Croatia, this resulted in genocide against the Serbs, Jews and Gypsies.
Page 32199
1 On the territories of this monstrous state a million Serbs were wiped out,
2 over half of them being expelled and then driven to their death amid the
3 most grievous sufferings. This monstrous activity was certainly
4 contributed to by the directive of Joseph Goebbels, which remained alive
5 and topical in German practice, political practice, to toady up to the
6 Croats in order to work against the Serbs, and this is evident in the
7 German relationship to the Balkans in the 20th century, the late 20th
8 century.
9 But this is best illustrated by the next quotation, a statement by
10 the Croatian leader Ante Pavlic, "The independence of Croatia is due to
11 the Fuhrer and to the German Reich. And we can compare this to the song
12 Danke Deutschland, "Thank You, Germany," sung in Croatia in 1991 and 1992
13 and the role of Stjepan Mesic and what he said about the role played by
14 Genscher and Pope John Paul II, in the break-up of Yugoslavia.
15 When we're talking about the second key international participant,
16 according to what Mesic said, the key international participant in the
17 break-up of Yugoslavia, the Holy See, it is also characterised by its
18 historical continuity and its anti-Yugoslav activity as well as the
19 stability of its alliance with those who fought against the establishment
20 of Yugoslavia before and during World War I and who fought throughout its
21 existence against it, in particular during World War II. The deep roots
22 of this policy by the Vatican and the war inciting anti-Serb propaganda of
23 the Vatican are attested to by a quotation from a report by the Austrian
24 envoy to the Holy See sent to Vienna on the 27th of July, 1914, before war
25 was declared against Serbia, report on his conversation with the
Page 32200
1 Cardinal's state secretary Marie Del Vallo [phoen]: "During the last
2 year, His Holiness several times expressed his regret that Austro-Hungary
3 failed to punish its dangerous Danube neighbours. The Pope and the curate
4 see in Serbia a sickness that is eating away at the essence of the
5 monarchy and which will cause it to disappear. The destruction of this
6 bastion for the church -- the destruction of this bastion for the church
7 would constitute a loss of the firmest stronghold in its struggle against
8 orthodoxy and the loss of its major fighters. The cardinal's first
9 secretary expressed the hope that the monarchy will follow this through to
10 the end."
11 So according to the official position of the Vatican, Serbia was
12 to be destroyed in order to strengthen the Austro-Hungarian monarchy as
13 the stronghold of Catholicism in that area and in particular to serve as
14 its basis to expand to the east. This of course has nothing to do with
15 the teachings of Christ and it's more than evident but it is also more
16 than evident how much this has to do with the teachings which two decades
17 later were propagated by Adolf Hitler in his crazed idea that he had a
18 divine mission to achieve -- in his pull towards the east, the Dynastie
19 [phoen]. And this is something that will be embodied later in the axis
20 powers headed by Hitler. In Croatia this was achieved through the close
21 ties of the Catholic church with the Pavlic's Independent State of Croatia
22 whose minister of education, Mile Budak, stated in Gospic, "A part of the
23 Serbs we will destroy, another part we will expel, the others will be
24 converted to Catholicism and turned into Croats. In this way, we will
25 eradicate their traces and what will be left will be just a bad memory of
Page 32201
1 them."
2 Professor Edmund Paris, in his book Genocide in Satellite Croatia
3 1941-1945, Chicago 1961, says that "The biggest genocide during World War
4 II against a majority of a population did not take place in Nazi Germany
5 but in the satellite State of Croatia" which was created by the Nazis.
6 Also Professor Helen Feyne [phoen] in her book Accounting for
7 Genocide, New York, The Free Press, 1979, says that Croatia -- I am
8 quoting: "The Croatian state planned and executed a massacre against the
9 Orthodox Serb minority and that the Catholic clergy approved of this
10 massacre," according to McMillan's Encyclopedia of the Holocaust, pages
11 323 to 328, "In the NDH, Independent State of Croatia, more than half a
12 million Serbs were killed" -- I'm quoting -- "a quarter million were
13 expelled, and another number were forced to convert to Catholicism. The
14 genocide in the Independent State of Croatia against the Serbs is one of
15 the most concealed secrets of the 20th century, just as the rescue of
16 Ustasha criminals has not -- has also been kept a secret by the US and its
17 allies."
18 The United States, Great Britain and some of its allies played an
19 extremely sinister role in the rescue and fleeing abroad of a large number
20 of Ustashas primarily to South America, including the highly ranking ones,
21 amongst them Ante Pavlic who was their leader.
22 The reasons to rescue Ustashas and other Nazis and to transfer
23 them secretly through the Vatican secret channels was in the interest of
24 the Vatican in its struggle against the USSR and against the communist
25 threat in which no methods were discriminated against. The objective was
Page 32202
1 to save criminals, practising Catholics, whose crimes they approved of.
2 This concealment of crimes, making it possible for the criminals to
3 escape, was done because if the role of the Vatican and the Pope Pius were
4 announced publicly in some dominantly Catholic countries in Europe, there
5 could be negative repercussions. Primarily he's thinking about France and
6 Italy. These criminals were later used in order to weaken the communist
7 countries of Europe and to carry out terrorist activities.
8 The attempts of the Vatican to have as close as possible ties with
9 the main victors in World War II, the United States in particular, was a
10 success at the beginning of the '80s when at a meeting between the Pope
11 and Regan it was leaked that they discussed the solutions that were
12 adopted at Dialta [phoen] in 1945. There was also a series of meetings
13 held in the presence of their associates in the course of which firm ties
14 were established which Richard Allen, the White House advisor for
15 security, described as one of the greatest secret alliances of all times.
16 There is a book by Carl Bernstein --
17 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, the Chamber has allowed you some
18 latitude in making your statement. That is consistent with the practice
19 in this Tribunal, but you have to be careful. It is questionable whether
20 a lot of what you are saying is relevant to the case, and certainly it
21 would not be admissible in evidence. But a broad historical sweep is, to
22 a certain extent, permissible in an opening statement, but you must
23 discipline yourself, particularly if you want us to consider favourably
24 your request for additional time. Proceed.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The nature of this secret alliance
Page 32203
1 is written about by Professor Smilja Avramov in her book, although the
2 three theory Catholics, Brzezinski, Casey, and Walters, prepared the
3 ground for alliance, and although President Regan at the most prominent
4 places in the administration appointed Roman Catholics, for example,
5 Aleksandar Hague whose brother was a bishop, it would be wrong to claim
6 that the Roman Catholic faith was a decisive factor in the policy of
7 United States in that period. The administration of the United States did
8 not see an expression of religion in the alliance but the power of the
9 church as an institution which has been placed in the context of real
10 politics. Washington used the Vatican or the Roman Catholic Church in the
11 same way that it will try to do a bit later with Islam.
12 "Through this alliance, the reshaped geopolitical shape of the
13 map, a new aggressive politically -- political planetary bloc was created
14 which will have the most fatal consequences in relation to Yugoslavia."
15 The words of prominent intellectuals about the role of the Holy
16 See were confirmed by Mikhail Gorbachev who said in La Stampa in 1992,
17 "Everything that happened in Eastern Europe over the past few years would
18 not have been possible without the participation of Pope John Paul II."
19 In Eastern Europe over these past few years Yugoslavia was broken up in
20 blood, a state whose creation the Vatican wanted to prevent during World
21 War I and in whose break-up and bloodshed, the vast bloodshed which
22 accompanied this break-up it took part once before supporting Hitler, the
23 Ustasha state and the Ustasha crimes in the course of World War II.
24 The Vatican's policy towards Serbia was shaped as is evident from
25 the quoted letter from 1914 and also dating back to the time before the
Page 32204
1 creation of Yugoslavia. After the Kingdom of Croats, Serbs, and Slovenes
2 was created, this multi-cultural state was considered to be the main
3 barrier in the spread of Vatican -- of Catholicism to the East. That is
4 why the policy of Pope John Paul II and the Catholic church in general at
5 the time of this poke towards Yugoslavia constitute just the final phase
6 in the activities of the Catholic church in the break-up of Yugoslavia.
7 I will skip a series of examples of meetings held from 1991,
8 during 1991 and during 1992 which confirmed this, but I will include this
9 in the text that I'm going to submit because time does not permit me to
10 quote all that I have prepared.
11 Following the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia, followed by the
12 recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Vatican suddenly adopted a
13 peace-making policy. It was proposed in 1994 that the Pope visit Zagreb
14 and Sarajevo. The Vatican diplomacy viewed the expulsion of Serbs from
15 the territory that they lived on for centuries in Croatia in the Storm and
16 Flash operations, and I will remind you that Lord Owen called the Storm
17 Operation "the greatest ethnic cleansing in the territory of the former
18 Yugoslavia." The Vatican dubbed those actions as the recapturing of the
19 terrain, this territory where Serbs lived for centuries.
20 On the 19th of October, 1995, the Pope said about that that in
21 certain situations use of force is not ruled out if this is necessary for
22 the defence of the justified rights of a certain people. In such
23 situations we're talking about a humanitarian intervention in order to
24 protect human lives.
25 No human lives were threatened at that time, nor were there any
Page 32205
1 attacks from the UN protected zones or from Krajina to the areas
2 surrounding them, contrary to the Srebrenica protected zone from where
3 attacks were conducted throughout that whole year and when hundreds of
4 villages were attacked and a lot of Serb population was slaughtered. A
5 retired chaplain - and I'm saying "chaplain" for the interpreters and not
6 "captain" - he stated in Pittsburgh in January in 1999 that the Vatican
7 is to blame for all the troubles that occurred in Yugoslav territory and
8 that he personally saw bank accounts of the Vatican confirming that the
9 Catholic church, together with the German government, destabilised
10 Yugoslavia and caused a decade of bloody events. He claims that the
11 Vatican pumped in millions to separatists in Yugoslavia and that the
12 Catholic church was very active in the events in Croatia and Slovenia.
13 It is well known that the Vatican and the press supported the
14 demonstrations of Albanians in Kosovo and Metohija in 1989, and they did
15 the same -- and this was also done by the Ljubljana and Croatia
16 archbishops. The Pope supported the demands of secessionist Albanians in
17 Kosovo and Metohija in 1994. He was the first one to call for energetic
18 action against Serbia in 1998, and then he turned into a peacekeeper on
19 the 30th of May when he called the ambassador of the NATO member countries
20 and started an initiative to stop the war against Yugoslavia, and he also
21 wrote a letter to Clinton to stop the bombing over the Easter holidays.
22 When we have all these activities of the Vatican in mind which
23 relate to the break-up of Yugoslavia, the message of the 12th of May, 2000
24 sounds frightful when the Pope said, "We cannot and not recognise the
25 betrayal of the gospels committed by our members and the voice of
Page 32206
Page 32207
1 consciousness, and we ask for forgiveness of the sins of the Catholic
2 church." Professor Smilja Avramov, in her book Opus Dei recalls the
3 critical reactions to this statement, underlining the following words of
4 Leo Lyndaker [phoen], a Dutch religious scholar. She quotes him: "The
5 Pope expressed regret for what was done in the past but there are no
6 indications that he is thinking about changing his behaviour at present,
7 in the present."
8 As far as the United States is concerned, it has its own interests
9 in the area of Eastern Europe and the former Yugoslavia. The mutual
10 antagonisms and conflicts, the impoverishment and the inability to
11 function independently in the political, economical or any other plane of
12 the little countries created in the former Yugoslavia are a favourable
13 ground in order to implement the United States' economic, political and in
14 particular military presence in Europe. Especially this last one is very
15 important, because after the fall of the Warsaw Pact, the US military
16 presence in Western Europe has lost any kind of pretext or justification.
17 So it is not surprising that the United States has been active in
18 establishing this sorry situation that is currently in effect in the
19 majority of the Balkan countries.
20 After the break-up of the Eastern Bloc, some kind of Cold War has
21 continued in this context in order to prevent in any way the survival of a
22 society which could serve as an example of a successful alternative to
23 this current simple introduction of the -- or imposition of the capitalist
24 model. Two different problems. In any case, Yugoslavia was not to
25 outlive the Warsaw Treaty, because the Eastern European countries would
Page 32208
1 have an uncomfortable example of independent development and alternative
2 -- and an alternative to unquestioning acceptance of the values of the
3 West, thus posing an obstacle to the new world order as introduced or
4 imposed by the United States as the only remaining superpower in the
5 world, namely the transformation of the world to a corporation society
6 under the leadership of the World Bank and the United States where robbery
7 would be the main motive.
8 It is a well-known thing that the US Congress in March adopted a
9 foreign operation law stopping all assistance to Yugoslavia except for
10 democratic parties, and then neo-Nazis and fundamentalists were included
11 among these democratic parties that were supposed to be assisted. Later
12 on, Albanian terrorists, too, and Albanian separatists all the way along.
13 It is a well-known thing that this privatised MPRI, Military
14 Resources -- Resourcing Incorporated, played with the Croatian army and in
15 the final stages of the Croatian offensive against the Krajina. This also
16 confirms that American action in relation to the Yugoslav crisis had as
17 its aim the maintaining of US presence in Europe, including Kosovo and
18 Macedonia, as well as the influence of the US and NATO throughout Europe.
19 Economic interest as an interest that stands above all others is one that
20 I believe I need not refer to here and now.
21 Such aspirations for domination in this area are the only
22 explanation for some irrational actions at first glance taken by the
23 United States. For example, influencing Alija Izetbegovic to withdraw his
24 signature on the Cutileiro plan. And also what is less known is that the
25 Vance-Owen and Owen-Stoltenberg plans were thwarted in some stages. It is
Page 32209
1 obvious that it was not in the interest of the US to have peace in the
2 Balkans until the military presence of the US and NATO were not ensured
3 and conditions were not created to have a solution found under US
4 patronage. The US insisted in Rambouillet for -- on NATO military
5 presence throughout Yugoslavia, and also this aggression which had as its
6 aim the occupation of Kosovo, the occupation of all of Yugoslavia, and
7 ensuring the lasting presence of NATO throughout the area.
8 The administration of William Clinton got involved in dangerous
9 liaisons with Islamist fundamentalists, and they include the Hezbollah, al
10 Qaeda, the KLA terrorists in Kosovo, et cetera. So it is precisely those
11 individuals and organisations that, after the 11th of September, have
12 considered -- have been considered the greatest threat to the United
13 States and to the world in general. The price that has to be paid for
14 this policy of the Clinton administration is an enormous one and has to be
15 paid, unfortunately, by innocent citizens throughout the world, including
16 American citizens, but others, too, like Spaniards, et cetera.
17 However, if the aspirations and objectives of Germany and the
18 Vatican and the USA in the Yugoslav crisis were more or less evident, what
19 is shocking is the behaviour of the members of the other members of the
20 European Community, later on the European Union, especially under German
21 influence. In spite of the declaration of the European Community about
22 Yugoslavia, and I quote: "A democratic Yugoslavia has the best prospect
23 of fitting into a new Europe appropriately." And this was a quotation.
24 After Slovenia and Croatia were recognised and after an armed
25 conflict broke out, the European parliament, in Strasbourg in 1991,
Page 32210
1 adopted a resolution which did not support unilateral secession of these
2 two Yugoslav republics. Other organs of the European Community also
3 supported the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia. A Euro-American forum
4 at the OSCE Council of Ministers at their meeting in Berlin on the 19th of
5 January, 1991, adopted a declaration and it, inter alia, expressed its
6 support to the territorial integrity and unity of Yugoslavia in line with
7 Helsinki. What was particularly underlined was maintaining the
8 territorial integrity of the country.
9 Had a similar stand prevailed at that point in time in the other
10 -- or actually, it became obvious that this kind of stand was espoused on
11 the other side of the Atlantic too. And Baker, after his visit to
12 Yugoslavia, said that America supports a democratic and united Yugoslavia
13 and that its future should be ensured and he particularly pointed out that
14 the USA would not recognise any one-sided acts of secession.
15 Nevertheless, the European Community, an organisation that came
16 into being as the result of a progressive process in Europe and in the
17 world, opted finally towards the end of 1991 to support a retrograde
18 movement, that is to say secession in Croatia and Slovenia and other
19 secessionist republics, and on the 17th of December, 1991 it adopted a
20 declaration on the criteria for recognising the newly-established states
21 in the Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe and a declaration about
22 Yugoslavia, calling upon all Yugoslav republics to submit requests by the
23 23rd of December including proof that they have met criteria for
24 independence. In this way, the European Community not only trampled on
25 what it said itself on the 26th of March, 1991, in its own declarations
Page 32211
1 but also in another document, an EC declaration in Rome, the 8th of
2 November, 1991, that requests for independence put forth by those
3 republics who so wish can only be looked at in a particular context.
4 The role of Germany is clear in the change of this position of the
5 12. Nevertheless, it comes as a surprise and it is self-defeating that 12
6 states permitted themselves to be coerced into doing something that they
7 in principle did not agree with. And all of this was done under the
8 pressure of one of these 12 states only.
9 This regarding the strength of that state, I have to point out
10 once again Friederich Naumann and what he said at the beginning of the
11 20th century and the creation small obedient statelets, and he called them
12 satellites. Of course, when creating satellites, he did not think of the
13 West. However, the dictat that had to do with the secession of the
14 Yugoslav republics that was imposed upon the European Community members
15 and the fact that they accepted that even though there were separatist
16 tendencies in some of these countries themselves, and this was in contrast
17 to their very own interest, this just shows the fact that many countries,
18 including some former great powers, became German satellites. They
19 stooped that low because of the opportunism of their leaders, and this
20 lead to the NATO aggression against Yugoslavia and they all became
21 satellites of the United States of America.
22 So one cannot bring into question at all the right of Yugoslavia
23 to survive, or can one bring into question the illegal character of its
24 break-up as the basis and reason for the conflict. It is cynical, to say
25 the least, that those who brought the peoples of the former Yugoslavia to
Page 32212
1 mutual wars and a cycle violence and hatred, that they now, pretending to
2 be naive, allow themselves to administer justice, as they call it. Our
3 peoples should never forget who the guiltiest party of all is for the
4 tragedy in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, and that will be shown
5 and proven clearly.
6 In Nuremberg, the first and basic crime was the crime against
7 peace, which in this illegal Tribunal of yours is not the case only
8 because those who had established this unlawful institution would have to
9 take themselves to trial first and foremost.
10 When looking at historical developments, and there are documents
11 and writings about all of this, and the side opposite has the -- all of
12 these documents, the war in Yugoslavia did not -- was not started by Serbs
13 nor did it come from Serbia. It was started by the ultra-rightist
14 separatist movement in Croatia, in Kosovo and Metohija, in
15 Bosnia-Herzegovina, by the Ustashas and neo-Nazis, to put it briefly,
16 Islamic fundamentalists, and Albanian terrorists. It is not hard to
17 prove, and you will see how this will take place that the fratricidal war
18 in the territory of the former Yugoslavia was instigated and supported
19 precisely by those who established this court of yours; Germany, the
20 Vatican, and the United States. The destruction and the break-up of a
21 sovereign state was something they carried out in spite of international
22 and national law. Also, it is not difficult to prove that they resorted
23 to highly undemocratic methods in the break-up of Yugoslavia although they
24 kept claiming that they were very humane. They called themselves the
25 international community, but in the territory of Yugoslavia, Croatia,
Page 32213
1 Bosnia, Kosovo, they supported a totalitarian chauvinist elite terrorist,
2 Islamic fundamentalists, neo-Nazis whose objective was an ethnically pure
3 state, that is to say a state without any Serbs. The methods of cleansing
4 the Serb people that the Croatian ultra-nationalist movement carried out
5 through their paramilitary units in the beginning of 1991 are quite
6 identical to what happened to the same people in the same area 50 years
7 before that.
8 In the early 1990s, it was the Serbs who were killed and expelled
9 from Croatia, and this happened just before Tudjman came into power. It
10 was Serbs who were being killed and expelled from Kosovo and Metohija.
11 This international community, headed by the USA, favoured in
12 Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo Islamic fundamentalism, and Islamic
13 fundamentalists carried out many crimes in the territory of
14 Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo. In addition to everything else, crimes
15 against Serbs are being committed in Kosovo with the full assistance of
16 the NATO-led coalition, fully trampling upon Resolution 1244 of the
17 Security Council which codified the terms of the cease-fire that were
18 offered to Yugoslavia.
19 When Yugoslavia could not be taken and when the war had to be
20 stopped, terms were offered guaranteeing the sovereignty and territorial
21 integrity of Yugoslavia, that the protection force of the United Nations
22 would come to Kosovo to protect the entire population. That was their
23 obligation. And to a certain extent the army and the police of the
24 Yugoslav state and Serbia would have to go back to Kosovo.
25 None of this was actually accomplished. Everything else was
Page 32214
1 accomplished. NATO soldiers came, together with criminals, expelled a
2 large number of people, torched many churches, but I will move on to that
3 later. What I wish to say now is that as far as crimes against the Serb
4 people are concerned over the past ten years, there is an enormous amount
5 of documents, and they were offered to this institution and to many
6 institutions throughout the world. The side opposite did not even glance
7 at these documents. The reason is that the international community, when
8 causing a conflict in our territories decided in advance that the Serbs
9 were to be blamed for everything, and that is why everybody else had to be
10 portrayed as a victim.
11 As to how the war started in the territory of the former
12 Yugoslavia, the authors of the so-called Kosovo indictment against me, in
13 paragraph 79 and 80 presented one of their rare true assertions contained
14 in this otherwise totally false and shameful document. I am quoting their
15 text: "Slovenia on the 25th of June, 1991, proclaimed independence from
16 the SFRY which led to the outbreak of war." That is what it says in their
17 document. "Croatia proclaimed its independence on the 25th of June, 1991,
18 which led to fighting between Croatian military forces on the one hand and
19 the JNA and paramilitary units and the army of the Serb Krajina on the
20 other hand." "Bosnia and Herzegovina proclaimed its independence on the
21 6th of March, 1992, which, after the 6th of April, 1992, led to a war of
22 wide proportions."
23 So even the authors of this false indictment probably did not
24 envisage that they would issue an indictment against me for Croatia and
25 Bosnia later on, said themselves who caused this war. This is indeed a
Page 32215
1 criminal enterprise, and there are protagonists both at home and abroad
2 and they acted in contravention of Yugoslav law and international law.
3 This is a trampling of law. And then there was a forceful secession of
4 Yugoslavia and Slovenia, and they carried out the gravest of all crimes
5 that was dealt with in Nuremberg and Tokyo and that is the crime against
6 peace.
7 As opposed to the authorities of Croatia and Slovenia and the
8 Muslim authorities of Bosnia-Herzegovina that carried out an armed
9 secession and as opposed to their instigators, aiders and abettors from
10 Germany, Austria, the Vatican, the European Community, and later on the
11 USA and NATO, the Serb people and the Serb leadership and I personally
12 made every effort to preserve the Yugoslav community. In this way, we
13 were on the side of the law, whereas the destroyers of Yugoslavia were
14 flagrantly violating national and international law. They were invoking
15 the right to self-determination but this was only a smokescreen, and they
16 were trying to hide their efforts involved in unlawful secession because
17 the Yugoslav peoples and Yugoslav republics did not have the right to
18 one-sided secession according to the constitution of Yugoslavia and
19 according to the constitutions of those republics and in accordance with
20 international law. In particular, they did not have the right to achieve
21 this objective by killing other people and breaking up the state.
22 Article 5 of the constitution of Yugoslavia, which was in force
23 then, was a constitution that was adopted in 1974, and it states: "The
24 territory of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is a unified
25 territory and is composed of the territories of the socialist republics.
Page 32216
Page 32217
1 The borders of the SFRY cannot be changed without the agreement of all the
2 republic and autonomous provinces."
3 It follows from this unambiguously that no single republic or
4 nation within the SFRY, as explicitly stated in the constitution, had the
5 right to secede from the SFRY one-sidedly. This was possible only on the
6 basis of agreement, the agreement of all.
7 Bearing this in mind and bearing in mind the desire expressed in
8 Slovenia and Croatia, and later on in Bosnia and Croatia and Macedonia, to
9 leave the Yugoslav Federation and in an attempt to avoid any kind of
10 conflict, the Serbian side, as confirmed by witness Borislav Jovic, the
11 president of the Presidency of Yugoslavia and later on the member of the
12 Presidency, the Serbian side, beginning in August 1991, tried to convince
13 the representatives of the other republics in the federal bodies to adopt
14 a law which would regulate this appropriately.
15 As Jovic said in his book which was quoted here, they were
16 determined to follow this through even though at the cost of incidents and
17 conflicts.
18 Let me remind you from Tudjman's great speech, which was quoted
19 here when he said there would have been no war had Croatia not wanted it,
20 without such a war, no one would have been able to expel half a million
21 Serbs from territories which they had inhabited for centuries, and who at
22 the time of Croatian secession were not asking for a state but only for
23 autonomy and who, up to that point according to the Croatian constitution,
24 were a constituent people in Croatia because Croatia had been defined as a
25 state of the Croatian people, the Serbian people, and others, and this was
Page 32218
1 later deleted.
