The General's Trial: Dallaire Direct, Day 2 -- 21 November 2006

The General's Trial: Dallaire Direct, Day 2 -- 21 November 2006

[Like a Thomas Mann or an Albert Camus novel, The General's trial is suffused with an air of illness. In this second day of direct examination of Canadian UN General Dallaire, who, himself, is claiming ill health as his excuse for not coming to Arusha to testify in person as he had done in the Military I and Akayesu trials, one discovers the beginnings of the debilitating chest infection that would sideline Me Chris Black (and curtail the trial) for a full day--and that even prosecutor Bâ is od-ing on paracetemol (#4 Tylenols w/c and Dauradins I would guess, because, from here, he really seems 'Load-ed').

Dallaire even brings up one of my favorite bourgeois germ fetishes, an aspect of Negro-phobia found in his pathologically obese tome of endless sniveling and puerile self-fawning--though Slarving Dodes with the Devil is not without some valuable information, it, like Philly Gourevitch's toxic little compendium of lies, half-truths, and humanitarian voodoo, We Wish to Disinform Y'all. . . , should only be picked up with ten-foot tinder hooks--: Dallaire and company are driving down a Rwandan road and they come to a section where the way is blocked with dead bodies. After a beat or two of mawkish reflection on how these poor black buggers came to obstruct the UN's warpath and probably should gently, respectfully, be dragged to the sides of the road so the blue boys can get on with their covering for the real RPF killers: the Genny flashes that these Rwandans might be among those many who, without benefit of ELISA or Western blot tests, were found to be HIV+! His next consideration, if my memory of the French translation is as good as his, is that perhaps the deadly virus (another filthy French invention!) might actually climb up the tires and seep through the air vents of his jeeps. Maybe they should just turn back. But, no, ever the committed officer, Dallaire soldiers on, shifts it into compound low, and just drives right over these poor, black, AIDS-ridden, victims of (perhaps more than one) genocide.

But discussion of iatrogenocide is for another day.

Here you will see the full-spectrum bias of the humanitarian warriors--esp the vocabulary that came to be used to define this terrible tragedy--you will find out a little about the presidential 'plane crash', and who the 'extremists', 'hardliners', 'rigorously disciplined cadres', even 'revolutionaries', and, of course, 'genocidaires' really are. As with all good Pulp Fiction, we're kinda jumping around through time and transcripts. The beginning of the Dallaire cross-examination is in this one, and it will continue in the next post, that of 22 November.

Stay tuned--and if you know where a geezer can find support, financial support, for debunking this sorta bogus story line, please drop a comment and let me know. --mc]


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THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA

CASE NO.: ICTR-00-56-T THE PROSECUTOR
CHAMBER II OF THE TRIBUNAL
v.
AUGUSTIN NDINDILIYIMANA
FRANÇOIS-XAVIER NZUWONEMEYE
INNOCENT SAGAHUTU
AUGUSTIN BIZIMUNGU

MONDAY, 21 NOVEMBER 2006

(1510H)

CONTINUED TRIAL

Before the Judges:
Joseph Asoka de Silva, Presiding
Taghrid Hikmet
Seon Ki Park

For the Registry:
Mr. Roger Noël Kouambo (Canada)
Mr. Issa Toure
Mr. Abraham Koshopa

For the Prosecution:
Mr. Ciré Aly Bâ
Mr. Segun Jegede
Mr. Moussa Sefon
Mr. Abubacarr Tambadou (Canada)
Ms. Felistas Mushi

For the Accused Augustin Ndindiliyimana:
Mr. Christopher Black

For the Accused François-Xavier Nzuwonemeye:
Mr. Charles Taku
Mr. Hamuli Rety

For the Accused Innocent Sagahutu:
Mr. Fabien Segatwa
Mr. Seydou Doumbia

For the Accused Augustin Bizimungu:
Mr. Ronnie MacDonald

Court Reporters:
Ms. Leslie Todd
Ms. Sithembiso Moyo
Ms. Eleanor Bastian
Ms. Kirstin McLean


WITNESS/ES

For the Prosecution:
ROMÉO DALLAIRE
Examination-in-chief by Mr. Bâ (continued) p12
Cross-examination by Mr. Taku p60



EXHIBITS

Exhibit No. P. 118A and P. 118B p37
Exhibit No. P. 119 p44
Exhibit No. P. 120 p56


P R O C E E D I N G S


MR. PRESIDENT:
Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. The Court is in session.

Mr. Prosecutor?


MR. BLACK:
Before he stands up, I have something to say.

I discussed with my client your orders of yesterday, and after a long discussion he has advised me that instead of me being struck off the list, he would rather have me here and active, so I have instructions to take part as of today.

But before we continue, I would like the screen, the Ottawa screen, put on the -- the video from Ottawa put on to the screen right now. I want to ask a question about that. Can you show -- I would like to know who the Canadian army officer is sitting in this room and why there is a Canadian army officer sitting in on the testimony in a UN court, because right now this room is part of this courtroom. There is a Canadian army officer, there are three other people in there we don't know, and we object to the presence of Canadian army officers in the room and we want to know what their purpose for being there is. So, somebody, please explain why that lady -- I think she is a lieutenant or a captain -- is in the room when she would not be allowed to be sitting here if Dallaire were here.


MR. PRESIDENT:
Well, Counsel, I have no problem --


MR. BLACK:
Well, I do.


MR. PRESIDENT:
-- with anybody. But since you are raising this matter, could the registrar please inform the -- enlighten us on these matters.


MR. BLACK:
We want to know who is in that room because we want to make sure that General Dallaire is speaking freely and not under any sort of pressure or intimidation from any party.


MR. KOUAMBO:
Thank you, Mr. President. As I said yesterday, the lady is here and she made us understand that she is here as a representative of the Canadian army. And maybe she should be allowed to speak by the Court.


MR. BÂ:
I am asking for the floor. I wanted to address this matter yesterday but I refrained from doing so because the Defence represented in Ottawa had not raised any reservations. Among those who are present in that hall, there is of course Counsel Yarosky, counsel for General Dallaire, who has been present each time the General is being heard or appearing. And in the document I disclosed to you on Friday, you would notice that even in the chambers of the examining magistrate in Belgium where the discussions are private, General Dallaire was assisted by his counsel, and that is allowed under Canadian law.


MR. PRESIDENT:
There is no problem with General Dallaire's counsel, but the counsel Mr. Black is --


MR. BÂ:
(Microphones overlapping) … I will get there. I will get there. I will get there. The other persons in that hall, first of all, Major Marla Dow (phonetic) and an officer from the general staff, Francine Allard (phonetic), and probably -- and I'm not in Ottawa -- Madam Anna Soloman. They are present in the hall for a very simple reason. If you look at the letter that lifts the immunity of General Dallaire, a copy of which was sent to you, Mr. President, in the very last paragraph of that letter, the last paragraph of that letter, it is stated that the waiver granted saying to allow General Dallaire to testify before the ICTR is restricted to his presence and not to the use of UN confidential documents, the use of which would require a special permit. You also know that when General Dallaire was on secondment, that is, when he was serving with the United Nations in 1993 and 1994, he was merely on secondment. He continued to be in active service, we've indicated, in the (Canadian) army. The United Nations is a repository of certain documents, the use of which and problems of the use of said documents may arise before this Chamber, and the Canadian government is another repository of these said documents. So it is Marla Dow and Francine Allard who are responsible, together with the DPKO or with the Canadian government, those are the persons from which such special authorisation would need to be obtained. The problem did arise when General Dallaire did have to testify in January 2004 before Trial Chamber I, and an order was issued by the said Chamber on the 19th of January 2004, allowing General Counsel Ken Watkins to be present in the courtroom, together with Counsel Yarosky. So there is a precedent that had been set in Trial Chamber I. Both the Trial Chamber and the Defence team did welcome the fact that those persons were able to cooperate with them. They facilitated the obtaining of certain documents or securing of certain documents that are in the custody of either the Canadian government or the United Nations.

I do believe, therefore, Mr. President, these are the people who are in that hall, in addition to the representative of the Defence and that of the Prosecutor, namely, Abubacarr Tambadou. If there is anyone in that hall whose name I have not mentioned, I would ask the registry to make us know who that person is. Thank you.


MR. BLACK:
Well, we object strenuously to any representative of the Canadian army being in that room. You've got three officers of the Canadian army observing General Dallaire testify. Why? They donated that room to provide a video link service only. He is no longer a serving officer. When he was working as commander-in-chief of the UN forces for UNAMIR, he was working for the UN, not the Canadian army. It has nothing to do with the Canadian army, unless they want to admit that they were involved in the war, which I don't think they do. It is known that General Dallaire -- I'm not finished. It is known that General Dallaire signed a secrecy deal with the Canadian army some years ago, when he was required to testify in Belgium, in which the Canadian army told him if he did not sign it and he testified in Belgium they could not prevent him from being arrested. We do not know the contents of that secrecy agreement he was required to sign by the Canadian army. It is quite clear to me that those officers are there to make sure that he does not violate that agreement and to speak about things they don't want him to speak about. The Defence requires that General Dallaire be free to speak freely, without fear of intimidation, repercussion or having himself placed in any sort of jeopardy by any authority anywhere in the world, and I'm sure General Dallaire would like that too. And I would like and I demand and my client demands that those officers be removed from the room and not be permitted to hear the testimony except as the rest of the public can hear it, but not as they're sitting there with notes and books and being able to give him signals and those sorts of things or watching him or intimidating him or making him nervous -- or in any other way. It is totally improper; it wouldn't be allowed in this courtroom. The fact that there was an officer sitting here in Military I was not known to me, and I would have objected if I was counsel at that point. We objected to a representive of George Bush, of the US Attorney General, being in your benches a few months ago, and Judge de Silva ordered him removed. It was not proper for a representative of the United States government, of George Bush's Attorney General, to sit there, and it is not proper for the Canadian army to sit in this courtroom with us now.


MR. PRESIDENT:
Well, Counsel, that was with the Prosecutor.


MR. BLACK:
Well, we now have sitting next to Mr. Tambadou a Canadian army major. Why? Because my client now thinks -- he is not being tried by this Tribunal; he is now being tried by the Canadian army.


MR. PRESIDENT:
Well, Counsel, I think I will --


MR. BLACK:
So we are demanding that those officers be removed; that their presence is not necessary; it is intimidating to General Dallaire; there is no reason given for their presence; and the optics of it for the rest of the world and the public look very, very bad.


MR. BÂ:
Well, he has made the point. Let me just add something: I forgot to tell you that Madam Anna Soloman is responsible for international criminal tribunals at the general headquarters of the Canadian army, and she is the one in charge of all of these logistics, these satellite connections between Ottawa and Arusha. So she is there for utilitarian purposes. So someone has to be there to care for any foreseens. As for the presence -- and I told you earlier and there are precedents that had been set, the presence of Marla Dow is quite necessary because there is a problem of the use of certain documents which might arise, and she is the one who is going to, as it were, intercede or operate as the link or the liaison person between the Tribunal and the Canadian government so as to secure the green light for the use of the said documents.

Well, I'm in the hands of the Court and will comply with your ruling.


MR. MACDONALD:
Your Honour, just a comment. We support Mr. Black's motion, and essentially what we are preoccupied with is the Canadian officer, and if I understand correctly, and Mr. Bâ could correct me on that, it seems that when General Dallaire testified in Akayesu, there were no representatives of the Canadian government, and I guess Mr. Bâ could confirm that, and if not, why, in that particular case.


MR. BÂ:
When he testified in the Akayesu trial, there was Ken Watkins, who was his adviser at the time, his counsel at the time, not Yarosky, and Ken Watkins was allowed to be present in the courtroom as a representative of the Canadian government. You can check the transcript of 19th January 2004. At the very beginning of the session, there was an oral ruling issued by the Chamber, allowing such person to be in the courtroom, but we shall comply with your ruling.


MR. MACDONALD:
It seems to be a conflict of interest but we strenuously object to, Your Honour -- General Bizimungu's team, anyway, objects to the presence of the Canadian official.


MR. PRESIDENT:
We have recorded the objections you have raised. But in the interests of justice, I will ask General Dallaire whether he is inhibited in any way by the presence of these people in court. If he says so, I will ask them to go; if he is comfortable -- as far as the Court, I have nothing, but for the purpose of the record, I will place the objections raised by you.


MR. BLACK:
Mr. President, I don't think it is appropriate to ask General Dallaire that. That puts him in an impossible position. If I'm correct that the Canadian army officer is there to observe his testimony in order to ensure he testifies in a certain way, how else could he respond except, "No, they don't bother me."


MR. PRESIDENT:
No, Counsel, we are to look at it this way: If there is pressure on General Dallaire by the Canadian government, whether these officials are here or outside, it doesn't matter; that pressure will remain.


MR. BLACK:
But, sir, the public, the world is going to question why are --


MR. PRESIDENT:
So let the world question. We don't know. But, as you say, if the Canadian government has put pressure on Dallaire, then whether these people are there or not, that will not change the position.


MR. BLACK:
But it also has to do with the apprehension of fairness, the fairness of the trial, the appearance of fairness in this trial. If my client sees General Dallaire testifying there, as I'm -- as we are seeing, he is sitting with three Canadian army officers, what are we to think? It's not about -- it's about also the appearance of a fair trial; not --


MR. PRESIDENT:
I don't know the --


MR. BLACK:
He is flanked by staff officers in the Canadian army when the Canadian army officially had nothing to do with the UN mission because they were all seconded to the UN, so what are they doing there? And I would like them to explain what they're really doing there.


MR. YAROSKY:
Mr. President, I don't know whether the Court hears me. I'm Harvey Yarosky, General Dallaire's counsel, and I would just to clarify and correct something that's been said.

May I speak?


MR. PRESIDENT:
Yes, please.


MR. YAROSKY:
Thank you. Thank you. Mr. President and Your Honours, I would just like to correct something. Lieutenant Commander Francine Allard is not here as a representative of the Canadian government to observe the proceedings. As a matter of fact, that is inaccurate. She has been with us and she has worked with me and I need her as my assistant. She's been on this file since before -- about the same time that I got into this file as General Dallaire's counsel. She is the one who has been in control of and knows the documents, and any time there is an issue about lifting the immunity of the UN with respect to any of the documents, it is Francine Allard who has been absolutely essential to obtain permission for the documents to be produced. As a matter of fact, she was most helpful to us in the Military I trial. And so I would just like for the members of the Tribunal to know that she is not here in any way, shape or form as a representative of the Canadian government to observe the proceedings. She is here to help me, to observe the UN rules with respect to the handling of the documents. I just thought I would like to make that clarification.


MR. PRESIDENT:
Thank you. Thank you.

Mr. Black, did you hear that?


MR. BLACK:
Yes, that disturbs all of us here even more. Now we have him admitting -- Mr. Yarosky saying that the Canadian army has been assisting him for years in Dallaire's testimony. And officially the Canadian army had nothing to do with Rwanda; the Canadian army officers that served in the UNAMIR mission were seconded to the United Nations, they reported to the United Nations, not to -- at least not officially to the Canadian army, even though they were part of it. And now he is saying that the Canadian army is going to decide which documents you get to see and which ones you don't get to see in this trial. That is not right. We are a United Nations tribunal. They have to show us everything. They can't say, "We are going to decide what to give you and what not to give you." Who is Canada to say, "We are going to let you see certain things and not see certain things"? Who is the Canadian government? And who decided that policy, which minister?

Well, you tell me, ma'am, Lieutenant Commander, which minister gave you the instructions --


MS. DOW:
Mr. President --


MR. BLACK:
Who gave you the instructions?


MS. DOW:
Mr. President, perhaps I can speak on behalf of the Canadian government.


MR. BLACK:
She speaks on behalf of the Canadian army. She is not a member of the government; she is a member of the military. She can't speak on behalf of the government.


MR. PRESIDENT:
Well, I think I have heard enough of this.


MR. BÂ:
You were going to put a question to General Dallaire before being interrupted by Mr. Black; you were going to ask him whether he felt intimidated or whether he was subject to any pressure from the Canadian government or the Canadian army. I believe it is in order to put that sort of question to him, Mr. President.


MR. SEGATWA:
I've been asking to address the Court, Mr. President. I think with respect to the testimony of Dallaire, your Court would need to rule on three matters. The first one is the status of that witness --


MR. BÂ:
Objection. We are still delaying with the purpose of that objection. What has the status of the witness got to do here?


MR. SEGATWA:
Prosecutor, if you could just be patient, Mr. Prosecutor. I do believe that there is a problem that arises with respect to Dallaire. Is he just some ordinary witness or some special witness? I think the Court would need to rule on that because, indeed, that is what has brought about all of these issues. If it was just a mere witness, an ordinary witness, why wouldn't he have to testify like any other ordinary witness? Does he need counsel or a counsel to advise the counsel?