2 When bearing in mind the provisions quoted from the constitution,
3 the Yugoslav republics of Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Slovenia
4 declared their independence and their secession in violation of the
5 constitution. In view of the fact that the secession was conducted by
6 armed force, this was illegal, violent, armed secession, and illegal,
7 armed, violent secession leading to tens of thousands of people killed,
8 leading to crimes is a crime under international law, just as aiding and
9 abetting this is a crime, and this was done by others. These were the
10 same ones who are behind this illegal court, and they are trying to gain
11 amnesty for themselves and to shift the blame onto the actual victims.
12 The secession of the former Yugoslav republics and the way it was
13 carried out is not permissible. This situation as regards secession, the
14 secession of the former Yugoslav republics, is confirmed explicitly by
15 Antonio Cassese, the former president of this institution, in a monograph
16 that he wrote dedicated to The Right of Peoples to Self-determination,
17 Cambridge University Press 1995. On pages 269 and 270 he points out that
18 the Yugoslav republics did not have the right to self-determination either
19 under international law or under Yugoslav internal law. Cassese says on
20 the pages I mentioned the following: "As in the case of the 12 Soviet
21 republics, under international law, the six Yugoslav republics did not
22 have the right to external self-determination. This right was not
23 provided for in the Yugoslav constitution. However, unlike the Soviet
24 constitution, the Yugoslav constitution did not provide for the secession
25 of the six republics making up Yugoslavia," and he quotes the constitution
Page 32219
1 of Yugoslavia.
2 Therefore, as this illegal prosecution in a moment of inattention
3 quoted in some paragraphs of the so-called Kosovo indictment, paragraphs
4 79 and 80, as to who caused the war in the former Yugoslavia, the former
5 president of this court, in the same book on page 273, after establishing
6 the illegality of the secession, draws an identical conclusion, identical
7 to the one that the Prosecution inadvertently slipped into these
8 paragraphs. He says: "It is well known that Croatia, Bosnia and
9 Herzegovina, as well as several former Soviet republics, that in these
10 republics it was secession that revived the ancient hatreds and led to
11 bloodshed. That it is generally known, this is correct." Anyone who
12 wishes to and who has a minimum of honesty has to accept this as true.
13 Those who do not have a minimum of honesty can permit themselves to
14 distort generally known facts and transform them into their opposite. But
15 inadvertently from time to time the truth slips out, even from them. It
16 must not be forgotten that to have the truth as one's ally is a guarantee
17 sooner or later of victory. Having the truth opposing you is a certain
18 path to a humiliating defeat. Everything I'm saying is true about the
19 bloody break-up of Yugoslavia, an internationally recognised state, which
20 both under law and according to morality and historical facts, and what is
21 most important, the real interests and well-being of its citizens, had the
22 right to survive.
23 Time does not permit me to set out some indispensable facts and
24 conclusions. I hope you will not oppose, in the case of Kosovo, accepting
25 the seven white books of Yugoslavia which are in evidence, and all the
Page 32220
1 documentation which has been submitted to the regular and legal
2 International Court of Justice in The Hague pertaining to the aggression
3 against Yugoslavia. Later on, I will tender other documents as well.
4 In relation to Kosovo, I wish to say only a few things which, with
5 hindsight, show how correct Yugoslavia's approach was. What happened?
6 What are the consequences?
7 In the first year of the foreign presence in Kosovo and Metohija,
8 from the moment the JNA and the Serbian police withdrew from this Serbian
9 province in June 1999, 5.000 acts of terrorism were perpetrated in Kosovo
10 and Metohija, in one year alone. Several thousand people were killed or
11 abducted. One hundred and fifty churches were destroyed. Had 150 mosques
12 or Catholic churches or synagogues been demolished anywhere in the world,
13 the whole world would be buzzing about it.
14 Under the auspices and protection of the United Nations, all these
15 crimes were committed, trampling on the UN resolution, transforming the
16 security forces of the United Nations into forces of occupation in
17 collaboration with the Albanian terrorists. Over 300.000 inhabitants were
18 expelled under the auspices of the United Nations and in collaboration
19 with them.
20 On the other side, more than 200.000 Albanians, foreign citizens,
21 moved into Kosovo, mostly from Albania and other countries. Persecution
22 of all non-Albanians continued with undiminished fervor and continues to
23 this day.
24 As a result of this criminal hysteria, almost everything that is
25 Serbia and non-Albanian has already been cleansed from Kosovo, and that is
Page 32221
1 the reason for the fall in volume and in scale, because there is less and
2 less that this violence can be directed towards. Even what little is left
3 that is not Albanian in Kosovo and Metohija has been too much for these
4 terrorists, so that the combination of the anti-Serb violence in Kosovo
5 and Metohija occurred on the 17th of March this year, after the most
6 recent efforts by witness Halid Barani, who testified here. He, of
7 course, is not the only criminal who has testified here. Numerous
8 criminals has testified here, but this has been proved.
9 Halid Barani with his new invented story of the alleged Serbian
10 crime against three Albanian boys who drowned in the river allegedly
11 fleeing from their Serbian persecutors gave the signal, the green light
12 for a hysterical mass assault on everything Serbian, for which reason KFOR
13 arrested him as well. And another witness here, Shukri Buja, another
14 criminal and terrorist who confirmed here that he was in command of a UCK
15 unit, a KLA unit in Racak and that he was the first to open fire from a
16 machine-gun on a policeman there, and of course together with his fellow
17 -- fellows.
18 This pogrom of the Serbian people in Kosovo and Metohija is the
19 result of a joint criminal enterprise between this institution and its
20 witnesses whose interest the defence here -- and with whom it collaborates
21 and those who are behind it with the most retrograde movement engendered
22 in Europe in history. Bearing in mind what happened in Croatia and Bosnia
23 and Herzegovina, especially the evident continuity between the separatist
24 and nationalist tendencies and movements and their pro-Nazi and extremist
25 predecessors from World War II, and bearing in mind the irrational fervor
Page 32222
1 and zeal with which this so-called Prosecution tries to justify the acts
2 of those who persist in revising the results of two world wars and to
3 achieve what they did not manage to achieve because they were defeated in
4 those wars, then a very worrying conclusion emerges that the joint
5 criminal enterprise, of which this institution is a participant, is far
6 broader, both by the number of participants and the criminal plan and the
7 time span and the territory involved.
8 Today many in the West are trying to justify the violence
9 perpetrated by the terrorists in Kosovo by saying it is revenge for the
10 long-term terror and repression over the Albanian population in Kosovo and
11 Metohija. This is a lie. Where are these people who were persecuted and
12 imprisoned all those years?
13 These arguments are not only based on false facts but they cannot
14 hold water in the face of historical continuity. The historical
15 continuity of the persecution of the Serbian and Christian population of
16 the territory of Kosovo and Metohija from the times of the Turkish
17 occupation with short breaks until today, although there were really no
18 interruptions to speak of.
19 The ethnic cleansing of the Serbs from Kosovo and Metohija has a
20 long history, and it became especially intensive after the founding of the
21 so-called Albanian League in Prizren in 1878 which drew up the idea of
22 creating a Greater Albania. Konstantin Jiricek, the eminent historian,
23 says of the old Serbia that is Kosovo from 1878 to 1912, 150.000 Serbs
24 were expelled, amounting to a quarter of the Serbian population. In
25 addition to many Russian, French, and other sources, this process is also
Page 32223
1 dealt with in British documents, diplomatic documents, for example, by Sir
2 George Banham to the Marquess of Lansdowne in 1901, where he speaks of the
3 expulsions of Serbs and then about the expulsion of large numbers of
4 Serbian families, but I have no time to quote this right now.
5 The development of the situation in Kosovo and Metohija has shown
6 that nothing has changed in the methods of de-Serbianising the area. On
7 the contrary, the policy of pressure and terror over Serbs and
8 Montenegrins by Albanians has become even worse, and this became
9 especially evident during World War I, especially during the withdrawal of
10 the Serbian troops through Albania in 1915. And there are numerous
11 documents about this. When at the beginning of World War II Italy created
12 the puppet Greater Albania, including the largest part of Kosovo and
13 Metohija, this was an opportunity for new terror over the non-Albanian
14 primarily Serbian population, as evidenced by the statement of Mustafa
15 Kroja, the Prime Minister of June 1941 of the puppet Albanian state, who
16 said: "Maximum efforts have to be invested to expel all the Serbs from
17 Kosovo, to take them to concentration camps in Albania. The immigrants
18 who are Serbs have to be killed." Reminding you of the statement made by
19 the Albanian Prime Minister, a famous historian says that from the
20 beginning of the war, April 1941 to August 1942, killed 10.000 Serbs and
21 expelled hundreds of thousands of people. A similar number of Albanians
22 moved from Albania to Kosovo.
23 Herman Neuebacher, special envoy of the Third Reich to
24 south-eastern Europe wrote in 1943 in the autumn: "The Albanians have
25 hurried to expel as many Serbs as possible from the country. When General
Page 32224
1 Nedic bitterly complained to me, I urgently recommended to the Albanian
2 government to stop the persecution. When I saw that my intervention did
3 not produce any results, I asked to resign from my mission in Albania."
4 And this was written by the -- by a man authorised by the Third Reich, a
5 Nazi, and he was horrified by this.
6 Priest Makarije, on the 3rd of April, 1968 wrote to Serbian
7 Patriarch German because the Yugoslav authorities after World War II
8 concealed the persecution of the Serbs from the public, especially the
9 public outside of Kosovo, he says: "The Albanians are again showing their
10 historic hatred towards the Serbs. We are in a difficult situation, more
11 difficult than during Austria and Turkey. Violence is an everyday
12 occurrence. Thefts in the middle of the day, insults. You probably hear
13 from others what is going on with Serbs from Kosmet."
14 The department for internal affairs in the province in 1966 says:
15 "In high schools, gymnasiums, and teacher training colleges, nationalism
16 is legally being taught to the youth. Enemy activity is growing and there
17 are more and more activities like this. Physical attacks against Serbs
18 and Montenegrins in order to expel them are also happening, and there are
19 publicly hostile speeches being made in public places."
20 Russian Balkans expert Professor Elena Guskova, in her book The
21 History of the Yugoslav Crisis From 1990 to 2000, on page 444, says:
22 "Demonstrations in the province are followed by diversion or acts of
23 sabotage in factories, dispersion of flyers in order to turn the province
24 into an ethnically clear territory. The chauvinists are using all sorts
25 of methods, including the threat of physical exterminations of Serbians
Page 32225
1 and Montenegrins. They have been burning Orthodox monuments, houses,
2 taking others' land by force, and limiting freedom of movement. The
3 consequence of that is the mass departure of Serbian families from this
4 area. From out of 1.451 settled places in 1981, there were no Serbs
5 except in six of them. There are only 216 Serbs left there. During the
6 ten years in this place, there was Albanian terrorism in play which was
7 very hard to suppress. During these ten years less than 10 per cent of
8 Serbs remained in the territory."
9 So the term "ethnic cleansing," "ethnically clean," began to be
10 used for the first time and appeared in relation to these events. And
11 your witness here Slovenian professor of law, of constitutional law, Ivan
12 Kristan, in an article entitled The Constitutional Position of Autonomous
13 Provinces in the SFRY, which was published in 1981, and I note in 1981
14 says, and I'm quoting from this article of his: "The Albanian nationalist
15 concept of an ethnically clean or pure state of Kosovo and the unification
16 of all Albanians into one territory violates all of the objectives
17 achieved after World War II. Instead of equality of peoples and
18 ethnicities, they are encouraging them to check their numbers all the time
19 and they are engendering chauvinism."
20 This is cited by the Slovenian professor here, who testified here,
21 and he said this in 1981. I continue to quote him: "Against other peoples
22 and nationalities, pressures are being exerted and there are chauvinist
23 excesses which go as far as to make the members of certain ethnic groups
24 move out. This has been going on for a while in Kosovo from where a
25 considerable number of Serbs and Montenegrins have moved out, so that
Page 32226
Page 32227
1 according to the census of 1981 in comparison to the one from 1970, there
2 are much fewer members of these two ethnicities than before."
3 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, before you continue, we're going
4 to take a break now for 20 minutes, and we will sit, with the cooperation
5 of the interpreters, until 2.00 p.m. So we are adjourned for 20 minutes.
6 --- Recess taken at 12.20 p.m.
7 --- On resuming at 12.43 p.m.
8 JUDGE ROBINSON: Please continue, Mr. Milosevic.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Judge Robinson, I insist that you
10 allocate some time for me for tomorrow.
11 JUDGE ROBINSON: We will consider that near to the end of today's
12 session.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well. Kristan, and I'm
14 repeating, this is an article by a witness of yours from 1981, who points
15 to a crucial link between the greater Albanian fascist movement from World
16 War II, the so-called Balists, with the separatist Albanian movement of
17 the 1980s, the same movement, the same participant which at the end of the
18 20th century, and especially intensely from 1988 grew into overt terrorism
19 with secessionist motives and by terrorist means and in cooperation with
20 the aggressor troops from 90 NATO countries, finally ethnically cleansed
21 of Serbs and other nationalities this birthplace of Serbian culture. This
22 link and the continuity of greater Albanian fascists from World War II,
23 Kristan says in the cited article the following: "The irridentist
24 aspirations of Albanian nationalists in Kosovo are not recent. They
25 actually appear as an extension of various quisling and fascist
Page 32228
1 organisations. Greater Albanian aspirations and territorial pretensions
2 of Albania are not dead and gone and they date back from World War II,
3 together with their German and Italian Nazis and fascists. We see by the
4 conduct coming from Albania and Kosovo and Metohija the General-Secretary
5 of the Albania Communist Party, Enver Hodza, thus, in a letter to the
6 Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party in 1949 relying on the
7 conflict of Yugoslavia with Stalin at the time wrote, I quote: "The
8 Berlin Congress and the Versailles Peace Treaty unjustly damaged the
9 interests of Albania and the Albanian national minority in Kosovo. They
10 did not agree with this resolution of that question and they do not wish
11 to remain within the borders of Yugoslavia independent of its political
12 order. Their only solution would be to politically join Albania." The
13 mentioned Russian historian Elena Guskova, in her quite voluminous work,
14 says: "The separatist activity of the radically minded section of
15 Albanians in Kosovo and Metohija started immediately after World War II
16 and did not stop for a second."
17 Already in 1956 the security service discovered in the province
18 several groups which a few years earlier were infiltrated to Kosmet from
19 Albania in order to create illegal nationalist organisations. At the end
20 of the '50s and in the early '60s the organisation of the revolutionary
21 movement for the reunification of Albanians was active in Kosmet and it
22 was headed by Adem Demaci."
23 Citing that in the course of the '60s, Albanian terror became much
24 more active, meaning that the Albanian separatists in that period
25 organised "provocations, sabotages, and that they attacked religious
Page 32229
1 facilities," the same author explains that the situation did not calm down
2 even in the '70s despite the fact that in 1974, Kosmet practically was
3 ripped away from the legal system of Serbia, and citing an interview that
4 the number one person of the police, the minister of internal affairs, a
5 Croat, by the way, Franjo Herljevic gave, says that he cited the following
6 fact, and I quote: "From 1974 until 1981, the security organs discovered
7 over 1.000 people who were involved in undermining the system from the
8 positions of Albanian nationalism. Many of them, according to him, are
9 linked to one of the most active organisations of the so-called red front.
10 It's a pro-Albanian organisation active in the territory of the Western
11 countries aimed at -- which is aimed -- directed and channeled by the
12 Albanian Party of Labour. Following the unrests of the Albanian
13 separatists from March 1981, the Albanian separatist movement openly
14 advocates the idea of a Kosovo republic or the secession of Kosovo from
15 Serbia and then from Yugoslavia, and finally this territory joining the
16 territory of Albania."
17 If you look at the demographic structure of Kosovo and Metohija at
18 the end of the 19th century and then at the end of the 20th century, you
19 can see that it had drastically changed, to the detriment of the Serbs.
20 The biggest changes took place specifically during the crimes which
21 occurred during World War II from 1941 to 1945.
22 After the adoption of the constitution in 1974, each political,
23 judicial or executive power in Kosovo was in the hands of the Albanian
24 minority there. In particular from 1966 and then of course following the
25 adoption of the constitution in 1974, the Albanians in this part of Serbia
Page 32230
1 used this power to harass the Serbian majority and to flame inter-ethnic
2 intolerance, which resulted in daily expulsions of Serbs instead of the
3 essential spirit of tolerance and understanding and civilised cultivation
4 of relations with other people. The paradox of this whole situation lies
5 in the fact that the Albanians in Kosovo and Metohija whose leadership
6 claimed that for centuries they were discriminated against actually -- and
7 oppressed, actually achieved such a level of economic prosperity that
8 already in the 1980s you could see a vast difference between the situation
9 in Kosovo and the situation in Albania where they had their own national
10 states, of course in favour of their position in Kosovo and Metohija. The
11 Albanian minority in Serbia, namely in Kosovo and Metohija, went through a
12 rebirth in the scientific, cultural and educational sense, primarily
13 thanks to the educational authorities of Serbia precisely during the
14 period when the Serbian population in the province drastically reduced.
15 Of course there was also the moving out of Serbian intellectuals
16 under pressure from Kosovo. Only in the course of 1981, scores of doctors
17 left the medical centre in Pristina. Scores of professors of university
18 were leaving the faculties in Pristina. On the other hand, the Greater
19 Albanian chauvinist propaganda achieved its peak from 1975 to 1980
20 following the adoption of the 1974 constitution giving a province
21 attributes of statehood.
22 Between Yugoslavia and Serbia, actually between Kosovo and
23 Metohija and the neighbouring Albania, there was practically no border.
24 And this was during the golden era of the rule of Enver Hodza in Tirana.
25 To the extent that the Kosovo Albanians during the time of Tito were given
Page 32231
1 ever growing autonomous rights, their appetites for even greater
2 independence grew as the first step towards secession.
3 The first mass destructive demonstration date from November 1968.
4 It became evident that later, following the period of 1980, they were no
5 longer satisfied with broad autonomy and guaranteed political and human
6 rights as provided for under the constitution of 1980, and this was
7 expressed in the mass rebellion of Albanian separatists in the spring of
8 1981 under the slogan of the creation of Kosovo Republika, Kosovo
9 Republic. And this is also something that was mentioned by your witness
10 Ivan Kristan.
11 The influence of foreign factors who supported and aided the
12 break-up of Yugoslavia was quite considerable. Precisely, these factors
13 of influence came out with quite a malicious claim, and that is that the
14 crisis in Kosovo and Metohija actually occurred in 1989 with the adoption
15 of the amendments to the constitution of Serbia, stating that they
16 abolished the autonomy in Kosovo and limited the human rights of
17 Albanians.
18 This is quite without foundations. The Serbian constitutional
19 amendments in 1989 established a constitutional or unity of the Republic
20 of Serbia which up until then was under the tutelage of its two provinces
21 because Kosovo and Vojvodina, up until the adoption of those amendments,
22 participated in the rule of that republic but the republic did not have
23 any influence over what was going on in the provinces. So the republic,
24 in parts of its own territory, could not implement its constitutional
25 authority, primarily -- one primarily being to care for the benefits of
Page 32232
1 its own people. By the amendments in the Republic of Serbia in 1990, the
2 anomalies were corrected in the position of the Republic of Serbia in
3 relation to its autonomous provinces, and these amendments of 1989 and the
4 constitution of 1990 did in no way infringe on or abolish the human rights
5 of Albanians. They still continued to enjoy free education, press,
6 publishing in their own language. And in everything else, proceedings
7 before judicial organs, they could do that in their own language. And
8 they were more protected than any national minority in any other country.
9 With the secession of Slovenia and Croatia, the Kosovo crisis
10 entered into a new phase. From the forming of the terrorist KLA, the
11 Albanian secessionists began with overt terrorist attacks. That
12 organisation, and this will be shown by documents that will be presented
13 here, armed and trained its members with the assistance of some foreign
14 countries, first of all Germany, the United States, Switzerland, and some
15 other -- some Islamic countries.
16 At the time, lists of names of banks and the numbers of bank
17 accounts where contributions were sent for the KLA were published in
18 Germany and Switzerland. I'm not going to go into this because I don't
19 have enough time.
20 According to reports in the European and the Concrete magazine
21 from March 1999, the latest weapons were delivered to Kosovo via Albania
22 worth several million German marks. According to OSCE members from a
23 checkpoint which was on the border of Albania and Yugoslavia, observers
24 noted there with surprise that members of the KLA actually were wearing
25 German uniforms. In any case, the German intelligence service admitted
Page 32233
1 that it had organised the training of Albanian terrorists in Berlin and
2 other places as well as the transport of Albanian terrorists. There was
3 also help and assistance from Turkey and also from the Albanian drug
4 Mafia. This is something that is known, and we have quite reliable
5 sources about these issues.
6 The main tasks with the arming of these forces were given to the
7 US intelligence service in assistance with the British service, and the
8 Scotsman says that the US intelligence service got in contact with MI5 in
9 order to train the KLA, and then MI5 or MI6 actually passed these tasks on
10 to certain British security companies which then in turn implemented these
11 tasks. Then they also published the lists of weapons and so on, and I
12 have no time to speak about that today.
13 The most frequent targets of the KLA were police stations and
14 military institutions as well as the civilian population initially. Their
15 victims were very often members of their own people just because they were
16 loyal citizens of Serbia. The terrorist activity was increasing from year
17 to year.
18 A vast number of attacks occurred. I will mention only some. In
19 the report for 1998 from January 1st until December 31st, there were 1.129
20 terrorist acts in which 115 members of the Ministry of Internal Affairs
21 were killed, out of which -- well, I don't want to go into division. No,
22 actually 215 were -- 216 were killed, 115 were wounded, and 187 were
23 likely wounded, while a number of them were also hijacked. There were
24 also 755 terrorist attacks and provocations directed at citizens. The
25 figures before referred to police officers. 173 citizens were killed out
Page 32234
1 of whom 46 Serbs and Montenegrins, 77 Albanians, three Gypsies, two
2 Muslims, and 42 unidentified persons. As you can see, in 1998, the KLA
3 killed more Albanians than Serbs.
4 In that year the terrorists abducted 292 citizens, out of which
5 173 Serbs and Montenegrins, 100 Albanians, 14 Roma, one Bulgarian, one
6 Greek, and one Macedonian. They killed 31, 142 are missing, and nine
7 escaped.
8 Then further explanations are given in terms of everything that
9 was used: Mortars, hand-held rocket launchers, explosive devices,
10 anti-tank mines, and so on and so forth. All of this happened at the time
11 when Ibrahim Rugova claimed that the KLA is just a figment of the
12 imagination of the Serb propaganda, that it doesn't really exist.
13 This information is sufficiently clear, and I wonder if any
14 government in the world would remain passive vis-a-vis such terrorist
15 activity. It is only understandable that the police not only had to react
16 to terrorist attacks but it was indispensable for it to take action in
17 order to neutralise and combat terrorist groups in order to re-establish
18 control.
19 Attacks against the army is something that you know of very well,
20 and the entire public does. In a broad spectrum of views of different
21 international political structures, particularly in part of the
22 international public opinion, especially since 1998 there was this
23 misconception that was launched on purpose of the KLA as some kind of
24 liberation movement, which is quite unfounded. So for example, the FAS,
25 which is considered to be a think-tank, published a report in which it
Page 32235
1 says that the terrorist KLA was included among the best-known terrorist
2 countries -- terrorist organisations in the world. In addition to the
3 FAS, the State Department is the only institution in the US that deals
4 with the question of terrorist organisations seriously.
5 John Pike, security head of the FAS, stated that his organisation
6 carried out a detailed analysis studying the entire structure of the KLA,
7 as opposed to the State Department which bases its opinions on opinions
8 only rather than such careful analysis. The tactics of the KLA consist of
9 ambushes, then KLA members are organised in members of three to five --
10 cells of three to five members, which is characteristic of terrorist
11 organisations. The members of the group are visibly obsessed with their
12 idea of secession from Yugoslavia and annexation to Albania, and they
13 carry out orders without any protest. There are a thousand mercenaries in
14 the KLA from Saudi Arabia, Albania, Bosnia and Croatia, and some Western
15 countries that I cannot go into now, and they work there as experts.
16 Also, the camps are listed, the camps on the territory of Albania.
17 The FAS report also states that the open, long-term objective of the KLA
18 is to unite the Albanian populations of Kosovo, Albania, and Macedonia
19 into a Greater Albania. The KLA represented a typical terrorist
20 organisation, with all the accompanying characteristics, and that was the
21 position of all the police forces of the Western countries because they
22 were aware of the links of this organisation to drug dealers and white
23 slave traders.
24 Gelbard, in 1998, on the 23rd of February, stated at a press
25 conference in Belgrade, and I quote: "We are deeply disturbed and we
Page 32236
Page 32237
1 condemn the impermissible activity of terrorist groups in Kosovo
2 especially the KLA. There is no doubt that this is a terrorist group. I
3 do not accept any kind of justification. Having worked on the subject
4 of terrorist activity for years, I know very well how to define a
5 terrorist group, and I base this on facts, not any kind of -- any kind of
6 rhetoric. Their activities speak for themselves."
7 He called upon Albanian leaders to condemn terrorism and to show
8 on which side they were, and nothing came out of this as we all know.
9 Outside the establishment, outside the Clinton administration, the
10 second half of 1998 there was an unequivocal belief that the KLA was a
11 typical terrorist organisation. This is also confirmed by a carefully
12 compiled document prepared by the Senate Committee of the Republican Party
13 in 1999, which says and I quote: "At the time when the NATO bombing
14 started, the partnership between the Clinton administration and the KLA
15 was unequivocal. Such demonstrative acceptance on the part of leading
16 persons from the Clinton administration of an organisation which was
17 branded a terrorist organisation by one of its officials only a year
18 beforehand is shocking, to put it mildly. It is even more important that
19 the new partnership between Clinton and the KLA can conceal the worrisome
20 characteristics of the KLA that Clinton did not take into account."
21 This is an official document of the Senate of the United States of
22 America.
23 The nature and role of the KLA as a terrorist organisation is the
24 subject of documents. And in the transcript of the US Congress from the
25 year 2000 Frank Ciluffo from the programme called Globalised Organised
Page 32238
1 Crime Programme, when testifying before Congress with the representative
2 juridical committee, stated: "What was concealed from the eyes of the
3 public was the fact that the KLA got part of its funds from the sale of
4 narcotics. Albania and Kosovo are in the middle of the Balkan route which
5 links up the crescent of Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Western Europe. The
6 value is about 400 million US dollars per year and about 80 per cent of
7 the heroin intended for Europe goes along that route."
8 All of this was said in a hearing in the US Congress. (redacted)
9 (redacted)
10 (redacted)
11 (redacted)
12 (redacted)
13 (redacted)
14 An analysis of Security Council Resolutions in Kosovo and
15 Metohija --
16 JUDGE ROBINSON: I think the witness is protected.
17 MR. NICE: I'm finding it a little hard to follow exactly what the
18 accused is saying but I think the passage that deals with protected
19 evidence ought probably to be given protection now.
20 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. It will be redacted, and be more careful in
21 the future, Mr. Milosevic.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This is not evidence that has to be
23 protected, it is the witness who has to be protected. I did not mention
24 who the witness was or his name, I'm just reminding you of what the
25 witness testified about over here.
Page 32239
1 Resolutions of the Security Council about Kosovo and Metohija
2 adopted before the NATO aggression against Kosovo show that the Security
3 Council believed that in Kosovo and Metohija there were terrorist attacks
4 that had taken place, and the KLA in these resolutions was clearly defined
5 as a terrorist organisation.
6 Resolution 1160: "Condemnation of all acts of terrorism by the
7 KLA or any other group or individual or any kind of external support to
8 the terrorist activity in Kosovo, including the financing, arming and
9 training thereof..." And we can see who was involved in this training, et
10 cetera.
11 In paragraph 2, the leadership of the Kosovo Albanians is called
12 upon to "condemn all terrorist actions," and it underlines that all
13 elements of the Albanian community in Kosovo should achieve their means
14 and objectives -- their objectives only by peaceful means.
15 In paragraph 8 reference is made to similar matters.
16 This remained a mere promise never fulfilled. Terrorist
17 activities were reinforced, more and more weapons brought in, and the
18 terrorists acted even more intensively with the engagement of the West.
19 Resolution 1199, I quote: "Condemns terrorism as a means of
20 obtaining political objectives of any group or individual and condemns any
21 kind of external support to such activity in Kosovo, including the
22 provision of weapons for terrorist activities in Kosovo."
23 What the Clinton administration did and which led to what happened
24 on the 11th of September is a major thing and nobody can deny that. You
25 can see how many of the suspects who were arrested took part in activities
Page 32240
1 conducted by the KLA in Kosovo. There is ample proof of that in Kosovo
2 and Bosnia-Herzegovina, practically as members of al Qaeda.
3 The Security Council expresses its concern over reports of
4 constant violations of the bans of providing weapons to terrorists, as
5 stated in Resolution 1160, and again in paragraph 6 it insists on the
6 condemnation of all terrorist activities and that all members of the
7 Albanian community should achieve their goals through peaceful means only.
8 In paragraph 11, it is stated that financial resources should not
9 be gathered in the territory of any country.
10 In Resolution 1203, there is a condemnation of terrorism of any
11 group or individual in order to achieve political objectives, including
12 the provision of weapons in Kosovo and the carrying out of terrorist
13 activities in Kosovo and also concern is expressed over continued
14 violations of previous resolutions passed by the Security Council.
15 In paragraph 10, I quote -- all of this has been a
16 quotation: "The Security Council insists that the leadership of the
17 Kosovo Albanians should condemn terrorist activities. However, they had
18 never done so." Terrorist activities of the KLA, that is.
19 So in contrast to these evident facts which pointed to the
20 terrorist character of the KLA and according to Security Council
21 Resolutions, every country had the duty to do their best to suppress such
22 activities. The Clinton administration, under the influence of a strong
23 Albanian lobby and their drug-related money, from 1999 onwards publicly
24 and directly sided with this terrorist organisation and became its
25 protector. Therefore, it is not surprising that after that period it took
Page 32241
1 measures to prevent the break-up of the KLA and to ensure them the status
2 of a party involved in the entire process, and it is in this capacity that
3 they brought them to Rambouillet even.
4 In this public rehabilitation Holbrooke, together with Gelbard,
5 the other US representative, met with a group of terrorists of the KLA and
6 conducted a dialogue with them before TV cameras. Soon afterwards he
7 admitted that Gelbard had previously established contact with them
8 already.
9 During August and September 1998, the police forces practically
10 broke up and neutralised the terrorists of the KLA and their strongholds.
11 Then again representatives of the Clinton administration came to the --
12 came onto the scene and then the Verification Mission came. Later on, it
13 was established that their only objective was to revitalise and re-animate
14 and protect the KLA.
15 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Milosevic, would you hold a minute.
16 [Trial Chamber confers]
17 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Continue, Mr. Milosevic.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The appointment of William Walker as
19 the leader of the Verification Mission was no accident. This was done at
20 the insistence of the CIA whose agent he was. It should be remembered
21 that he was the US Ambassador in Salvador and that he was in charge of
22 special operations in Nicaragua, such as the supplying of arms and the
23 forming of the death squads.
24 The developments of the late 20th century showed that the Clinton
25 administration used the nationalist and separatist movement and similar
Page 32242
1 movements in the world in order to achieve their interests. Therefore,
2 they whole-heartedly supported such movements, usually by way of sponsored
3 terrorism. This was shown on Kosovo and Metohija, and it is also
4 confirmed by the conclusion of the Committee for Foreign Affairs of the US
5 Congress in 1992 which said activate Kosovo and wherever possible get
6 concessions from Belgrade.
7 In an analysis of a commission of the republican Senate, it says
8 that the NATO intervention was planned beforehand by the American
9 administration but it lacked a media event which would, in the eyes of the
10 international community, serve as a political pretext for intervention.
11 There were lies upon lies waiting for a trigger to set events in motion.
12 Official NATO structures were recruited on time and during Clark's mandate
13 they established initial contacts with the KLA. This follows from the
14 background briefing in the American Ministry of Defence on the 15th of
15 July, 1998. These initial contacts were recognised by NATO in mid-1998.
16 They were given covert support from the mid-1990s onward by the CIA and
17 the BND. These secret operations were supported by NATO and were known to
18 NATO, as can be seen by -- in the book Kosovo, The Freedom Fighters, under
19 quotation marks. All of this confirms that the KLA, which was initially
20 treated as a terrorist organisation from mid-1998 due to a decision by the
21 Clinton administration entered into close links with NATO. Preparations
22 for the NATO aggression were conducted in this partnership together and in
23 parallel with the farcical negotiations in Rambouillet.
24 The turning point was the above-mentioned media event which was
25 created pursuant to what happened in Racak, according to the tried and
Page 32243
1 tested scenario from Bosnia in the case of the Markale market. There was
2 allegedly a massacre in the village of Racak, and the experienced chief of
3 the OSCE mission, Walker, called it an unprecedented crime by the Serbian
4 security forces. This was the peak of the preparations carried out in
5 order to create a pretext for the NATO aggression according to a plan
6 developed previously by the Clinton administration. There was an attempt
7 to describe this event in these terms here as well, and I showed you a
8 video where you can see the orange uniforms of the Verification Mission on
9 the hill overlooking Racak when Walker's deputy testified where you can
10 see what really happened there, and you could see the testimony of their
11 commander over there.
12 I have no time to go into it now on this occasion, but I wish to
13 quote what the military commentator Milovan Drecun said in the book The
14 Second Kosovo Battle about the Racak case. He said: "The Racak case will
15 enter many textbooks as a brilliantly executed and pure anti-terrorist
16 action carried out by members of the police but also as one of the most
17 monstrous media deceptions ever seen by the world. We are witnesses to
18 the fact that the events in Racak are daily being manipulated, especially
19 in The Hague where persistently serious falsification is being
20 perpetrated."
21 It is well known that the sponsors of these events did not want it
22 to be published that there was no massacre in Racak but attempts were made
23 throughout to blame the Serbian side.
24 JUDGE ROBINSON: That is the commentator, Mr. Milosevic, the
25 commentator that you just referred to.
Page 32244
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Milovan Drecun, in his book The
2 Second Battle of Kosovo.
3 JUDGE ROBINSON: And he's from where?
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Belgrade.
5 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thanks.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] There are facts that show that after
7 the agreement on the presence of the Verification Mission in October 1998
8 on Kosovo until the end of January 1999, over 500 KLA attacks were
9 perpetrated. And in the same period, using the Verification Mission as a
10 screen, 35 villages inhabited by Serbs and Montenegrins were ethnically
11 cleansed. And on -- in November 1999, 80 terrorist attacks were
12 perpetrated by the KLA on the police and on civilians.
13 As a reward for these and all other crimes they perpetrated,
14 primarily against the Serbs but also against other non-Albanians and also
15 against Albanians, and for their collaboration during the NATO aggression,
16 the KLA was renamed the Kosovo Protection Corps, and the UN gave it
17 legitimacy, making it possible for them to access funds in Western
18 countries through bilateral channels, including direct military aid. It
19 was understood, however, that they had to disarm immediately. This is
20 only one of many details in a sea of abuses that occurred. And Agim Ceku,
21 a notorious terrorist, was put at the head of this protection force.
22 There were many crimes against Serbs in Kosovo and Metohija committed
23 under his orders. Serbs and Albanians were killed because of their
24 loyalty to the state they lived in, Serbia. This same person fought
25 against the Serbs as an officer in the Croatian army in Croatia, and he
Page 32245
1 was especially prominent because of the crimes he committed against the
2 Serbs during Operations Flash and Storm and in the Medak pocket where
3 women, after being raped, were doused with gasoline and set on fire.
4 There is certainly data about this. But he is protected. He is an ally
5 in spite of the fact that he is a notorious murderer and terrorist.
6 You're able to see, for example, in 2003 in November in the
7 Belgrade press, photographs. I have no time to use photographs in my
8 opening statement because my time is too short, but you can see KLA
9 members in uniform holding heads of Serbs in both hands and where you can
10 see a bag full of heads of Serbs who had been beheaded. Everybody can see
11 that the person being photographed holding Serbian heads in his hands is
12 Sadik Cuflaj, and they carried out, they perpetrated crimes in Pec and
13 other places, Zvelan [phoen] and Pec. And this is just a part of
14 everything. Names, dates, information was published, but this was all
15 neglected and ignored. And now this same Cuflaj, with thousands of other
16 terrorists of the former KLA is a member of the Kosovo Protection Corps
17 and he holds a rank in it and he's a corporal. And they have been
18 entrusted by the international community to maintain order in Kosovo where
19 the Serbs are in constant fear of extinction.
20 In Kosovo and Metohija, for example, the USA and the West have
21 shown that they have a double standard when it comes to terrorists. I
22 know I have no time, but please look at this. On the 26th of August,
23 2004, the Washington Post writes about an Australian being tried for war
24 crimes. He was captured in Afghanistan, and in the article published by
25 the Washington Post it says how Hicks went from kangaroo skinner to
Page 32246
Page 32247
1 alleged al Qaeda fighter. How he did that is not clear but the prosecutor
2 says he converted to Islam "[previous translation continues] [in English]
3 ... Kosovo Liberation Army, received training in al Qaeda camp, and took
4 up arms with a terrorist organisation against US forces in Afghanistan."
5 The question arises to illustrate this double standard whether he
6 is a Taliban and al Qaeda war criminal when he's fighting against
7 Americans in Afghanistan or was he also a criminal when he was fighting
8 against Serbs as a member of the KLA.
9 Every day an information such as this one comes to light. This
10 one is only a few days old.
11 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, in view of the extended break that
12 we had to take for technical reasons and the fact that you have had to
13 slow down, and I notice now that you are speeding up, I should tell you
14 that the Chamber has considered your request for an extension and has
15 decided that if you need it, you may have the first session tomorrow
16 morning. Only if you need it.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I certainly need it. I need much
18 more than that, but I will certainly make use. There is no doubt about
19 it, I will make use of it.
20 While American planes were transporting al Qaeda terrorists from
21 Afghanistan to Guantanamo in chains, at the same time the then puppet
22 regime in Belgrade received a demand that they should release from prison
23 all Albanian terrorists without any condition because they were allegedly
24 political criminals, and these were -- political prisoners, and these were
25 in fact murderers, and they were released.
Page 32248
1 I think that the consequences of what the Clinton administration
2 did in support of terrorism are evident, both in the USA and elsewhere.
3 And now they have become the greatest threat to modern humanity.
4 Clinton -- Clinton's administration, throughout its time in
5 office, applied this policy of double standards which has now turned very
6 brutally against the Americans themselves, as can be seen from what
7 happened on September the 11th.
8 From the aggression of the NATO pact on Yugoslavia, five years
9 have elapsed. This is not a great distance in time, but it is enough to
10 draw some conclusions about the consequences of this disgusting act and
11 the consequences on the population and the cultural and other values of
12 the country that came under attack. It is known for a fact, and it shall
13 be established here through documents and witnesses, reliable witnesses,
14 that the aggression was planned for a long time. It was inspired and
15 organised by those who concealed its true causes through a propaganda
16 trick about the alleged humanitarian catastrophe on Kosovo. The powers
17 that be in the NATO pact proclaimed the KLA terrorists to be peaceful
18 civilians, and they accused the military and political forces of the
19 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of alleged crimes against the civilian
20 population while in fact they were legally fighting against terrorists.
21 The question should be put to them if this was the case, what did
22 a thousand soldiers and policemen die of? Were they killed by these
23 peaceful unarmed civilians? How come so many citizens died? Was this
24 caused by these peaceful and unarmed civilians? What are the facts that
25 can be taken as valid?
Page 32249
1 Clark himself, the then Commander-in-Chief of the NATO pact for
2 Europe whom you did not allow me to cross-examine here either about the
3 war or about his book in which he himself denied these charges in a very
4 obvious manner, he says in his book that NATO brought forces to Macedonia,
5 apparently for the pull-out, and everybody knew the extraction forces, and
6 everybody knew that there was no threat to the Macedonians, and they
7 escorted them to the border when they expressed a wish to go. And as
8 General Naumann testified here, they went when the aggression on
9 Yugoslavia became imminent and then they told the Verification Mission to
10 withdraw so as to make the bombing possible.
11 On page 168 of his book, he says the following: "When the army of
12 Yugoslavia, in spite of all the threats of bombings seized the troops" --
13 I will slow down. "The army of Yugoslavia when it seized troops at the
14 border, reacts by strengthening its forces toward that border." Then
15 Clark calls General Ojdanic, that's on page 168 of his book, and asks him
16 why he was bringing in new troops. Ojdanic replied that this was a
17 response to the new NATO troops in Macedonia, and then Clark said, "From
18 the Serbs' position the strengthening of his forces makes sense but it is
19 also a pretext for strengthening the forces again the Albanians.
20 Therefore, when a direct threat causes the strengthening of forces as a
21 consequence, this consequence is transformed into a cause for new
22 escalation."
23 And Madeleine Albright - this is on page 172 of his book - I
24 quote, says that: There is continuous deployment and strengthening of
25 Serbian troops. That's what he reported to Madeleine Albright, but before
Page 32250
1 that he said that it made sense from the Serbs' point of view. Then he
2 transforms a consequence into a cause, and this is what he says in his
3 report on the 6th of March, 1999, 18 days before the bombing, before there
4 were any refugees, he explains the scenario, what would happen after the
5 airstrikes and what the airstrikes would lead to. That's what he says in
6 page 173 of his book.
7 "Albright: If we start with the airstrikes, will the Serbs
8 attack the population? Clark: Almost certainly they will attack the
9 population. This is what they are promising to do. If we begin the
10 airstrikes, will they attack?" And he is talking about the attack not in
11 the past tense but as something that is to be expected as a consequence of
12 the airstrikes. Will the Serbs attack if the airstrikes begin? And he
13 says almost certainly they will. "Albright: What should we do? How can
14 we prevent their attacks on civilians? Clark: We can't. In spite of our
15 best efforts, the Serbs will attack civilians. This will be a race of our
16 airstrikes and the damage we do to them and what they can do on the
17 ground. In the short-term they will win the race. Albright: So what
18 should we do? Clark: We will have to strengthen our powers, our forces.
19 We will have to do more. We can be superior to anything they have, but it
20 will not be pleasant.
21 That's what it says in his book. Of course he doesn't mention the
22 KLA. As it can be seen clearly, the fight with the KLA he calls the
23 fighting with the civilians, but undoubtedly one or the other would be
24 caused by bombing consciously in a planned way. It's expected, and it
25 will be resolved by the bombing of the whole of Yugoslavia over a longer
Page 32251
1 term. Therefore, he himself, the Supreme Commander of NATO for Europe at
2 the time, discards the main thesis that the Serbs are responsible for the
3 persecution of Albanians because, he says, when we attack, then the
4 attacks will continue. He says that Rambouillet is not any kind of
5 unsuccessful negotiating situation but a process planned to produce an
6 ultimatum to be able to move from peace to war. This indicates that the
7 unscrupulous bombing of the towns, villages, the infrastructure and the
8 enormous human casualties are not a mistake but a calculated race, pouring
9 fuel onto the fire from a safe distance in order to burn down whatever can
10 be burned down as soon as possible, and then the fire-fighter would be
11 responsible whose duty it is in all fire conditions to spare human
12 casualties and to give them help.
13 He says that he planned the air operation against Yugoslavia, and
14 he wanted to be able to introduce NATO to Kosovo. I expect when he's
15 issued the summons to come and testify here we will see whether you think
16 that it is worth charging Wesley Clark for the crimes committed in the
17 former Yugoslavia for which you claim that you are responsible for, it's
18 under your jurisdiction. Then we will see.
19 Then we will see evidence that will show that the NATO pact -- or
20 I shouldn't say NATO pact, I should say the Clinton administration rather,
21 because Clark was one of his closest associates, and the rest, of course.
22 The Clinton administration falsified the reasons for their aggression
23 against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
24 The Canadian General Lewis MacKenzie, one of the former commanders
25 of UNPROFOR in Bosnia, in his text of the 6th of April, 2004 in the
Page 32252
1 Canadian daily National Post, says: "NATO decided on the action although
2 no member of the NATO alliance was in danger. It was decided to bomb not
3 only Kosovo but also the infrastructure and the people of Serbia, and this
4 without a resolution of the United Nations." I continue to quote: "We
5 mentioned that the West is placing itself on the side of the extremists,
6 of a militant separatist movement of Albanians from Kosovo, but we were
7 pushed aside as unobjective, and it is without doubt that the Kosovo
8 Liberation Army, which is fighting for the secession of Kosovo, was
9 characterised as a terrorist organisation which was receiving assistance
10 from Osama bin Laden," and we will present documents about this.
11 MacKenzie continues, contrary to what this illegal Prosecution insists on
12 in their unfounded indictment, he says: "All the information served to
13 cover or justify the bombing of Serbia turned out to be serious
14 forgeries."
15 General Lewis MacKenzie is no pro-Serb Canadian, he's only a
16 professional soldier speaking about the campaign to expel from Kosovo all
17 those who are not Albanian so that Kosovo would link up with mother
18 Albania and fulfil the objective of a Greater Albania, MacKenzie says:
19 "The campaign began with an attack on Serb security forces in the early
20 1990s. Milosevic's strong response to these attacks were managed to be
21 used by Albanians to get sympathies from the world for their objectives.
22 Quite contrary to Western claims, the genocide did not happen. Out of an
23 alleged 100.000 buried in mass graves, about 2.000 were found, and these
24 were members of all ethnic groups, including those who were obviously
25 killed in war, while taking part in combat."
Page 32253
1 Let us not even speak about how many of those were killed by the
2 KLA. You have here in prison this Limaj who is charged with the murder of
3 nine Serbs and 13 Albanians. So for the murder of more Albanians than
4 Serbs. Well, he only had nine Serbs in the prison and he had many more
5 Albanians, so he killed all of those nine Serbs and out of the rest of the
6 Albanians, he picked those 13 to kill. We have witnesses who will tell
7 you here, tell you and the international public how many Albanians were
8 killed and in what way by the KLA, and all this of was ascribed to the
9 Serbs.
10 And finally, playing with these numbers with your alleged experts
11 who are doing statistical calculations about the possible number of Serbs
12 is senseless in any kind of procedure which pretends to be a criminal
13 procedure.
14 MacKenzie goes on: "The Albanians from Kosovo played with us just
15 like a maestro plays with a violin. We helped and indirectly supported
16 their forceful campaign for an ethnically cleansed and independent Kosovo.
17 We never blamed them for the violence from the 1990s. We still present
18 them as victims although facts speak to the contrary. Think what kind of
19 a message of encouragement this would be to other terrorist movements in
20 the world who are seeking independence. If the Albanians achieve the
21 independence of Kosovo with the assistance of our taxpayer dollars as well
22 as those coming from bin Laden's al Qaeda."
23 He does not mention many other dollars received by them but we
24 will have the opportunity to discuss those as well.
25 He goes on: "Following the NATO intervention in 1999, Kosovo
Page 32254
1 became the biggest centre for crime in Europe, a white slave trade and
2 also a smuggling route on its way to Europe and North America. There is
3 proof that the largest quantities are coming from -- through Kosovo from
4 another country liberated by the West, Afghanistan. Members of the KLA
5 are personally implicated in these in this organised crime."
6 Admiral Gregory Johnson, the commander of the NATO forces in
7 Kosovo, or the commander of the NATO Southern Force, stated on the
8 occasion of the crimes in March 2004 that the conflicts which followed
9 constituted an action organised in advance, an action of ethnic cleansing
10 organised in advance by Albanians.
11 Damjan Krnjevic, he's an editor of the US magazine National
12 Interest and an associate of the Centre for South-Eastern Studies, in an
13 article published in the Wall Street Journal, under the title
14 Kristallnacht in Kosovo, underlines that Serbs for years warned about the
15 true nature of the Siptar movement and that the West claimed that they
16 were making this up and exaggerating. Krnjevic characterises this
17 anti-Serb activity and the position of the Serb people in Kosmet in the
18 following way: "Murder followed by murder, kidnapping followed by
19 kidnapping, and arson followed by arson, and finally the pogrom, which
20 confirmed the fears of the Serbs that they had been left to the mercy of
21 barbarians," and this under the auspices of the United Nations. This is
22 something that I added that is not his quotation. His quote ends at
23 "barbarians."
24 In this article Kristallnacht in Kosovo, he presents the fact that
25 from June 1999, 3.000 were kidnapped or killed. This is what I already
Page 32255
1 told you, and that "the mission of the United Nations in Kosovo constantly
2 deceived the entire world during the past five years with their alleged
3 successes while they were actually concealing the militarisation taking
4 place there."
5 Just like General MacKenzie, he quotes Derek Chapel, the spokesman
6 of the NATO police, who stated, "Everything is planned in advance." And
7 then he concludes based on that: "The only thing that is lacking or that
8 was lacking was the trigger. Now it is clear that certain Kosovo
9 politicians believe that by expelling Serbs, which they have already
10 achieved from 1999 with two-thirds of the Serbs, they can present the
11 international community with a fait accompli, and they can then take this
12 cleansing to be a sort of foundation for a sort of independence."
13 The Florida Times Union daily, shortly before the March escalation
14 of Albanian terrorism in Kosovo, March of this year, so prior to the
15 escalation in 2004, expressed the demand that Kosovo be returned to Serbia
16 because, I quote: "It is final time that Kosmet be returned to its true
17 owners."
18 Reporters of the Russian agency Novosti informed their readership
19 about the scale of the activities of the Albanian extremists in an article
20 entitled Vandals of the 21st Century. The aggressively minded section of
21 the Albanian population is destroying Christian monuments probably because
22 these monuments are direct evidence of the life and existence of Serbs in
23 that territory from ancient times and because they present authenticate
24 history which cannot be negated or eradicated from the collective memory.