MR. PRESIDENT:
I think -- I think we have already given our decision as to why he should testify from there. So we are not here to waste any more time on that.

Mr. Dallaire, I have put a question to you. Are you in any way inhibited by the presence of anybody in the room?


MR. BLACK:
Let him finish his submissions.


THE WITNESS:
Your Honour, I am a bit taken aback by some of the innovative thinking that has been expressed by Defence this morning. One must remember that I was a serving officer seconded to the UN, but at no time did I relinquish my commission as a general officer of the Canadian forces. And still today I'm recognised as a lieutenant general, retired.

In the accomplishment of my ability to meet the requirements of your Court, it has been essential that I be supported in order to accomplish this task. And in so doing, the Canadian government has demonstrated an enormous amount of generosity in regards to providing not only counsel but extensive amounts of resources to be able to make me available in a secure fashion before not only your Court, sir, but also the previous court, Military I. At no time has there been any indication of prejudice and I have been totally and completely free to be able to accomplish my mission, which is ultimately to end my mission as force commander by providing testimony in support of those courts.


MR. PRESIDENT:
Having heard all of these comments and submissions from both parties, I permit those -- the officers to be present in court.

Yes, Counsel, you may continue now.


MR. SEGATWA:
Thank you, Mr. President.

Mr. President, please, I said that I had three questions, and hardly had I made the first -- gotten out the first question before you withdrew the floor from me.

I agree with you that Dallaire is entitled to being assisted. There is no problem with that, but now comes a second question. Are there documents which may not be produced before this Chamber because the United Nations or the government of Canada may object to the production of such documents? Is there an international institution that may object to the manifestation of the truth that we are looking for here? That was my second question. It is essential, it is crucial for us to know that documents, whether they are in the possession of the Prosecution or the Defence, documents that are of a nature as to help us unearth the truth be tendered, of course subject to your control but not subject to the authority of the Canadian government or Canadian army.

Now I move on to the third question, Mr. President. We wonder why these clarifications are given today, why they are given today, a day after the beginning of General Dallaire's testimony. In fact, what are the answers that may have been suggested to him so far?


MR. PRESIDENT:
Counsel, for the third one, the answer is clear. You didn't raise it yesterday, so that is why it is being talked about today. And, further, the next question is, I don't deal with hypothetical questions. When the question arises with regard to the production of documents, if they object we will consider it then. As it is, there is nothing for us to object. We are just probing and just wasting our time on these matters.

Yes, Counsel, you may proceed.


MR. BLACK:
Well, just ten seconds, Mr. --


MR. PRESIDENT:
Yes, Counsel, Mr. Black --


MR. BÂ:
I thank you, Mr. President.


MR. PRESIDENT:
Counsel, now half an hour is gone again today.


MR. BLACK:
I'm sorry but it is an important point for my client. We now -- my position is that we are now a combination UN/Canadian military court, and we object to that and it is just not right, but I've made my objection.


MR. PRESIDENT:
Yes.


MR. BLACK:
And it is also -- with my experience, I just don't feel comfortable with Canadian army officers watching me cross-examine Dallaire.


MR. PRESIDENT:
Well, Counsel, even if you -- even if they are outside, they can still watch you.


MR. BLACK:
I know that but when they are there -- there are certain things. It is like when he had all these commandos outside before, it was very intimidating to counsel inside the courtroom.


MR. PRESIDENT:
Do you think they have all the answers to your questions?


MR. BLACK:
I'm sure they do.


MR. PRESIDENT:
Yes, Counsel, you may proceed.


MR. BÂ:
I thank you, Mr. President. Mr. President, we take it that the presence of the counsel and other persons is accepted and that General Dallaire would have the right to discuss his or -- doesn't have the -- wouldn't discuss his testimony with anyone. Well, we will -- you have a representative there, a representative of the Defence and he will tell you whether any answers were suggested to General Dallaire.

After having made those clarifications, yesterday there was a problem of communication and Mr. Taku said that the accused persons had not received documents which were intended to use. I received a proof of service which shows that these documents were delivered at the UNDF on the 17th of this month. I will request the representative of the registry to give them to the Bench so that these documents become part of the case file. Having said that, we, nevertheless, served a second set of documents to the detained persons this morning. The representative of the registry can testify to that. But I just want to say that on the 17th, they had received those documents.


MR. SEGATWA:
Objection, Mr. President. Mr. President, indeed, we received those documents this morning. They are -- they comprise about 200 pages. Technically and reasonably speaking, it is difficult to put 200 pages on the e-mail and to make hard copies thereof. I challenge the Prosecution and the registry to prove the contrary. And, as I said, we have about 200 pages. We tried or made the experiment this morning. The document could not be printed, which means that the disclosure was not made.


MR. BÂ:
You received these documents for the first time on the 16th of November. Yesterday you came here and did whatever you did and said that you did not receive the documents. The documents were given to you today, the electronic version; you were also given a hard copy and you signed for it.


MR. SEGATWA:
I received that copy this morning.


MR. BÂ:
You received a hard copy as well as an electronic version.


MR. SEGATWA:
No, this is the only version I received, the hard copy of the document.


MR. PRESIDENT:
Can we start now -- please start now.


MR. BÂ:
I would like to begin my examination-in-chief now.


MR. MACDONALD:
Do we have to respond to that document that's been introduced? What he is trying to say to the international community and to you is that we are a bunch of liars here. So we are going to respond to that; we are not just going to sit down. He wants to produce that document. There is going to be an issue -- there is an issue and we have to pursue it, or else we should not accept that document that he is trying to introduce into evidence. Because the sole purpose of introducing that, this proof of reception, is to show the Court or try to establish to the Court that we were lying to the Court yesterday by saying that we had not received that. So by introducing that, we have to respond.


MR. PRESIDENT:
What is the response you are going to give? What is your response?


MR. MACDONALD:
Well, if we can respond to that, do we have to bring in experts to establish that we haven't received that, members from my staff to show that what Mr. Bâ is saying is not the truth? You can't just throw documents in without responding, Your Honour.


MR. PRESIDENT:
Yes, Counsel, you may continue now.


MR. TAKU:
Your Honours, I just want to clarify one thing.


MR. SEGATWA:
I was not allowed to make my objection. My objection is related to the disclosure of documents. It is necessary for the Judges to be sure and certain that the documents which the Prosecution is going to rely on were disclosed at the appropriate time to the Defence. I believe that this objection is significant, is of crucial importance, and it cannot be just waved aside.

Are the Judges convinced that these documents were effectively disclosed to us?


MR. PRESIDENT:
Mr. Segatwa, you need not take 10 minutes to say that. You can say that they have not been disclosed to us. What is your response to that? I will disclose these documents to them?

MR. TAKU:
Your Honours, I do not see any reason for this argument. Your Honours, please, I do not see any need to open this debate today. It's a pure waste of time. Yesterday we asked that the documents be served on us and they were served --


MR. PRESIDENT:
You already wasted 40 minutes today.


MR. TAKU:
They were served today on us. And the question about UNDF documents, the problem is that when did my client sign for the documents? Signing for the documents at UNDF is not enough. When they are handed over to them is what is important. But, as I say, Your Honours, I do not want -- I think this is a pure waste of time. We received the documents and we are not complaining. Let's move on.


MR. PRESIDENT:
Yes. Yes.


MR. MACDONALD:
I would want a ruling from the Bench, your Honour, because Mr. Bâ is making an issue out of this. What is your decision? What is your -- I would just like to know one thing, Your Honour. What is your factual ruling on what Mr. Bâ is advancing, that we received these documents on the 16th of November? My position is we did not; we have received them today. Your ruling of fact is important because we might object to the fact that they introduce one document or another on the grounds that we have not had the opportunity to evaluate or study that document. So we need a ruling of fact. Do you believe what Mr. Bâ is saying?


MR. PRESIDENT:
This is not an issue that we should waste time on. We have already given a ruling on that matter.


MR. MACDONALD:
Well, I don't know what the ruling is. Did we receive them on the 16th or today?


MR. PRESIDENT:
You know better whether you received or not than I do.


MR. MACDONALD:
No. I want your ruling, Mr. President. Because he said we are liars. Do you think we are liars also?


MR. PRESIDENT:
Counsel, I -- at this point you sit down.

Please continue.


MR. BÂ:
I thank you, Mr. President.


ROMÉO DALLAIRE,
EXAMINATION-IN-CHIEF (continued)

BY MR. BÂ:

Q. General Roméo Dallaire, yesterday before we broke up, we were dealing with the meeting, the meeting which the three of you had, that is General Ndindiliyimana, Colonel Bagosora and you, yourself, the meeting you held in Colonel Bagosora's office at the ministry of defence. I'm not going to dwell on that point. I have two or -- one or two more questions to ask you in this regard and thereafter we will move on to something else.

My question is the following: On that afternoon of the 7th of April, why did you think it necessary -- why did you find it necessary, to spend such a long period of time, namely, two and a half hours to three hours, with Colonel Bagosora and General Ndindiliyimana? Was it just a courtesy visit or was it because you thought these two people were important personalities?


MR. BLACK:
Objection. He can't suggest why General Dallaire may have met these two men. He can ask simply why did you meet these two men and not give him a series of possible answers so that General Dallaire can pick the one he wants him to give. Stop with the suggestive answers. Just ask him, "Why did you meet them?" Period.


MR. BÂ:
I will rephrase my question and it will be very simple.

BY MR. BÂ:

Q. General, why is it that on that afternoon on the 7th of April you thought it necessary to spend the afternoon in the office of Colonel Bagosora in the company of Bagosora and General Ndindiliyimana?

A. At that point, the conclusion that I had was that, one, the military control of the situation was still in effect and that was shared the previous evening by Colonel Bagosora who also ran the meeting in the morning with all of the military commanders. Secondly, General Ndindiliyimana was nominated as the head of the crisis committee and so he also had then the responsibility or was the link I needed in order to find out what, in fact, the military structure was about to be doing or conducting or whether I could influence it or not.

The political meeting that was attempted in the morning with the American ambassador and the FRGs at the residence of the American ambassador with all the other ambassadors had failed, and so there was no other political process. And with Madam Agathe dead and all the other senior persons who could possibly have been involved had disappeared, the only place where I could be was either at my headquarters with somebody there with them or me personally monitoring what was going on and assisting what I still hoped to be an attempt to save the Arusha Accords and prevent the situation from degenerating any more.

Q. General, I would request that you speak a little bit more slowly. Yesterday, I was told that the sound quality was not very good and because of that the interpreters had difficulties following you. So, please, kindly speak a little bit more slowly.

How did Colonel Bagosora and General Ndindiliyimana appear to you on that afternoon of the 7th of April? Did they appear worried by the situation?


MR. BLACK:
Again, it's suggestive. He can't ask that. He is suggesting already the answer. You can only ask him, "Tell me your observations of these two men, the demeanor and so on."


MR. PRESIDENT:
Yes, Counsel.


BY MR. BÂ:

Q. What was their demeanor? How did they appear to you?

A. Well, as I indicated yesterday, I was in the presence of the two most senior persons who had any semblance of authority and control of the situation, which they were themselves saying that they were attempting to do, and it seemed as if the situation was normal, that the situation was seemingly under their control, because I didn't see any of what I was -- I expected, any of the stress, any of the sense of urgency, any of the outright actions of monitoring intimately what was going on, no coming and going of staff officers or representatives with instructions or directions to get on with things. Things seemed as if we were in a normal afternoon of work, with Colonel Bagosora shuffling papers and answering on occasion very calmly his phone, with only a visit of one officer that I did not attend that was behind closed doors for a short while, and with General Ndindiliyimana sitting there sort of monitoring or observing and, in fact, very calm in the face of this situation.

Q. Thank you, General. My last question on this issue: On that afternoon, where was the minister of defence? We know that Colonel Bagosora was the directur de cabinet of the minister of defence. Now, where was the minister of defence?

A. The information that I had at the time was that he was away in Cameroon at a meeting of the African Olympic committee. I believe he was a member or represented the government in that, and so he did not return until a couple of days later.

Q. Thank you. And the Rwandan army chief of staff, General Déogratias Nsabimana, do you know where he was?

A. He was in the plane. He --

Q. I knew that. But I wanted you to say it because you are the witness.

General, on that afternoon, when did you hear in a definitive manner of the death of the 10 Belgian UN troops?

A. Well, in fact, that afternoon –


MR. BLACK:
Objection.


THE WITNESS:
-- I was simply being told --


MR. BLACK:
I have an objection. Ask him where he was at the death of the Belgian troops, because we dispute there were 10; we say there were 13 and we'll prove that later. General Dallaire admitted at least 11 or 12. So don't say 10. It's not accurate information; it's a false premise for your question. Ask him where he was when the Belgians were killed if you want, but don't say 10 because that is not the truth.


MR. BÂ:
I will not ask the question in the way you want. It is for me to lead my examination-in-chief as I please. He mentioned the death of those troops yesterday and he also mentioned their presence at the Kigali camp yesterday. And I'm asking him, when on that afternoon of the 7th of April he heard in a definitive manner the death of those 10 UN Belgian troops.


MR. BLACK:
Well, again, it's a false premise, and my objection remains. Captain Apedo, the UN officer at Camp Kigali, said that there were 13 that arrived there, not 10.


MR. PRESIDENT:
You can ask those things in front of the witness.


MR. BLACK:
Well, he is putting a false premise in the question. He can't do that. The UN documents show there were 13 that arrived at Camp Kigali. He can't say there were 10. Not only that, Your Honour --


MR. MACDONALD:
General Dallaire never said 10. He said anywhere from 11 to 15.


MR. BÂ:
Mr. President, I withdraw the figure of 10 if that is what is of concern.

BY MR. BÂ:

Q. So, General, when did you hear about the death of the Belgian troops?

A. On several occasions during the afternoon, I requested information on the status of the troops that had gone, disappeared, including those who were at Camp Kigali, remembering that I had several other troops that were unaccounted for and some of them in fact under the gun of RGF forces. And in regards to the ones in Camp Kigali, I was told that they were working and negotiating and intervening with the people in the camp to regain control of the camp. There was chaos; there had been officers who had been attempting to stop the riots and that they had been unsuccessful so far, and that I was not to intervene as they were in fact sorting out the problem.

When I found out the final state of my soldiers was around 10 o'clock that evening after the meeting we had with the crisis committee at which time I had to insist and refuse to end the meeting until I got a definitive answer of what happened to those soldiers and others, but those specifically, and it is at that time that I was told they were at the Kigali hospital.

Q. Did you go to find out yourself what their situation -- what their situation was at the Kigali hospital?

A. When General Ndindiliyimana got the information from one of the officers that they were at the hospital, I then said that we are all going to the hospital to see what is the status. We walked out of the army headquarters, just down the road, and ultimately went in by the main entrance. We were then indicated to go to the morgue. And as we approached the morgue, we could see outside piled in the most gruesome of fashions a pile of bodies of white soldiers, half naked in many cases, simply thrown together. And that is where I ultimately found the Belgian soldiers who were killed that day.

Q. Did you make that observation with your own eyes?

A. Yes. I was there with the chief of staff of the gendarmerie and the new arrival of the interim chief of staff of the army, General Gatsinzi, and a number of staff officers and my EDC. I ordered that we attempt to count the bodies, and the number that came out was 11, and then I ordered that such disgusting treatment of the bodies be sorted out and that they be properly laid out and prepared so that the Belgian contingent in the morning could pick them up. General Ndindiliyimana and all the officers that I saw there were quite shocked and surprised at the state of affairs that we were witnessing.

Q. Yes. And after that, did you return to your headquarters?

A. At that -- having -- after having ended our meeting of coordination of effort with the crisis committee, I then returned to my headquarters. General Ndindiliyimana offered me his personal escort as it was after dark, there was shooting going on, and he demonstrated a concern for my security, and so I returned via an alternate route as there was firing going on in the area of the CND, that sort of shooting had kept on. And as we were approaching my headquarters at an intersection close to Camp Kanombe and the airport, my vehicle was ambushed by what under the lights I could see were troops from the paracommando battalion. We were able to make it through the ambush without any injury; we arrived at my headquarters. The escort that General Ndindiliyimana had offered me refused to leave my headquarters for their own safety and stayed until the next morning.

Q. General, before going to the Kigali central hospital, you were at the crisis committee meeting as you told us. During that meeting, did you mention the possible withdrawal of the Belgian contingent?

A. The -- as I indicated yesterday, the first time that anyone mentioned a possible withdrawal of the Belgian contingent was in the afternoon, uttered by Colonel Bagosora. That evening that subject was also raised in regards to the population having been informed through RTLM, the radio station, that they accused the Belgian contingent of having shot down the presidential plane and, as such, it was expressed that the Belgians would be a liability to any of our attempts to secure or stabilise the situation and so that they should be considered to leave.