25 The conduct of the protectorate power and the outrages of the Kosmet
Page 32256
25
Page 32257
1 rulers are characterised in the following ways: Every time with new
2 crimes against Serbs the protectorates have expressed condolences to those
3 who have collaborated in these crimes. So is it those who are in power
4 there who have command responsibility there and everything else that is
5 used here in the -- to the most possible degree? And they have four times
6 as much power than we had at the time when it was possible to maintain
7 public law and order to protect the citizens in the entire territory of
8 Kosovo.
9 Russian historian Naro Chichkaya, who is also the deputy president
10 of the Commission for International Relations of the Duma of Russia, in a
11 text entitled Kosovo, The Monstrous Boil on the Body of Europe, which was
12 published in the Belgrade newspaper Srpska Oblada on the 14th of April,
13 2004, says: "The bitter fruit --" that "They are the bitter fruits of the
14 anti-Serbian phobia of the West. The author says that it is still not
15 talked about the fact that not a single crime ascribed to the Serb police
16 and army has not been proven and that The Hague Tribunal has been
17 projected in order to justify the aggression against the sovereign Federal
18 Republic of Yugoslavia and that it has been a complete fiasco."
19 The well known and respectable London Financial Times expresses
20 the dilemma whether Kosovo will ever be safe, answers that first of all
21 depends on, I quote, "whether the West will think and review its policy
22 towards Kosovo from the very beginning."
23 The news from Kosmet indicate that the members of the KFOR are not
24 only allowing the rages of the Albanian terrorists but look on it
25 favourably. So they prevented a Serb from putting out the fire on his own
Page 32258
1 house with the words "Tonight everything Serbs must burn." Members of the
2 German KFOR peacefully looked on as terrorists burned down four churches,
3 demolished the monastery of St. Archangel and also the monument to Emperor
4 Dusan. This is not the first time that they did that. They set fire on a
5 Serbian religious building with people still inside, and they also burned
6 the fresco of philosopher Plato that was inside. A German officer coldly
7 and cynically commented the burning and the destruction of medieval
8 churches of vast cultural and historical importance in Prizren and its
9 environs by saying, "Well, those churches were old anyway."
10 I will skip over the propaganda activities and the statements of
11 various people or figures from the West. I will mention Kinkel who, on
12 the 27th of May, 1992, said that "Serbs should be brought to their knees."
13 Helmut Kohl in 1993, "Let the Serbs drown in their own stench." Blair in
14 1999, "War against Serbia is no longer a military conflict. It's a battle
15 between good and evil, between civilisation and barbarism." Clinton, who
16 said on 23rd, 25th of April in 1999 that "The Serbs were inflicting terror
17 and raping Albanian children."
18 This political psychological and psychopathological, I will say it
19 that way, situation is the conditions under which the NATO aggression
20 against Yugoslavia was conducted.
21 It has already been documented here, already I have shown a large
22 number of photographs about the bombing, but this is also in the
23 voluminous documentation which I will tender as an exhibit along with my
24 opening statement. Apparently it was not enough that so many Serbian
25 facilities were destroyed and so many citizens of Yugoslavia were killed
Page 32259
1 and wounded. That was not enough. So they even fired at the Chinese
2 Embassy and killed some Chinese and destroyed their embassy. Along with
3 using ammunitions with depleted uranium, this has polluted the ground, and
4 this will go on for many thousands of years. It can be said with
5 certainty that the pollution of the environment is not something that
6 occurred not only on the territory of Yugoslavia, but this pollution has
7 occurred on a broader area in Eastern Europe. Depleted uranium ammunition
8 was mostly -- mostly used in Kosovo. That is where there are many sources
9 of rivers which flow throughout Europe, so it was obvious that this was
10 the intent, to poison the rivers which flow into Serbia. Velika Morava,
11 Sava, and the Danube. So this led to an ecological catastrophe by
12 polluting major rivers as well as many spas in an area which is one of the
13 richest of medicinal waters. In the production of food, first of all,
14 which is something that is very expensive in Western Europe and the United
15 States, we're talking about organically grown food, and it's something
16 that Yugoslavia thought it had a future in. So this was jeopardised.
17 There was also a long-term strategic plan for agriculture which was made
18 by Yugoslavia until the year 2020 and where biologically or organically
19 grown food had a specific special place, health food. And with bombing,
20 many impermissible chemicals were introduced, thus jeopardising the
21 long-term production of this health food.
22 According to the findings of experts of the District Court in
23 Belgrade in the indictment against NATO leaders, the cluster bombs which
24 were dropped by NATO dissipated over a large area, and that is why it is
25 not possible to direct their activity only at military targets even though
Page 32260
1 -- even their use against military targets was a crime but they dispersed
2 to a much greater territory.
3 JUDGE ROBINSON: I'm sorry to interrupt you but I think we have to
4 leave it there for the day.
5 We will adjourn now and resume tomorrow morning at 9.00.
6 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.00 p.m.,
7 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 1st day of
8 September, 2004, at 9.00 a.m.
Page 32261
1 Wednesday, 1 September 2004
2 [Defence Opening Statement]
3 [Open session]
4 [The accused entered court]
5 --- Upon commencing at 9.05 a.m.
6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, the concluding part of your
7 opening statement.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, I hope you will bear
9 in mind that we started with a delay.
10 During the NATO aggression, poisons were not used directly, but
11 consequences similar to those of a chemical war were caused all the same
12 in other ways. For example, by bombing plants and warehouses containing
13 chemicals, oil refineries, chemical factories in Pancevo, Novi Sad,
14 Lucani, Baric. So that a chemical war was also waged against Serbia.
15 The powers that be do not like the sovereignty of Serbia and
16 Kosovo, although it is guaranteed by the conditions of the cease-fire and
17 contained in Resolution 1244, which is not being respected at all. Their
18 interest is to use the territory of Kosovo and Metohija for their
19 geostrategic and political goals; to use the mineral wealth, water
20 resources and other resources of Kosovo. We bear in mind that Kosovo
21 contains the biggest lignite mines in Europe. Close to 14 billion tonnes.
22 And there are also mines at Sink [phoen] and lead mines of enormous value
23 there. On Kosovo and Metohija there are also reserves of cobalt, nickel,
24 which are also very valuable. And the electricity plants in Kosovo are
25 very significant for the energy balance of Serbia.
Page 32262
1 All this demonstrates the basest motivation of the so-called
2 fighters for human rights of the Kosovo Albanians from the West. It is
3 evident that the source of the overall crisis in Kosovo and Metohija,
4 which has been going on ever since the Turkish occupation of that area
5 until today, is the wish of Albanian nationalists to create a Greater
6 Albania. They do not conceal this aspiration, and they do not refrain
7 from any means. They don't hesitate to use any means to achieve that
8 goal.
9 This so-called Prosecution is impudent enough to include in their
10 indictment against me and the Serbs that in the middle of the state of
11 Serbia, on the territory which is the very heart of the medieval Serbian
12 state, that there we wanted to create a so-called Greater Serbia. How can
13 Serbia, great or small, be created in Serbia itself is something that they
14 themselves are unable to explain or prove. And this is best demonstrated
15 by the first part of this operation which you call a trial, which like the
16 remainder of that operation, thanks to the nature and contents of this
17 false indictment, has turned into a simple and pure farce. However, the
18 amount of money set aside is not insignificant. It is not a cheap farce.
19 The money set aside by Saudi Arabia, George Soros, and other ostensibly
20 impartial donors, the US and so on.
21 Let me add that in 1998 when Holbrooke visited us in Belgrade, we
22 told him the information we had at our disposal, that in Northern Albania
23 the KLA is being aided by Osama bin Laden, that he was arming, training,
24 and preparing the members of this terrorist organisation in Albania.
25 However, they decided to cooperate with the KLA and indirectly, therefore,
Page 32263
1 with bin Laden, although before that he had bombed the embassies in Kenya
2 and Tanzania although he had already declared war.
3 I am convinced that one day all this will have to come to light,
4 these links, and that soon there will be a time when Clinton, Albright,
5 and others will have to be held responsible if not for what happened to
6 the Serbs then at least for what happened to their own people.
7 I will read a quotation and then I will have to move on to other
8 topics. The airstrikes and the unprecedented strikes, terror, sabotage,
9 murders of leading statesmen, the overwhelming attacks on all enemy lines
10 that will take place at a single point in time, this is the war of the
11 future on an unprecedented scale. I assume this reminds you of what the
12 NATO forces did to Yugoslavia in 1999. The aggression that this side
13 whose duty it would be to pay attention to that refuses to do so, but it
14 is not Clinton or Clark who said this, it is Hitler, although it fully
15 describes what they did. This was published in New York in 1940 by Herman
16 Rausching, My Confidential Conversations with Hitler. And this book goes
17 on to say, "No so-called international law or treaties will prevent me
18 from seizing the opportunity that is presenting itself." And then he goes
19 on to speak about how he will enslave France, how he will enter France as
20 their liberator, and how he will convince the middle class that he has
21 come in order to establish social law and order and a just social order.
22 As regards the war in Slovenia and Croatia, to begin with I will
23 only mention briefly that in Warren Zimmerman's book - he was the last US
24 ambassador to the SFRY - on page 173 he makes the following comment on the
25 position of the JNA and the so-called heroic struggle in Slovenia and
Page 32264
1 Croatia against the still common and legal Yugoslav army. I quote: "The
2 JNA was in its own country. Its troops were legitimately deployed in all
3 the Yugoslav republics. Even so, after the declaration of independence by
4 Slovenia and Croatia, the troops were treated as occupying troops even
5 when they did not leave their barracks. The Slovenian tactics and later
6 on --" Very well, I will slow down. "The Slovenian and then the Croatian
7 tactics, which cannot boast of any particular heroism, was based on
8 avoiding open conflict and attempting to bring the soldiers in the
9 barracks to a state of hunger and forcing them to leave. The JNA, which
10 until yesterday was a protector of the country and today has been treated
11 as the occupier, had a strong effect on the soldiers who were torn between
12 the two sides."
13 Further, Zimmerman, bearing in mind all the circumstances,
14 concludes in his book that it is wrong to speak of an attack by the JNA on
15 Slovenia and later on on Croatia. One of the most active anti-Serb
16 activists, Warren Zimmerman, who was then on the spot, is pointing to a
17 well-known fact that it is wrong to speak of an attack by the JNA on
18 Slovenia and Croatia while you here have been given the task of saying
19 that aggression was perpetrated there by the JNA on its own country.
20 Within Yugoslavia the Croatian separatist tendencies did not fully
21 disappear with the defeat and disappearance of the quisling independent
22 state of Croatia in World War II. These tendencies began to be displayed
23 quite openly in the early '70s with the so-called mass movement in Croatia
24 by a part of the republican leadership when demands were put forward for
25 the independence of Croatia and very strong pressure and threats were
Page 32265
1 directed towards the Serbian people. Although in post-war Yugoslavia,
2 among the most prominent state leaders, the Croats were given especially
3 significant posts, and they dominated in absolute numbers. Even so, in
4 Croatia and in some other places, the thesis was constantly fabricated
5 that there was so-called Serb hegemony there. What the Serb domination or
6 hegemony looked like we shall see.
7 From World War II throughout the existence of Yugoslavia, it is
8 very well known that from the end of World War II until his death in 1980,
9 the undisputable leader was Tito, who was a Croat. During the existence
10 of socialist Yugoslavia from 1945 to 1992, over a period of 47 years at
11 the head of the Yugoslav government, 30 years, were Croats. And during
12 the remaining 17 years, it was all the others. Only one of them was a
13 Serb, from 1963 to 1967, and that was Petar Stambolic.
14 When all this is borne in mind, how can we say that it was the
15 Serbs who dominated in the political leadership of the country? As for
16 the army, your own witness described the composition of the top leadership
17 at the time of the break-up of Yugoslavia. There was one Yugoslav and
18 that was the minister of defence, Veljko Kadijevic, from Croatia, from a
19 mixed marriage between a Serb and a Croat woman; two Serbs, one from
20 Serbia, one from Bosnia; eight Croats; two Slovenians; two Macedonians;
21 and one Muslim.
22 We should add to this that Tito's closest collaborator and the
23 creator of the constitutional system in all its stages was a Slovene,
24 Edvard Kardelja. All this shows quite clearly that the story of some kind
25 of Serbian domination in Yugoslavia is a pure and simple lie as well as
Page 32266
1 the statement that the Croats and Slovenians had cause to complain of
2 inequality and insufficient representation. The story of Serb hegemony
3 was only a propaganda tool which went against the truth and which was used
4 to justify secessionist aspirations.
5 In post-war Yugoslavia, the Ustasha genocide over the Serbs was a
6 topic that was not much talked about. The remaining Serbs on the
7 territory of the former Independent State of Croatia, especially those in
8 the Krajina which the well-known Serbian poet Matija Beckovic described as
9 the remnants of a slaughtered people, tacitly agreed not to talk about the
10 sufferings of their relatives, even not to bury them in a proper way. The
11 mass graves, Jadovnov [phoen], Pribilovci, Golubnjaca were simply covered
12 over with concrete and left to be forgotten, whereas here the thesis has
13 been put forward that the Serbs reburied their dead later on, although
14 these people had never been given a proper burial.
15 Bearing in mind this terrible mass crime from the not so distant
16 past, what could the Serbs in Croatia feel when at in February 1990, at
17 the rally of the HDZ in Zagreb, the president of that party, Tudjman,
18 said, among other things, the Independent State of Croatia was not only a
19 quisling creation and a fascist crime, it was also an expression of the
20 historical aspirations of the Croatian people. What was more natural than
21 for them to respond and to raise their voices before "the Croatian
22 people," in quotation marks, because this was not referring to all Croats
23 but to extremists aided from abroad, before they set out anew to realise
24 their so-called historical aspirations.
25 All this is information that you have and that you are
Page 32267
1 overlooking. This illegal Prosecution was not hindered from speaking in
2 paragraph 94 of its illegal indictment about the HDZ without any
3 qualification, although this was a party which revived the practices and
4 symbols from Ustasha times. While in paragraph 95 of this same false
5 indictment, the pro-Yugoslav Serb Democratic Party is called a nationalist
6 party. This is a manipulation which they permitted themselves in this
7 kind of presentation because they know everything about the chauvinist
8 activities of the HDZ, but they are not allowing a word to be said about
9 it. Everything about the HDZ had to be suppressed, and the SDS had to be
10 blackened.
11 This shows quite clearly that these activities of the Serbian
12 people -- what they fail to say is that the activities of the Serbian
13 people were activities aimed at defence.
14 Warren Zimmerman, in his book The Source of a Catastrophe speaks
15 about how in Tudjman's Croatia, in quotes, "The rights of Serbs were
16 seriously violated. They were dismissed from work, asked to sign
17 statements of loyalty." The irony is greater because here they tried to
18 impute that I requested some type of statement of loyalty. Well, they
19 couldn't find then a single person who had to sign this statement of
20 loyalty to me. This is absurd. Their homes and property were attacked,
21 Zimmerman continues, says that Tudjman's ministers called the Serbs by
22 derogatory names.
23 On page 215 of that book he says that Tudjman played a major role
24 in the violent death of Yugoslavia and the violence in Bosnia and
25 Herzegovina and Croatia. He said that he was said to have a Nazi attitude
Page 32268
1 towards the Serbs due to which Croatia turned into an undemocratic and
2 explosive republic, and these are his words.
3 The anti-Serb path of the new Croatian government is linked to the
4 Nerval Group. Nerval is a place in Canada where the Franciscan monks and
5 Ustashas were situated. These neo-Ustasha groups were assessed by the
6 Canadian government as more extreme than the actual pro-Nazi-Ustasha
7 organisation during Hitler's Independent State of Croatia.
8 In spite of that, the Croatian press is writing about these things
9 but due to a shortage of time I cannot present this to you now. But the
10 gist is in the following: At the time already in 1987, in 1987, as early
11 as that, an approach was made to the future Independent State of Croatia
12 containing this programme containing four main points taken over from
13 information coming from Croatia, from the Croatian magazine Globus.
14 Number one: At any cost Croatia must be an independent state. We must
15 work on having Croatia become ethnically clear and homogenous. In other
16 words, the Serb national community should be reduced to a minimal minority
17 so that they would not be a disruptive factor. The struggling Croatia
18 should be led on one front, and the main opponent are the Serbs. In order
19 to defeat the Serbs, we need to join together with the Communists and the
20 Partisans and in union with them we will win our finer victory. And
21 four: As far as Bosnia and Herzegovina is concerned, such a policy should
22 be conducted which would sooner or later lead to the joining of Western
23 Bosnia to Croatia to have a pure Croatian territory.
24 Martin Spegelj, his defence minister during the time of these
25 events in the Dnevnik on the 28th of October, 2001, said publicly, "If a
Page 32269
1 house of a Serb is burned down, he will not have anywhere to return." He
2 said that Gojko Susak said this. Again in Novi List, Spegelj said on the
3 29th of October 2001 that Tudjman and Susak essentially made a concept of
4 a pure nationalist state after the model of Croatia from World War II.
5 In December, on 8th of December, 1993, the New York Times speaks
6 about 10.000 homes which were blown up with dynamite. I'm not going to
7 quote from that in order not to waste time.
8 In spite of the pressures, harassment, physical attacks and an
9 overall degradation on the individual and collective level, the Serbian
10 people in Croatia were also discriminated against in a legal way. The
11 Christmas Constitution is well known, which deprived the Serbs of all the
12 rights that they enjoyed prior to that. In The Balkan Odyssey, Lord Owen
13 says on page 61 that they resisted joining the settlements populated by
14 Serbs which generally together formed the military border between the
15 Habsburg and the Ottoman Empires, which was defended from Vienna and not
16 from Zagreb. The sense grew after 1945 because this population was
17 exposed to genocide during World War II by the Croatian Ustashas. A very
18 small number of commentators in 1995 realised or recognised that the
19 Croatian government in attacking Krajina did not liberate this land since
20 the Serbs had inhabited it for over three centuries. This is something
21 that is written by Lord Owen.
22 Already in mid-1990, there was a series of actions, attacks, and
23 killings, and because of the Serb reaction by placing barricades to the
24 entrances to their settlements, this revolt was called the log revolution.
25 The Croatian authorities interpreted these reactions of Serbs who were
Page 32270
1 afraid to remain without any means of collective defence in relation to
2 the recurring Ustasha terror and ideology, considered that to be an
3 attack, an aggression against the Croatian state. Well, I don't know how
4 one can make an attack by placing logs in front of the approaches to their
5 houses.
6 Spegelj, who said what I quoted before, said the following:
7 "Knin, we will resolve in such a way that we will massacre them. We will
8 massacre them." This is what we have international recognition for.
9 There are numerous proofs of this, that these are not just empty words but
10 that we are talking about dead people here.
11 In his book The Invasion of Serbian Krajina, Gregory Elich speaks
12 of the following: "In 1990 Tudjman said, 'I'm glad my wife is neither a
13 Serb or a Jew.' [In English] and wrote that accounts of the Holocaust were
14 exaggerated and one-sided."
15 [Interpretation] I will skip over many of his quotes but mention
16 just some of them. "[In English] During its violent secession from
17 Yugoslavia in 1991, Croatia expelled more than 300.000 Serbs, and Serbs
18 were eliminated from ten towns and 183 villages." [Interpretation] There
19 was a mistake. Yes, that's correct; and 183 villages.
20 And then: "[In English] Tomislav Mercep, until recently the
21 advisor to the Interior Minister and a member of parliament, is a
22 death-squad leader. Mercep's death squad murdered 2.500 Serbs in Western
23 Slavonia in 1991 and 1992, actions Mercep defends as 'heroic deeds.'"
24 [Interpretation] You have here the testimony of Miro Bajramovic, a
25 member of that death squad. I have it on tape, but I don't have time to
Page 32271
1 show it to you.
2 Gregory Elich goes on to say: "[In English] Sadly, the Clinton
3 administration's embrace of Croatia follows a history of support for
4 fascists when it suits American geopolitical interests."
5 [Interpretation] Susan Woodward of the Brookings Institution, in
6 the book The Balkan Tragedy 1995, says: "[In English] The Croatian
7 government did little to protect its citizens from vicious outbursts of
8 anti-Serb terrorism saw mixed communities of Dalmatia and interior during
9 the summer months of 1989 when Croat zealots smashed store fronts,
10 fire-bombed homes, and harassed and arrested potential Serbs leader. In
11 many parts of Croatia, Serbs were expelled from jobs because of their
12 nationality. Discrimination was not limited to this early flare-up but
13 increased over the following years."
14 [Interpretation] How long before this log revolution when this was
15 going on in 1989 and that criminal activity that you are ascribing to the
16 Serbs when they were actually just defending themselves?
17 Chris Hedges, in The New York Times on the 16th of June, 1997,
18 says: "[In English] [Previous translation continues]... 500.000 of
19 600.000 ethnic Serbs from the country and carried out de facto annexation
20 of largely Catholic region of Herzegovina," et cetera.
21 [Interpretation] I don't have time. They are talking about the
22 Kristallnacht in Zadar, talking about expulsion of tens of thousands of
23 people from their apartments. They're talking about in the Croat papers
24 in Feral, in the Tjednik, new proof about the -- of the crimes in Vukovar,
25 and I'm quoting them, "when the corpses of dead bodies floated down the
Page 32272
1 Danube, then in Gospic in the Croatian coastal area," and so on.
2 The magazine Identitet, a Croatian magazine, says that the least
3 work was done to shed light on the crimes in Osijek in 1991 and 1992 when
4 several Serb civilians were killed, and they explain how they were taken
5 away and how they were killed.
6 When we're talking about Gospic, three officers of the Croatian
7 army applied to testify here about the crimes. They were not given any
8 protection, so the witness Milan Levar, who was supposed to testify
9 against those who committed the Gospic massacre was liquidated.
10 Erdemovic, who admitted that he had killed 100 people in Srebrenica, whom
11 we arrested, who came here because he asked to be brought here, he asked
12 to be extradited to The Hague, and he was not our citizen so he was
13 extradited at his own request, you provided protection for him although he
14 admitted killing 100 people. He admitted that to our investigative
15 organs, and you released him after four years to -- to live unpunished.
16 But you did not protect these other witnesses, but you did extend
17 protection to him so that he can go back to -- I see that I will have to
18 skip some things. The time flies, unfortunately.
19 On one page 182 of his book, David Owen touches upon the following
20 topic and he says: "Mostly the Serbs who remained there didn't have any
21 freedom at all. Many JNA barracks were surrounded by the Croatian army,
22 which was the reason why the JNA reacted so strongly in places like
23 Vukovar." He says "places like Vukovar," but that is actually the only
24 place where the JNA reacted forcefully. But he does explain why this
25 happened.
Page 32273
1 The explanation is also what is being written in the Croatian
2 press now about how many corpses were floating down the river much
3 earlier, before the events in Vukovar.
4 Vukovar was the only exception and the only place where the JNA
5 responded to being surrounded, to its members being attacked, to civilians
6 being attacked, responded forcefully. So it is without doubt that the war
7 in Croatia was caused and initiated by the Croatian authorities in order
8 to effect a violent and illegal secession, and, as the years that will
9 come would show, to achieve an ethnically clean Croatian state.
10 And arising without doubt from everything is that the Serbs were
11 forced to defend themselves. They had to fight for their survival. So
12 nobody is doubting the existence of individual crimes which were the
13 result of the chaos that had occurred and which this so-called indictment
14 is trying to present as the result of some kind of joint criminal
15 endeavour, although all the facts, the historical, military, and legal
16 facts, speak to the contrary. And they base this on testimonies such as
17 the testimony of Milan Babic, who was in conflict with his very own
18 leadership precisely because of his own extremism and similar witnesses.
19 It is well known that primarily thanks to the efforts of Cyrus
20 Vance but also thanks to the efforts of the Republic of Serbia and my own
21 efforts, the Vance Plan was adopted. The protected zones were created
22 which the Croat army never respected, because it is well known how many
23 attacks there were: Miljevacka, Klatno [phoen], Peruca, Medak pocket,
24 Zemunik, Western Slavonia, Flash, Storm, and so on. How many hundreds of
25 Serbs were killed in each one of those attacks and all that happened.
Page 32274
1 Weapons were under a double lock. The Serbs had handed it over, but they
2 took it back when they were attacked in order to defend their very lives
3 and to prevent a massacre.
4 In view of all the above, Lord Owen in his book says:
5 "The Croatian army equipped itself quickly with planes, heavy
6 artillery. All this came from neighbouring European countries and was
7 bought in the former eastern Germany. When this happened, it was not
8 difficult, as far as the Serbs were concerned, why they resisted
9 demilitarisation and demobilisation. The Serb factor was a consolidating
10 factor, and the Croatian side was a destabilising factor."
11 I am finishing my quote from the Owen book. And he said that the
12 biggest ethnic cleansing in the Yugoslav crisis was the ethnic cleansing
13 in front of which this institution remains unmoved, and that is the
14 expulsion of thousands of Serbs and hundreds killed. When something like
15 this happens to the Serbs, it does not appear to be a crime.
16 I will just say a few words about Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is
17 well known that peace lasted as long as the former Yugoslavia lasted, with
18 a small delay. We had this peace. It was there because the absence of
19 tutors and occupiers finally turned the citizens of this multi-cultural
20 state towards one another.
21 In the changes of the constitution on the 31st of July, 1991, in
22 Article 1, the drafters wrote that Bosnia and Herzegovina is a democratic,
23 sovereign state, an equal community of all of its citizens - Muslims,
24 Serbs, and Croats of members of other nationalities that live there; and
25 that the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina is within the
Page 32275
Page 32276
1 composition of Yugoslavia. This was written in the new constitution.
2 However, even during this peaceful life among the population in this
3 republic, you can still see -- see on the site of the Bosnian organisation
4 Mladi Muslimani, Young Muslims, organised in 1939, find the oath which
5 they created in the second half of 1947 in which they talk about an
6 uncompromising struggle against everything that is not Islamic, that they
7 will sacrifice everything on the path, including their own lives, if this
8 is in the interests of Islam.
9 How can you fight in a multi-ethnic community like Bosnia and
10 Herzegovina and Yugoslavia against everything that is not Islamic? And if
11 we keep in mind that the vast majority of the population there is not
12 Islamic. And it happened that precisely these young Muslims had the way
13 open to them and the means placed in their hands in order to conduct a
14 holy war.
15 The first national political party that was created was the Party
16 of Democratic Action of Izetbegovic. It is characteristic that the
17 founder of the station and Izetbegovic's sponsor, Izet Adil Zulfikarpasic,
18 speaks in his book about Novi Pazar the following:
19 "When we came to Novi Pazar, we were welcomed by a large mass of
20 people. The authorities were quite fair, the police also. Patrol cars
21 made sure that everything passed without any conflict. In the town
22 itself, when we arrived, the police officers withdrew from the streets and
23 we could see only SDA guards everywhere."
24 But then something happened at this rally that surprised me
25 considerably. There was a rally and this rally was conducted in a sort of
Page 32277
1 pro-fascist way. There were hundreds of religious flags on the stadium.
2 And then he continues to speak in his book:
3 "Whenever we went in a large number, then the imams would
4 appear. They were our hosts. They organised everything. Religious
5 officials joined the party. At some point I requested that the flags be
6 removed, but then people appeared in caftans and dzelabija, which nobody
7 actually ever wore in Bosnia before then."
8 I'm going to admit some things. Anyway, Zulfikarpasic left the
9 party because he didn't want any part of that.
10 It is a well-known thing that Izetbegovic, as far back as the
11 spring of 1943, led the Muslim youth of Sarajevo, and in that capacity he
12 was the host of Amin al Huseini, the great mufti from Jerusalem, Hitler's
13 friend who had fled to Germany. And in his book he advocates jihad, a
14 holy war against Christians and Jews. All of this within the Independent
15 State of Croatia of Pavelic. And at Himmler's initiative, and through the
16 mediation of this same Huseini, a Muslim Wafe SS division was established.
17 Not one, as a matter of fact; a Handzar Division, a Kama division, and
18 also a Skenderbeg division consisting of Muslims from Kosovo and Metohija.
19 Unfortunately I have to be very quick and move through this very
20 quickly.
21 Izetbegovic in 1990 again published his Islamic declaration, and I
22 quote from it:
23 "The creation of a single Islamic Community from Morocco to
24 Indonesia. Also the fact that non-Islamic institutions cannot co-exist
25 with Islamic institutions. We do not herald an era of piece. We herald
Page 32278
1 an era of unrest. People who are asleep can be awakened only by blows.
2 First of all, we have to be preachers and only then soldiers. The Islamic
3 movement can and shall take over power as soon as its numbers rise to the
4 extent that it cannot only topple the existing non-Islamic government but
5 build an Islamic government. Members of the Islamic faith should learn,
6 using the example of Pakistan, what should be done and what should not be
7 done. Nowadays, the aspiration for all the Islamic communities and all
8 Islam believers in the world should be brought together. This is all
9 aimed at an Islamic Community from Morocco to Indonesia, from Europe to
10 Africa."
11 So you can imagine how people who were not the Islamic faith felt
12 in Bosnia and Herzegovina in view of these promises that they were
13 supposed to live in some kind of European Pakistan. You can imagine what
14 their reaction could have been.
15 However, as for the allegiance of the -- of Alija Izetbegovic to
16 the Islamic fundamentalist cause, nobody can testify better to that than
17 Islamic fundamentalists themselves. On the 11th of April, 1993, Reuters
18 reports from Dubai that Alija Izetbegovic received an Islamic award in
19 Riyadh in great festivities, and I quote, "for his contribution to jihad,
20 the holy war against non-believers."
21 So this reward confirmed that Alija Izetbegovic persevered along
22 the road that he had opted for when he was a young man, and in accordance
23 with the oath of allegiance he took in 1947, it meant an uncompromising
24 struggle against everything, especially everything non-Islamic. But it
25 was not only the Islamic fundamentalist circles that knew of this kind of
Page 32279
1 nature of the Bosnian-Herzegovnian regime; it is also clearly stated in
2 the republican report in the Senate of the United States of America. This
3 is a document dated the 16th of January, 1997.
4 I'm going to go through it very, very quickly. It refers to three
5 questions.
6 First of all, I am going to omit the rest, how it all went.
7 The last sentence in one is:
8 [In English] "And the departments of state and defence were kept
9 in the dark until after the decision was made."
10 The second point speaks of:
11 [In English] "The military Islamic network, along with the weapons
12 Iranian Revolutionary Guard and Vivac Intelligence Operatives, entered
13 Bosnia in large numbers along with thousands of Mujahedin, holy warriors,
14 from across the Muslim world. Also engaged in the effort were several
15 other Muslim countries, including Brunei, Malaysia, Pakistan, Saudi
16 Arabia, Sudan, and Turkey, and a number of radical Muslim organisations.
17 For example, the role of one Sudan-based humanitarian organisation..."
18 [Interpretation] This is under quotation:
19 [In English] "... one relief agency has been well documented."
20 [Interpretation] Point number 3:
21 [In English] "Islamic character of the Sarajevo regime. This
22 Islamist orientation is illustrated by profiles of important officials,
23 including President Izetbegovic himself. The progressive Islamisation of
24 the Bosnian army, including the creation of native Bosnian Mujahedin
25 units, credible claim that major atrocities against civilians in Sarajevo
Page 32280
1 were staged for propaganda purposes by operatives of the Izetbegovic
2 government in suppression of enemies, both non-Muslim and Muslim."
3 [Interpretation] In this document, it is corroborated that they
4 themselves staged attacks against their own citizens.
5 I'm going to skip over some other things.
6 [In English] The report concluded, page 2:
7 "The Administration's Iranian green light policy gave Iran an
8 unprecedented foothold in Europe and has recklessly endangered American
9 lives and US strategic interests."
10 [Interpretation] Then there is reference to the presence of Divak,
11 also sleeping agents; then the AID, Izetbegovic's intelligence service
12 that you brought here, rather, you brought their members here to testify
13 against me. "[In English] [Previous translation continues]... point of
14 jointly planning terrorist activities."
15 [Interpretation] And then it says: "[In English] Clinton gave a
16 green light that would lead to this degree of Iranian influence."
17 [Interpretation] Then they give explanations as to what this is all about
18 and you will have an opportunity to see this document. "[In English]
19 [Previous translation continues]... Islamic revolution in Europe."
20 [Interpretation] And then there is reference to this phoney
21 humanitarian agency. "[In English] [Previous translation continues]... is
22 believed to be connected with such fixtures of the Islamic terror network
23 of Sheikh Omar Abdel-Rahman, the convicted mastermind behind the 1993
24 World Trade Centre bombing, and Osama bin Laden, a wealthy Saudi immigrant
25 believed to bankroll numerous militant groups."
Page 32281
1 [Interpretation] And then it says: "[In English] [Previous
2 translation continues] "'... into Bosnia was of great assistance in
3 allowing the Iranian to dig in and create good relations with Bosnian
4 government,' a senior CIA officer told Congress in a classified
5 deposition. And it is a thing we will live to regret because when they
6 blow up some Americans, as they no doubt will before this thing is over,
7 it will be in part because Iranians were able to have the time and
8 contacts to establish themselves well in Bosnia."
9 [Interpretation] Later on they blew them up, the Kenyans, the
10 Tanzanians, and also these crimes that were committed in the Balkans, but
11 I don't have time to speak of that now. I really have to move on very
12 quickly because you've been so stingy with time.
13 I just wish to note that the 31st of March, 1991, in
14 Bosnia-Herzegovina today, or rather in this federation, is an official
15 holiday. It is the Day of the Patriotic League, the military formation
16 that was established by the SDA. The 31st of March, 1991.
17 They organised their party along military lines as well a year
18 before the conflict broke out. And in this year, 1991, when conflicts
19 broke out, half of the Serbs were killed then out of the total number of
20 Serb victims. Analyses show, experts have proven, that Serbs were not
21 prepared for the war at all, whereas these people were preparing for
22 themselves for an entire year.
23 Owen says in his book the picture of the Bosnian Muslims of being
24 unarmed is not a true one. Even Alija Izetbegovic himself admitted on
25 television that they were armed through secret channels. And he speaks of
Page 32282
1 millions of bullets and tens of thousands of bombs, grenades, shells,
2 hundreds of thousands of uniforms, and so on and so forth. And according
3 to the statement made by Sefer Halilovic, the Chief of the Main Staff of
4 the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, in an interview he gave to Nasi Dani on
5 the 25th of September, 1992 - 1992, gentlemen - the Patriotic League, when
6 the war started, had 103 municipal staffs and 98.000 fighters. 103
7 municipal staffs. And Bosnia-Herzegovina had a total of 109
8 municipalities altogether. Everything is clear as far as war preparations
9 are concerned. It is clear to all but you.
10 The Serb side had three objectives. That can be seen when the
11 entire political situation is analysed. The first one was to preserve the
12 Yugoslav federation. And then, if it is impossible to obtain that
13 objective, to attain their own right to self-determination like the right
14 enjoyed by other peoples in Yugoslavia. So in case that objective is
15 impossible too, then finding ways and means through negotiations to ensure
16 an equitable position for Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
17 The Serb side advocated the preservation of Yugoslavia, and it was
18 not only the fact that this was in line with domestic and international
19 law but everything else worked in favour of that. Unfortunately, there is
20 no time to discuss all of this now.
21 How justified the requests of the Serb people were, their calls
22 for an equality of rights, that is deeply rooted because the Serb people
23 have lived in the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina for over a millennium.
24 So there are deep roots in history.
25 I have to speed things up.
Page 32283
1 If one looks at the chronology of all events, and we will have the
2 opportunity to deal with this through witnesses, indicates the following:
3 First that what the Serbs did were reactions to what the Muslim side did,
4 that is to say violations of the constitutional rights of the Serbs. And
5 this, what the Serbs did, was only making up for what the other two, the
6 Muslims and the Croats, took away from them. It can be seen that the
7 other side gradually moved away, and finally the Serbs were cornered and
8 agreed to a minimum of their demands. Finally the Dayton Agreement
9 sanctioned their minimal rights, but unfortunately, later on in a fully --
10 this happened only after a great deal of blood was shed unnecessarily.
11 The last chance of preserving peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina before
12 the war was the Cutileiro plan. Everybody signed the plan, and when
13 Zimmerman talked him into it, Izetbegovic withdrew his signature from the
14 plan. I believe that we are going to have ample documents about this that
15 we will present later.
16 All of this shows very clearly that the Serb side was not the one
17 that wanted war. It did its best to prevent a war.
18 After the international recognition and after the break-out of the
19 war, and it is no accident that the two coincided, the JNA started
20 withdrawing from Bosnia-Herzegovina in accordance with the previously
21 signed agreement. That is stated in the report of the Secretary-General
22 of the United Nations, Boutros-Ghali, dated the 30th of May, 1992,
23 addressed to the Security Council, in which it is also stated that the
24 army of Republika Srpska, established on the 15th of May, was not under
25 the control of Belgrade. And it also states that a considerable part of
Page 32284
1 the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina was under the occupation of the
2 official forces of the Republic of Croatia. However, the then president
3 of the Security Council, the Austrian Petar van Felner [phoen], concealed
4 or, rather, withheld part of that report of Boutros-Ghali until sanctions
5 were voted for by the Security Council against Yugoslavia. And it is only
6 Croatia that should have had sanctions imposed on it on the basis of the
7 report, by no means the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
8 These are all the facts that I managed to present over this short
9 period of time. This is only the tip of the iceberg. And now what have
10 you come up with against these undisputable material facts and historical
11 facts?
12 In this false indictment, you mechanically compiled in an
13 unnatural way a series of events - and crimes, no doubt - and you branded
14 it a joint criminal enterprise without a shred of evidence. And you only
15 talk about some kind of plan and intention of the Serbs. However, this
16 so-called Prosecution relies on a unique concept called joint criminal
17 enterprise, and that in itself proves that they cannot establish guilt.
18 There is absence of evidence and of any intent, and that is the only thing
19 that could compel one to resort to such a nebulous construction, joint
20 criminal enterprise. In other words, when there is proof and evidence of
21 something someone did and of intent, then an illegal Prosecution does not
22 have to think up some joint criminal enterprise. Then it uses evidence
23 concerning the actual deeds committed and the intent.
24 When a prosecutor does not have evidence and cannot establish
25 guilt, then they resort to that, and then in this way they dodge the
Page 32285
1 obligation which is called burden of proof, and that is part of any legal
2 judicial system.
3 This was conceived so that without proving guilt innocent people
4 can be charged. And of course that is sheer mutilation of justice,
5 nothing else. What it says there are empty words.
6 You explain in these indictments, in these charges, in these
7 alleged indictments, you speak of crimes that we did not commit. And you
8 explain it by intent that we never had. That is your concept.
9 I don't want to go into the question of Bosnia and Croatia again
10 where Serbia did not have any jurisdiction, but we did assist the Serbs.
11 Of course we did. And we would have been the scum of the earth had we not
12 helped them when their lives were in peril. And our greatest wish was to
13 establish peace and the greatest assistance was that in Serbia over all of
14 those ten years there was no discrimination on ethnic grounds against
15 anyone in any way.
16 When speaking of Kosovo, there is not a single shred of evidence
17 that any crime was committed. Not only on anyone's orders but also with
18 any kind of previous knowledge of the generals in command. And you have
19 indicted four generals. Not a single one of them issued any orders to
20 that effect. Not a single one of them had any knowledge about anything
21 that could have constituted a crime before these crimes actually happened.
22 You have accused the political leadership and the military leadership of
23 Serbia and Yugoslavia, and you have all the evidence showing that whatever
24 happened in Kosovo and Metohija was during the bombing, the day and night
25 bombing, and that the legal authorities brought to justice those who
Page 32286
1 committed crimes.
2 Even your witness here, General Vasiljevic, confirmed the details
3 about a meeting that I had with the top echelons of the military, of the
4 General Staff, and that I personally insisted that all perpetrators should
5 be arrested. And he even quoted me as saying that no one should have it
6 easy and that everyone, including General Ojdanic, who is sitting in this
7 prison, totally innocent, and then further on these four generals who you
8 have indicted, Lazarevic, Pavkovic, Djordjevic, and Lukic, everybody had
9 the same position. And even the leadership, the Supreme Command along the
10 vertical line acted by way of prevention, that is to say forbidding the
11 existence of paramilitary formations.
12 There are written reports and I have tendered them into evidence
13 -- or, rather, I shall tender them into evidence through the testimony of
14 witnesses. There are hundreds of reports of military courts, of military
15 prosecutors' offices regarding the perpetrators of various crimes. The
16 first reports start already at the end of March 1999 and then they move
17 on.
18 What else could the executive government have done and the
19 judiciary in any country as well as the chain of command but to
20 categorically insist on the Prosecution of all perpetrators of crimes and
21 to make sure through the reports it gets that this is being done? This is
22 what we did under the most difficult of circumstances, under conditions of
23 daily bombing. Some trials were completed and the perpetrators convicted
24 even before the bombing ended.
25 In these two years of presentation of evidence, you have not
Page 32287
1 presented a shred of evidence to the contrary. Throughout these two years
2 you have not presented a shred of evidence or a single testimony that
3 might indicate a link between a crime that was committed or a criminal
4 with the troop commanders, the generals you have indicted, or the
5 political leadership of Serbia, or me personally. On the contrary, you
6 have evidence that we did our utmost to prevent crimes, and if crimes were
7 committed - and this is possible even in peacetime let alone during
8 wartime and especially during ethnic conflicts - that they should be
9 prosecuted under the law. In Serbia in the Sabac District Court in 1993,
10 the first of these trials was held, and you have information to that
11 effect.
12 On the other side, you have all the evidence that we were the ones
13 who were the most persistent in achieving peace and who can claim the most
14 credit for achieving peace, that we saved millions of refugees on the
15 principle of non-discrimination, because tens of thousands of Muslim
16 refugees found refuge in Serbia. We freed French pilots and other
17 hostages. You can see what was done to achieve this through materials you
18 yourselves have. And all we could do was insist and beg and exert
19 pressure because we had no other powers. But we succeeded in this.
20 Please look at these interviews, because this is enough for you to
21 understand that all these charges make no sense.
22 On the other side, you can see what evidence you have on the role
23 of the Croatian political leadership in ethnic cleansing and the plan and
24 the achievement of the plan both before and after 1990. You even have
25 stenograms. We received some of these from you, and we were able to see
Page 32288
1 them here, from which you can see the fabrication of excuses for the
2 perpetration of crimes during Operations Flash and Storm. You have
3 evidence of the role of the Clinton administration in all this, and you
4 will receive more evidence. You have written evidence about those who
5 made all these decisions, because in each of the stenograms of the
6 so-called VONS, the Council of Defence and National Security, you can see
7 who was present there.
8 You also have evidence of crimes against the Serbs based on
9 decisions by the Muslim leadership. Kljuc testified here, a former member
10 of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and on the basis of the
11 stenogram I asked him about this because you can see that Izetbegovic knew
12 about the camps where people were illegally detained for years on end, and
13 you will be able to hear more testimony about this. You have everything
14 you need about the Croatian and the Muslim leaderships but not about the
15 leadership of Republika Srpska, the Republika Srpska Krajina, and Serbia.
16 You have evidence from the testimony of your own protected witness
17 who was an important political leader that what Milan Martic said to me
18 was correct, that is that in the Krajina, including in Knin itself, the
19 Croats who remained were being treated as equal citizens and that there is
20 absolutely no discrimination whatsoever.
21 I think that what I'm going to say now deserves more time, but I
22 will be very brief and simply just touch upon it. And this is the matter
23 of witnesses who reached a plea agreement with this so-called Prosecution,
24 and this is, I dare say, an example of the fabrication of false witnesses.
25 I think that this is an unprecedented event. When one of these
Page 32289
1 witnesses, when I asked him how he could have signed that in Srebrenica
2 7.000 Muslims were shot, he explained that his defence sent a letter in
3 which it promised not to challenge numbers. So you could have written
4 down 70.000. You could have written down whatever you wanted.
5 Before the Bosnia case, I put forward information my collaborators
6 succeeded in collecting which throws serious doubt on your constructions
7 about Srebrenica. In the meantime, we have heard the testimony of General
8 Morillon who testified here that Srebrenica was a trap for Mladic who
9 confirmed that in his opinion, and he knew Mladic well, Mladic could never
10 have issued such an order. And this is in accordance with what I believe.
11 I do not believe Mladic could have issued such an order. His honour would
12 never have allowed him to do such a dishonourable thing. But there will
13 be witnesses called to testify about all this.
14 And what I want to say is that I think it's in the interests of
15 both Serbs and Muslims that the truth about Srebrenica should come to
16 light rather than a false myth be created. Your fabrication of false
17 witnesses and the pressures of Paddy Ashdown on the leadership of
18 Republika Srpska, which is synchronised with what you are doing, this will
19 not be sufficient to perpetrate this double crime, this double crime which
20 insults both the dead and the living.
21 Everyone should be interested in establishing the truth about
22 Srebrenica so that those who perpetrated crimes might be punished and
23 those who are innocent might be released and set free of any charges or
24 doubts that they committed such a dishonourable thing.
25 You did not make use of Erdemovic to get information from him.
Page 32290
Page 32291
1 You did not make use of any of the things you could have made use of to
2 establish the truth. I hope, I can only hope that some of the witnesses -
3 I am trying, through my collaborators, because I myself cannot do it, of
4 course - I hope they will throw more light on what happened there.
5 But to go back to this witness or two other witnesses whom you
6 have here who made plea agreements. You then had such protected
7 witnesses, because you had the public testimony of Miroslav Deronjic, and
8 his own mother should not speak to him in view of what he said he did,
9 that he killed a whole village after guaranteeing its security. First, he
10 guaranteed its security and then slaughtered the whole village. You
11 forgave him all of that only so that he would lie against Karadzic. And
12 you have Karadzic's order to the troops in Srebrenica in your hands to the
13 effect that they should look after the civilians and adhere to the Geneva
14 Conventions. This was sent in writing to the troops. And then someone
15 like Deronjic comes along to testify that Karadzic allegedly whispered in
16 his ear that they should all be killed. This does not make sense, and
17 it's not even worth discussing. No normal man could comprehend it,
18 especially when someone signs a document about the shooting of 7.000 men
19 because he's obliged not -- obliged not to challenge any figures.
20 Not to mention other matters that you made use of here. You made
21 use of my speech, you built it into the very foundation of your indictment
22 when you first opened your mouths in 2002, my speech in Gazimestan where I
23 allegedly fanned the flames of Serb nationalism. I am proud of that
24 speech to this day, because it is everything else, but it is certainly not
25 the awakening of some sort of negative atmosphere. On the contrary. But
Page 32292
1 you are not the only ones to participate in this. This has been repeated
2 by many Western politicians. There is almost no newspaper that has not
3 written about it. The lie has been repeated innumerable times, but not in
4 '89. To put it correctly, then, it's only ten years later that this
5 happened. I have no time to dwell on this, but I will take it as an
6 example of the way manipulations and lies are perpetrated.
7 Robin Cook, on the 28th of June, 1999, ten years later, says:
8 [In English] ... not to give a message of hope and reform.
9 Instead, he threatened force to deal with Yugoslavia's internal political
10 difficulties, doing so thereby launched his personal agenda of power and
11 ethnic hatred under the cloak of nationalism."
12 [Interpretation] I have here any number of quotations dating from
13 1999, 2000, 2001. Look at The Independent, the 1st of July, 2001:
14 "[In English] ... without his agenda, more than a million Serbs;
15 at the battle of Kosovo, 600, anniversary celebration, as he openly
16 threatens force to hold the six-republic federation together."
17 [Interpretation] You have quotations here from Time magazine, even
18 from The Economist. They are all quoting lies. I have now quoted from
19 The Independent, the 1st of July, 2001. Now I will quote The
20 Independent from the 29th of June, 1989. The same newspaper, it says:
21 "[In English] The President made not one aggressive reference to
22 Albanian counter-revolutionaries ..."
23 [Interpretation] Counter-revolution is a definition put forward by
24 the party leadership in 1981.
25 "[In English] ... of mutual tolerance, building a rich and
Page 32293
1 democratic society and ending the discord which he said led to Serbia's
2 defeat here by the Turks six centuries ago."
3 [Interpretation] And then The Independent quotes my words when
4 they report it:
5 "'[In English] There is no more appropriate place than this field
6 of Kosovo to say that accord and harmony in Serbia are vital to the
7 prosperity of the Serbs and of all other citizens living in Serbia
8 regardless of their nationality or religion,' he said. 'Mutual tolerance
9 and cooperation were also sine qua non for Yugoslavia.'"
10 [Interpretation] And then they quote me:
11 "[In English] Relations on the basis of equality among Yugoslav
12 peoples are a precondition for its existence for overcoming the crisis."
13 [Interpretation] Therefore, when they received orders that they
14 should lie, they did not even read their own newspapers from the time they
15 first reported. But I have no time to dwell on this now.
16 And the quotations you can find not all that easily, but you have
17 the Lexis Nexis programme on the BBC. You can find my original speech
18 which the BBC translated, and you can find it there even today, where it
19 says, for example, this is taken from the BBC:
20 "[In English] [Previous translation continues] ... only Serbs
21 living in it. Today, more than in the past, members of other peoples and
22 nationalities also live in it. This is not a disadvantage for Serbia. I
23 am truly convinced that this is an advantage. Citizens of different
24 nationalities, religions and race have been living together more and more
25 frequently and more and more successfully. Therefore, all people in
Page 32294
1 Serbia who live from their own work, honestly, respecting other people and
2 other nations, are in their own republic."
3 [Interpretation] There is no point in taking up my time, using up
4 my time on this. I just wanted to illustrate the scale to which the
5 abuses go, in particular the abuses in a procedure which pretends or
6 aspires to be a legal procedure, because intellectuals, authors, literary
7 critics, publicists, scientists believe it is immoral to take out of
8 context a few sentences. But you did not only take out of context pieces
9 -- sentences, but you took out of context parts of sentences in order to
10 create your constructs. But we will have time later. In any case, this
11 is -- it seems to me it is not something that is difficult to establish.
12 I am not citing that here for any other reason but to show in
13 which way lies are being put forward unscrupulously. You can look at this
14 policy, and I'm talking about national equality as the only principle on
15 which one can proceed further, and it has continuity over ten years. We
16 have the transcript of a party conference in 1998 here, and it's a
17 transcript where we have all the members sitting together from the ruling
18 party, which, amongst other things, the meeting discussed Kosovo. This
19 was not discussed for the newspaper, this was a discussion with the
20 political leadership, including all the ministers, members of government,
21 members of the parliament from the ruling party.
22 I would just like to read only a brief part, my conclusion. And I
23 say, as far as Kosovo is concerned, I'm saying who submitted the
24 introductory remarks, what the majority was, and then I say:
25 "Our policy to resolve the problem of Kosovo is to do it by
Page 32295
1 political means," so we're talking about 1998 now, the 10th of June, 1998.