Q. Who suggested that possibility or that wish to see the Belgian contingent leave?

A. I'm afraid 12 years later I don't remember specifically how or when during the meeting that was raised. The meeting was chaired by General Ndindiliyimana, but I'm afraid I can't give you a specific answer on that.

Q. Thank you, General. I don't hold it against you. The 7th of April 1994, did the RPF troops at any point move out of their barracks, that is, the CND?

A. Yes. After the unsuccessful discussions that I had orchestrated between the RPF and the CND and General Ndindiliyimana and Colonel Bagosora, at about 1620, at about 1620, I got word from my observers who were at the CND that the RPF battalion was moving out, had pushed aside my troops and simply conducted what I would consider operational deployments of a defensive position to enhance their own security, as was described, but really to gain a better position on the ground. And later on I received information from my staff in Mulindi that General Kagame and his general staff had moved away from Mulindi to what my staff there estimated to be a position to better control the operations of the RPF forces in the north.

Q. If I have understood you clearly, General, you had observers in Mulindi. Did your observers tell you when they observed such major movement of RPF soldiers in Mulindi, that is, moving out of (sic) the demilitarised zone?

A. No. The reports I got that night to the best of my recollection was that there was significant movement of RPF forces, including the general headquarters, but I had not received any specific information about them moving through the DMZ, remembering how limited my capability of observation was in the DMZ, but the central area where I did have forces, in Byumba, I had reports from them that no specific action had yet been taken there on that day or that evening of the 7th.

Q. Thank you, General. We now move on to the 8th of April. Did you move out of your headquarters on -- in the morning of the 8th of April?

A. Yes. In early morning --

Q. And if you did move out, for what purpose? So I was merely adding on to my question. Well, go on, go on, General, sorry.

A. After my normal orders group, I left my headquarters to once again reestablish communications with the leadership at that time, which was either General Ndindiliyimana and/or Colonel Bagosora, remembering that the telephone systems were now non-functioning and so it was essential to have contact there. I had good links with the RPF side but we were still establishing them on the government leadership side. And so I went to the ministry of defence in order to touch base with Colonel Bagosora and found him there. I believe it was around 9-ish or something, 9 o'clock or so. And when I went to his office, he was not in his office but I was told he was in the minister of defence's conference room, which is just a little ways down from there. And as I entered the door of the conference room, Colonel Bagosora was chairing a meeting of gentlemen in civilian uniform.

Q. Did you know at that point in time or later on the type of meeting that was? Did you talk to General Bagosora?

A. Yes. Again, he was startled by my sudden arrival; he immediately stood up from the -- from his chair and approached me before I could even really enter the room and told me that he was chairing a meeting of members of the political structure, that they were attempting to (inaudible) the place as soon as possible as he had indicated to me on the night of the 6th. And so that the people around the table were politicians from a political party.

Q. And what were they trying to set up?

A. Well, I mean, the conversation wasn't very long, but it was to establish the political structure to ensure the handover or transition from the military side to a -- to the political leadership.

Q. Did Colonel Bagosora tell you when and where he received that authority or mandate to set up such a political structure?


MR. BLACK:
Before he answers that, is not --


THE WITNESS:
No, there was no such detail in the conversation. In fact, I was --


MR. BÂ:
Well, I suppose you are afraid of what the answer would be. Don't be flustered.


MR. BLACK:
I'm not flustered; you are flustered. My objection --


MR. BÂ:
Please, please, don't interrupt. General, I will continue.


MR. BLACK:
I have an objection.


MR. PRESIDENT:
One second, Mr. Bâ.

What is your objection?


MR. BLACK:
The objection is he is suggesting the purpose of the meeting. He is suggesting that Bagasora had the purpose of setting up a government, as if he is some king in charge. Well, he can't suggest that. He can ask -- he's already asked it, "What was the purpose of the meeting?" He said that Bagosora was there, chairing a meeting of political parties to do this and that. Now he is trying to suggest that Bagasora himself was trying to set it up, as if he was in charge of something special.


MR. PRESIDENT:
No, that was not the question. The question was whether he asked whether Bagosora told him how he got his authority.


MR. BLACK:
Well, exactly. But he is saying, we don't know that Bagosora had that authority. That meeting may have been convened by the political parties and then they asked Bagosora to chair it when he got there. He can't suggest the answer in the question. That's my point.


MR. PRESIDENT:
Yes, you can reframe it and ask it again.


BY MR. BÂ:

Q. General, I was -- I had concluded on this matter, but I will get back to it. Did Bagosora tell you when he received you what he was really doing? Could you repeat your answer? Because I have the feeling it is not clear for everyone.


MR. BLACK:
The answer was very clear. Objection. Sorry, General Dallaire, I'm sorry to interrupt you, sir. It's -- that's cross-examination. He has given a very clear answer. He appeared at the meeting; Bagosora told him what was going on, and that's all you need to know.


MR. BÂ:
You can raise it in your cross-examination.


MR. BLACK:
No. This is an objection, Mr. Bâ. You never understand them.


MR. BÂ:
Counsel, you are testifying, you know. That is not proper. Let the witness speak, please. Let him testify.


MR. BLACK:
He has already given the answer. If you want to ask him more details about the conversation at that meeting, fine. I have no problem.


MR. BÂ:
I told you -- I told you I was almost at an end. It was the Presiding Judge who said I should rephrase the question, so I said the answer wasn't clear to everyone and I asked the witness to repeat his answer. That is all.


MR. PRESIDENT:
Yes, General, what is your answer to that?


THE WITNESS:
Your Honour, the answer is that my recollection as best as I can remember was, is that as he approached me in haste at the door he told me that he was chairing a meeting to bring about the building of a political structure that had been promised and indicated right from the start on the evening of the 6th of April.


BY MR. BÂ:

Q. General, would you know whether that political structure was ultimately established and when?

A. By the afternoon of the 8th, I had another meeting with the crisis committee, and it was at that time that information was passed on to me that a number of individuals were being assigned ministerial positions, that a president had been chosen, a prime minister, and I must say I cannot recollect the names and so on, how it was, but it was told to me that they were being -- (inaudible) -- actual assembly or someone of that nature.


MR. PRESIDENT:
I think there is a technical problem. We need to resolve it first.

Yes, General, we are having a little bit of a technical problem here. We will tell you when it is resolved.


MR. BÂ:
Are we -- aren't we back to normal now, Mr. President?


MR. PRESIDENT:
It looks like it.


THE WITNESS:
Yes. Do you hear me now?


MR. PRESIDENT:
Yes.


MR. BÂ:
Oh, yes, clearly.


THE ENGLISH INTERPRETER:
It's gone off.


MR. BÂ:
Mr. President, I hope this waste of time would not be attributed to the Prosecutor. That is in addition to all of the time taken for objections.


MR. MACDONALD:
Perhaps, Your Honour, while we are doing nothing, we should consider the fact that Mr. Bâ got just about a full day of examination-in-chief yesterday because we started at 1:00 and finished at 8:00 so that's --


MR. PRESIDENT:
Yes, you are very good at mathematics.


MR. BLACK:
Who is counting?


MR. PRESIDENT:
Is it all right now?


MR. PRESIDENT:
Yes, Mr. Bâ, I think we might be able to continue.

General, can you hear us now? We can see you.


THE WITNESS:
I can hear you very clearly, sir.


MR. PRESIDENT:
Yes, we can hear you now. Yes. Here is Mr. Bâ.


THE WITNESS:
If I may --


BY MR. BÂ:

Q. Yes, General, you were about to say something.

A. Right. If I may -- if I may continue. So that by the late afternoon, they were working on the details of installing an interim government that was to be sworn in either that evening or early in the morning of the 9th of April.

Q. Okay. And who gave you that information?

A. It was at that crisis committee meeting that afternoon, and I cannot remember specifically who provided that information. But General Ndindiliyimana was chairing again.

Q. Well, the government that was ultimately formed, did it -- was it sworn in before the president of the constitutional court?

A. I have absolutely no specific information on that. None of us were invited to the event, and, in fact, the next thing I knew about it was the next morning when I went to again the meeting of the crisis committee. It had been moved to the diplomat hotel, and when I arrived there, I was being informed that the government that had been installed was packing up and preparing to move to Gitarama.


MR. PRESIDENT:
Yes, Mr. Taku, you wanted to say something?


MR. TAKU:
I wanted to say that the question was quite leading to say was it sworn before the constitutional court, Your Honour. It was quite leading. That's why I had to object, but --


MR. PRESIDENT:
There are certain questions which are leading but are quite innocuous.


MR. BÂ:
How is it a leading question? In what way?


MR. PRESIDENT:
We will continue, Counsel.


BY MR. BÂ:

Q. General, was that government recognised, I mean legally so, by the international community, by the United Nations?


MR. BLACK:
Well, objection. Excuse me, General Dallaire. It's not really a question that he can answer. He is not a legal expert. In fact, we do have a document from -- that we've already placed in Military I and this trial from Mr. Zacklin, the legal counsel for the UN at that time, who said it was recognised as a legal interim government. But General Dallaire can't -- he isn't capable of giving a legal opinion. He's a military officer. You have to call Rob Zacklin who gave the opinion at the time that it was a legal interim government, if you want to call that evidence. He is not an expert in law; he can't -- he can't give that --


MR. PRESIDENT:
Well, Counsel, you can put that question in a different form. Was that government recognised by anybody? Put it that way.


MR. BLACK:
That's a different thing. That's an appropriate question, but it's a different thing. As to whether it's leading or not --


MR. BÂ:
Mr. President, I still stand by that phraseology. I don't see how or in what manner it can worry anybody.

BY MR. BÂ:

Q. General, you were in Rwanda on behalf of the United Nations. Now, was that government recognised by the United Nations?

A. We had had communications with the UN headquarters on the subject of the government during the 8th in the evening, and I was told, and Mr. Booh-Booh had agreed, that the government that was being established was not to be recognised as a government of Rwanda and as such Mr. Booh-Booh was not to establish any particular link with them. I did meet with the president, and I'm trying to remember, I believe it's the 9th in the presence of General Ndindiliyimana and I did so purely on the sense of establishing a link with whoever might have any possible authority or influence on the decaying situation, and as such was purely there to enquire and get information on what was going on.

Q. Well, that takes care of my question, General. Was that government recognised by the RPF? Make it brief, General.

A. No, the RPF never recognised it, and it was one of the principle objections to, in fact, being able to advance ceasefire negotiations and the like.

Q. My last question on this point, General: Did the politicians of the moderate wing, those who were characterised as moderates, were they part of that government?

A. The --


MR. BLACK:
Sorry, General. Again, sorry, General, but you would have to define what the word "moderate" is and who they are. You would have to ask was, Mr. X a part of that government, was Mr. Y a part of that government, because each person here has a different sense of what moderate means.


MR. BÂ:
I didn't give him any name; I didn't mention any name. Yesterday he said that in September the parties had a moderate wing and then a power faction, and I asked him whether the politicians of that moderate wing known to him were part of the government. I mean, the evidence-in-chief didn't start today; it started right from yesterday.


MR. BLACK:
But it was never defined yesterday what he meant by "moderate." It's not been defined.


MR. BÂ:
Well, if you want, I'm going to ask him to define it.

BY MR. BÂ:

Q. General, could you define what 'moderate' means since Counsel Black would want us to have it defined?

A. The interpretation that we ultimately were using throughout the extensive negotiations with all of the political factions before the war started was a definition of those who held a very firm position and even one could say hard line, an extension -- an extremist position in regards to the Hutu position of overarching control, authority and presence, and were of no will to conduct any negotiations or any movement of reconciliation with other members of the political structure. These other members of the political structure were identified under the term of moderate because they were demonstrating a desire to be more reconciliatory, to try to balance out the more Hutu based, hard-lined political elements, and those who were more for integration of Hutu-Tutsi background and as such reflected a more sort of generic willingness to bring about the solutioning of the peace agreement and the political process.

And then you had the RPF which was an entity in itself, being a military, politically-integrated revolutionary faction, and as such they held a position that was identified as an RPF position, which some would say was a Tutsi position but it was very much one that ended up by being qualified as RPF. And their position was different from the ones that I would say were moderate in the middle, as they held firm to the Arusha Accords and demonstrated extensively an unwillingness to be flexible in the attempts to bring about the solutioning of the political impasse.

Q. General, well, let me link up with the question that I put to you earlier. So you -- did it appear to you as those whom you characterised as moderate, did it appear to you as if they were part of that government?

A. From the information that we had received since the start of the civil war and other data that was coming in on the 7th, the presence of the moderates were not seen. We had some who had been killed, we had had reports of others hiding, escaping, and so -- we had also heard from Prime Minister Agathe on the 9th of the -- the 6th and 7th that all of a sudden all of the MRND ministers had en masse disappeared and who were not accountable for. And then on the morning of the 8th, around the table, I did not recognise any of those that I would sort of been able to recognise as from the moderate faction, and there were certainly none from the RPF, and so I was deducting that these people who were sitting there were from the more hard-lined line because we had had no information in regards to those of the moderate side of the house. And on the contrary, from what we were getting as SITREPs over the phones, the moderates the day before had been -- many were rounded up and killed or had escaped, including interestingly enough the prime minister designate who was not invited at all to this affair whatsoever and was fearful of his life and still in my headquarters.

(1630H)

BY MR. BÂ:

Q. Thank you, General. General between the 7th of April and the end of June 1994, did your team follow broadcasts or programmes of the RTLM, and if you did, could you tell us, more or less, that is between the 7th of April and the end of June, what would be the content, the substance or the purport of the RTLM broadcast?

A. In the time frame that you speak of, the first days the RTLM was being monitored by Faustin Twagiramungu who was listening in, and I met with him on a number of occasions as his room was not far from my office in the headquarters, and he was indicating to me that the RTLM was inciting people to killing, targeting Tutsis, telling them how to kill, to take action and to go there and seek them out and words to that effect. Then one of my staff met with an individual who had been working at the headquarters that was hiding in the Amahoro stadium amongst the thousands of others who were seeking our protection and he spoke very good English and French. And so we brought them into my headquarters and with his family and set them up in an office where he monitored, on a functional basis as much as he could, of course, with the frequency of being alone, the output of RTLM and kept us abreast of what he was saying.

Q. General, from what you have just told us, there was a kind of apology or condoning of the crimes by the RTLM. I would even say that there was incitement to genocide.


MR. MACDONALD:
Your Honour, you have to do something with this behaviour of Mr. Bâ. I mean, it doesn't make any sense in a court of law.


MR. BÂ:
But that is what he said. He said that the RTLM was broadcasting messages on how to kill. Isn't that condoning the crime and apology for what was being done? Isn't that what he said?


MR. BLACK:
We also heard Des Forges testify -- and it's not even two weeks ago -- that RTLM encouraged people to kill General Ndindiliyimana. And why don't you ask him of Radio Muhabura? This is not relevant for this trial. General indicated -- that's the Media trial, it's already finished. It is not relevant to this case, but if you want to bring out the fact that RTLM told people to kill my man, fine.


BY MR. BÂ:

Q. General -- General, there is a divergence of views in this courtroom and it seems to me that the Bench is not making any decision. Can you please repeat your previous answer? Between April and June, did you follow broadcasts over the RTLM radio? Did you follow those broadcasts personally or did your collaborators follow them, and if yes, what was the content of those broadcasts? You can answer in a brief manner.


MR. BLACK:
It's already done, so why (inaudible).


THE WITNESS:
I had staff in my headquarters who monitored the RTLM throughout the period and the content was one of incitement to kill, incitement to target specifically Tutsis, incitement to where people were and sending people to find them, incitement ultimately also to get me killed and also describe how and where to find me in order to also kill me.


BY MR. BÂ:

Q. Thank you, General. That apology, as it were, of the crimes, did you mention it to the minister of defence, that is, Mr. Bizimana, or to the army chief of staff when he was appointed, that is, Bizimungu, or to the gendarmerie chief of staff, Ndindiliyimana, or to Colonel Bagosora? Did you mention that situation to them?


MR. BLACK:
The answer to the question, it is based on a false premise. Again, General Gatsinzi was not minister of defence of the RPF regime in Kigali; he was the army chief of staff until April 16th, 17th and 19th. Why don't you ask him if he asked General Gatsinzi what his reaction was?


MR. PRESIDENT:
Counsel, you may put the question if they were reported to anybody. Let him come with names, if he did so.


MR. BLACK:
But you want to protect General Gatsinzi as usual, the Kagame regime, even -- if he now says he shot down the plane.