2 "Our policy is to resolve the problem of Kosovo by political
3 means. We are approaching that settlement in view of our conviction and
4 our programme which implies the principle of national equality. We do not
5 want to damage or inflict damage on the Albanians, and we do not want
6 Albanians in Kosovo to be citizens of second class."
7 And then I speak about how many think that perhaps the majority of
8 Albanians are in favour, and I say:
9 "It is not true that all of them are for it. Perhaps the majority
10 is depending on the pressure exerted on them, what was explained to them,
11 how this explanation was given about their future perspectives and
12 everything else. We must discuss this and we must take this approach. We
13 must have a political resolution on the principles of national equality.
14 We must keep in mind that those who were manipulated in this way, these
15 are unhappy people who are manipulated with just like any poor people in
16 the world are, by the powerful, by the manipulators throughout the world
17 whose objective is to destabilise South-Eastern Europe where they
18 constantly need to have an alibi in order to keep the military forces of
19 the great powers there."
20 And then at the end I say Dialogue: "The dialogue which was
21 started is not reserved for the state committee and representatives of
22 Albanian political parties," and then I mention them, all those from the
23 state commission, I mention them individually. "The dialogue is not
24 reserved only for them and it is not only the Serb-Albanian dialogue but
25 it is the Serb-Albanian-Roma-Muslim-Bulgarian dialogue. This dialogue
Page 32296
1 should be present at all levels; in the municipality, in the local
2 commune, in the formal and informal sense, a formal and informal dialogue,
3 because people need to be mobilised to live."
4 So ten years of continuity in my commitment for a policy of
5 national equality which preserved half of the former Yugoslavia from
6 entering into any conflict or war throughout those ten years.
7 I'm speaking about how much this -- this whole thing has been
8 turned upside down. And that is why I said that this indictment
9 represents a sum of unscrupulous manipulations, lies, crippling of the law
10 and an unjust presentation of the history.
11 The individual acts of generals, officials, my own, by way of
12 command responsibility through which you could convict any innocent person
13 because they held a certain post, and now you're trying to bring these
14 generals here. These individual acts I cannot discuss because of a lack
15 of time, and first of all, they've already been challenged in the
16 testimony of your own witnesses and much more, in the biographies and
17 memoirs of participants, and also in scientific studies which were written
18 based on Western sources, documents, and so on. We will leave it up to
19 the witnesses to have the final word when they appear before you here.
20 I would just like to point out a paradoxical situation in which
21 you have brought yourself into by bowing down to the daily merciless
22 policy of the Clinton administration. Reality was falsified in the name
23 of a pragmatic political programme. All three indictments were issued
24 after 19 NATO countries carried out an open aggression against the
25 remaining part of Yugoslavia, Serbia and Montenegro, with banned weapons
Page 32297
1 implementing new forms of tyranny through high technology. Is there any
2 greater cynicism? The indictment for Croatia cites ethnic cleansing of
3 Croats, and this was conceived before the 1st of August, 1991, and lasted
4 until 1992. I must say that one has to be extremely arrogant to place
5 such a lie on paper. As is well known, this was a period of mass crimes
6 against Serbs, and the first major exodus of Serbs from Croatia. A
7 hundred and fifty thousand of them, precisely in this time period.
8 The Kosovo indictment was issued, and I am quoting, "because of
9 the expulsion of a substantial number of Albanian citizens from Kosovo."
10 Well, you saw what it says in Clark's book, but you will see many other
11 also more interesting things. You cannot cite one single village from
12 which someone was expelled while Kosovo was under the control of the Serb
13 state organs. And it's a fact that I'm not following --
14 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, bring your statement to an end in
15 three minutes.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes. I will do my best. If not in
17 three then four, but it will not be longer than that. I've had to skip
18 over a lot.
19 You're not even monitoring official statements by US and NATO
20 representatives who openly state today they needed these games around
21 Kosovo so that NATO could extend its activities beyond its borders. The
22 indictment against Bosnia and Herzegovina was issued for genocide.
23 Please, genocide against Croats and Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which
24 is also highly insolent when we know that the Belgrade precisely --
25 Belgrade was the political centre in these evil times. The only centre in
Page 32298
1 Yugoslavia during the Yugoslav crisis from which the policy of peace was
2 consistently conducted, the policy of national equality, thanks to which
3 there were no occurrences of discrimination and no occurrences of crimes,
4 and thanks to which throughout the entire decade an unchanged national
5 ethnic structure in Serbia was preserved.
6 I am aware, gentlemen, that it is illusory to look for logic in a
7 staged process. There were such cases before, the Dreyfuss case or the
8 Dimitrov case regarding the burning of the Reichstag. This process
9 exceeds those because of the depth of the tragic consequences that it
10 entails. I do not even wish to say anything on a personal note in this,
11 but I would like to mention the depth of the tragic consequences where the
12 universal legal order was thoroughly destroyed. Thanks to our past, there
13 were honourable authors who have carved the truth into history so that
14 mistakes would not be repeated and that the generations that come would
15 know what happened. In the true history of this era, this ad hoc justice
16 of yours will be placed or used as an illustration of monstrous events at
17 the changing from one century to another.
18 Gentlemen, you cannot imagine what a privilege it is, even in
19 these conditions that you have imposed on me, to have truth and justice as
20 my allies. I am sure you cannot even conceive this.
21 Thank you, Mr. Robinson. Unfortunately, I did not have the
22 opportunity to present everything that I wished to, but I believe that I
23 will be given this opportunity perhaps by other means. Thank you very
24 much.
25 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you, Mr. Milosevic. You are right, of
Page 32299
1 course, that you will be able to bring your evidence.
2 We're going to adjourn now for 20 minutes, and when we resume we
3 will have the discussion on procedural matters as indicated in the
4 Chamber's order of the 25th of August. We'll begin with the Prosecutor,
5 then the accused, then the amicus, and the subject matter will be the
6 content of the medical reports and the assignment of Defence counsel.
7 I urge parties to confine their submissions to those issues,
8 although the Chamber will hear other matters if it finds it appropriate.
9 We are adjourned.
10 --- Recess taken at 10.37 a.m.
11 --- On resuming at 11.00 a.m.
12 JUDGE ROBINSON: As indicated, we will have submissions now on the
13 two questions set out in our order of the 25th. Beginning first with the
14 Prosecutor. Madam Prosecutor.
15 MS. DEL PONTE: Mr. President, Your Honours, detailed argument
16 regarding the imposition of counsel have been made in a number of previous
17 Prosecution filings. The arguments made in these filings will be dealt
18 with in full by Mr. Nice. I do, however, wish to make a few general
19 introductory remarks.
20 This is not the first time that a Trial Chamber of this Tribunal
21 has had to consider the question of imposition of counsel. The Trial
22 Chambers in the cases of both Seselj and Blagojevic have previously ruled
23 that in certain circumstances, counsel may be imposed. The issue has also
24 arisen in the Rwanda Tribunal case of Barayagiza and in both the cases of
25 the accused Norman and Gbao before the Special Court of Sierra Leone. In
Page 32300
1 these International Tribunals counsel has been imposed for varying
2 reasons, including the obstructionism of the accused and the Tribunal's
3 right to protect the integrity of the proceedings.
4 National jurisdictions have also recognised the need in some
5 instances to impose counsel. In Israel with the defendant claiming to be
6 a political prisoner but also in the United Kingdom where in sexual
7 offence cases the accused is not entitled to run the totality of his own
8 defence in person. And the United States Supreme Court has observed in
9 the Martinez case, I quote: "[e]ven at the trial level, therefore, the
10 government's interest in ensuring the integrity and efficiency of the
11 trial at times outweighs the defendant's interest in acting as his own
12 lawyer."
13 And the imposition of counsel is entirely familiar to those
14 accustomed to the law and practice of the criminal courts in modern Serbia
15 and Montenegro, and indeed previously in the SFRY and FRY.
16 It is the duty of the Prosecutor and of the Chamber at this
17 Tribunal to ensure that the type of problem being faced can be dealt with
18 in the cases concerned, but as it will also no doubt be a question of
19 concern at other International Tribunals, including the International
20 Criminal Court, we owe a wider duty to developing international
21 jurisprudence it show how such problems can be dealt with. The parties,
22 including the accused, have a right to a fair and expeditious trial, and
23 the responsibility for ensuring a fair trial falls to the Trial Chamber.
24 We submit that the accused should be invited to allow his
25 associates to extend their present behind-the-scenes role of legal
Page 32301
1 advisors and to assist him with the presentation of his case simply in the
2 courtroom. Should the accused refuse to allow his associates to appear in
3 court, the accused will not have been denied the right to appoint counsel
4 of his own choosing. Rather, having been provided that right, he has
5 failed to exercise it.
6 This trial has required from the beginning the imposition of
7 counsel, and I have urged this position at every opportunity from the
8 start of the trial. The evolution of the trial in the past year has made
9 this need even more evident.
10 As mentioned before, the imposition of counsel is something which
11 is now becoming more familiar to the common law tradition. It has, on the
12 other hand, for a long time been familiar to the civil law tradition. The
13 civil law tradition takes the view that an accused lacks the requisite
14 distance and objectivity. The appointment of professional counsel allows
15 for the greater protection of both the accused's right and the wider
16 interests of justice.
17 This Tribunal draws on both the civil and common law traditions.
18 When faced with problems such as the present one before this Trial
19 Chamber, the Chamber has the privilege and duty of looking to both
20 traditions for solutions. When the solution is found, the Tribunal must
21 have or find the confidence to apply it irrespective of argument, even
22 public argument, however loud, extensive, and apparently well-informed.
23 It is we here who now know the problem. We here who face the
24 problem, and we here who have the duty to resolve the problem in the
25 greater interest of justice.
Page 32302
1 I recognise that in the earlier stages of this trial there was
2 little practical experience of this type of problem. The Chamber acted
3 with generosity towards the accused out of the best of intentions and in
4 so many ways to the best effect, but now the need for a more robust
5 approach has been revealed by the accused himself. The trial needs the
6 safeguard of imposed counsel.
7 Thank you very much for your attention.
8 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you, Madam Prosecutor.
9 Mr. Nice.
10 MR. NICE: Your Honour, this matter has been extensively argued in
11 written filings, of which there are public versions. I desire today to
12 make a general point and then to summarise our position with some
13 particulars on imposed counsel, to deal with the health issue, and then
14 with one or two other matters, with your leave.
15 The general point is this: Where a rational and reasonable person
16 finds himself pitted in discussion, argument, or even conflict against
17 someone who is irrational or unreasonable, there is sometimes an almost
18 irresistible temptation on the part of the reasonable one to think that
19 the other is going to behave reasonably, is going to respond to sense or
20 generosity. And that almost irresistible temptation derives from the
21 reasonable person's belief that there will be no chance of progress in the
22 matter at hand without movement by one party or the other and the
23 reasonable person's belief that the other party will never budge. Now,
24 this may be a process that this accused well understands, as it happens,
25 in the very matters into which we are inquiring, but also in this court.
Page 32303
1 And to pick up the last point made by the Prosecutor, this Bench,
2 rational, reasonable in the extreme, has, it may judge, faced some
3 obduracy and obstinacy by this accused over and over again, for example,
4 in time being allowed and, it may be thought, used in an ill-advised way
5 by him leading to his repeated demands or indeed, yesterday, insistence of
6 the Chamber for more time, and the Court always hoping for the best.
7 I would ask you to have that general proposition in mind as we
8 look at the problem we now face, and it is a real problem, given the
9 history of intervention -- not intervention, interruption of the timetable
10 by matters arguably without but arguably within the accused's own control,
11 namely, his health condition.
12 I turn, then, to some supplementary points about imposing counsel.
13 In domestic court systems, in the vast majority of all criminal
14 cases, those charged comply with the reasonable requirements of the court
15 system in which they find themselves. Do they do it because they respect
16 the law or the judges? If they are, in fact, serious offenders, criminals
17 of one kind or another, it's highly unlikely that they respect the law.
18 That's why they are, in fact, offenders. Nor is it likely that they
19 respect the judges, in truth. But they comply because they recognise that
20 once in the system, their own best interests, acquittal or reduced
21 sentence, will be served by compliance.
22 In that very, very small minority of cases in domestic courts and
23 in the rather larger portion of cases in this type of court where
24 non-compliance is a feature of a defendant's or accused's conduct, it is
25 because he does not see his own best interests as served at all by
Page 32304
1 compliance. His best interests, he judges, are elsewhere. And it is, of
2 course, our argument to this Court, as it has been on earlier occasions
3 and indeed in written submissions, that this accused's interests are
4 arguably, if not unarguably, his ability to address a different audience
5 with his account of events and his understanding of history.
6 For a court facing this problem, compliance will only, it may be
7 thought, be secured if even the accused recognises that his perception of
8 his best interests will be favoured by compliance. And so in this case,
9 without beating about the bush, unless the accused recognises that he will
10 lose his platform for whatever purpose he puts it unless he so conducts
11 his defence as to fit in with the requirements of this Court which has to
12 deliver justice and not to serve the non-forensic purposes of this
13 accused, then we will be in the same unfortunate position we have been in
14 for the last year and more.
15 For those who haven't read the public filings, in a sentence, our
16 arguments are that there is the power to impose counsel who would be able,
17 if necessary, to conduct the defence case without contact with or without
18 discussion with the accused, and that imposed counsel should be imposed
19 now and be ever-ready to take over the conduct of the defence immediately
20 or at a later stage, that that imposition is required now for all the
21 reasons with which we are familiar; and that once that has been done, then
22 the accused can be invited to make the reasonable decision, given the
23 health history and other matters, to conduct the preparation and
24 presentation of his case through lawyers. If he declines that invitation,
25 imposed counsel will be in a position to do the job for him.
Page 32305
Page 32306
1 Even if he declines the invitation so that imposed counsel takes
2 over the running of the Defence case, as we have proposed in a schedule to
3 our first filing, there are many ways and many stages in which and at
4 which the accused can be invited positively to contribute to the
5 preparation of witnesses -- not so much preparation, identification of
6 witnesses and their presentation in court by being allowed or invited to
7 contribute to the questioning that might otherwise be taken by imposed
8 counsel.
9 That's our proposal in a nutshell, and we say that the most
10 obvious candidate for imposed counsel should be one of or two of the amici
11 because of their familiarity with the case. We say that their proposal,
12 which would take them far more closely to the accused, is perilous in the
13 extreme for this reason: At the moment they retain, according to one of
14 their recent filings, the detachment of never having been instructed by
15 the accused. They may speak to him but they've never been instructed by
16 him, so that they do not have any relationship of intimacy with the
17 accused as a professional client that would enable him to put them in the
18 position of their being embarrassed and having to withdraw. They would
19 thus always be available to the Court to conduct the defence if things
20 started, yet again, to go wrong. Thus, in our submission, is their
21 proposal a dangerous one, one that should not be followed.
22 In our arguments, and as the Prosecutor has already foreshadowed,
23 we refer to recent developments in common law jurisdictions in relation to
24 sexual offenders, or alleged sexual offenders. I say straight away that
25 in our first filing, which, for reasons of timetable of the Court, was
Page 32307
1 prepared in somewhat short order, I missed that material. I was later
2 gratefully later reminded of it by Mr. Ruxton. I missed it. And we
3 worked out from first principles how imposed counsel could and should
4 operate in a case like this.
5 With a little more time at our disposal after complying with the
6 deadline for the first filing, we reviewed the present state of the law in
7 Scotland, in England and New South Wales and New Zealand, where the
8 practice is developing of imposing counsel in cases of the kind I've
9 described. And it was interesting and indeed heartening to discover that
10 the regimes that are being imposed by statute in those common law
11 countries match extremely closely the model we identified as suitable for
12 this case, working simply from first principles.
13 It may be worth going back to an earlier point in relation to the
14 sex offenders exception in common law countries for this reason: I
15 believe that one of the early stimuli for the change of the law in England
16 was that a sex offender, or alleged sex offender, cross-examined a victim
17 extensively and, as it was judged, not for the proper forensic purpose of
18 establishing his innocence if he could but to gratify himself by further
19 subjecting -- or by subjecting the victim to further punishment. He had
20 an interest outside the interest of the court, and it was because he
21 needed to be deprived of the ability to serve that interest through a
22 court hearing that the change in the law was ultimately made.
23 And so the case, although very different on its facts, of course,
24 than the case at hand, has -- the exception for sex cases is very
25 different for the case at hand, has in common with it the need to ensure
Page 32308
1 that accused persons cannot, through court proceedings, serve their own
2 improper and irrelevant purposes.
3 JUDGE ROBINSON: Did that arise frequently, Mr. Nice?
4 MR. NICE: No, I think --
5 JUDGE ROBINSON: Because normally sex offenders would be
6 represented by counsel who would carry out the cross-examination.
7 MR. NICE: Absolutely so. But on this particular case, if my
8 recollection is correct, it was the case of a sex offender appearing for
9 himself and subjecting the victim to a quite extravagant cross-examination
10 that lead to the inquiry being made by parliament and the change in the
11 law, because they realised that otherwise they didn't have the power to
12 deal with this problem.
13 There is much in the consultative documents for the Scottish
14 reform of the law that I think matches the arguments that we've made as
15 well as matching in the final practices that have been introduced and
16 those which we recommended.
17 Can I return again to a point that the Prosecutor has made. We
18 suggest in our filings that this problem is unknown or very rarely known
19 to the common law and that in this area the genius of the common law has
20 to some extent been wanting, and it is to the genius of the civil law that
21 we must turn. And with my remarks so far in mind, would the Court bear in
22 mind what it is that, as the Prosecutor reminded us, is the underlying
23 purpose of the civil law's requirement that counsel be imposed, for it's
24 twofold. It's both to achieve the objective of the court to have justice
25 done, and it is to bring distance and objectivity to the presentation of a
Page 32309
1 Defence.
2 And of course here, if we are right in our characterisation of the
3 accused's defence as being aimed at a different audience, there is the
4 real possibility that he will be missing points that he should be making
5 if looking at the problem in the proper way, and nobody in this court
6 wants any accused to be convicted when he should be acquitted, to be, in
7 the vernacular, over-convicted or over-sentenced. And so the imposition,
8 on the basis of the civil law approach, of counsel would in this case
9 serve those twin objectives that the Prosecutor has identified from her
10 experience and knowledge of the civil law.
11 Finally on this point, the accused -- or the trial of this
12 accused, facing the problem it does, must not be subject to any special
13 treatment simply because of the gravity of the charges against the accused
14 nor must there be any special leniency in the approach of the Chamber to
15 the problem simply because of the once elevated status of this accused.
16 A problem has been created and we'll turn to it more perhaps in
17 closed session when we look at one or two other issues, that demands
18 immediate resolution if we're not to run the risk of the timetable being
19 out of control, and I use the word "again." In our respectful submission,
20 the detailed proposals we make will work and are likely, if not very
21 likely, to ensure that the accused's future conduct will serve the best
22 interests of justice as well as of himself.
23 Before I turn to health and as a subsidiary point of what I've
24 said already and before the first witnesses are called, can I make one
25 observation about etiquette, court etiquette, because I have referred to
Page 32310
1 it on several occasions in our filings.
2 The Court, for the best of possible reasons, has tolerated what in
3 any other court would be quite unacceptable; that is to be told day after
4 day that it is an illegal court and that the Judges of it and the
5 Prosecutors are acting unlawfully. Were it to be the case that the
6 accused were to be allowed to call his own witnesses without correction as
7 to his manner of conduct in this court, we would be left, would we, with
8 the position where the accused would be using the incorrect form of
9 address to the Court, referring when it suited him to this illegal court
10 and yet expecting his witnesses, who would of course have to take the
11 solemn declaration, to treat the Court with the appropriate respect? It's
12 hard to conceive of a more unsatisfactory way of progressing. It's hard
13 to know how his witnesses would understand what was truly expected of
14 them. Can you really have a litigant being allowed to say to his witness,
15 "Witness, tell this illegal court what you know"?
16 When we see that the accused would wish people with either present
17 or past high office to come here to help you, can we really expect that
18 they would if they know that that is how they're going to be dealt with?
19 And so etiquette is not a trivial matter, in our respectful
20 submission, and it's something that needs to be dealt with.
21 The next issue is health, and although there's been some opening
22 of the health issues, it may be at the moment that the Chamber would
23 prefer us to go into private session to deal with that.
24 JUDGE KWON: Before going on, Mr. Nice, if you could elaborate on
25 the feasibility that an imposed counsel can start his conduct of
Page 32311
1 examination immediately, without any adjournment.
2 MR. NICE: Yes. I've -- I've dealt with that in the filings and
3 I'm grateful for the opportunity of repeating our position.
4 It may be urged that if counsel is imposed, he or she, whether an
5 existing amicus or a newly imposed counsel, could not run the Defence case
6 if the accused declines to cooperate because he or she could not be
7 prepared. The answer to that comes in two parts.
8 First, imposed counsel in the circumstances of this case would not
9 be expected and should not be instructed on the basis of and should not be
10 allowed to contemplate conducting a full investigation or any extensive
11 further investigation into the defence case in order to run it, because,
12 A, the position we find ourselves in is largely, if not wholly, of the
13 accused's own creation; and B, because there is an enormous amount of
14 material already and easily available to any counsel, however newly
15 imposed, that would enable him or her to identify and to call the
16 witnesses very quickly but, of course, not immediately.
17 My proposal, and this is the second part of the answer to Your
18 Honour's question, is this: Were the accused absolutely to refuse to
19 cooperate in any way and were the Chamber to have decided to impose
20 counsel, we already have a list of some 70 witnesses that the accused
21 wishes to call, he having, although the order has changed on a regular
22 basis, ordered the first -- I think the latest list is 12 but in fact it's
23 been up from time to time to figures rather more than that. And those,
24 the pro se legal officer assisting him, will know of the logistical
25 arrangements to bring those witnesses here. We know from the 65 ter
Page 32312
1 summaries in short order what the witnesses are supposed to deal with and
2 it would always be possible, possibly subject to privilege but that will
3 be for detailed consideration, to obtain what notes exist of what the
4 witness is going to be talking about. So the Chamber itself could find, I
5 have no doubt, the power to call witnesses from that list while imposed
6 counsel was being identified and instructed, could get them to give their
7 evidence in the way that witnesses in this court used to give evidence in
8 the earlier days of these proceedings, in the narrative form with
9 questions coming later, and the Chamber could, as I've suggested in our
10 filing, at the end of its examination of the witness, invite the accused
11 to identify topics that haven't been covered that should have been covered
12 to make sure that the evidence he would want from that witness would be
13 before you.
14 Those first witnesses, the witnesses on his present list, at three
15 days a week would probably take us nearly to Christmas. And in that
16 period of time, identified, retained, appointed counsel, imposed counsel,
17 could be becoming familiar with the case. We know from recent experience
18 that with the records available, reading into this case to become familiar
19 with it is, of course, a heavy task but not a limitless one.
20 So that's our proposal. And to reach that conclusion - and I'm
21 very grateful for being able to think about this and address it - to reach
22 that conclusion, as the Chamber might have to do, which would be a strong
23 and bold decision, would be simply to reflect that the court's authority
24 has been flouted, as we will explore, and the accused has shown himself
25 willing to decline to do what the Court wants, and it's in the face of
Page 32313
1 that that the Court would have to be saying to itself, "Yes, getting this
2 case concluded in the reasonable time we have allowed, by next October, is
3 something that we can accomplish, and we can accomplish it with these
4 early witnesses by dealing with them in this way, calling them ourselves,
5 giving the accused the opportunity to fill in the questions we may have
6 missed."
7 JUDGE KWON: One more query. If counsel is to be imposed in one
8 way or another, during the interim period until he or she can take over
9 the case in full, what kind of danger would there be if the Chamber allows
10 the accused to go on without being represented until that -- until -- as
11 far as he can?
12 MR. NICE: The real danger would appear to be -- there are several
13 dangers but the principal danger would be that he would still be preparing
14 the witnesses himself and -- we are venturing into something that is
15 probably best dealt with in private session, but taking it shortly, the
16 risk is that we would find ourselves back in the position we were in where
17 the health condition or apparent health condition of the accused simply
18 leads to weeks and months of downtime of the court.
19 There are other risks associated with his preparation and
20 presentation of witnesses. I've touched on the matter of etiquette, but
21 the major risk of doing that, and it's not a risk, it's almost a certainty
22 on the material we have, is that the timetable will not work at all.
23 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
24 [Trial Chamber confers]
25 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, the Chamber was consulting on your
Page 32314
1 request for a private session to discuss certain matters. Would you like
2 to explain why you think there should be a private session?
3 MR. NICE: Only out of respect for the privacy that is associated
4 with medical reports. If the Chamber is happy for me to discuss all those
5 medical reports fully in public, I will do so.
6 JUDGE ROBINSON: I'm going to inquire from the other parties, of
7 course, but as I indicated to the accused when we met in July, the
8 jurisprudence of the Tribunal is that such material is confidential except
9 when it is required for trial purposes in the public interest. The health
10 of the accused is intimately tied up with the pace of the trial which
11 itself is linked to the issue of expeditiousness, and expeditiousness is a
12 requirement of a fair trial. I see it as an issue that is essentially
13 tied to the fairness of the trial ultimately, but I'd like to hear first
14 from the amicus.
15 Mr. Kay.
16 MR. KAY: Your Honour, would you like us to deal with the issue of
17 privacy at this stage rather than the full argument?
18 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, just the issue of privacy, yes.
19 MR. KAY: It very much depends upon what the accused would submit
20 on the matter. Sometimes an accused is happy enough for such issues to be
21 public so that there is a full understanding of what the argument is
22 about, particularly if he has his own view on the matter.
23 Personal details should be avoided being put into the public
24 domain, and by that I mean specifics of medical analyses, and I think we
25 can all understand what I mean about that. But general issues relating to
Page 32315
1 health when they arise in this manner would be able to be discussed so
2 that the public or -- we're not doing this really for the benefit of the
3 public, we're doing this for the benefit of legal argument in the ordinary
4 course of the -- of the trial and so that there is an understanding what
5 is going on in this trial at this stage.
6 So if argument was able to be without specific references to
7 personal medical details, which I'm sure that the Court would understand,
8 then that -- that can take place in public, in our submission, but it must
9 be dealt with in general terms rather than anything that might cause
10 embarrassment or anything that might be too revealing. In many respects,
11 it's how far the Trial Chamber wants to go, or any of the parties wants to
12 go on the issue.
13 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you. Mr. Milosevic, on this issue. Do you
14 wish to say anything?
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] In connection with my personal
16 health issues to be discussed in a public or private session, is that what
17 you're asking me?
18 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I told you last time when you asked
20 this that I feel that issues of health should be discussed in private
21 session. These are my own personal private matters. They do not concern
22 the public. I think that these are elementary rules.
23 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you. The Chamber will consult.
24 [Trial Chamber confers]
25 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, yes. On this issue?
Page 32316
1 MR. NICE: We would, of course, favour the presentation of this
2 material in public to the extent necessary to explain part of the
3 reasoning of our arguments on imposed counsel. We have no desire to go
4 into matters in detail, and indeed the conclusion of the doctors is all we
5 need.
6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you. Yes. The Chamber believes that
7 Mr. Kay struck the right balance in his presentation on this matter.
8 We will have the discussion in public in general terms, and if a
9 matter comes up that is particularly sensitive, then that can be brought
10 to the Chamber's attention and we will move into private session.
11 MR. NICE: Your Honour, thank you.
12 Before I move on to the health issue, and going back to Your
13 Honour's earlier question about the introduction of imposed counsel for
14 sexual offence cases, I am very grateful to Ms. Graham for finding the
15 reference that will most help you. It's actually in the New South Wales
16 Law Reform Commission papers in the book of authorities at pages 20 and
17 21, where they are looking at the then-British experience, or the English
18 experience, and at paragraph 2.26 the commission's report sets out how the
19 England -- or the English -- the United Kingdom Home Office report on the
20 same topic followed two prominent sexual assault cases in which defendants
21 used the opportunity of cross-examination in person to humiliate and
22 intimidate their victims, and it sets out the details of what happened at
23 that paragraph.
24 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you, Mr. Nice.
25 MR. NICE: On the health issue, I need, I think, only remind the
Page 32317
1 Court of one fact and take you to short passages in summary from the four
2 latest reports.
3 The Chamber will recall that in discussions of the time required
4 for preparation of his defence, the accused was always unhappy with the
5 time allowed, reasonable though it undoubtedly was, and required to be
6 allowed until September. In the event, the manifestation of his health
7 problem has brought us to September.
8 The latest reports with which we need be concerned start with the
9 report of Dr. Tavernier, dated the 24th of July of 2004. On the third
10 page of that report, following a detailed examination and analysis to
11 which I need not refer, he picked up on an earlier suggestion that the
12 accused was not following the drug regime prescribed in his best interests
13 and in order to enable him to be fit for trial with this observation at
14 the end of the paragraph:
15 "All these observations suggest that the accused is not taking his
16 medication in a strict manner."
17 Further down that page, the doctor expressed the opinion that
18 based upon the presented clinical condition, the then-lifestyle and poor
19 adherence to proposed therapeutic plan, the accused was not fit, in the
20 opinion of Dr. Tavernier, to represent himself. And he went on to say
21 that he shared the opinion of his colleague, Dr. Dijkman, that the
22 resumption of the trial under the then-conditions would result in a very
23 early -- an early occurrence of very high blood pressure with the
24 inability of the accused to continue to work, which would have a major
25 impact on the trial schedule.
Page 32318
1 The next report in time comes from the said Dr. Dijkman, is dated
2 the 18th of August, and again on the second page, following careful
3 examination of -- a record of examination of the accused, it says this:
4 "We may conclude that there must be serious doubt over the
5 patient's adherence to this therapy. From the clinical point of view, we
6 have suspected this for some time given the repeated occurrences of sinus
7 tachycardia, which is odd with the continuous and correct taking of a
8 particular drug that he identifies."
9 But he then goes on, and I think this is the first time this is
10 clear from the reports, to identify something else. He says:
11 "In addition," and he then identifies another drug, "another drug
12 was repeatedly found in the blood, which is odd given the patient's
13 refusals to take benzodiazepines from the United Nations unit's staff."
14 It goes on to suggest that the accused must have obtained and be taking
15 drugs other than those prescribed in some other way.
16 Dr. Dijkman ended this paragraph by saying that, in his opinion,
17 the patient is not fit to defend himself.
18 "Should the trial be continued in the old way, there will be
19 constant interruptions which will delay the progress of the trial
20 considerably."
21 Dr. Tavernier's report of the 27th of August, commenting on Dr.
22 Dijkman's report, said at page 2, paragraph 1, subconclusion 2, there is
23 significant doubt about the therapy compliance of the accused, and at the
24 end of that paragraph, dealing with the drug taken that was not being
25 prescribed, said:
Page 32319
1 "Since this drug is not on his medication list in his medical
2 file, this means that Mr. Milosevic must obtain this drug in another way.
3 This illustrates the unwillingness of Mr. Milosevic to adhere to a
4 therapeutic plan because administration of this kind of drug in a
5 controlled was already suggested but refused."
6 The doctor then deals with one of the possible complications of
7 detail that we needn't go into.
8 The last report comes from Dr. Dijkman on the 26th of August, I
9 think, specifically in response to an order of the Trial Chamber, and he
10 sets out in detail - it's a longer report - why it is and the basis upon
11 which he's able to say that there has been a refusal of the accused to
12 comply with the prescribed medical regime and, indeed, why it is clear - I
13 needn't go into the detail of this - that he is taking some other drug.
14 And on page 3, at the end of the large paragraph on page 3 dealing
15 with the other drug that has been taken without prescription and without
16 supervision by the Detention Unit staff, he says this -- well, perhaps one
17 can pick it up two-thirds of the way down the paragraph:
18 "The measurements taken by a colleague," he names the colleague,"
19 proves the opposite thus indicating that Mr. Milosevic is providing us
20 with incorrect information about his medication intake, which leads me to
21 doubt also his statements that he is taking the anti-hypertensive
22 medication correctly."
23 At the end of that paragraph, he says:
24 "The medication is not at all expected to cause a rise in blood
25 pressure. On the contrary. It would be expected indirectly to lower it
Page 32320
Page 32321
1 when this medication has achieved a reduction in stress. This was the
2 reason why I offered it to him in the past. I am at a loss to explain why
3 he has refused it in the past but has now taken it."
4 The drug that was being taken without supervision and prescription
5 would have been of benefit if taken in a controlled way, but apparently
6 was not being so taken. At times -- well, it was not taken in that way.
7 And the overall and unanimous opinion of the experts is that the accused
8 is not fit to conduct the trial himself, that he has not been taking the
9 drugs in the manner prescribed and apparently supervised for no reason
10 that is advanced by the doctors but for reasons that can be all too
11 readily understood by those of us who have seen months of court time
12 wasted; and that in combination with that conduct, he has been obtaining
13 for his own purposes other drugs, no doubt to help himself.
14 This material makes it overwhelmingly clear that the accused will
15 do whatever is necessary to serve his own purposes, in our respectful
16 submission, and that the Court can be quite satisfied that this material,
17 for two reasons, shows that counsel must be imposed; the first being the
18 underlying health condition itself, which will be aggravated to the point
19 of intolerability if he is allowed to continue seeing, preparing
20 witnesses, which is clear on the evidence to be the hard work, but also
21 because the Court might be quite satisfied he has been manipulating this
22 Tribunal.
23 Your Honour, the only other points I would make, I've been some
24 time --
25 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Nice, I think I need some clarification on the
Page 32322
1 issue of non-adherence of the accused to the therapeutic plans. It seems
2 to me that both doctors based their conclusion -- their conclusion that
3 he's not fit to represent himself on the very fact that he is not been
4 adhering to the therapeutic plans. Well, then, suppose from now, if he
5 adheres to the therapeutic plan in full, then he will be fit to represent
6 himself. I don't think so. So his non-adherence can be a basis for us to
7 continue while he is sick, which he brought himself, but I don't think
8 it's a sufficient -- can be a sufficient reason to impose a counsel while
9 he's healthy to represent himself.
10 Can I hear your observation on this?
11 MR. NICE: Well, several points. The first point is the doctors
12 appear to be of the view that it's his underlying medical condition that
13 makes him unfit, and that, of course, we rely on and that's in itself is
14 sufficient.
15 To that, the non-adherence is a feature of obstructionism by this
16 accused, to use the words I think used in the Seselj case, that taken
17 together with other aspects of his behaviour and other ways in which it's
18 clear that he's using this Court for purposes that are not properly
19 forensic, show that the civil law's approach to the imposition of counsel
20 is right. You have a man who in one, two, or more ways is acting
21 unwisely, improperly, and for personal reasons outside those of the
22 furtherance of justice, and, says the civil law, you need to protect that
23 man and to stop him doing what he's doing. You need to ensure that his
24 proper defence is advanced. You need to ensure that the administration of
25 justice is not impeded.
Page 32323
1 And so Your Honour's proposition that merely not to take his
2 prescribed medicines correctly, even to do so with bad intent, is not in
3 itself enough to impose counsel is, if I may respectfully say so, slightly
4 off the point, because imposition of counsel comes in this case and at
5 this stage for a range of reasons of which this is one component part, but
6 it's one component part of a mix of reasons that relate to his conduct and
7 is separate from his underlying ill health which freestanding on its own
8 would justify the imposition of counsel because he's simply not actually
9 physically strong enough and fit enough to prepare and present the case
10 himself.
11 JUDGE ROBINSON: What are the other reasons? What are the other
12 reasons? You say it's just one component part of a mix of reasons.
13 MR. NICE: Yes. This accused has shown himself, and we've seen it
14 in the recent speech that he's presented, concerned to take - and we would
15 say to waste - time, valuable, precious time on matters that are not at
16 the heart of this case, indeed completely away from what this case is
17 about. He will continue to do that because he has another objective to
18 serve, both in his -- to some degree in his identification witnesses but
19 certainly in the use he seeks to make of witnesses. And we've seen in the
20 cross-examination exercises how difficult it was for the Court to bring
21 him to matters of relevance. Time after time he would be allowed two
22 hours and he would waste one hour and three-quarters, in our respectful
23 submission, on what was irrelevant, and try hard as His Honour Judge May
24 did to bring him to matters of relevance, it didn't work.
25 Now, the same accused represented by counsel, whether imposed or
Page 32324
1 his own, can be sure to have the correct matters identified and laid
2 before you and the irrelevant omitted. So that's a second way in which it
3 is appropriate to impose counsel.
4 And a third way, which I have already touched on, is, frankly,
5 etiquette. The time has come when this Court is entitled to be approached
6 on behalf of this accused's defence appropriately, and it should not, in
7 our respectful submission, any longer be tolerating the manner in which
8 this case is being presented.
9 And can I come back, however, in light of Your Honour's -- His
10 Honour Judge Kwon's question, to what I suspect may be an underlying
11 thought, and I hope Your Honour won't mind if I say temptation, because
12 Your Honour will remember that my first point, which was a general point,
13 was how the reasonable person reacts to the unreasonable and the rational
14 to the irrational by being tempted time and again to expect the best of
15 the other when all the experience is actually to the contrary. And I
16 venture to suggest that Your Honour's question may have allowed within it
17 this thought: Maybe the accused will now buckle down and behave. That
18 would be a perilous approach to take for, in our submission, he has shown
19 himself quite uninterested in bringing this case to a just conclusion, and
20 there is no reason to believe that he will not take whatever course is
21 open to him when it is necessary to have his way.
22 And so in answer to His Honour Judge Robinson's question, there
23 are at least three separate reasons of which non-adherence to the drug
24 regime is a component part which would justify the imposition of counsel.
25 The health condition on its own also justifies it.
Page 32325
1 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you.
2 MR. NICE: Your Honour, I know that time is valuable but this is a
3 very important topic. I have identified in the pleadings, and I don't
4 desire to go through it in detail now, one way in which this accused has
5 shown absolute defiance of this Court. He produced a list of whatever it
6 was, 1.300 witnesses and was required to name all but whatever might be
7 the very small minority to both the Court -- the small minority that will
8 require special protection, to the Court and to the Prosecution. He told
9 you at the last hearing he would give us as many names, basically, as he
10 thought we deserved.
11 We have drawn to your attention in a couple of pleadings that he
12 has refused to comply with the order although the names were there because
13 they were provided to the Chamber, and it was two days ago, I think, that
14 we got not the majority of the names but -- 600? About. About 900 of
15 them.
16 JUDGE ROBINSON: 900.
17 MR. NICE: About 900 in total.
18 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.
19 MR. NICE: Without apology, without explanation. He was
20 instructed to provide all exhibits. Now, there may be practical problems
21 with exhibits. The first -- that was months ago. The first day we
22 received exhibits, all in B/C/S, was a couple days ago.
23 These -- one can readily understand an instinct to say, oh, let
24 bygones be bygones, let's not look at that; but we have to press the
25 Chamber in making this decision now, realising that if a decision isn't
Page 32326
1 made now it will always be more difficult later, to recognise what is
2 quite apparent from this accused's conduct of this case, namely that he
3 will to the limited -- or to the degree allowed, have it his way, act in
4 defiance of the Court and diminish the standing of this court which has
5 and merits the very substantial of a court, of a lawful court doing its
6 best to deliver justice in a difficult case to this particular accused.
7 Your Honour, I won't say anything more about other matters save
8 just to identify things which I think are on your agenda generally. One
9 is whether the accused should give evidence himself, which of course he
10 will have to do with the solemn declaration, and when. And to draw to
11 your attention that, as I understand it, certainly one of the quotations
12 attributed to a Western leader in the speech of the accused was, as it
13 sounded when I heard it, a complete misquotation, and I will provide you
14 with chapter and verse for correction. And unless I'm in error, unless
15 those informing me are in error, I will be asking the accused personally
16 or through counsel, in due course, to correct an error. There may be
17 other examples of straight misquotations that we've heard in the last day,
18 and they should not be allowed to stand.
19 JUDGE ROBINSON: If you have that, bring it to the Court's
20 attention, we will bring it to the attention of the accused, and we expect
21 him to take the appropriate action.
22 Mr. Milosevic, do you have submissions on this matter?
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] First of all, there is no need for
24 anyone to make me correct quotations. If it's given wrongly, it's
25 sufficient just to draw my attention to it, and of course I will do that
Page 32327
1 myself. So I am convinced that I did not provide any wrong or
2 misquotations, but if that is the case, I will very easily correct that.
3 That is not a problem.
4 But as far as the topic is concerned that we're discussing,
5 Mr. Nice has talked here about motives because of which I'm speaking here.
6 There is no mystery there. I have emphasised this on several occasions.
7 I will always speak here any time you make it possible for me because I'm
8 using the opportunity to tell the truth. That is my only motive.
9 I assume that the truth should be also a motive and objective or
10 purpose of any procedure or any debate or any academic discussion, even.
11 Therefore, I don't see why my motive to speak the truth would be in
12 collision with any honourable motive of any side, whatever it is, if it
13 should turn out that that other side wishes to learn the truth and wishes
14 to find out the truth in an as thorough way as possible in the interest
15 of justice.
16 Mr. Nice speaks about rules. Well, your rules are not such that I
17 have no right to a defence. All international regulations, all treaties
18 and pacts on human rights give me the right to defend myself. In any
19 case, the late Judge May himself, when this was discussed the last time,
20 stressed in particular, and I remember that very well, that my right to
21 defence must not be questioned.
22 We have an absurd situation here. I'm now talking about the
23 explanations that we have heard from Mr. Nice. I was capable of
24 questioning witnesses of the other side, the hostile side, which it, in
25 the best desire to bring in as many as possible strong witnesses against
Page 32328
1 me, did so. So I was able to question witnesses of the other side. And
2 now suddenly I'm not able to question my own witnesses. And there is this
3 absurd thing here that is cited by Mr. Nice --
4 JUDGE ROBINSON: Please continue. We adjourn at a quarter past,
5 15 minutes after.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well. Speaks about the danger
7 - and I don't know how this can have any logic at all - of the danger of
8 mistreating or abusing witnesses if I question them. I did not mistreat
9 any witnesses of theirs. I did not mistreat any witness from the other
10 side. And how can then it be conceivable at all that there be a danger
11 now that I will mistreat witnesses that I have called myself? For
12 goodness sake, is there any logic in that even for any one to consider
13 of any age? It's absurd that I would be in the situation of mistreating
14 my own witnesses.
15 Mr. Nice said - I even wrote it down - about the danger of
16 preparing my own witnesses. I understand if this were a danger in order
17 to knock down this construct that they have built, but that is precisely
18 what I want to do. It is my right to do so. How can anyone who is in
19 favour of law and justice against me preparing my own witnesses?
20 I -- as far as my witnesses are concerned, in view of the short
21 time that you have given me and in view of the fact that I will be working
22 three days a week, will be able to spend one day at the most with an
23 individual witness. And you know very well that the other side prepared
24 their witnesses for a week or two or more than that with their entire
25 machinery, and this was even in the case of witnesses that they chose not
Page 32329
1 to call to testify. I will have to perhaps even prepare two witnesses in
2 one day. Therefore, the rational use of time is a relative question,
3 whether this is the most rational thing or not. This is something that
4 can be put as a question. But I will be using my time much more
5 rationally than the other side which used much more time in the
6 preparation of their witnesses. This is something that is obvious.
7 Therefore, I think that the whole idea presented by Mr. Nice is to
8 actually shut me up in the process of stating the truth. That's what it's
9 about. He says that I inflicted my health problem on myself. I have
10 suffered from hypertension for ten years now.
11 Second, it must be clear to everyone that I have been given
12 hundreds of thousands of pages of documents here, different papers, as
13 part of what the other side was doing and not given an adequate amount of
14 time to read them all. Of course this calls for additional efforts. Of
15 course this creates fatigue, and of course this then reflects on higher
16 blood pressure as a result of the fatigue, and this applies in any kind of
17 work; less sleep, a large number of hours spent reading, reviewing,
18 preparing. So it is just not true. Quite to the contrary. Their
19 dynamics and the lack of time is something that is responsible for that.
20 The other claim is that I am not responsible in taking my
21 medication. I will not go into the methods, how this is measured and
22 calculated, but you probably don't know the practice in your own Detention
23 Unit. I take my medication in the presence of guards. I'm given them. I
24 take them in the presence of the guard, and the guard writes down in the
25 book the exact time when I ingested those medicines. Therefore, this
Page 32330
1 assumption can be an assumption. Anyone can assume whatever they want,
2 but this assumption is groundless.
3 It is true that I had a discussion - this was over a year ago -
4 with the doctors about certain medicines which had some bi-effects which
5 actually caused fatigue, drowsiness, and which prevented me from working.
6 But this medication that I'm talking, I didn't take this medicine because
7 it didn't agree with me and put it to the side. I told the doctor, "I
8 cannot take this medicine because it interferes with my normal
9 functioning." I spoke with my own doctor by telephone, and we coordinated
10 the -- a different regime of medication, and this was approved by this
11 doctor here, and it was suggested by the doctor who has been treating me
12 for more than ten years now. And I have told you about the way that I
13 take these medicines, about the procedure under which I take the
14 medication.
15 I believe that other factors are at issue here. We're talking
16 about fatigue, that factor, because if I am taking the same medicines the
17 whole time and then over the past month or so my blood pressure has
18 normalised, that is because I have had a rest. I gave precedence to a
19 rest -- a rest for a period when I saw fit to do that in order to
20 stabilise my blood pressure so that I could be physically able to
21 function. I did that at the expense of what I needed to do at that time,
22 but I assume that it was within human bounds and that it's a minimal rest
23 that I needed to give myself. And this was a crucial factor in
24 contributing to me normalising my blood pressure.
25 So if we are taking care to have a regular, normal pace of
Page 32331
1 affairs, something that can be maintained, then absolutely there can be no
2 question of it not being possible for me to do what I need to do. It
3 would be very unfair, in the same health conditions, for you to assess
4 that I could go through these past two years of cross-examination of
5 witnesses of the other side and now that it's my time to examine my own
6 witnesses, the other side suddenly panics that I'm not preparing
7 witnesses, that I should not be working with them, that I should not be
8 questioning them. Actually, this seems a panic caused by the lack of
9 desire for the truth to be heard, and this is something that is evident to
10 anybody who is watching.
11 There are no other reasons for that other than those which were in
12 force at the time when the late Judge May was the Presiding Judge, who
13 said at the time that my right to defend myself cannot be infringed upon.
14 Therefore, I really cannot accept at all that you do not give me the right
15 and the opportunity to voice the truth, and I find it unacceptable to be
16 prevented from having witnesses come, witnesses that I have called, and to
17 have them testify about what they are supposed to testify about, to
18 testify for reasons that they are called to testify for.
19 As far as I know, this number of 900 witnesses that Mr. Nice
20 talked about, as far as I know, this list was given over a month ago
21 containing over 1.100 names. So this is the first time that I'm hearing
22 about it. As far as what was said when this was given, I will accept
23 that. But as far as I know, to my best recollection, you were provided
24 with this list certainly over a month ago.
25 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, we are going to take a break now
Page 32332
1 for 20 minutes.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would just like to clarify one
3 thing before we take this break. Each person can fall ill, especially
4 someone who suffers from chronic cardiovascular problems. I'm hearing for
5 the first time that someone, because they can possibly fall ill, should be
6 denied their right to defence, which is guaranteed by all conventions on
7 human rights, rather than if that person is ill not holding a sitting on
8 that day, one day, two days, or something like that for as long as it's
9 needed. But I've never heard that someone, because they are ill and they
10 are in that situation because of the other side that is asking that, that
11 they are then denied the right to their defence for these reasons.
12 This has nothing to do with any sense of logic or morale or law,
13 and it is simply out of the question.
14 JUDGE ROBINSON: We will take the adjournment now for 20 minutes.
15 --- Recess taken at 12.19 p.m.
16 --- On resuming at 12.45 p.m.
17 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would just like to add I also
19 think that the explanation of Mr. Nice is quite inappropriate regarding
20 the recognition of the Tribunal. I consider the Tribunal to be illegal.
21 This is not in dispute as far as I'm concerned. But I did state political
22 and legal reasons for my views. I even quoted the book of the former
23 president of the International Court of Justice who believes the two
24 resolutions under which this court was founded are controversial from the
25 point of view of the United Nations. I do have the right to state
Page 32333
1 political and legal reasons in my assessment of whether this Tribunal is
2 legal or not, especially when I pointed out to the way in which we can get
3 the question of -- on its legality, through the institutions which are
4 authorised within the UN system to decide on that. So it's not logical
5 that I'm insulting anyone in this way, and I don't believe that I even, as
6 far as one witness is concerned, whether there were false witnesses and
7 murderers, I don't believe that I insulted any one of those witnesses
8 during my questioning. But I am stating political and legal arguments
9 which I believe are valid in relation to the illegality of this Tribunal,
10 and this is my right and I do not have any intention of being deprived of
11 that right just because Mr. Nice or anyone else does not like that.
12 Therefore, I request to be allowed that witnesses come regularly,
13 that I am allowed to question them, and that I have the rights in relation
14 to that, the same rights that the other side had when they questioned
15 their witnesses. I ask for no more or no less than that. I actually have
16 less because my conditions for preparation are not as extensive, but that
17 is my problem.
18 In any event, I request to be allowed that witnesses be permitted
19 to come. They are coming here at my invitation and not at the invitation
20 of somebody that they do not know at all.
21 And I must say that I do not believe that there is any lawyer who
22 holds to the legal codes, who sticks to essential moral norms who would
23 agree to be imposed as an attorney to somebody who does not accept that.
24 I don't believe that there is anyone like that, but probably everything is
25 possible.
Page 32334
1 So I request to be permitted to be able to question my witnesses.
2 And Mr. Nice, who obviously wished that he himself questions my witnesses
3 personally or through an intermediary, has the same right to
4 cross-examination that I had when he was bringing his witnesses. I did
5 not interfere in his choice of witnesses.