BY MR. BÂ:

Q. General, this incitement to commit genocide in or over on the RTLM radio --


MR. TAKU:
Your Honours, we object. That is a question that has legal implications, serious legal implications and the qualification of what incitement -- what the alleged incitement might have made. It is for Your Honours to take a position on that, but it is completely wrong for learned counsel to ask if it's incitement to commit genocide. That's a crime which is actually in the indictment and that cannot be an object of a direct question to any of the witnesses.


MR. PRESIDENT:
Counsel, witness used the word "incitement." He said that they were inciting.


MR. TAKU:
They incited, but not incitement to commit genocide, that is my objection, Your Honours.


MR. BLACK:
And my objection, Mr. President, briefly is that -- sorry Mr. Bâ -- is that he be precise. General Bizimungu was not army chief of staff at the first two weeks of the war, so he couldn't have asked him. You've got to be precise, asked who at what time?


MR. PRESIDENT:
That is why I told him without mentioning the names; ask him whether he complained to anybody.


MR. BÂ:
Mr. President, I think I am being wrongly criticised. First of all, the question I put to General Dallaire related to the period between the 7th of April and the end of June. And when I mentioned the name of Bizimungu, I specified from the period Bizimungu was appointed. This, therefore, means that I am not of the opinion that he was there as from the 7th of April. In any case, I am going rephrase my question.

BY MR. BÂ:

Q. General, this condoning of the crime, did you discuss it with government authorities or military authorities of that time? When I say of that time, I mean the period from April to June 1994.

A. On several occasions the subject of RTLM was raised by myself, by even emissaries from outside the country, be they human rights commissioners, the – (inaudible) from DPKO throughout the time frame and raised in the sense of why the government has not stopped this radio station that was inciting people to kill, to literally rape and destroy a specific segment of the population. On all these occasions I agreed with the minister of defence, be it with Ndindiliyimana, be it with Bizimungu, be it with Bagosora, the same story came back, in fact, be it with the prime minister at the time of the interim government, the answer kept coming back that RTLM was a private radio station that they had their own right to express and that, yes, they will attempt to influence it to stop saying such things. But that the influence they seem to have was nil. But what was rather interesting is that on two occasions I was interviewed by RTLM, once in the Diplomat Hotel in April, once in Gitarama in May right at the site of the government after having met with the prime minister and a number of ministers, and RTLM was there functioning and conducting its daily operations of inciting people to killing, murdering, slaughtering and mutilating, raping and every -- whatever.

Q. Thank you. General, after the murder of 10 UN Belgian troops, did Belgium keep or maintain its contingent in Rwanda?


MR. BLACK:
Please be precise. He has already said he counted 11 bodies at the morgue of 11 Belgian soldiers, so it's not 10. And Captain Apedo said there were 13.


MR. PRESIDENT:
Counsel, you are giving evidence. I don't know why you are -- (Microphones overlapping).


MR. BLACK:
It has already been filed -- 13 soldiers came up to Camp Kigali.


MR. BÂ:
(Microphones overlapping)


THE ENGLISH INTERPRETER:
Mr. President, the interpreters are having difficulty interpreting more than one person at a time.


MR. PRESIDENT:
Mr. Bâ, you also must restrain yourself. Don't jump at the same time with the others. Yes, what do you want to say?


MR. BÂ:
I want to say that counsel's objection has no basis. If I say 10, it is because we have had at least 20 witnesses here who gave the figure of ten. The general also said that he counted 11 bodies, but that later on -- well, I don't want to give evidence in the presence of the witness, but if counsel prefers the figure of 11, well, then I am going to go on, go along with him, but to avoid any further discussion, I will not mention any figure.

BY MR. BÂ:

Q. Now, General, after the murder of the Belgian troops, did Belgium maintain its contingent in Rwanda?

A. The Belgians having heard that 10 of their soldiers had been slaughtered, ordered the forces that were under my command, under the UN, to withdraw and to abandon the mission. Not only that, but the Belgian forces that came in to pull out the expatriates in the face of the genocide included officers and men that were with my mission but were no more under my command, they were under the command of the army -- Belgian --

Q. Thank you, General. Thank you, once more. Did that withdrawal affect the operational capability of your troops, that is, the withdrawal of the Belgian contingent, did affect the operation capability of your troops? Please give me a brief answer. Brief answer, please.

A. I am certainly more than willing to be cooperative and give a short answer as possible, but I was simply requested I be able to provide a definitive response, if that's possible in the circumstances, if I may. And, yes, directly related to the loss of the 10 Belgian soldiers, the Belgian government pulled out its troops and also conducted a campaign to convince all the other contingents and the countries to pull out their troops. They also made a campaign to influence the secretary general that we were all going to be slaughtered and the whole mission had to be pulled out, but essentially by pulling out the Belgians, you pulled out my heart of any operational capability I had to conduct any type of action apart from adverse -- protecting some vital points where we had thousands of people seeking our protection.

Q. Thank you. General, between the 7th of April and the end of June 1994, behind the lines of government forces or in the territory under the control of government forces, did you notice the presence of roadblocks?

A. In the concept of operations -- that was described to me by the government, both in previous campaigns, that is twice before in 1990, '92 and explained to me by the minister of defence and by the chief of staff of the army and also the gendarmerie. A structure of civilian self-defence was established and armed by the government in order to protect themselves, as they said, against infiltration by the rebel force of the RPF. These barriers, however, were set up in absolutely no semblance of practical requirement as they were set up at intervals within the city or even on the roads and villages opened at 50 to, at most, a hundred metres from each other. They were manned at times by gendarmerie, by soldiers, by a majority of cases by youths at first recognisable as Interahamwe, by their uniform and so on, and then as the campaign continued these barriers escalated and more and more of the population joined in. And we also saw military and gendarmerie members participating in the actions at those barriers.

Q. General, you mentioned the presence of civilians and the militia at the roadblocks. How did these civilians or militiamen -- or, rather, were these civilians or militia armed, if yes, how?

A. In the vast majority of the cases, they were armed with traditional weapons, principally machetes, but other various accoutrements that they used in the agriculture, also in some places with the spears, bows and arrows, and on some occasions with light machine guns but those were principally in the hands of either the gendarmerie or the army but they were used. They did have some of those weapons.

Q. General, did you have the opportunity of seeing those roadblocks, and if yes, what could one see there, that is, you and your observers, what were you able to see at the roadblocks?

A. The actions at the roadblocks were principally conducted in filtering the civilian population and in so doing, the ID cards, the national identification card was used as the principal tool for doing so upon which the ethnicity of the individual was so indicated. We saw extreme violence and destruction on a variety of these checkpoints throughout the country as they continued to be built over the weeks to the extent where some literally had bodies laid out, who had been killed or mutilated, the people still dying of the use of these machetes and so on.

At other places the bodies were simply tumbled from the checkpoints down the ravine or hill or the like. At other points we observed people being beaten up and brutalised at the checkpoints and this was found in a sort of a serried fashion, I mean, people would make it to one checkpoint but then go to the next one, then the next one, and then potentially get beaten up on the fourth one and so on. We had to negotiate our way through these checkpoints, often under stress, and on a number of occasions we were not able to make it through as they were reinforced not only by youths with the light weapons such as machetes but also others with light machine guns.

Q. General, were you able to see people who suffered violence at those checkpoints? Did you see such cases with your own eyes?

A. Yes, I had gone to checkpoints where there were bodies laid out, violent blood flowing and people being aggressed and surrounded by large numbers of youths and all those people who were in the process that I would say of culling the population by choosing who goes through and who doesn't go through, and that was men, women, children, the same thing.

Q. Thank you. Thank you, General. The corpses you saw, were they the corpses of civilians or of soldiers?

A. No, we rarely saw military casualties, and as I was not often able to get through the lines, when I did, I saw on occasions areas where combat had happened but the mere totality of the casualties that we could identify at these different checkpoints were civilians of all ages.

Q. Thank you. Were there adult casualties, children, women; who were they?

A. Yes. I am sorry, I wasn't clear. All ages, from babies, all the way through to pregnant women to elderly people. There was no sort of discrimination against one age group or another that we could discern.

Q. By looking at the corpses, could one have an idea of how they were killed or of the instruments that were used in killing them?

A. It was -- as reported by my observers and what I saw, you could see the bodies that had been chopped up or chopped open with large gashes of -- due to mostly machete cuts at the heads, shoulders, and things like that. There were other types of places where you saw the bodies mutilated by the -- or the sexual organs cut up and so on, but I never saw that specifically at any of the checkpoints.

Q. General, on the bodies or corpses of women and young girls -- rather, did you ever see the corpses of female persons, that is, women and young girls?

A. Yes, on a couple of occasions in my moving between the lines and conducting different negotiations and actions, we ended up at what could be described as a sort of a rape site, where it was mostly younger women who were sort of laid out and evidence of rape by the way they were laying on the ground and mutilation was conducted.


MR. BLACK:
General, you are not clear. Is this –

I am not clear, Mr. Bâ.


MR. BÂ:
A moment's indulgence, Counsel. I am going to clarify that. Please, could you sit down? I am going to clarify that answer.


MR. BLACK:
I am not clear if these were committed by the RPF or the other sides.


MR. BÂ:
Yes, fine, but please sit down. It is for me to clarify that, not you.


MR. BLACK:
Okay. I just wanted to know which side did this. Was it the RPF soldiers that did this?


BY MR. BÂ:

Q. General, you mentioned women and young girls who were raped. Did you witness a physical rape? What enables you to say that those young girls or women were raped?

A. They were laid out on their backs, the legs were up, their dresses were thrown over their heads, they wore no underpants. There was at one place where it seemed to be there was still semen present or at least it looked like that on the dress. I must say I didn't spend a lot of time conducting a detailed investigation of those sites, but as experienced as one can be of coming in front of such scenes, and that was the deductions I drew.

Q. Thank you. Once more, let's talk about the machetes. Do you have an idea of the provenance of the machetes, at least, some of them?


MR. BLACK:
How can he answer that? Which machete, owned by which person? I mean, are we talking about --


MR. BÂ:
The machetes that the militia had. The machetes that the witness mentioned before. Does he have an idea of the provenance of the machetes, all of them or some of them?


MR. BLACK:
He can't answer that question. You better put to him, if you -- axe with a machete --


MR. BÂ:
Yes, Counsel, it is for him to say that.


MR. BLACK:
He can't answer the question.

MR. PRESIDENT:
I think he can't do his cross-examination and examination-in-chief at the same time.


MR. BLACK:
No, he can't answer -- the General can't answer that question.


MR. PRESIDENT:
So if he can't answer, General will say so.


MR. BLACK:
No.


MR. PRESIDENT:
You are trying to answer for him. That is why you are saying that he can't answer.


MR. BLACK:
Which person, with which machete?


MR. PRESIDENT:
So if the General can't understand the question, he will put it back to the counsel.


MR. BLACK:
No, but my objection is that the question is improper. He can't ask in general where the machete --


MR. BÂ:
If the witness does not understand the question, he will say so.


MR. BLACK:
It is not a proper question. He can ask, "Mr. X was arrested with a machete, was it a Chinese machete, a Zimbabwe machete?"


MR. PRESIDENT:
How do you know it is a Chinese machete? So, why are you just -- no --

Mr. Black, you are entitled to ask that question. You better (Microphones overlapping).


MR. BLACK:
Well, I don't know who is asking that.


BY MR. BÂ:

Q. General, you heard the question; please can you answer it?

A. The only information I have of the sources of machetes was the fact that in the early stages of the campaign, we found a large number of brand new machetes that were at the airfield that had been dumped there with a -- there was stuff that had a sign that it was made in China and it was new. I mean, we saw all types of machetes on -- all over the place, so I cannot speak of this distribution, only the fact that it was at the airfield which was still under the RGF area of responsibility.


MR. MACDONALD:
Your Honour, that's the problem with that question because Mr. Bâ knew the answer to that question. And --


MR. PRESIDENT:
He should know all the answers to his questions, otherwise, he can't put the question.


MR. MACDONALD:
But it calls for speculation and Mr. Black was right. We don't have any link between the question where Mr. Bâ did not specifically mention which machetes, and the answer from General Dallaire where at a certain point in time they saw a shipment of machetes. So they want you to speculate to the effect that these machetes that were in -- we don't know in whose hands but certain people's hands he saw at the roadblocks were from that shipment. So that answer has to be stricken because the question calls for speculation and that's exactly what we got, speculation. So what is the purpose? What is the link between the answer and the question? What is the rational link between the question and the answer? There is none.


MR. BÂ:
Mr. President, I am satisfied with the answer. The use I will make of it would be a matter to be considered later on, not now. I am satisfied with the answer and I will move on to something else.

BY MR. BÂ:

Q. General, you talked about roadblocks or road checkpoints that were set up within distances of about -- or, intervals of about a hundred metres. At that time, did you think that those roadblocks were going to be brought down or dismantled?

A. Well, it was on a number of occasions I raised the point of roadblocks with a hope of --


MR. BÂ:
(Microphone not activated)


MR. MACDONALD:
You want to stop the witness.


BY MR. BÂ:

Q. Please, go on, General.


MR. PRESIDENT:
When you put a question, put a complete question, otherwise, when you try to add here, it gets confused. Please put the question.


BY MR. BÂ:

Q. Did you think at the time that those roadblocks were going to be dismantled or that they were useful for the defence of the territory? That was the clarification I wanted to add.


MR. BLACK:
Let me -- before General -- I am sorry. General, I am sorry.


THE WITNESS:
In my professional opinion --


MR. BLACK:
General, sorry. You have to specify which roadblocks. There were civilian roadblocks by alleged Interahamwe; there were military roadblocks with military objectives. You have to ask which roadblocks.


MR. BÂ:
I am talking about roadblocks manned by civilians. If I didn't say so, it was an oversight, but I thought I did.


THE WITNESS:
Right. There were roadblocks, some manned by military at certain valid practical locations and not that many, really. But the bulk -- nearly the totality of the roadblocks were manned by civilians or some military (unintelligible) and so on and these roadblocks had, in my opinion, absolutely no tactical value as, in fact, they were used to cull the population of what was described to us as the Tutsi elements of the population, or those who couldn't be specifically identified one way or another by their ID cards. These roadblocks were the subject of enormous amount of discussion between the chief of staff -- both chiefs of staff, Gatsinzi and Bizimungu, with the chief of staff of the gendarmerie and who had a solemn sole responsibility of internal security there and with Colonel Bagosora, with the minister of defence, with the prime minister. And in all circumstances I had the following actions: One, they were essential because the population felt threatened and they were a self-defence instrument that they had condoned in the past and was, in fact, still in place.

The other answer was that they agreed that there were killings and massacring going on at the checkpoints but that they didn't have control fully on all of them and as such, they were in a difficulty of trying to dismantle them or stop them.


BY MR. BÂ:

Q. Okay, General. Throughout your stay in Rwanda, from April to the end of June 1994, did you witness any gunfire shots in the air so as to disperse people in those roadblocks where people were being killed?

A. And as far as I can respond to what actions were actually taken on those roadblocks, there were no seemingly deliberate operations conducted by either the gendarmerie or the army to take control of those roadblocks and, in fact, we had instances where even the chief of staff of the army attempted to dismantle the roadblocks at one of the exchanges of people between the lines and himself was totally unsuccessful of stopping that roadblock. And so I do not have any example of other elements except the Interahamwe themselves, after meeting with them and negotiating the transfers that we actually saw some roadblocks being opened up without any problem so that we could pass through, but that did not generate the elimination of roadblocks. It just permitted us to get through them without all the risks of casualties as we were surviving most of the time.

Q. General, as part of your daily activity, did you submit or send – sorry. Well, earlier on, you talked to us about killings at the roadblocks. Did you report on them to your bosses in New York?

A. As of the evening of the 7th of April my headquarters submitted, once a day, a situation report on what we were able to see, on what negotiations or activities that we had taken during that time frame. And so on the numerous occasions the question of the roadblocks, the question of our inability to get through and many of them if any, safety wise, the inability of getting humanitarian aid through them, and the inability or unwillingness, depending on how we look at these things, of the authorities who dismantled that process of security.

Q. Let me ask the representatives of the registry to show you document number 3 in the folder.

A. Yes, I have it.

Q. Are you familiar with that document, General?


THE ENGLISH INTERPRETER:
Just a minute, Mr. Bâ, so that the representative of the Defence gets acquainted with it.


BY MR. BÂ:

Q. It is produced in English and French. Could you take up the English version, please?

A. Right. I fully recognise the English version of this document.

Q. Who is the author of the document?

A. I, myself, and the others.

Q. And to whom is it being sent?

A. It was sent to General Baril, who is the military adviser in the DPKO.

Q. Has it got a date?

A. It is dated 17th of April 1994.

Q. Is that one of the periodic reports that you had alluded to earlier?

A. No. On occasion and even previous to the start of the civil war, I would send a sort of composite assessment of the situation, which, in fact, the primary source says, the military assessment of the situation as of 17th April 1994, and these were a compendium of not only facts of what happened but my interpretation of the situation with my recommendations on future actions that my mission should take and seeking authority, advice or capabilities from my superiors in New York.

Q. Is there any portion regarding the security of persons and property in the report, all that we have discussed, right from the very beginning of this afternoon?

A. I believe I am at a loss to fully understand the question. I mean, we have got a civil war going on here and massive massacres and the report describes that situation in parts of it, yes.

Q. So that, more or less, it is dealt with; is that what you are saying?

A. Yes, it is part of the -- heart of the (unintelligible) ... report -- it touches on that point.


THE ENGLISH INTERPRETER:
Sorry, Your Honours, both the Prosecutor and General Dallaire were speaking at the same time, so there was some overlapping.


MR. BÂ:
Your Honour, Prosecutor would like to tender this document as a Prosecution exhibit.


MR. PRESIDENT:
What is the number?


MR. SEGATWA:
Mr. President, well --


THE ENGLISH INTERPRETER:
Well, his microphone is not working.


MR. SEGATWA:
I notice a slight difference in the French translation. I don't know which is the original version. In French, they say two barriers alone or solely or exclusively, whereas that doesn't appear in the English version. So I don't know why in the French version they use the word (French spoken) or solely.


MR. BÂ:
Well, I am tendering the exhibit -- the original as an exhibit, that is, the English version. For whatever purpose we may use the translation which might be reliable or not, but I am tendering the original.


MR. PRESIDENT:
Mr. Segatwa, you said that there is no -- you can't find the word "only" in the English one? It is there, you read it.


MR. SEGATWA:
Exactly.


MR. PRESIDENT:
Yes. So what's your objection?


MR. SEGATWA:
Well, my objection is to find out or we should ask Dallaire why in French we use the word, (French spoken) in French.


MR. BÂ:
Well, the translation was not --


MR. SEGATWA:
Well, I have heard the answer, I am sorry. I am sorry.


MR. MACDONALD:
I am not sure this could be defined as an objection. But I would like perhaps your clearance on this -- this document. First of all, I would have to seek from Mr. Bâ, what's the purpose of introducing this document. We have the author of the document, which is General Dallaire. He says it is his document. Now, should we take it that Mr. Bâ's position is to say, well, by introducing this document, therefore, General Dallaire recognises the full content of that document. Is that Mr. Bâ's position or is Mr. Bâ's position to say, well, we just want to introduce this document to -- I don't know for which purpose because General Dallaire did not specifically testify on it?


MR. PRESIDENT:
Counsel, witness said that he sent situation reports and he said this was one such report which he had sent to the headquarters.


MR. MACDONALD:
Okay. Well, that is the clearance I wanted because if it's General Dallaire had deposited -- Mr. Bâ had deposited General Dallaire's book, so we are not bound by the contents of that book and by analogy, we are not bound by the contents of that document.


MR. PRESIDENT:
Well, you are authorised to question the author on this, of him.


MR. MACDONALD:
Well, I don't have to question him on this if Mr. Bâ does not interrogate the witness in-chief on the contents of that document. This is my point, because if Mr. Bâ's position is to introduce this in evidence without questioning him --


MR. PRESIDENT:
He has not introduced it just for the words, Counsel. This is introduced for the purpose of --


MR. BÂ:
(Microphones overlapping)


MR. PRESIDENT:
One second. This is introduced -- once a document is introduced, the contents also come in with the document.


MR. MACDONALD:
Well, I disagree with that. I disagree with that. So, what if Mr. Bâ introduces General Dallaire's book, are we stuck with the contents of that book? I mean, it's a serious question. This is what I want. I would like to -- I am seeking a ruling from the Bench on this, or are we to assume that the content is in evidence?


MR. BÂ:
Mr. President --


MR. PRESIDENT:
Yes, what is the purpose of this?


MR. BÂ:
Mr. President, well, in the last 45 minutes Dallaire has been talking about the roadblocks, the massacres that had been perpetrated there in those roadblocks, about the tragic situations when it comes to human rights violations. And I asked him whether this is also reflected in the document, and this is when these events were occurring and his answer is yes. That is why I am tendering it as an exhibit, and my own conclusions, that's my business and I will do so later on.


MR. MACDONALD:
Very well. I am just wondering if Mr. Bâ is not trying to sneak in some elements in this document without questioning the witness, and at the end of the day stands up and says, "Well, General Dallaire said that -- I don't know that Kagame was in Mulindi on the 24th of April." This is my concern. Now, he is questioning on a very particular incident and he is saying, well, that incident is in the cable in question. I have no problem with that. If it's to accredit the witness or corroborate the witness or call it whatever, I have no problem with that. But if he is trying to sneak in some elements without questioning General Dallaire on what's in that document, I disagree.


MR. BÂ:
These are with respect to matters already covered in the course of the examination-in-chief, all right?


MR. PRESIDENT:
Yes, what's the number?


MR. TAKU:
May it please Your Honours. I would like respectfully to contribute very briefly. This document cannot be tendered for the truthfulness of what he asserts because General Dallaire cannot be allowed to corroborate himself by a statement or a document he has produced elsewhere. There must be some independent document that can corroborate him. So it can only be for the purpose that what he has testified to today. He made a report to the headquarters about that, but not for the truthfulness of the content.


MR. PRESIDENT:
Yes, for the purpose of showing consistency, he had been saying it then and he is saying it now.


MR. TAKU:
Yes, Your Honour.


MR. PRESIDENT:
P? This document is marked as P. 118. The document dated 17th April 1991 -- sorry, 94, bearing number L0001752. You have not provided a copy to him, too.


MR. BÂ:
I thought it was Roger who was keeping the exhibits. I thought it was Roger keeping all the exhibits, otherwise, I don't know there is a copy here.


MR. PRESIDENT:
We can admit them straight away.


MR. BÂ:
Okay. I will hand them over. There is French and English versions, the English version being the original. Could we have the Defence look at it?


MR. PRESIDENT:
P. 118 English version is A, French is B.

(Exhibit Nos. P. 118A and P. 118B admitted)


MR. PRESIDENT:
Yes, Counsel.


MR. BÂ:
Wouldn't it be fit to take a break now, or we are not entitled to the break? I can move on. I can proceed.


MR. PRESIDENT:
You are entitled to, we will take half an hour break.


BY MR. BÂ:

Q. General, should we take a break now?

A. I am at your leisure, sir.


MR. PRESIDENT:
Yes, we will come back at 10 to 6:00, Arusha time, 10 to 6:00.

(Court recessed at 1725H)



(Court resumed at 1800H)


MR. PRESIDENT:
Yes, Mr. Bâ, you may continue.


MR. BÂ:
Thank you, Mr. President.


BY MR. BÂ:

Q. General, during the months of April and May, were there any attempts made by you for the purpose of instituting a ceasefire? And if, yes, were those attempts successful?

A. There were several attempts, and in the first week of not only possibly ceasefire but also truces in order to permit the expatriate community to leave with relative success in a short period. But, subsequent to that, negotiations on ceasefire stalled throughout the time frame until the latter part of May, when a proposal was introduced by the visiting staff from DPKO and both sides agreed that they would sit down and start face-to-face negotiations with us moderating it on moving towards a ceasefire. The war ended, essentially, around the 17th of July and at no time were we successful in bringing about a ceasefire in Rwanda.

Q. What were the obstacles regarding those attempts? What were the conditions laid down by the parties?

A. Two significantly different positions that became irreconcilable unless a major intervention would be required. And on the government side and during the time frame that the comité de crise was in operation and that (inaudible) led a number of the negotiations and there was an outright desire for near unconditional ceasefire by the RGF military and supported limitedly by the politicals (sic). It was difficult to often assess their position and that desire to bring about a ceasefire was in order for them to be able to regain control, to return to Arusha, and, essentially, start over the peace process.

On the other side, the RPF who indicated they also were keen on a ceasefire established very early on that it was conducive to first eliminating or stopping, one, the massacres that were going on extensively behind the lines; two, on the dismantlement and return to garrison of the Presidential Guard, and, three, on negotiating only with the military on the RGS side as they absolutely did not recognise the interim government. So, both positions created a scenario of chicken and egg: One side saying "We won't negotiate a ceasefire unless you stop the massacres" and the other side, the RGF, saying, "Well, we can't stop the massacres because we can't put troops behind the lines to stop them as we are fighting you up front".

That led me to provide the UN with proposals of how the UN with a new mandate and reinforced could, essentially, in the first instance, stop the massacres behind the lines; and secondly, then, have the road open for a ceasefire negotiation and culmination.

Q. Thank you. General, do you know a certain Prudence Bushnell and Bushnell is spelt, B-U-S-H-N-E-L-L. And if you know her, tell us who she is, and, also, whether you had direct or indirect contact with her during the period of the conflict.

A. Yes, she was an under or, assistant secretary of foreign affairs from the US government, and I am not sure of her subtitle on the humanitarian side. I really cannot recall clearly. I remember a short call from her near the end of the month of April where she had gotten in contact directly with General Bizimungu, trying to bring to his attention the absolute essentiality of stopping the massacres.

Q. Do you know whether General Bizimungu responded to her requests? If "yes", what was the situation?


MR. MACDONALD:
I object, Your Honour. We're not sure what these requests were. I do not think General Dallaire has been specific on that. So, before soliciting that answer we have to know exactly what they were.


MR. PRESIDENT:
(Inaudible)


MR. MACDONALD:
Mr. Bâ wants to know if General Bizimungu accepted under secretary of state for foreign or African affairs Prudence Bushnell's demands, but we have to know what these demands were.


MR. PRESIDENT:
Yes, Counsel, you asked what Bushnell requested Bizimungu and whether Bizimungu responded, and if he knows, how he knows.


MR. BLACK:
I have another objection, Mr. President, which is that General Dallaire shouldn't be asked this question; it should be Prudence Bushnell. Why are we asking indirect evidence of General Dallaire, when he can call Prudence Bushnell? Prudence Bushnell is a very important lady, and was involved in this -- these events. They can still call her. Why are we getting it through what General Dallaire may have heard about what she did?


MR. PRESIDENT:
Yes, Counsel, that is a matter of weight. So, where it comes from it does not matter. If he knows what transpired, let him say that.


MR. BLACK:
Okay, I was just wondering why the Prosecution was doing that when they can call Prudence Bushnell directly.


MR. BÂ:
I have finished. I can no longer call directly anyone. Perhaps you are the ones who could do that. But, in any case, please allow me to continue.

Mr. Black, please will you allow me to continue?


MR. BLACK:
I am not sure what you meant by you are finished. What did you mean by that? You have not closed your case yet. I have never seen an announcement that you are closing your case. So, I don't know what you mean.


MR. PRESIDENT:
Well, let the -- Counsel, put your question. Don't get involved on unnecessary things.

Please continue with your question.


MR. BÂ:
I share that view, Mr. President.


BY MR. BÂ:

Q. General, how were you informed of the contacts between Prudence Bushnell and General Bizimungu?

A. Well, as best as I can recall, a short conversation over the phone, but on the 1st of May I had, in the morning, a meeting with General Bizimungu and he mentioned to me that he had received this phone call from this American woman who seemed to not comprehend the complexity and the difficulties of attempting to bring the situation under control in Rwanda at the time, and that she was rather miffed at him being specifically requested or targeted by her to sort the situation out.

Q. Very well. Do you remember whether during that period you received any information from Mr. Kofi Annan, information relating to the said concerns?

A. I mean I was discussing with New York nearly on a daily basis, if not a couple of times a day. I had a few conversations directly with Mr. Kofi Annan, with his two other colleagues there, with Mr. Nbaliza (phonetic) which was his number two on the political side, and General Baril who was his military adviser. And throughout this time frame we discussed the situation that was worsening on the ground, the humanitarian catastrophe that was growing, the inability of my force to conduct operations. On the contrary, I was being emasculated in the field by the nations who contributed troops by pulling them out or by not letting them do any functions. And the situation in regards to growing numbers of refugees and displaced persons, the nature of the killing and slaughtering that was going on and a feel for the military tactical situation that was on the ground regarding the two forces, I also fed to them the information I had on whatever political initiatives or participation we were having at the time.

Q. Thanks, General. Between the 7th of April and the end of June 1994, did you have direct or indirect contacts with the militias?

A. I had contact with them on the -- on the barriers that's for sure. And if we are speaking about me and my role as force commander and also becoming head of mission, I had two meetings that I can recall with the Interahamwe leadership, but my staff had a series of meetings with them and in order to, one, try to convince them to stop the massacring, but, more specifically, stop targeting the UN in the conduct of its work in attempting to bring ceasefire negotiations and attempting to move people between lines, protecting sites like Mille Collines and so on, and asking them to provide a cooperation in regards to possible operations in which we would be moving people to their safety.

Q. General, you mentioned two meetings that you remember. The first meeting you had with the Interahamwe, when did it take place?

A. On the 1st of May.
Q. And how was it organised, I mean that meeting? How did you contact the Interahamwe?

A. All my contacts with the Interahamwe, as well as for my staff, were done either directly with Colonel Bagosora or General Bizimungu. I am trying to remember. I cannot recall the chief of staff Jean (inaudible) specifically being an intermediary on a specific task that I would request between me and the Interahamwe.

Q. With respect to your daily activities, did UNAMIR address a situation report to DPKO at UN headquarters in New York?

A. As I indicated, I sent reports twice daily to New York.

Q. The meeting of the 1st of May that you just talked to us about, that is, the meeting with officials of the Interahamwe -- or, the meeting with the militia, was it reported on in a situation report?

A. Yes, it was covered in a report that covered that day activity and was sent out late that night, early next morning, to New York in which I had indicated that I had conducted negotiations with the Interahamwe militia leadership in regards to providing more safe conduit for the UN to conduct its work, stopping the massacres. And I am at a loss whether it is at that meeting or the other one, where they responded that they were going to be doing similarly to me what they had already negotiated with the International Red Cross, in regard to letting people through the lines.

Q. I will ask the registry staff to show you document number 4 in the folder?

A. Yes, I have it.

Q. General, do you recognise this document?

A. Yes. This is a SITREP that was sent to New York on the 2nd of May '94.


MR. BLACK:
Excuse me, Mr. Bâ.

I don't doubt that this report was based on a briefing by General Dallaire, but it is from Booh-Booh to Annan. So, I think we should identify it correctly. It is a situation report from Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh to Kofi Annan. And then you can ask is this Booh-Booh's situation report to New York, based on his own notes, or based on a briefing from General Dallaire. Because the way you are presenting it, it looks like it is from General Dallaire, when it is not.


MR. BÂ:
The question I just asked the witness was from who did this document come, and I was still waiting for his answer.


MR. BLACK:
No, sir, you said this document was from you -- wasn't it to New York -- that is why I stood up -- because, maybe I misheard you, but that is what I heard.


MR. BÂ:
No. No.


MR. BLACK:
Well, then just be accurate. If it is from Booh-Booh to Annan and -- then we can ask how Booh-Booh wrote this.


MR. BÂ:
No, I did not say that. My question was who does this document come from.


BY MR. BÂ:

Q. General, did you hear my question? My question is: Who does this document come from?

A. Right. The document -- so the SITREPS were prepared out of my offices, the force offices -- force headquarters offices, sent to the special representative where his political staff looked at the content and added whatever political information that was not covered in their input. And then it was signed off by the special representatives and, in normal process, sent to the head of peacekeeping operations in New York, Kofi Annan.


MR. BÂ:
Yes, Mr. MacDonald, you want to say something?


MR. MACDONALD:
I would like to know, first of all, what is the purpose of introducing that document? Is it to corroborate General Dallaire's assertions about this meeting? Because the problem we have now is mentioned by Mr. Black: It does not emanate from General Dallaire, and since General Dallaire tells us that the political staff would, in certain circumstances, modify, add, withdraw, redact, certain information, we'd have to have in our possession the original document.

If the purpose of the exercise is to corroborate General Dallaire, we need the document prepared by General Dallaire, or General Dallaire's staff, and not this one. Because the weight to be attributed to this document is practically none, as far as I am concerned.


MR. PRESIDENT:
Yes, you can tell him that on that basis. But this is the document he identifies as the document which he also has contributed to a certain extent, and by looking at the document, he can say whether there is any addition by the political authority.


MR. MACDONALD:
But given -- given the reasons why they want to introduce that document, what I suggest, Your Honour, is given the best evidence rule, we should have the original document, again, if the purpose of it is to corroborate General Dallaire. Other than that, that it is worthless unless General Dallaire could certify that the initial document, the original document prepared by his staff, is the exact same document. And I can't see how he could do that.