6 JUDGE KWON: If I can say this to Mr. Milosevic once again, I
7 remember I once mentioned this earlier: Mr. Milosevic, you are saying
8 that you cannot appoint a counsel because you don't recognise this
9 Tribunal. However, in my opinion, recognition of the Tribunal and having
10 the assistance of counsel are two different matters. In fact, your
11 actions have reflected this already. You nominated, by a document signed
12 by yourself, the three legal associates from Belgrade, and during the
13 presentation of the Prosecution's case they have been assisting you, inter
14 alia, by gathering the information and the evidence and preparing the
15 questions you have put to the witness. In essence, I think they have been
16 your de facto Defence counsels without being physically present in the
17 courtroom.
18 It is with this in mind and given that the presentation of the
19 Defence case requires a higher level of physical exertion than what may be
20 required during the Prosecution's case the Trial Chamber discusses this
21 current issue of imposing or assigning a counsel to assist you.
22 We are discussing this issue to alleviate the burden of yours, not
23 to silence you. If you truly wish to remain loyal to your assertion that
24 you endeavour to present your case for the sake of the truth, I think then
25 it's only rational and in the best interest that you choose to have the
Page 32335
Page 32336
1 assistance of counsel.
2 I urge you to bear these facts in mind. And if I add to this, we
3 have a clear doctor's message which says that you are not fit to represent
4 yourself. We have to do something in one way or another. But we leave
5 it, as was suggested, we leave it to you to avoid such imposition of
6 counsel at any time by inviting your associates to come into the courtroom
7 to assist you. And if you so wish, there is also room for you for further
8 flexibility by allowing you the opportunity to supplement the examination
9 and re-examination of witnesses by the counsel whom you appoint.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Kwon, that is the difference.
11 That is the point. I do not wish to be in a situation to cross-examine my
12 own witnesses. I want to be able to conduct the examination-in-chief of
13 my own witnesses, and that is my right established by you according to
14 your rules, that I do have the right to defend myself. This is a major
15 difference.
16 Therefore, I request that you permit me to call and examine my own
17 witnesses. This is an elementary right of mine.
18 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, in your earlier presentation
19 before the break, you made reference to Judge May's support of your right
20 to defend yourself. I also supported it, as did Judge Kwon, but there is
21 a decision of the Trial Chamber on that issue, and it clearly states that
22 the Trial Chamber supported that right but that the right was not without
23 qualification. So I ask you to bear that in mind in your repeated
24 references to the earlier ruling of the Trial Chamber on this issue.
25 If you are finished, then Mr. Kay.
Page 32337
1 MR. KAY: Thank you, Your Honours. In our submission, this issue
2 entirely arises as a result of the condition of the health of the accused.
3 We do point out to the Court that rather contrary to some of the
4 submissions from the Prosecution today, that in their submissions of the
5 26th of July, 2004, at paragraph 29, they conceded that the conduct of the
6 accused was stopping just short of obstructionism. That was not in fact
7 an allegation that was in their mind at that time rather to the extent
8 that it has been presented today.
9 We all know the issue of the accused concerning the legitimacy of
10 the Tribunal, and the proceedings over the last three years has been
11 conducted with that in mind, and in our submission the Trial Chamber has
12 respected his arguments on the matter whilst ruling against it. There's
13 been no attempt by the Trial Chamber to silence the accused on such an
14 issue. They, in fact, have respected his opinions whilst going about
15 their own business in dealing with the conduct of this case. And it's not
16 meant to be insulting to the Court in any way. There is a freedom of
17 expression available to him. He is not counsel. He has chosen to defend
18 his case himself whilst at all times taking pains to ensure that why he is
19 doing what he is doing is understood within a general context. At the end
20 of the day, the powers and decision-making, we all recognise, lie with
21 this Court and the Judges, and in our submission, the accused isn't being
22 disrespectful in relation to that.
23 Judge Bonomy.
24 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Kay, I think there are certain limits to how
25 far certain references can be tolerated, and as you must have observed
Page 32338
1 yesterday, I think on two occasions Mr. Milosevic referred to this Trial
2 Chamber as part of a joint criminal enterprise and acting against him.
3 Now that is offensive. And my only reason for not intervening on either
4 occasion was the circumstances that he was making an opening statement,
5 which in my opinion he's entitled to make without interruption, but that
6 was the only reason, I assure you, for not interrupting what I thought was
7 a flagrant insult to the Court.
8 MR. KAY: It was an opening statement. When he gets down to the
9 matter of dealing with business in terms of witnesses, one will have seen
10 from the record that in fact that's not his approach to the evidence.
11 And he's also been the subject of many barbs and criticisms from
12 the other side. We have heard it today as well. We have at times as
13 well. And this is perhaps when the parties on both sides perhaps get too
14 over-enthused by the legitimacy of their provisions and positions.
15 In our submission, there is no disrespect here intended by the
16 accused. In fact, within the proceedings he has not been obstructive.
17 He's been respectful to the Court subject to certain occasions that Your
18 Honour has pointed out, and his clear intent has been on that line.
19 To start saying whatever faults there may be, that that's a ground
20 for taking away his right to represent himself, in our submission is
21 Draconian and doesn't really cause us to be here today discussing this
22 issue. It's probably a feature of the Prosecution's argument that we can
23 put on one side.
24 JUDGE BONOMY: I think I also ought to make it clear to you,
25 Mr. Kay, that of course that sort of thing is something that in my opinion
Page 32339
1 the Court ought to deal with as it arises, and I understand what you're
2 saying, that it may well not be an issue in relation to the assignment of
3 counsel. It may in fact be a quite separate matter, and indeed that may
4 be said of the other references that Mr. Nice made to features of the
5 conduct of the accused himself.
6 The point, however, needs to be made that these things do not go
7 unnoticed. What action is taken is quite another matter.
8 MR. KAY: Yes, and I'm grateful for Your Honour's comments on
9 that, and we of course are all aware of that, that that's the position of
10 the Trial Chamber.
11 In relation to issues such as the naming of the witnesses, that
12 appears to have been, which the Trial Chamber I believe know from
13 documents filed, a misunderstanding in communication by those acting on
14 his behalf. The amici curiae on the 9th of August filed a list of numbers
15 of witnesses ex parte and confidential. We've been endeavouring to help
16 as much as possible to try to get a smooth introduction to the Defence
17 evidence in this case, and I believe it was misunderstood by another party
18 about the need for the issuing of the names. When that mistake was
19 recognised, the legal officer for the Tribunal, Ms. Anoya, filed on the
20 25th of August, I believe, a document that had been constructed with
21 numbers and names together which came from the associates. The
22 Prosecution have known this as well, actually, and to make it as a point
23 now, in our submission that doesn't really give merit to their arguments.
24 They've known what the difficulty was behind that particular matter.
25 Let's get to the real issue, which concerns the health of the
Page 32340
1 accused. The amici curiae filed on the 13th of August our submissions in
2 relation to this matter, and we have always argued in support of the right
3 of the accused to represent himself. However, there has been a change in
4 the information before the Trial Chamber and that arises from the medical
5 reports.
6 In many respects, this is an issue that perhaps can be dealt with
7 in two stages. First of all, do the -- do the Trial Chamber accept from
8 the evidence before it that the accused is unfit fully to represent
9 himself? And there needs to be a second stage, once that finding has been
10 made, that receives the arguments of the parties as to where to go next.
11 The amici curiae have always sought to fulfil their role which requires
12 them to make points in the interest of the accused on matters of law,
13 objections to evidence, and matters of procedure, and that's been our
14 position to date, and we've endeavoured to provide full arguments for his
15 side on the matter, there being no written filings by the accused himself,
16 just the oral argument that the Tribunal has heard today and on other
17 occasions.
18 In many respects, I've then got to go to the next stage on the
19 basis of what if there is a finding in relation to his representation?
20 There's no point me just standing here and saying, well, that's as far as
21 the matter goes, because it may be that the Trial Chamber makes that
22 finding and then deals with the secondary stage: What happens next.
23 In our submission, there's nothing in the Rules that would prevent
24 the accused from still taking part in the presentation of his defence, and
25 on those occasions where there may be failings in the trial that require
Page 32341
1 an alternative course of conduct or indeed if the accused to preserve his
2 energy and health and in the delegation of tasks brought about by
3 representing himself, that in those circumstances he should be entitled to
4 use the services of his associates if they wish to take up that position
5 on his behalf or another counsel appointed by Mr. Milosevic or his
6 associates to deal with such matters when they arise.
7 Within the funding of this Tribunal, there are grounds, and indeed
8 within the Rules, that no obstruction to funding being made available for
9 counsel appointed by him or his associates to represent him in this
10 courtroom if the Court went down that route of what we could call a hybrid
11 position of representation. Maybe the phrase in that circumstance of
12 "imposing counsel" is inappropriate. It's assisting Mr. Milosevic in his
13 presentation of the Defence case.
14 JUDGE ROBINSON: You will have noticed, Mr. Kay, that we haven't
15 used the term "imposing." We have been speaking of assigning in our
16 orders.
17 MR. KAY: Yes, the amici have noticed that throughout and felt
18 that that was an indication here that the Tribunal were not, in the
19 circumstances, taking away the right of his representation, but as Judge
20 Kwon's questioning earlier this morning posited that there could be a dual
21 function within Mr. Milosevic's team or group for the presentation of his
22 case. And that's a course that we urge be adopted by him as well as by
23 the Trial Chamber. And all lawyers involved in big litigation - and this
24 litigation is as big as it gets - have to delegate roles and tasks, and
25 the leaders of teams involved in this kind of litigation, as we've seen in
Page 32342
1 the Prosecution presentation, may I say in a very limited form in terms of
2 the amici curiae, but in all other cases, a delegation of tasks for
3 interviewing witnesses, thinking of case strategies, as well as the
4 presentation of evidence.
5 We urge that that not be taken away from Mr. Milosevic despite the
6 medical reports, but that it gives him a free hand, if you like, to make
7 his own personal decisions as to what is in his best interest. And it may
8 be, if we're in this stage, too, of his right of unfettered
9 self-representation being curtailed because of the position of the trial
10 at this date, it may be that having passed the one hurdle, that he, aware
11 of the fact that if there is a breakdown in the course of the conduct of
12 the case caused because he has worked himself too hard, then someone else
13 on his behalf within his team, or appointed by him if it's outside his
14 team, would be able to present evidence on his behalf. And then he has to
15 judge how much he does and either delegate more, regulate the amount of
16 work that he does; but to ensure that those aspects of the case that he
17 needs to deal with he can fulfil that role effectively.
18 So if the Trial Chamber does move from the position of unfettered
19 self-representation, we urge him and the Trial Chamber to view that as
20 really the first stop on the issue. The highest priority is that it's
21 someone within his team who is able to share some of the burden within
22 him. And if his other two associates, or three associates now who have
23 been dealing with the preparation of the case are unable to take that on
24 themselves because they're involved in other aspects, that they appoint
25 someone that they want to deal with the supplemental advocacy on those
Page 32343
1 occasions when Mr. Milosevic can't do it or has felt able to relieve some
2 of the burden on himself.
3 Within the Rules of this Tribunal, that can be funded. There is
4 no reason why there should be an obstruction in the provision of resources
5 that way. And every indication would be so far in the presentation of
6 this trial that the Registry in this building would be supportive of that.
7 But we do urge that that is very much the first stop, to give him
8 the choice once a decision is made, when it's known how this matter is to
9 be dealt with, before the Trial Chamber moves into any other position.
10 Unless I can deal with other issues specifically on behalf of the
11 amici, those are our submissions at this stage.
12 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you very much, Mr. Kay.
13 Mr. Nice.
14 MR. NICE: Can I reply briefly?
15 On the accused's points, he speaks of our speaking of danger in
16 preparing the witnesses. The danger to which I initially referred was the
17 danger to his health. But there is, in fact, an additional danger. It's
18 the danger of a personal party to litigation being too close to the
19 litigation to prepare witnesses dispassionately, and in this case, of
20 course, some witnesses might actually prefer the practice that exists in
21 many jurisdictions whereby witnesses are not prepared by the litigant
22 himself and have to be prepared by the independent solicitor or other
23 lawyer.
24 In speaking of his fatigue, the accused did not suggest that he
25 has the physical capacity to both prepare and present witnesses at the
Page 32344
1 rate that would be required to guarantee a three-day sitting week, which
2 is the minimum, of course, that the Chamber might regard as acceptable.
3 And indeed, he didn't challenge the medical finding that he is not fit to
4 prepare and present his case wholly himself.
5 I observe from an interview we've received notice of recently,
6 when the accused speaks of, as it were, his disinclination to have a
7 lawyer act for him, that one of his advisors, in a public interview in a
8 newspaper - I'm afraid it's in German; we'll make it available - Mr.
9 Ognjanovic, has described his role as being only marginally distinct from
10 that of Defence counsel. The next stage is one that, at a minimum, should
11 now be required of him via this accused.
12 It's said that our initial submissions spoke of behaviour being
13 just short of obstructionist. True. We also referred to the etiquette
14 matter. We have referred regularly and extensively to the wasting of
15 time, and that filing came before we had the recent and very much stronger
16 evidence going to show that what was happening with the medical regime was
17 obstructionist.
18 JUDGE ROBINSON: You mean before the second report from Dr.
19 Dijkman?
20 MR. NICE: Yes. That's the earliest filing that came right in
21 July. So insofar as there's been a strengthening of our position, it
22 reflects that.
23 As for the suggestion that the observations, the recurring
24 observations of this accused are not present to be insulting, that's not a
25 proposition we can accept. Apart from the matters to which His Honour
Page 32345
1 Judge Bonomy referred, it is the needless repetition of the points, both
2 as against the Judges and as against the Prosecutor and those prosecuting,
3 that we rely on to reveal the true intention of this accused, which, in
4 our respectful submission, is claimly aimed at showing public respect and
5 being allowed to show public respect to the audience at which his
6 performance is principally directed.
7 On the topic of the production of statements -- sorry, names of
8 witnesses and exhibits, the Chamber will have the history before it. It
9 was on the 18th of June that the order was made -- or the 17th of June,
10 set in writing on the 18th of June. The Prosecution sought relief on the
11 29th of June in relation to this and raised the question of non-compliance
12 on the 5th of July, and it was at that hearing that the accused said that
13 he was only going give us so much and he was acting in the identical
14 manner as the other party.
15 Compliance with that order was made on the 6th of July, and on the
16 16th of July, the amici requested, as for the accused, 14 days for further
17 compliance, so that would have only taken them until the end of July.
18 The order of the Trial Chamber came on the 28th of July, and
19 whatever misunderstanding there may have been, and I accept that Ms. Anoya
20 spoke of a misunderstanding to the case manager, Ms. Dicklich, on the 25th
21 of August, the fact of the matter is, that despite that history, we got
22 the names on the 20 -- well, two days ago, three days ago, and we don't
23 adjust our position in respect to that at all.
24 Funding is a separate issue and it's not a matter, I think, upon
25 which we should dwell, save to say this: If the Chamber decided that its
Page 32346
1 future conduct of the case were to be conditional on the accused appearing
2 through counsel of his own nomination as part of its overall plan for the
3 future conduct of the case, that decision should come first and the
4 question of funding should come second, it needing to be established, I
5 think, by the Registry, what his financial position is, and that's not a
6 matter for us to trouble you with at this stage.
7 The distinction between imposition and assignment is one we've
8 recognised from the beginning and throughout our submissions, and
9 Mr. Kay's -- my learned friend Mr. Kay's proposal, as we ventured to
10 suggest at the start of our argument this morning, allows for control of
11 the proceedings to be in the hands of the accused, and one has only to
12 look at what happened in Seselj where counsel was made available to him on
13 the basis that counsel would not be removable by him, and the first
14 counsel was. It's all too possible, if you have that kind of
15 relationship, for something to go wrong, which is why we repeat our
16 request to the Chamber to impose counsel and then to allow the accused to
17 make the sensible decision. Imposed counsel might have no function more
18 pleasing than to be on stand-by throughout the rest of the case. He might
19 serve as an alternate Judge serves in courts that appoint such Judges.
20 But his presence or her presence would guarantee two things, first that
21 the progress of the Chamber of the trial would not be further thwarted;
22 and second, in fact, that the accused through his nominated counsel would
23 comply with what was required of him, for imposed counsel would remind
24 him, standing ever so still and ever so silently in the Court -- or
25 sitting ever so still and ever so silently in the Court, would remind him
Page 32347
1 that if he returned to conduct that was obstructive in any way by
2 preparation or otherwise, the conduct of the case would be handed over to
3 an independent and objective different counsel.
4 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson.
6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This is improper. I would use an
8 even graver word, but there is no need for that. It is highly improper.
9 This proposal made by Mr. Nice is that you should threaten me that
10 I should not fall ill, because in case I fall ill, you will not act as you
11 would act in any other court of law on this planet. You will not say on
12 such and such a day we will not work, but then there will be this threat
13 hanging over me that then some other person would take over my rights to
14 defend myself. That is senseless.
15 Please, let's be clear on this. Mr. Nice says that I did not
16 challenge the fact that I was ill. Of course I did not challenge it. But
17 I was ill during that case of theirs too. They had 300 days. Three
18 hundred active days and I don't know how many witnesses. Please.
19 And indeed if anybody is watching this, then it's quite clear. At
20 that time, the question of my capabilities was not raised in terms of
21 exercising my rights, the ones that you gave me and that belong to me
22 according to all international conventions. But now when my time has
23 come, all of a sudden the question of my ability to defend myself has been
24 raised. You do not take away somebody's right to self-defence if he gets
25 sick. Then you don't work and that's it.
Page 32348
1 Let's get another thing clear too. The right to defend myself is
2 a question of principle. I do not accept any decrease of that right or
3 any renouncing of that right altogether. So I insist that you make it
4 possible for me to question my own witnesses, and I am categorical on that
5 point.
6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. We have heard your submissions.
7 [Trial Chamber confers]
8 JUDGE ROBINSON: We'll take a ten-minute adjournment to consider
9 this matter.
10 --- Break taken at 1.26 p.m.
11 --- On resuming at 1.45 p.m.
12 JUDGE ROBINSON: In the result, the Chamber was not able to arrive
13 at a decision on this matter in the time that we had set ourselves for the
14 adjournment, but in the event that the Chamber should decide to assign
15 counsel, the Chamber would wish the parties to be prepared tomorrow
16 morning at 9.00 to advance submissions on the question of how such
17 assignment should be made, the manner in which such assignment should be
18 made, that is the modalities that would govern such an assignment.
19 Is that sufficiently clear?
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson.
21 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, yes.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Please bear in mind the following:
23 For three years, the same doctors have considered me fit from the point of
24 view of health to function, and you yourselves have been able to see that.
25 Even Mr. Nice, in support of his motion that I be given as little time as
Page 32349
1 possible, put forward the argument that I have been functioning very
2 efficiently. So for three years the same doctors have considered me fit
3 to function. Then an independent doctor turns up from Belgium, the
4 country which is the seat of the NATO pact, and he says I'm unfit and then
5 the doctors here agree with him.
6 Allow me to bring into question this kind of deduction of medical
7 evidence. Please consider my motion and let the experts evaluate the
8 situation, but I ask for an expert from Russia, from Serbia, from Greece,
9 and then you can add two of your own, if you like, whom you will appoint,
10 to see what this is about. Things are being mystified here when in fact
11 they are very simple.
12 I see this as a manipulation aimed at depriving me of my right to
13 speak here and to speak the truth. That is the essence of it all.
14 Mr. Nice says in support of his argument that a lawyer should be
15 imposed on me, counsel should be imposed on me, that I am too involved and
16 am unable to be dispassionate. However, I feel that the other side is too
17 dispassionate when it comes to the truth. I cannot, of course, interfere
18 in how the other side do their job, but they cannot interfere in the way I
19 exercise my rights. That too is a question of principle.
20 Therefore I wish to reiterate: My right to defend myself is
21 something that I will neither accept having diminished nor will I ever
22 waive it. Please bear that in mind. And you can reach your own
23 decisions, but I receive the medicaments given to me by your people, your
24 employees. What is happening here, I don't know, but I can bring the
25 whole floor of the Detention Unit here to testify to what happened when
Page 32350
Page 32351
1 the food I had was exchanged with the food of the person across the
2 passageway, and there was a big to-do about setting things right, although
3 the food apparently was the same. It appeared to be the same. And I did
4 not raise the issue. I don't know what was going on.
5 But please be kind enough to bear in mind that when, for three
6 years, they have been saying one thing and now suddenly they turn around
7 and say something else, I am right in having suspicions. My suspicions
8 may or may not be justified, but they are well grounded.
9 [Trial Chamber confers]
10 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, on the submission from the accused that
11 he be allowed to bring an expert on the question of his health, do you
12 have any --
13 MR. NICE: First of all -- first of all, just investigating
14 whether this whole and very late submission by him was the subject of an
15 earlier order of yours that has not been reflected or respected by him,
16 and I'm grateful to Ms. Graham again for having this point in mind because
17 it had eluded me.
18 Would Your Honour just give me one minute.
19 [Prosecution counsel confer]
20 MR. NICE: Your Honour, what I'm concerned about is whether, in
21 fact, there's an order that quite expressly raises these issues for the
22 accused to deal with, and he, it may be thought, declined to deal with
23 them until right at the last minute, maybe when he sees, in the
24 vernacular, which way the wind is blowing. But even if there is no
25 express order in respect of which he is in non-compliance, his approach to
Page 32352
1 raising this issue, really, at this stage when he's seen the reports and
2 he had the earlier opportunity to raise the point is not insignificant.
3 Let me see if I can find the order. Apparently not. The amici
4 might be able to assist with the relevant order that we have in mind, and
5 I'm sorry, I've gone through them all recently, chronologically, but I
6 can't find it.
7 As to the substance of the matter that he raises, no, it's far too
8 late. This issue of his health and of his possible, probable, or certain
9 manipulation of his medical regime has been before him and his associates,
10 who are marginally different from lawyers appearing for him, as one of
11 them has said, for months. They know. The accused is a highly
12 intelligent man who, it may be thought, knows how to play the Court when
13 he has to. They know that that's an issue that is going to come up for
14 consideration and that you need to prepare to deal with it. This
15 allegation about the Belgian NATO-country doctor is absurd and the Chamber
16 should be content with the evidence that it has, the Chamber having been
17 always extremely careful to check medical information against second
18 opinion when it's judged it necessary.
19 The order that we had in mind is the order dated the 6th of August
20 where the accused and the amici were ordered to file submissions within
21 two weeks on the role that counsel assigned -- I'll check. It's a public
22 order. On the role that counsel --
23 JUDGE ROBINSON: We only have four more minutes before we have to
24 vacate the court.
25 MR. NICE: Okay. Ensuring fair representation of the Defence case
Page 32353
1 in the absence of instructions or cooperation with the counsel, and the
2 role which the amici curiae might play. And Your Honour, that order, even
3 if it didn't specifically seek any contrary evidence on medical issues, to
4 any intelligent person let alone to a lawyer appearing for this accused
5 would have raised the need to prepare himself against the eventuality he
6 now concerns himself with.
7 JUDGE ROBINSON: All right. Mr. Kay.
8 MR. KAY: Very briefly. There was no order requiring him to posit
9 any alternative medical report the Trial Chamber in our researches into
10 the matter. It has been raised by the accused at a late stage but it is
11 an important matter and the Trial Chamber might like to consider that when
12 dealing with this issue and give the accused, say, seven days in which to
13 respond to the matter.
14 JUDGE ROBINSON: We're going to adjourn and resume at 9.00.
15 Mr. Milosevic, can you say very quickly, why is this matter being
16 raised so late by you?
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Because it seems to me,
18 Mr. Robinson, that there is a manipulation going on here, because if for
19 three years --
20 JUDGE ROBINSON: I'm stopping you because the medical reports have
21 been transmitted to you. So you would have had time to consider the
22 matter, and instead you're raising it at the very last minute.
23 It's important that you offer an explanation for the lateness if
24 the request is to be considered.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Because, Mr. Robinson, until today
Page 32354
1 when I heard all these arguments which I feel to be highly illogical and
2 tendentious, it never crossed my mind. I'm probably not as intelligent as
3 Mr. Nice thinks I am. It never crossed my mind that it might be at all
4 possible for counsel to be imposed on me. It didn't even cross my mind.
5 I had in mind a clear-cut position that this was my right which would not
6 be denied me. However, now that I have heard all this, examples of how
7 people are treated who are accused of sexual crimes, which have nothing to
8 do with which we are speaking about here, when I see the arguments
9 constructed by the other side in order to have this right denied to me at
10 any cost, then of course I am beginning to think that there might be some
11 sort of manipulation involved here. I think it's quite logical and
12 normal. It never even crossed my mind that this kind of situation might
13 arise, that you might impose counsel on me. That is out of the question,
14 and I will not accept it.
15 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Kay, your submission, as I understand it, is
16 that the accused might be allowed a week in which to get this medical
17 evidence.
18 MR. KAY: Yes. I don't think he's been advised on this issue by
19 his associates, from the information I have, the argument just put by the
20 accused to the Tribunal concerning it never crossing his mind that his
21 right of self-representation may be taken away is probably right. And it
22 may be well be that this issue has not been given the attention that it
23 ought to have been by those advising him.
24 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you. We will adjourn, and we will address
25 these matters tomorrow morning at 9.00.
Page 32355
1 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.00 p.m.,
2 to be reconvened on Thursday, the 2nd day of
3 September, 2004, at 9.00 a.m.
posted by CirqueMinime/Paris at 10:57 AM
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