BY MR. BÂ:

Q. General Dallaire, can you please specify once more the process by which the situation report was prepared?

A. The situation report was a collation of all of the information that we had during the time frame it covers. That information was fed into my offices where my staff typed up the information. I reviewed it, and then it was sent up to the special representative for him to sign off.

Now, the political staff participated in the initial inputs. Whether at times there was variance to that, that then would be brought back to my office because we had the only functioning office at the time. We had lost everything else, and the corrections would be done in my office, and then sent in to the special representatives. When I became head of mission, then I had the overarching authority to sign off on the full content.

Q. General, this document you have before you, is it dated?

A. Yes, it is dated 2nd of May 1994.

Q. Before sending it, or after sending it, did you receive a copy? Was there a copy sent to you?

A. Well, no, I think if I may say, we are taxing a bit my memory. We were punching these things out regularly. Some were under my signature directly, and others were under the signature of the SRSG. So, it went to him. He was probably at the Meridien hotel at the time for his sign off. And I'm afraid that is as close as I can get to a response. I must say that on the military dimensions, what comes under the military paragraphs was not touched upon by the SRSG. He looked only on the political assessment and in general overall assessment, which are the first parts of the document.

Q. General, if you look at the first page of this document, right at the bottom of this page, there are handwritten remarks. What do they mean, Those handwritten remarks, Right on the first page -- the bottom of that page, the cover page of this document?

A. These are the indicators of the distribution list of the documents side of the mission (inaudible) that these are code cables and, as such, have a certain security dimension to them, and, so, the letters down in the bottom, the first one is the "SRSG", which is the special representative of the secretary general for his files. That's Mr. Booh-Booh. The next one over, and which is encircled, is the force commander, the FC, force commander. The third one is the acting director, and in that case, is a political section. And the last one is the CAO, or chief of administrative operation, and that is the civilian who handles all of the logistics needs of the mission, and that copy would go to him in Nairobi at the time.

Q. And who was the FCA at the time -- rather, who was the FC at the time, the force commander?

A. Well --

Q. FC, General. Who was the FC, the force commander at the time?

A. I was the force commander at the time of this specific SITREP.

Q. Thank you. General, this document that you have before you, does IT mention the meeting of the 1st May, which you had with the Interahamwe?

A. Yes, it does, I am reading now.

Q. In which portion of the document?

A. I am, in fact, just looking at it right now if I may: Recruitment -- in the paragraph 1, fourth line -- fifth line from the bottom, it indicates discussions held with RGF chief of staff and Interahamwe leaders. It also comes back, I believe, later on in the documents, in paragraph 4 alpha, and that is about the fourth line again -- sorry, third line, where "held series of discussions with president of Interahamwe, chief of staff, RGF and the leaders of some political parties".


MR. BÂ:
Mr. President, the Prosecution would like to tender this document into evidence.


MR. PRESIDENT:
Yes, document dated 2nd May 1994, a document purportedly written by Booh-Booh to Annan is marked as 119.

(Exhibit No. P. 119 admitted).


BY MR. BÂ:

Q. General, did you know someone by the name Bernard Kouchner?

A. Yes, the gentleman --

Q. Who is he? Sorry, continue.

A. Yes, the gentleman made three trips to my headquarters under different roles.

Q. What was he doing? What were his duties, that person? What was his nationality?

A. Bernard Kouchner was a -- is a French citizen. He, on the first instance, around the middle of May, came over on his own volition to discuss the situation on the ground, and to assist in attempting to stop this catastrophic humanitarian situation.

He then returned on the 17th of June, as a personal emissary from the president of France. In that regard, came to convince me -- or, at least negotiate or inform, ultimately, of the French initiative to deploy forces in Rwanda. And the third time he came was in late July, early August, as a member of the European Union wanting to deploy 100 humanitarian or human rights investigators behind the RPF lines.

Q. General, there might be a problem of translation. I heard for a second time and a third time, but I did not hear a date with respect to the first time?

A. The date for the first time was around the 15th of May. I mean I -- I've got the 13th in mind. There were meetings that we were holding. He was there for four or five days. I think it is the 13th of May, yes.

Q. Again, I don't know whether it is a matter of my own understanding. It seems to me that on the 13th you held a meeting; is that what you said?

A. Yes. I'm -- I'm going through my memory banks here and I remember there were meetings with Bernard Kouchner on the 13th. He probably arrived the day before. I remember his arrival, but I cannot confirm the date.


MR. BLACK:
I have to object to that strongly. It is quite clear we heard in English, General Dallaire said he came in mid-May. Then Mr. Bâ says, "I think there is a translation problem. I did not hear the date for that." General Dallaire then struggles to say, "I think it was around the 15th. I have that in my mind. And he was there for four or fives days, and we had some meetings." And now, Mr. Bâ says, "I think there is a translation problem again. Didn't you say the 13th? Is that what I heard?" And everyone else says the 13th. What kind of game is this?


MR. PRESIDENT:
Well, Counsel, it is recorded here and it says the "13th".


MR. BLACK:
Where does it say that? It does not say that in the documents.


MR. PRESIDENT:
No, it is not on the document, but it is recorded here. It says -- what -- his answer is recorded here and it says the 13th.


MR. BLACK:
Which answer recorded where?


MR. PRESIDENT:
Just -- just now.


MR. BLACK:
Yes, he just said it now, because before he said Kouchner came on the 15th, twice, stayed four or five days. And then Bâ plays his usual tactic, he is pretending he does not hear, which is his usual way of getting around his problems and pretending: "I did not hear the answer correctly. Did I hear you say the 13th?" And then Dallaire comes back and says, "Oh, yeah, it was the 13th." I do not know what the significance of that is, but it is totally dishonest to do that. His first answer was the 15th.


MR. PRESIDENT:
Around the 15th, he said.


MR. BLACK:
That's right, and he says that, "The 15th sticks in my mind as being the date".


MR. PRESIDENT:
Around the 15th, yes.


MR. BLACK:
No, well, he went further and said, "That is the date that sticks in my mind, yes. It was an estimate." But Mr. Bâ is not satisfied with that, and then chose the dishonest trick of saying, "I don't think I heard it correctly in my translation", which is the way he usually does it. I think he should be sanctioned for that. It is totally dishonest to do that and get away with it.


MR. BÂ:
Counsel Black attributes to me some genius or some talent that I do not have. Whether it is 13th or 15th, it really does not matter to me. He talked about a meeting, who participated in the meeting, who attended that meeting.


MR. BLACK:
Well, we know Kouchner wrote a letter on the 20th to Kofi -- to the UN, I think. But I do not know why you want him to say the 13th. There must be some reason he did not like the 15th.


MR. PRESIDENT:
Well, Counsel, I think -- well, what is this? Let him answer.


MR. BLACK:
Sir, it is just dishonest what Mr. Bâ did. He got an answer and he played this game he did not hear it in his earphones and says the translation is bad and suggests the answer to the witness and the witness just feeds it back, "Yes, that is what I said", when he did not say that. He said the 15th.


MR. PRESIDENT:
I think, Counsel, listen to the evidence carefully and then proceed, otherwise we will attribute dishonesty to you.


MR. BÂ:
I must protest. I do so vigorously.

Now, the 13th, that's not what I said. It is the witness who says so. He said the 15th, and then he said the 13th. If you can read the transcript again.


MR. MACDONALD:
Let's just ask the stenographers, perhaps. Unfortunately, we are not on realtime --


MR. PRESIDENT:
That is why I am looking at it, and telling you: It is 13th or 15th.


MR. MACDONALD:
You have realtime?


MR. PRESIDENT:
Yes.


MR. MACDONALD:
I didn't know that. Nobody told me.


MR. PRESIDENT:
That is how we follow it.


MR. MACDONALD:
Okay. Well, I thought you were reading Judge Park's notes.

All right. Are we going to get the set up, too?


MR. PRESIDENT:
Yes, you should get it.


MR. BLACK:
I'm aware of that. Sir, my problem is I heard from my earphones. I don't know what you see on the screen. I heard him say the 15th. He said, "I'm struggling, but I think it was the 15th. It sticks in my mind." Bâ then says, "I didn't hear that. Did you say the 13th?" "Yes, I said the 13th." That's why you see the 13th. But originally the answer was the 15th. He then plays the game to get in --


MR. PRESIDENT:
Originally he said around the 15th.


MR. BLACK:
That is cross-examination. That should be struck out.


MR. BÂ:
I'm listening to the French. I'm not listening to what he says in English. Do you have the French version before you? Before I sought clarification from him, did the date of the 13th -- wasn't that mentioned? I heard it in French.


MR. BLACK:
You have very special earphones, Mr. Bâ; nobody knows where they come from.


MR. PRESIDENT:
Well, Mr. Black, I followed the English one and it -- I don't know about the French. So, well, Counsel, I think we have to -- it does not matter, you respect --


MR. BÂ:
I am following in French.


MR. PRESIDENT:
Yes, Counsel, I know that you are following in French. What I say is don't hurl insults at each other. That will not take you anywhere.


MR. BÂ:
I did not hurl any insults. I didn't insult anyone. I just protested when I was being accused of being dishonest. I didn't insult anyone.


MR. PRESIDENT:
I am not just telling you; I am telling, generally, not to insult each other.


MR. BÂ:
Thank you, Mr. President.


MR. BLACK:
You tried your tack -- and just to say he has got a very special earphones.


MR. PRESIDENT:
We all know that he follows French. And I do not know, because I can only follow what is here.

Anyway, Mr. Segatwa is the French expert.


THE WITNESS:
Your Honour, may I intervene?


MR. PRESIDENT:
No. Now, it is over you can intervene.

Yes, continue Mr. Bâ.


MR. BÂ:
Much obliged, Mr. President.


BY MR. BÂ:

Q. General, I must exercise caution now. It would appear to me you spoke about a meeting, didn't you?

A. Yes, I spoke about a meeting in the following fashion: That it seemed to me it was around the 15th. Then, when I was asked to clarify that, I said, it was on the 13th. When I was asked to clarify that a second time, I said it was on the 13th. I got in my mind a clear picture and to me that meeting was on the 13th of May.

Q. Who was present at the meeting, if you remember?

A. My memory is that when we had the first meeting with Mr. Kouchner, and I believe it was in the Diplomat hotel, it was the chief of staff of the army, chief of staff of the gendarmerie, and I'm just not sure if it was Bagosora, but I believe he was there. I -- he must have been there. And it was an introductory meeting which -- in which Mr. Kouchner explained what he was doing there, and asked some specific questions from the members who were representing the government.

Q. If you remember the address of Mr. Kouchner, what was the purpose of that meeting – or, what he spoke about? What was the purpose of that meeting? What was the purpose of that meeting?

A. Mr. Kouchner presented himself as a great humanitarian, in which he was there to berate or speak harshly to the leadership of the government forces that were there in regards to the catastrophic state of human destruction that was going on. He indicated that, in Paris, the French people were beside themselves seeing day in and day out the massacres that were going on, and that there had to be some gestures of trying to get a grip on the situation. That simply could not continue to happen. So the discussion went on between him and General Bizimungu and General Ndindiliyimana in regards to then explaining to them, trying to get control of the Interahamwe, the war at the same time where ceasefires are not happening, that they have limited capabilities and that, ultimately, they want to have peace and return to a state of peace in the country.

And then Mr. Kouchner, if I am not mistaken, at that meeting raised the fact of some gestures that could be done, of maybe things like saving some of the orphans that are happening and getting them out and giving them a safe conduit out of the area and demonstrate goodwill through that. And near the end, if I am not mistaken, it happened. He then mentioned that he wanted to talk with the political leadership which was organised over the next day or two, or so on.

Q. During the period between April and June 1994, did UNAMIR protect the refugees in Kigali? Now, if it did so, in what area, at what site, was UNAMIR protecting the refugees in Kigali?

A. UNAMIR had five sites: the Amahoro stadium, the King Faissal Hospital area, the Meridien hotel, the Hôtel des Mille Collines and the Sainte Famille.

There were other sites that I was not able to keep permanent staff at, but whenever my patrols could get through -- would visit in order to see the state of affairs that were going on there. We mostly reported on humanitarian needs and checking if the people were still being attacked, harassed or abducted.

Q. Now, let's talk about the site located at the Hôtel des Mille Collines. Did you get any -- or hear at any point whatsoever some threats that were made against refugees in Mille Collines?

A. Forgive me I am not sure I picked that up properly. Your question was regarding the refugees at Mille Collines?

Q. Yes, that is correct. That's correct, the refugees at Mille Collines.

A. And what about them, please?

Q. Were there any threats made against the refugees at Milles Collines?

A. That would probably be the most polite way of saying it. The hôtel des Mille Collines was continuously surrounded by either military, gendarmerie or Interahamwe. More often than not, it was the Interahamwe. And I had military observers on the site, eight of them. And I was able, later on, to move an armoured vehicle (inaudible) with a section of Tunisian soldiers. The site was invaded or attacked on a number of occasions where the people were beaten up or tried to take them out -- like the Interahamwe tried to take the people out.

The UN observers intervened on all of those occasions. The site was bombarded, and by direct fire and indirect fire on a number of occasions. The site was, essentially, a site where Tutsi Rwandans had found refuge. These were Rwandans who held different posts and responsibilities in community and government and so on and were -- had sought protection at that international hotel.

Q. Do you recall having spoken to General Kagame regarding those threats made against the refugees at the Hôtel des Mille Collines?

A. Yes, he on the meetings that I had -- Hôtel des Mille Collines became very much an international focus of people who were held hostage in a specific site. And he showed enormous distress at the fact that the site was, at more than a number of occasions, targeted by direct and indirect fire, and that it was to him a significant gesture of lack of will to really --- to bring a conclusion to these peace talks -- or, you know, the seriousness behind the peace talks.

Q. Thank you, General. General, we know this is a matter of common knowledge, that the Rwandan forces ultimately lost the war. As from when -- we want you to fill us in as to a time frame, as from when did the Rwandan forces start withdrawing, and how was it done, the withdrawal procedure.

A. (Inaudible) and to be as succinct as I can, the Rwandan forces throughout the campaign conducted withdrawal operations as the RPF advanced. There is little information of any counterattacks conducted by the government forces. They often withdrew very rapidly, pushing the general population in front of them and with the militia, and as reported, the members of the forces conducting exactations on the civilians, meaning killing as they are going, or culling as they are going, and so proceeded over the weeks to, essentially, move the population in front of them as they withdrew first south, and then westerly to about a line that splits the country nearly in two. That line was there around the -- as best we could estimate, around the middle to the start of the second half of May. Throughout that, Kigali was surrounded and forces in Kigali continued to fight the RGF, but they were also thinning out, meaning pulling forces out and conducting a rearguard action as the RPF continued the offensive.

Then, in the second part of May, there seemed to be a sort of decision or a semblance of decision that the government side started to withdraw even before the assaults of the RPF, and were moving westerly and also north-westerly and with them -- moving millions of civilians with them and, again, continuing the process of killing as the people went through different barricades and the like. And, ultimately, the French then deployed in the middle of June, and the government forces withdrew behind the French line and northerly, again, moving millions of people with them.

And on the 4th of July, Kigali fell. And, essentially, as of the same date, the Rwandan government forces withdrew with some equipment, mostly heavy equipment, across the lines in Ngoma and some in Bukavu.

Q. Thank you, General. General, did you publish a book in 2003, General, which narrated your experience in Rwanda?

A. Yes, I did.

Q. Thank you, General.

In the French version of that book, after having stated in page 109 – 109 -- that during your reconnaissance mission, in the month of August 1993, General Ndindiliyimana had appeared to you to be the most cooperative, the most honest, and the most open-minded officer. And, then, in several instances you describe him in your book, pages 293, 320, 336 --


MR. BLACK:
Objection. Is this a cross-examination? Are you doing my cross-examination? All he can do is ask --


MR. BÂ:
Well, my question will be coming.


MR. BLACK:
(Microphones overlapping) General Ndindiliyimana -- he can't read to the general the answer that he wants him to feed back by using his book. He can't -- you can't give a statement "Did you say this?" I can use it in cross-examination, but he can't use it to support -- get the cross-examination for himself. It is his own man. He can only ask, "Did you meet General Ndindiliyimana?" "Yes." "When? "What was your impression on that date, on that day, on that date?"


(1900H)

THE ENGLISH INTERPRETER:
Your microphone, sir.


MR. PRESIDENT:
Ask him to say what -- the impression he has about this, this person called Ndindiliyimana.


MR. BÂ:
(Microphones overlapping)


MR. BLACK:
Just ask him, "You met Ndindiliyimana the first day, what did you think of him?" Let him give me an answer, then I will use his book to cross-examine him. Don't read the book to him first and then say, "Is that what you said?" You can't do that. Never with a witness -- you can never give a witness's prior statement and say, "Did you say that?"


MR. BÂ:
I am merely submitting his statements to him and then I will ask him questions. I'm not cross-examining him.


MR. BLACK:
(Microphones overlapping)


MR. BÂ:
On what grounds? Why do you say that?


MR. BLACK:
Mr. President, it can't be done. No -- no witness can be presented with a prior statement --


MR. BÂ:
On what grounds?


MR. BLACK:
-- and then cross -- essentially cross-examined… (Microphones overlapping)


MR. BÂ:
I'm not cross-examining him.


MR. MACDONALD:
Not only that, but he's being suggestive with the witness, Your Honour. It doesn't make sense.


MR. BLACK:
I'm sure General Dallaire like -- would like to give Augustin a fair chance. So don't go try and destroy that chance.


MR. PRESIDENT:
Mr. Bâ, the position is this: That you can't cross-examine your own witness. So you can't -- you ask him, now he's there, what's -- what -- the impression he has about this man at various occasions. He may have described him at various
occasions differently. That's a different matter. But get the witness to say when he -- what he thinks about this particular person. He might say at various stages whether he had one opinion or whether he changed his opinion as the time goes by.


BY MR. BÂ:

Q. General Dallaire, what would be your own opinion today of General Ndindiliyimana if you were to pass judgement on him?


MR. BLACK:
No, no, no, no, he's not here to pass judgement on him. You can't even ask him what his view is today.


MR. BÂ:
Counsel Black --


MR. PRESIDENT:
(Microphones overlapping)


MR. BÂ:
Counsel Black, I withdraw the question, I withdraw the question, I withdraw the question.


MR. PRESIDENT:
Yes.


MR. BÂ:
We will talk about in a moment -- we won't talk about it anymore, I withdraw. If that makes you cackle like a hen, then I withdraw. I know you will raise it; I won't dwell on it.


BY MR. BÂ:

Q. General, we'll come back on Jean Pierre. We are practically at the end, and I believe that is good news for the Trial Chamber.

In -- or, rather, General, when did you finally leave Rwanda?

A. I left Rwanda on the 19th of August 1994.

Q. In August 1994, if you were to cast a glance at -- if you were to have some hindsight with regard to the seven or eight months that you went through, would you still say that the information that Jean Pierre gave you in the month of January of the same year still remains credible?

A. I think that I could safely say that nearly everything that Jean Pierre told us would happen actually did happen during the civil war and the genocide of Rwanda.

Q. Did you or your observers see the lists that he talked to you about?

A. We did at one point receive some lists of names of people that we were told were targeted. I honestly can't remember the dates, or I certainly can't remember the names on it. They were not extensive. I don't even think there were 100 names on the list, something of that nature. We also saw the Presidential Guard on the morning of the 7th going from different homes with pieces of paper which they were referring to as they moved from different -- different sites, and that was observed by my observers at the time.

Q. Thank you. Did you also witness large-scale killings?


MR. BLACK:
By whom? The RGF, the RPF?


THE WITNESS:
I did not witness --


BY MR. BÂ:

Q. Which are mentioned in your cable code of 11 January. You mentioned that in your cable of 11 January in paragraph 6. Did you witness those killings?

A. On several occasions we had to negotiate our way through sites where large numbers of people were killed off the road -- in one case, over 2,000 in a garbage dump. Nearly every church or mission was turned into slaughterhouses where thousands were killed, mostly by machete as we could determine. And there were bodies all over the doggone place, to the extent where it became so dangerous due to the wild dogs who were eating it, and also of pestilence, that in certain circumstances we were able to pile the bodies and burn them with diesel fuel. There was a fear of HIV/AIDS, as there had been a substantial numbers in the country before the blood-letting, and so there was concern about being infected by that also.

Q. Last question on this point: Cooperation between the army and militia, that is, the military -- cooperation between the military and the militia that you mentioned in paragraph 4 of your code cable, did you witness it?

A. The cooperation we sought on a number of occasions where militia and military forces were deployed. These occasions were not in the front lines as such, except in Kigali where the Interahamwe fought beside -- or, side-by-side with the government forces when the city was under attack. Whenever we wanted to get through to the militia, we could do it through the army and -- and also Colonel Bagosora. And when we conducted our exchanges of people, a number of points were manned by both military, army, and some gendarmerie, and by militia together.

So they were seen operating together, but also there were so many militia-cum-civilians that had joined in to the slaughter on all these different checkpoints, is that the -- these people essentially overwhelmed the -- in numbers, the numbers that we saw of military functioning in the rear areas. And that includes also the gendarmerie, sorry.

Q. Thank you, General. General, we are soon going to land. In 1994, did you have a legal adviser placed at your disposal?

A. The mission was a -- a mission that had a very low priority, and so many of the civilian staff essential to a mission, six months into it, still had not been recruited. And as such I did not have a legal adviser, nor a humanitarian cell, as such.

Q. The legal instruments, the statutory instruments that governed the Rwandan armed forces as well as the gendarmerie, or the instruments that governed discipline within the Rwandan army, were you able to study those instruments?

A. No, they were never -- in fact, we never had access, nor do I remember specifically looking into the constitutional structure of the army, nor in its internal disciplinary code of conduct. The Rwandan army was an army from a country that was recognised as a -- as a state, a sovereign state. The army, as well as the gendarmerie, had extensive French and Belgian military advisers over the years who were still on duty within the units, including the elite units, who were assisting them in building that military force to meet the requirements of that government.

Q. To conclude, we are going to go back to the map we used yesterday for a short while, and this will be in connection with just one question.


MR. BÂ:
Roger, can you make the map available to the witness, please.


BY MR. BÂ:

Q. Oui, Général Dallaire --


MR. KOUAMBO:
Yes, go ahead.


BY MR. BÂ:

Q. General, yesterday you delimited the part of the territory which in the -- under the RPF in 1993, the demilitarised zone, as well as the area occupied by the Rwandan government forces. The two belligerents, did each of them have a structured command, and did they effectively exercise control over the -- over the troops in the territories where they were established?

A. Yeah, the response is yes. In the RPF zone, they were divided into (unintelligible) and sectors which had a very tight and very structured military organisation postured in a defensive position, with a high level of discipline and -- and training.

In the government area, it was divided up into sectors across the country with a substantial concentration of troops in the Byumba area, in the Ruhengeri area, in the capital, and then lesser camps in the south in the Butare area. The gendarmerie was deployed throughout the country with a sizeable force of reaction -- reaction force, the (French spoken), in the Kigali area.

The commanders, as far as my visits to the ground previous to the war, such as in Ruhengeri when General Bizimungu was in fact a battalion commander -- a sector commander there in the Byumba area and also on the east flank, were in communication and did receive direction from their higher headquarters in Kigali. However, the government forces were more limited, I think, in resources as they had very poor medical facilities for the troops here and were losing a number of them to cholera, the mobility here was limited by fuel, as was indicated in Ruhengeri, although it seemed less so. And essentially the better-quality troops, that is to say the 6 per cent elite units, were principally concentrated in Kigali with the commando battalion at the commando camp in this area.

Q. Thank you, General. General, when you went to Rwanda in August 1993 for your reconnaissance mission, were the -- did the two parties undertake or commit themselves to respect the Arusha Accords and international law?

A. Well, in fact, before we took the decision in New York to actually send a mission, a -- a delegation by the FAR minister Gasana and from the RPF Patrick Mazimpaka, visited New York to bring forward the conviction that the peace process was essential and that they needed a neutral force to assist them in implementing it. My negotiations with both sides in the reconnaissance, in interpreting the Arusha Agreement, were done with a desire to clarify the detail and to implement the peace agreement.

I would, however, indicate to you that the willingness to cooperate with my mission and to provide it with the means in order to do its job as a neutral force to observe and report received very varying levels of success depending on who I have to do business with, be it on the RPF side or on the government side.


MR. BÂ:
Mr. President, Prosecution would like to tender this map into evidence, as Prosecution evidence.


BY MR. BÂ:

Q. General Dallaire, I thank you very much.


MR. BÂ:
Mr. President, after tendering this exhibit, I am done with my direct examination. I thank you.


MR. PRESIDENT:
Thank you. The map that was referred to by General Dallaire, Mr. Registrar in Canada, please put the number P. 120.

(Exhibit No. P. 120 admitted)


MR. PRESIDENT:
Yes.


UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER:
(No interpretation)


MR. PRESIDENT:
Yes, thank you. (Microphones overlapping)


MR. MACDONALD:
Your Honour, I mentioned yesterday that I wished to cross-examine last for the reasons I had invoked --


MR. PRESIDENT:
Yes, you can agree among yourselves.


MR. MACDONALD:
-- but since -- I believe Mr. Black's going to be cross-examining, so I have no problem with starting the cross-examination. But my status is a bit precarious, as you know. I could start with General Dallaire, cover a few areas, but some areas I'd rather speak with my client before. So I could probably go on for 15, 20, half an hour, maybe. If you'd like me to start.


MR. PRESIDENT:
Yeah, I think Mr. Segatwa, Mr. Taku, you will have no questions, I think? You -- you know the indictment, you know the evidence. If you give me an indication as to what time it will take.


MR. TAKU:
We will do the cross-examination, Your Honours, at the appropriate moment.


MR. PRESIDENT:
Yeah. How long will you take, Counsel? Then we can apportion the time to the other two.


MR. MACDONALD:
Are you asking me, Your Honour?


MR. TAKU:
One minute, Your Honour.


MR. PRESIDENT:
Yeah. Because sometimes silence is golden.


MR. BLACK:
(Microphone not activated)... take one of the shortest questions can go now, I mean, they could finish tonight. Then me and Mr. MacDonald know exactly what we've got to deal with. Because...


MR. PRESIDENT:
Yes.


MR. BLACK:
And I don't feel very well, myself, to start tonight. I don't -- I've got something wrong with my chest. But if they got a series of short questions, as they usually do, perhaps they could use this time and just get rid of it. I mean, not get rid of it, but you know what I mean.


MR. PRESIDENT:
Yes, Mr. Taku, you may start then.


MR. TAKU:
Your Honours, at most I will need four hours. But probably less.


MR. PRESIDENT:
Yeah, okay, you --


MR. TAKU:
But just to be on the safe side.


MR. PRESIDENT:
Okay, you will start now, we will see how far we go.


MR. TAKU:
Just one moment, Your Honour.


MR. PRESIDENT:
Segatwa, you -- Mr. Segatwa, will you be using less than -- less time than Mr. Taku? Then you can start.


MR. SEGATWA:
Mr. President, it will all depend on the points that Mr. Taku will cover. But in my view, I do not see the possibility of completing within less than two days. I will be surprised. So that is the minimum. But obviously, as you said, when I would have finished my two half days, I will request you to give me another half day.


MR. PRESIDENT:
It may be, Counsel, that time remaining is enough for you to finish, if you know your case well.


MR. BÂ:
Mr. President, please, can we take stock of the time that we took for the direct examination? I would like to recall that yesterday we started at 4 p.m. I do not think that I took more than eight hours, seven or eight hours; that was the time I took.


MR. SEGATWA:
Mr. President, I think it's very easy to accuse but difficult to defend one's self. I believe that generally the Defence needs more time than the Prosecution, and that is perfectly normal. In any case, we are not going to waste time. This will all be under your guidance. If I repeat any questions you are going to call me to order. But I also am sure that with your understanding... (Microphones overlapping).


MR. PRESIDENT:
(Microphone not activated)


MR. TAKU:
In that case, Your Honours --


MR. PRESIDENT:
You can have --


MR. TAKU:
-- I have no problems starting, if Your Honours decide so.


MR. PRESIDENT:
Yes, because I think the other two, let them think over it and come tomorrow.


MR. TAKU:
Thank you, Your Honours.

Before I start, Your Honours, I will call on my legal assistant to hand over some documents to the registrar that we will be referring to, the copies here, so that we can go very fast.


MR. PRESIDENT:
Yes.


MR. BÂ:
Mr. President, I do not want to appear to disturb the Court -- I do not want to talk to you about my domestic problems. My request is whether we could not adjourn now and resume tomorrow at maybe 1 o'clock or 3 o'clock. In fact, I took a -- so many paracetamol in order to be able to be here today.


MR. PRESIDENT:
Well, Counsel, if you are not well, you can go. There are others to look after your interests. You are permitted to go.


MR. BÂ:
(Microphone not activated)


MR. BLACK:
Actually, in this case I support him, because I've got a chest infection; I don't feel very well. If we could -- I could just --


MR. PRESIDENT:
Well, Counsel, we have limited time --


MR. BLACK:
(Microphones overlapping)


MR. PRESIDENT:
I know the concerns, but the only problem is we also have to work within the time frame that is given.


MR. BLACK:
So we can't start the video link half an hour earlier?


MR. PRESIDENT:
No, tomorrow there is -- I would have started at 1 if the time permits, but there is another video link taking place here until 3; that is the problem. So we will try to make use of the time that is available.

Mr. Bâ, you are permitted to go if you are not feeling well. Yes, you are free to go.

Yes, Mr. Taku, you can start. We will go on until 8 and then stop.


MR. BÂ:
Well, I will try to put up with the situation. Don't worry, I will do my best.


MR. TAKU:
Just one minute.

Your Honours, I wonder whether the registrar is ready, so that they could put the --


MR. PRESIDENT:
Yes, all these documents have been sent there?


MR. TAKU:
Well, we have the transcripts, we have the --


MR. PRESIDENT:
Okay. There's a -- Mr. Registrar in Canada, have you got the documents referred to by Mr. Taku?


MR. KOUAMBO:
Yes, Your Honour, all the documents (unintelligible) Taku I have with me.


MR. PRESIDENT:
Yes, they are in positions there.


MR. TAKU:
I have no idea what time it is in Canada, but I will presume it's afternoon.


CROSS-EXAMINATION

BY MR. TAKU:

Q. Good afternoon, General Dallaire.

A. Good afternoon, sir.

Q. General Dallaire, as we all know, the special rapporteur of the UN to Rwanda, (unintelligible) qualified the assassination of President Habyarimana, his Burundian counterpart, and others through the shooting down of their plane as it approached the runway of Kigali international airport that fateful night of 6th April 1994, as a powder keg that ignited the sad events that took place in Rwanda 1994.

If I understood you well, in your evidence-in-chief, you continue to refer to it as a "plane crash". For your information, General Dallaire, since yesterday the French Prosecutor gave orders to Judge Bruguière, to issue international arrest warrants against some senior military officers. Among them General Kagame and General Kabarebe, suspected of being the sponsor for this terrorist act. History and fate, General Dallaire, have conspired to place the memorial events at a time when you have once more been called to testify about the said sad events in which you played a significant role.

The reason I say this, General Dallaire, is because several questions we have prepared to ask you were in this -- already have been asked in the past trials, Military I and Akayesu. So you give us the same answers, if you may, like the previous answers, and you will permit the Chamber to save precious judicial time. Do you understand that, General Dallaire?

A. I understand well. You're going to use material from other courts, or we will be covering the same ground again. It is at your leisure, sir.

Q. Thank you so much. Now, General Dallaire, can you remind this Honourable Court when you arrived in Rwanda to take over duties within UNAMIR?

A. Forgive me, I did not understand the specifics, you want me to remind the Court of what, when I arrived?

Q. Now, let me repeat that, General Dallaire. Can you please remind the Honourable Court when you arrived in Rwanda to take over duties within UNAMIR?

A. My date of arrival in Rwanda was the 22nd of October 1993 as the head of mission and force commander of UNAMIR.

Q. Is it not true, General Dallaire, that by the time you assumed your mandate, soldiers either of the RPF or the Rwandan government forces still occupied the operational positions despite the signing of Arusha Accords on the 4th August 1993?

A. In my study of the accords, the forces that were in play at the signing had been moved into defensive positions on either side of the DMZ -- a very unusual type of DMZ, meaning in some places it was barely 100 metres apart, in other places it was up to 10 kilometres. But that they were in their defensive positions and that they had not moved from them as a result of the signing of the Arusha Accords.

Q. And is it not true, General Dallaire, that the situation remained unchanged until the shooting down of President Habyarimana's plane?

A. During the month of the difficult political negotiations, there were movements of troops and before we brought in the KWSA, that is to say, several heavy-weapons systems like guns and armoured vehicles and so on had been moved out of the Kigali restricted area and moved north and west. The period of, I would say, the latter part of March into April was -- a bit in the first part of March, we had incursions in the DMZ by the RPF, incursions on the scale of sort of reconnaissance, and on a couple of occasions I even myself flew over some new trenches that the RPF had dug in the hills in the DMZ that were not particularly far from Byumba. And they were ordered to be refilled and sent back, which was being done and supervised by my observers.

Q. In your -- in your position, General Dallaire, as a head of the military mission, can you tell the Court the meaning of that situation you just described?

A. The -- the actions by the government forces to move the heavy systems outside of Kigali weapons secure area gave them the flexibility to move across the front as they wanted, for I did not have enough observation capability to guarantee where each of those systems were at any one time once they were outside of the weapons secure area.

In regards to the incursions by the RPF, and also the altercations on the east flank of the DMZ where the troops were at best 100 yards apart, these were signs, in my opinion, of either reconnaissance on the terrain, testing our decisiveness in regards to holding them accountable for moving into the DMZ, and also a position that I would consider to be one of (unintelligible) intention.

Q. General --


THE ENGLISH INTERPRETER:
The sound is very poor, sir, the sound from The Hague -- sorry, from Canada, is very poor. If counsel can observe a -- the gap, you know, between the question and the answer, it would be helpful. But the sound from Canada gets bad as we get later in the day.


MR. PRESIDENT:
Yeah, please note that observation from the interpreters' booth. If possible, please try to improve the reception.


BY MR. TAKU:

Q. General, is it not true that -- yes, General Dallaire, is it not true that it was agreed by UNAMIR, the RPF, and the Rwandan government, that the capitals -- capital, Kigali, be declared a weapons-free zone, called Kigali weapons secure area?

A. The agreement was to establish a new concept called the weapons secure area, which, if I may say, is different from a weapons-free zone. A weapons-free zone would mean that the mission would have had to confiscate every weapons system in the area and have it under the direct control of the UN, and that we would have enough resources to deploy in that zone to ensure that no weapons were able to be brought in or moved out.

Because you had a battalion from the ex-belligerent -- the other ex-belligerent, which was agreed to in the peace accord as a protection force to the RPF leadership, we could not bring about a weapons-free zone, and so we had to build a weapons secure zone where the verb "to secure" meant that we would have a control, with the ex-belligerents, of the weapons systems.

This was deemed acceptable as a concept under a chapter 6 peacekeeping mission, because we are there, fundamentally, because both sides want peace, and so both sides want to demonstrate that they are doing their best to ensure that they are applying all the possible rules of peace. I am merely there as an observer to assist if there is any mishap or altercation.

Q. Would I be correct -- would I be correct, General Dallaire, to state that the objectives of creating this Kigali secure area were three: One -- one: To ensure the peaceful and (unintelligible) free establishment of a broad-based transitional government in Rwanda; two: To provide security for the last expatriate community residing in Kigali, as well as the entire population of Kigali; three: To control the movement and activities of elements of the Rwandan government forces, the RPF, and other armed elements within Kigali and its environs?

A. I'm trying to, from memory, remember the specific directions, and I am uncertain about the second one in as much as the mandate was to assist the Rwandans in establishing an atmosphere of security, of which the KWSA was one of the tools. And so that was the instrument being used, and I must say that I don't know what you're quoting from, if it's the directive of the KWSA. If that's the case, then I'd like to refresh my memory on it, but I can't remember those specific terms, I'm afraid.

Q. In any case, General Dallaire -- sorry.

In any case, General Dallaire, is it not true that the primary objectives of the KWSA was to protect the RPF contingent that was interned at the CND?

A. No, it was not to protect the RPF contingent. It was to ensure that that contingent -- its security responsibility to its own leadership was done in accordance with a structured plan that the other ex-belligerent would also be very committed to. And so it is, on both sides, a tool to give a transparent guarantee of goodwill.

Remember that Kigali is a major garrison city that had extensive defensive works produced by the government forces in previous wars, and that the risks of altercations could be fairly easy to happen if we didn't have a tool by which we could keep weapons in the most secure environment possible.

Q. Now, General, may you explain to the Trial Chamber the meaning of "controlled movements and activities of military elements"?

A. In the context of that time, to the best of my ability, it meant that troops from either side, either ex-belligerent, were not authorised to move indiscriminantly in the KWSA. As such, we had put limits, which were agreed to by both sides, on the size of forces that were allowed to move around without escort, and the sizes that were allowed to move around with escort, and a procedure of forewarning.

As an example, we had a couple of cases of the Presidential Guard conducting morning physical training by deliberately running by the CND chanting patriotic songs, or sort of warrior songs. And that, under the KWSA was not authorised, and so we had to bring it to the attention of the commanders, and it was rectified. And it was to -- to sort of ensure that we didn't have movements of troops of any significance in the KWSA that could create altercations or frictions that could degenerate in the two sides fighting each other.

Q. Do you agree with me, General, that this definition has a general connotation?


MR. TAKU:
Just one minute, Your Honour.

Your Honours -- let me repeat it again. Maybe there's some problem.

The question is whether the general agrees with me that the definition he had just given has a general connotation.


THE WITNESS:
It would be so, I suspect, sir, if we had not specified in that fairly lengthy document that was the KWSA rules what -- what that object meant. That is to say, defining the structures, defining the methods of informing, defining the size of escorts that I would have to provide and the like. And so it was all part of trying to establish that atmosphere of security, but with some rather specific direction.


BY MR. TAKU:

Q. Is it not true, General, that you had in each military camp in Kigali military observers to control and ensure the respect of this convention that you are testifying about?

A. The plan called for a small detachment of sometimes two, sometimes four unarmed military observers to be deployed to the various army and gendarmerie camps in the weapons secure area, including also the airport, as an example. And that the role was to monitor and to pass information regarding troop movements, control of weapons, and the like. The camps had observers who were not always present due, one, to the lack of observers, two, lack of vehicles, and three, a lack of communications. I had at some camps no communications with the observers, even by phone. So I would be quite remiss if I didn't indicate to you that the system was not 100 per cent effective.

Q. In any case, General, is it not true that these observers, under the convention, were permanently on duty, day and night, within the military camps?

A. Yes, they were -- there was to be a rotation at every location of people either going back and being replaced for different duty hours, some were on duties 12 hours at a time, others actually lived in a sort of residence or rooms made available to them, but the numbers at times prevented from having a 24 hours, seven days a week guaranteed watch on the main gates, on the weapons armouries that -- in those different camps.

Q. In concrete terms, General, what was the mission of these observers?

A. Their role was to ensure that the forces that were in that camp, or that location, were to observe the KWSA rules in regards to troop movements, to control of weapons systems, control of ammunition, and including control of, as an example, exercises, training with live ammunition or with no ammunition, just, as we would say in the military, dry.

Q. Is it not true, General, that the UN observers put seals on all the arms and ammunition depots in the military camps in Kigali?

A. That was one procedure of control. However, that was not used throughout because we could not, nor was it within the terms of the KWSA, prevent commanders from continuing to maintain operational effectiveness of their troops, which at times meant that they would be using their weapons inside the camp to do specific training. And so the method that was preferred was a method of counting the number of weapons systems, and accounting on paper the lot of ammunitions that were within the different depots.

Q. Did you, General, effect the same control on the RPF arms depot?

A. The control of weapons in the RPF compound was to follow the same distribution plan in this -- in regards to the weapons systems being under control and the weapons for their own security within the compound or, let's say, training within the compound, as was permitted with the other contingents, or the other barracks or garrisons.

Q. The question, General, is: Did you, in effect, effect the same control on the RPF arms depot?

A. Well, to the best of my recollection, yes. An example of that was on one occasion, a Belgian Hercules aircraft overflew the CND, and the RPF deployed heavy machine guns, and we intervened by protest for having taken out that weapons system without authorisation. And that's about as close as I can get you in regards to the specifics of the control of weapons within the CND.

Q. General, did they submit reports to you?

A. Would you mind, again, the question; if you don't mind.

Q. Yeah, the question is: Did these observers submit reports to you?

A. The reports of the observers were submitted through the military observer chain, and the detachment of them that was under command of Kigali sector, and it was in Kigali sector that they monitored the information that was received from the various depots, be that altercations or non-compliance and so on. And so at Kigali sector headquarters they were responsible for responding to that requirement within -- within their region.

Q. Now, General, were these reports daily, weekly, monthly, quarterly, or circumstantial reports?

A. Well, with the limited assets that we had, I must say that it would not surprise me if the reports were conducted as exceptionally in writing, with most of the reports being done verbally with an accounting of that at the headquarters -- the subordinate headquarters, as was done at most of the different headquarters within the command structure.

Q. Do you, General Dallaire, have any report on the violation of this zone, or this area, this KWSA by the --

A. Well, I --

Q. -- Rwandan government forces in any of the military camps in Kigali?

A. I -- I remember situations where there were confrontations and that they had to be resolved at a subordinate headquarters level. I remember specifically that the observers at the Presidential Guard camp received very little cooperation, as well as the reconnaissance battalion -- the commander in particular. Outside of those there were minor events, and there was, of course, an aircraft that came in full of ammunition, and also some vehicles that were found with ammunition. But nothing directly related to either the RGF or the RPF.

Q. Now, General Dallaire, with whom did you take up the question of these violations that you just testified about?

A. The violations were taken up by the Kigali sector commander, and in extremis I would do it. And as an example we agreed with the minister of defence that a certain number of VIPs would be allowed to keep their personal weapon, and as such the minister of defence had promised me a list of 89 individuals to whom we would have given special identification cards so that if they were ever stopped at any of our checkpoints, they would then be able to show that they had an authorisation to carry a personal weapon for their own security. And ultimately, after repeated requests, I never received that list and there were a few incidents where VIPs were stopped and caused some embarrassment.

The other events -- I mean, I was receiving complaints from the minister of defence, and if I'm not mistaken the chief of staff of the army at the time, that according to them the RPF were moving weapons in their logistic convoys from Mulindi into the CND. However, my escorts who were with them conducted the verifications within the competencies they had, and we never found any weapons within the transport systems that were used going down to the CND.

Q. General, just --


MR. BÂ:
Please, that needs to be clarified. In the French interpretation I heard "in the convoy that came from Burundi". Is it indeed Burundi? I heard in French, "Burundi". Is it "Burundi" or "Mulindi"? Well, in French they said "Burundi".


MR. PRESIDENT:
"Convoys from Mulindi".


THE ENGLISH INTERPRETER:
I suppose it is because of the poor sound, sir.


MR. PRESIDENT:
Yeah, Mr. Taku, if it is convenient you can stop now.


MR. TAKU:
I just have two more questions --


MR. PRESIDENT:
Okay, okay.


MR. TAKU:
-- on this subject.


BY MR. TAKU:

Q. Now, General Dallaire, did you have any indications that this weapons security accord was published, as such, within the (unintelligible) units in Kigali?

A. The responsibility of publishing that information rested with the goodwill of both ex-belligerents, and if I'm not mistaken we assisted in the translation of it to ensure that there was a French copy so that it could be fully distributed within the RGF forces. The observers had portions of it, but I'm not sure if all the observers had a copy. I -- I must say I didn't go down to that detail of checking.

Q. Now, General, you -- you said in your evidence, here in chief yesterday, that you were informed about the presence of heavy weapons in the president's region of birth. However, we take note of your testimony that you never investigated this information and therefore you are not able to say if it was true or false. In case, however, such arms were to be found in the president's region of birth, which we deny, would it, General, not be readily explained away by the possibility of checking an eventual RPF attack?

A. The weapons systems, the heavy-weapons systems that were moved out of Kigali just before the KWSA, was done within, I would say, not the best of good faith. Because the KWSA was to include all weapons systems that were, at the signing of the peace agreement, deployed inside of Kigali. And so the artillery regiment was in Kigali, the reconnaissance regiment was in Kigali, and as such their weapons systems should have been -- remained there, because when I did my reconnaissance in August, I saw the weapons systems. Now, I'm not saying they were all there, but a significant number were there, and when we actually put in the weapons secure area, a lot of them had moved out.

Now, you're absolutely right, is -- I did not conduct any formal substantial -- no, subsequent investigation at the president's site, and nor in fact at about 23 other sites, both inside the KWSA and in the perimeter, where we had received information that arms caches were deployed.

A number of those I was attempting to gain authority from the UN, ultimately -- although I felt I didn't need it, but they imposed it upon me -- to go and simply verify or raid those sites as they were not within the normal deployment of military forces under the peace agreement. And that gave me, in my opinion, the authority to go in. However, because all of them were in the RP -- RGF zone, they -- when I briefed in a classified fashion the SRSG, after the UN had demonstrated a less than desirous opinion of me going after those systems, he felt that I could not do it as it would skew the objectivity of the mission. And so we were still discussing and negotiating that aspect in April. And if you remember, I was just starting to conduct some of those raids at that time.

Q. Now, the question, General Dallaire, is -- let me repeat the question, because apparently you are replying to something else. The question is that you testified yesterday that you were informed about the presence of heavy weapons in the president's region of birth. And I would note -- we do take note of your testimony yesterday and what you've just said now, that you never investigated this information. And therefore you are not in a position to say definitely if that information is true or false. In any case, if such arms were to be found in the president's region of birth, an allegation we do consider unfounded, would it, General, not easily be explained away by the possibility of checking an eventual RPF attack? That is the question, General.

A. Well, let me be more specific, and thank you for bringing that to my attention. If you remember, in the opening questions you asked me about the deployment of the forces at the signing of the peace agreement and when I did my reconnaissance. And at that time I indicated that they were deployed in defensive positions in accordance with the peace agreement in order to permit the subsequent demobilisation, and that weapons systems were as they were at the signing. However, a number of large weapons systems, when we brought in the KWSA, were moved out of the KWSA, and now we're talking about December, well into my mandate of the peace agreement, and months into the peace agreement itself.

And if we are there under the context that both sides want peace, that both sides want transparency, that both sides want a neutral force to assist in making sure they have peace, then why are they deploying heavy weapons systems north in the eventual attack of the RPF, when in fact we're in the throes of a major operation of peacekeeping?

Q. General, you still did not understand my question. My question is -- sorry. General, I make reference to your previous statement yesterday, that you did not investigate it, and therefore you were not in a position to tell the Court whether the allegation is true or not, because you didn't investigate it, about the alleged arms in the president's home region. I'm not talking about -- of arms or finding the arms elsewhere, about the alleged arms in the president's region of birth, that you didn't investigate it and therefore you are not in a position to say whether those arms were moved to the president's -- or arms existed in the president's region of birth or not. I take note of that.

But the question is: If indeed that were the case, which we say is unfounded because you didn't investigate it, would it not readily be explained away by the possibility of checking an imminent RPF attack? That is the question. You are asking -- you are answering something else. I am talking about the allegation of arms in the president's home region.

A. You are quite correct that I was not in a position to validate the information that I had received. And as such, I gave you the information that I had within the context of what it's worth.

Now, in regards to the movement -- or, the logic of having heavy weapons close to the front in case of RPF attack, that is, sir, a totally illogical argument, because we are in a peace process. And so you either are preparing for an eventuality of war, or you are transparently deploying your capabilities for peace. You can't have it both ways. And if you are potentially deploying forces for war, then you are not transparently committing yourself to the peace process for which I was there.

(2010H)

BY MR. TAKU:

Q. Now, one last question on this issue for clarification. Witness, in the context in which you testified before about the RPF violations which you testified about, my question is in that context. Did the RPF move troops into the demilitarised zone and into other areas which you observed? So my question is in that light.

A. Those activities were conducted in March, the latter part of March, if my memory serves me well, and in April, in that circumstance, I have to tell you that the attitudes on all sides of bringing about the successful completion of the Arusha peace accord was highly in jeopardy, and under those circumstances the security situation was degenerating significantly and so such movements were within that context. And at that time we were in a process of not moving, I think, in the most positive sense towards implementing a peace agreement; we were far more moving towards a possible clash or rupture of the peace agreement, that is, in early April.


MR. TAKU:
Your Honour, we will take a break.

And, General, thank you very much if I have not properly said RPF movements were in March and these alleged movements were in December. Thanks so much.


MR. PRESIDENT:
Yes, Counsel, the Court is adjourned until 3 o'clock tomorrow, 3 o'clock Arusha time, because there is another case before then. Court is adjourned until 3:00.

(Court recessed at 2014H)




C E R T I F I C A T E

We, Leslie Todd, Sithembiso Moyo, Eleanor Bastian and Kirstin McLean, Official Court Reporters for the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, do hereby certify that the foregoing proceedings in the above-entitled cause were taken at the time and place as stated; that it was taken in shorthand (stenotype) and thereafter transcribed by computer; that the foregoing pages contain a true and correct transcription of said proceedings to the best of our ability and understanding.

We further certify that we are not of counsel nor related to any of the parties to this cause and that we are in nowise interested in the result of said cause.


___________________________ Leslie Todd


___________________________ Sithembiso Moyo


___________________________ Eleanor Bastian


___________________________ Kirstin McLean